Privacy-enhanced Identity Management – From Cryptography to Practice by Sommer, Dieter M.
Privacy-enhanced Identity Management
From Cryptography to Practice
Dieter M. Sommer
Dissertation

Privacy-enhanced Identity Management
From Cryptography to Practice
Vom Fachbereich Informatik
der Technischen Universität Darmstadt
genehmigte
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.)
von
Dipl.-Ing. Dieter M. Sommer
aus Bruck an der Mur (Österreich)
Tag der Einreichung: 18. Mai 2013
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 11. Juli 2013
Hochschulkennziffer: D 17
Darmstadt im Juni 2014
Referenten:
Prof. Dr. Michael Waidner
Prof. Dr. Stefan Katzenbeisser
Dr. Jan Camenisch
c© 2014 Dieter M. Sommer
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form by
any means without prior explicit permission by the copyright holder.
Typeset by the author in Computer Modern Roman 10 using LATEX 2ε.
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I would like to thank Jan Camenisch for making me consider a
PhD thesis in the field of data privacy, for giving me guidance in my work, for always
being available, when needed, for discussions related to my research, and for being
my industry-side advisor for my PhD thesis. Large parts of the thesis work have
been done while being in the team of Jan at IBM Research – Zurich in Switzerland.
It has always been enjoyable and fruitful to work with Jan over the course of many
years at IBM Research, whether in relation to this thesis or other aspects of my
work, starting with my first internship at IBM Research over a decade ago.
I am very thankful to Prof. Michael Waidner for being the academic advisor of
my thesis, giving me the opportunity to work as an external PhD student at his
Institute for Secure Information Technology (SIT) at the Fachbereich Informatik of
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt, and for supporting me in my thesis-related work
from the very beginning. I would also like to thank Prof. Stefan Katzenbeisser of
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt for agreeing to be the academic co-examiner of my
thesis. Particular gratitude also goes to Mrs. Andrea Pu¨chner, the personal assistant
of Prof. Michael Waidner, for her continued support regarding the administrative
processes related to a dissertation at Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt, which was
particularly helpful when being an external PhD student living hours away from the
university. Also I would like to thank all administrative staff at TU Darmstadt I
had to do with for the always friendly service provided in answering questions or
handling requests related to my promotion.
Also, I would like to thank Prof. Max Mu¨hlha¨user, Prof. Dieter Fellner, and
Prof. Melanie Volkamer for being part of my PhD examination committee and for
their time spent on this.
I am particularly thankful to my friends, office mates, and coworkers Patrik
Bichsel and Franz-Stefan Preiss for having frequently helped out on LATEX-related
questions and having shared their opinions on my questions related to typesetting
or phrasing sentences when time was tight in the final writing phase, for comments
on my work, for the great and fun collaboration on projects and research papers,
and particularly for the awesome time we have had in our office.
I would particularly like to thank Samuel Mu¨ller, a friend and former office
mate at IBM, for the intense collaboration on security, privacy, and other aspects
of electronic social networks and the otherwise great time during our stay at IBM
in our shared office.
v
vi Acknowledgements
Furthermore, I would like to express my particular thanks to Samuel Burri and
Maria Dubovitskaya, friends and former office mates at IBM, as well as Anthony
Bussani and Kris Haralambiev, friends and colleagues from IBM Research, for the
great time in our office, respectively for frequently trying to convince me to finally
submit my thesis and stopping spending further time on it. Additionally, I would
like to thank Stephan Krenn, a friend and colleague from IBM, for the few focused,
yet excellent, discussions we had related to details of cryptographic mechanisms.
Especially, I am grateful to Sebastian Mo¨dersheim, a friend, colleagues, and
coworker, formerly at IBM, for the collaboration on research as well as the fruitful
discussions regarding my work, particularly the formal logic aspects thereof.
Furthermore, I would like to thank all my other friends at IBM, or formerly
at IBM, not mentioned already, for having made my time in the IBM Zurich Re-
search lab and my PhD work even more enjoyable, particularly Caroline Ander-
sson, Robert Enderlein, Ce´dric Favre, Lukas Kull, Abhilasha Bhargav-Spantzel,
Chris Vanden Berghe, Roger Zimmermann, Toke Meyer Andersen, Olya Ohrimenko,
Ashish Garg, Carl Binding, abhi shelat, Lydia Chen, Mathias Bjorkqvist, Hari Ra-
masamy, Thomas Groß, Clemens Schroedter, Annie Chen, Tadeusz Pietraszek, and
all the others not mentioned here.
During my involvement in the PRIME research program, I had the opportunity
to meet many great researchers and people. My gratitude goes to all those with
whom I worked, mainly Giles Hogben of JRC, Thomas Ro¨ssler and Rigo Wenning
of W3C, Stephen Crane, Marco Casassa Mont, Pete Bramhall, and Siani Pearson of
HP Labs, Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner and John-So¨ren Pettersson of Karlstad University,
and Marit Hansen of ULD. Furthermore, appreciation goes to Eric Goderniaux of
IBM and Ge´rard Lacoste of IBM for the excellent collaboration and for the great
technical and other discussions and the great collaborativ atmosphere they have
always created.
Particularly, the discussions with Prof. Andreas Pfitzmann of TU Dresden were
fruitful in progressing work in the privacy domain during the PRIME time.
During my time as project manager, when my research activities were largely
suspended, I also had the opportunity to meet a great group of researchers in the
PrimeLife project. For the excellent collaboration, I would like to thank all of
them, particularly, Maren Raguse, Ulrich Pinsdorf, Pierangela Samarati, Michele
Bezzi, Stuart Short, and Harald Zwingelberg, and those who have been collaborators
already in the PRIME project and mentioned above. Particularly I would like to
thank also Karin Pletka-Waldvogel and Gabriella Galli for assisting me at IBM with
a plurality of the project’s tasks.
Specifically, I would like to thank Karel Wouters and Ronald Leenes, friends and
coworkers, with whom I worked in both the PRIME and PrimeLife projects, for the
great, reliable, and dependable collaboration and being great colleagues during an
extended period of time and for attending my PhD defense.
Particularly, I would like to thank Mario Verdicchio, a friend and coworker,
for the fruitful discussions while collaborating in PrimeLife and for being a great
colleague during his multiple research visits to IBM Research in Zurich during the
PrimeLife project and beyond.
Acknowledgements vii
Appreciation goes to my managers Andreas Wespi, Douglas Dykeman, Phil Jan-
son, and Michael Osborne at IBM who have supported my thesis-related work by
making flexible working hours possible and giving me the time flexibility to align
the thesis work with all the other project responsibilities, of which there were plenty
during my time at IBM. Particularly, appreciation goes to Michael Osborne also
for the fruitful and always very enjoyable collaboration on international standards
related to privacy technologies within ISO/IEC.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Bernhard Jansen, a friend and colleague at
IBM Research – Zurich, for the numerous and always interesting technical and other
discussions we have been frequently having.
Needless to say, I appreciated the work with all my coauthors who have not yet
been mentioned above. Furthermore thanks goes to all the other people whom I
was working with or had to do with in other ways during my PhD time and who
are not mentioned here for whatever reason.
Particularly, I would like to thank my friends Martin Schaffer, Anton Ja¨ger, and
Christian Thurnhofer for the great time whenever we met on visits back home in
Austria.
Last and definitely not least I would like to thank my family for always support-
ing me during the time of my PhD thesis, in whatever form, and for the great time
and food during my regular visits back home.
Dieter M. Sommer
Zurich, May 2013

Erkla¨rung
Hiermit erkla¨re ich, diese Arbeit selbsta¨ndig und ausschließlich unter Verwendung
der angegebenen Hilfsmittel erstellt zu haben.
Hiermit erkla¨re ich weiterhin, dass von mir bisher kein Promotionsversuch unter-
nommen wurde.
Dieter M. Sommer
Zu¨rich im Juni 2014
ix

Publications
Conference and Workshop Publications
1. Patrik Bichsel, Jan Camenisch, and Dieter Sommer. A calculus for privacy-
friendly authentication. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on
Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT’12), June 20–22, 2012,
Newark, NJ, USA, ACM, 2012, pp. 157–166.
2. Jan Camenisch, Sebastian Mo¨dersheim, and Dieter Sommer. A formal model
of Identity Mixer. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (FMICS’10), September 20–
21, 2010, Antwerp, Belgium, Springer, 2010, pp. 198–214.
3. Jan Camenisch, Sebastian Mo¨dersheim, Gregory Neven. Franz-Stefan Preiss,
and Dieter Sommer. A card requirements language enabling privacy-preserving
access control. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Symposium on Access Control
Models and Technologies (SACMAT’10), June 9–11, 2010, Pittsburgh, PA,
USA, ACM, 2010, pp. 119–128.
4. Patrik Bichsel, Samuel Mu¨ller, Franz-Stefan Preiss, Dieter Sommer, and Mario
Verdicchio. Security and trust through electronic social network-based interac-
tions. In Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Compu-
tational Science and Engineering (IEEE CSE’09), August 29–31, 2009, Van-
couver, BC, Canada, 2009, IEEE Computer Society, 2009, pp. 1002–1007.
5. Jan Camenisch, Abhi Shelat, Dieter Sommer, and Roger Zimmermann. Secur-
ing user inputs for the web. In Proceedings of the 2006 Workshop on Digital
Identity Management (DIM’06), November 3, 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA,
2006, ACM, 2006, pp. 330–44.
6. Abhilasha Bhargav-Spantzel, Jan Camenisch, Thomas Groß, and Dieter Som-
mer. User centricity: A taxonomy and open issues. In Proceedings of the
2006 Workshop on Digital Identity Management (DIM’06), November 3, 2006,
Alexandria, VA, USA, 2006, ACM, 2006, pp. 1–10.
7. Christer Andersson, Jan Camenisch, Stephen Crane, Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner,
Ronald Leenes, Siani Pearson, John So¨ren Pettersson, and Dieter Sommer.
xi
xii Publications
Trust in PRIME. In Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium
on Signal Processing and Information Technology (ISSPIT’05), December 18–
21, 2005, Athens, Greece, 2005, IEEE, pp. 552–559.
8. Jan Camenisch, Abhi Shelat, Dieter Sommer, Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner, Marit
Hansen, Henry Krasemann, Ge´rard Lacoste, Ronald Leenes, and Jimmy C.
Tseng. Privacy and identity management for everyone. In Proceedings of the
2005 Workshop on Digital Identity Management (DIM’05), Fairfax, VA, USA,
November 11, 2005, ACM, 2005, pp. 20–27.
9. Jan Camenisch, Dieter Sommer, and Roger Zimmermann. A general certi-
fication framework with applications to privacy-enhancing certificate infras-
tructures. In Proceedings of the IFIP TC–11 21st International Information
Security Conference (SEC 2006), May 22–24, 2006, Karlstad, Sweden, IFIP,
Springer, 2006, pp. 25–37.
10. Michael Backes, Jan Camenisch, and Dieter Sommer. Anonymous yet account-
able access control. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in
the Electronic Society (WPES’05), Alexandria, VA, USA, November 7, 2005,
ACM, 2005, pp. 40–46.
Journal Publications
1. Claudio Agostino Ardagna, Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, Ronald Leenes,
Gregory Neven, Bart Priem, Pierangela Samarati, Dieter Sommer, and Mario
Verdicchio. Exploiting cryptography for privacy-enhanced access control. A
result of the PRIME project. In Journal of Computer Security vol. 18 (2010),
no. 1, pp. 123–160.
2. Abhilasha Bhargav-Spantzel, Jan Camenisch, Thomas Groß, and Dieter Som-
mer. User centricity. A taxonomy and open issues. In Journal of Computer
Security vol. 15 (2007), no. 5, pp. 493–527.
Book and Book Chapters
1. Jan Camenisch, Ronald Leenes, and Dieter Sommer (eds.). Digital privacy
– PRIME – Privacy and identity management for Europe. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (LNCS), vol. 6545, Springer, 2011.
2. Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Dieter Sommer. Pseudonyms and
private credentials. In Jan Camenisch, Ronald Leenes, and Dieter Sommer
(eds.), Digital privacy – PRIME – Privacy and identity management for Eu-
rope, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol. 6545, Springer, 2011,
pp. 289–308.
Publications xiii
3. Stephen Crane, Siani Pearson, and Dieter Sommer. Introduction: Privacy,
trust, and identity management. In Jan Camenisch, Ronald Leenes, and Dieter
Sommer (eds.), Digital privacy – PRIME – Privacy and identity management
for Europe, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol. 6545, Springer,
2011, pp. 141–149.
4. Dieter Sommer. Architecture. In Jan Camenisch, Ronald Leenes, and Dieter
Sommer (eds.). Digital privacy – PRIME – Privacy and identity management
for Europe, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol. 6545, Springer,
2011, pp. 151–288.
Patents
1. Samuel Muller and Dieter M. Sommer. Negotiable information access in elec-
tronic social networks. United States Patent Application Publication, No. US
2012/0297003 A1, November 22, 2012.
2. Samuel Muller and Dieter M. Sommer. Access to electronic social networks.
United States Patent, No. US 8,234,300 B2, July 31, 2012.
3. Chris Vanden Berghe, Tadeusz J. Pietraszek, Jan L. Camenisch, and Dieter
Sommer. Privacy enhanced comparison of data sets. United States Patent,
No. US 7,974,406 B2, July 5, 2011.
4. Chris Vanden Berghe, Tadeusz J. Pietraszek, Jan L. Camenisch, and Dieter
Sommer. Privacy enhanced comparison of data sets. United States Patent,
No. US 7,974,407 B2, July 5, 2011.
5. Samuel Muller and Dieter M. Sommer. Automated relationship management
for electronic social networks. United States Patent Application Publication,
No. US 2010/0235886 A1, September 16, 2010.
6. Samuel Muller and Dieter M. Sommer. Context-aware electronic social net-
working. United States Patent Application Publication, No. US 2010/0228590
A1, September 9, 2010.
7. Carl Binding, Anthony Bussani, Jan Camenisch, and Dieter M. Sommer. In-
teractive selection of identity information satisfying policy constraints. United
States Patent Application Publication, No. US 2010, 0100926 A1, April 22,
2010.
8. Anthony Bussani, Dirk Husemann, Ansgar Schmidt, and Dieter Sommer.
Method, system, and computer program product for providing e-token based
access control for virtual world spaces. United States Patent, No. US 8,132,235
B2, March 6, 2010.
xiv Publications
9. Anthony Bussani, Jan L. Camenisch, Thomas R. Groß, Dirk Husemann, and
Dieter M. Sommer. Confidential presentations in virtual world infrastruc-
tures. United States Patent Application Publication, No. US 2010/0058443
A1, March 4, 2010.
10. Anthony Bussani, Jan L. Camenisch, Thomas R. Groß, Dirk Husemann, Ans-
gar Schmidt, and Dieter Sommer. Method, system, and computer program
product for virtual world access control management. United States Patent
Application Publication, No. US 2009/0254968 A1, October 8, 2009.
11. Dieter M. Sommer and Samuel Muller. Hybrid profile management for elec-
tronic social networks. United States Patent Application Publication, No. US
2009/0248844 A1, October 1, 2009.
12. Jan L. Camenisch, Abhi A. Shelat, Dieter M. Sommer, and Roger D. Zim-
mermann. Method and computer system for performing transactions between
a client and a server. United States Patent Application Publication, No. US
2007/0288750 A1, December 13, 2007.
13. Thomas R. Groß, Dieter M. Sommer, and Jan L. Camenisch. Assertion mes-
sage signatures. International Patent Application, No. PCT/IB2007/051546,
November 29, 2007.
Technical Reports
1. Patrik Bichsel, Carl Binding, Jan Camenisch, Thomas Groß, Thomas Heydt-
Benjamin, Dieter Sommer, and Gregory Zaverucha. Cryptographic protocols
of the Identity Mixer library. Technical Report IBM Zurich Research Report
RZ3730, IBM Research – Zurich, March 19, 2009.
2. Giles Hogben and Dieter Sommer. A meta-data and reasoning framework for
open assertion and evidence exchange and query. Technical Report RZ3674,
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory (joint research report with the
Joint Research Centre (JRC)), October 2006.
3. Patrik Bichsel, Jan Camenisch, Franz-Stefan Preiss, and Dieter Sommer.
Dynamically-changing interface for interactive selection of information cards
satisfying policy requirements. Technical Report RZ3756, IBM Research –
Zurich, 2009.
Abstract
People perform an ever increasing number of their interactions over electronic com-
munication networks, which has induced a complex space of issues related to data
privacy. The transition from manual record keeping to electronic data processing
has greatly amplified privacy problems related to personal data processing due to
powerful automated processing and knowledge induction capabilities. Users fre-
quently need to reveal excessive amounts of personal data for obtaining access to
services, typically being identified, while service providers and third parties exten-
sively profile the users to commercially exploit their data as part of the so-called
personal data economy.
The personal data required to be released in online interactions often exceeds
the minimum that would be required for the service to be provided, and, worse,
it typically identifies the user. This, together with the absence of widely deployed
strong authentication systems, creates the risk of identity theft, e.g, based on user
data leaked through privacy breaches, with severe consequences for both affected
users and service providers. The personal data economy creates, due to the increas-
ingly powerful automated induction of knowledge from (unstructured) data, further
privacy problems, which are expected to worsen with the widespread adoption of
Big Data analytics. The frequent mergers and acquisitions of service providers or
data aggregators and related creation of large-scale databases further worsen the
privacy issues.
In this thesis, we address user-centric privacy-enhanced identity management,
with a focus on data-minimizing authentication of attribute statements about users,
vouched for by third-party identity providers. Authenticated attributes allow for re-
ducing the amount of data to be requested because they make background checks,
e.g., for minimum age or creditworthiness verification based on identifying user
attributes, obsolete. Data minimization benefits both users through stronger pri-
vacy and service providers through the reduction of data-breach-related risks and
increased data quality and fraud prevention through the certification of attributes.
Main challenges for an open privacy-enhanced authentication system are realiz-
ing data minimization, trust delegation, user accountability, and attribute delegation
—all in a single system. That is, revealing exactly the data required for a trans-
action, deciding on which parties to trust for certifying attributes or for providing
other relevant knowledge, being able to hold non-identified users accountable for
actions in case they violate agreed terms or for law enforcement, and allowing users
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to delegate authority over certified attributes to parties they trust. Today’s avail-
able systems or competing research proposals fail in addressing those challenges in
an integrated manner. A system addressing those challenges needs to build upon
complex composed cryptographic protocols to achieve the properties we require in
a strong trust model, where each such protocol is a function of the data to be re-
leased. The cryptographic data release semantics needs to be expressed in a formal
language which abstracts from the details of the cryptographic protocols and ex-
poses semantics at the level of identity management concepts, the authentication
messaging between parties needs to be integrated with standards, and the human
user must be involved in transactions through simple yet effective user interfaces.
The presented work has started, as a foundation, with available cryptographic
protocols capable of the data-minimizing release of certified attribute data while
reducing the trust assumptions in third parties. Our goal of this work has been
bringing those cryptographic protocols towards practice. We address the above-
mentioned challenges through proposing a comprehensive system, designed around
those cryptographic protocols, to make them applicable as part of an open real-world
identity management system.
As one main contribution, we propose logic-based languages for representing data
requests (policies), statements, protocol interface elements, and knowledge in the
form of ontologies. The languages allow for automated processing, e.g., computing
a response statement to a data request, in a logic calculus. The languages are used
to govern system behavior, while allowing for hiding the underlying cryptographic
protocol semantics.
We propose an abstract authentication model for privacy-enhanced authentica-
tion which expresses preconditions to authentication transactions and formalizes
transformation rules for obtaining authenticated communication channels. The
model formally specifies under which preconditions which authenticated commu-
nication channels between parties can be established using our authentication pro-
tocols. Authenticated attribute statements are expressed through the logic-based
statement language.
We discuss how the cryptographic protocols to be executed for authenticating
data-minimizing attribute statements are specified through formulae expressed in
our logic-based languages and how multiple instances of the protocols relate to each
other. We show how the cryptographic protocols realize the transformation rules of
our authentication model.
A cryptographic protocol for releasing certified attribute statements is a pro-
tocol from a family of protocols and is a function of the statement to be authen-
ticated. Because all protocols for all valid to-be-authenticated statements cannot
be exhaustively specified, we propose a subsystem for compiling a protocol at run-
time from the logic-based statement to be authenticated. This runtime generation
results in cryptographic programs to be executed by a protocol interpreter. This
has the advantages of handling the powerful semantics of our statement language
through a multi-layer processing approach and allowing for aggressive performance
improvements, among other things, through exploiting the instruction-level paral-
lelism inherent to the derived programs at the cryptographic layer.
Abstract xvii
Those contributions give rise to an integrated system for data-minimizing au-
thentication of certified attribute statements using cryptographic protocols, thereby
solving the main challenges of data-minimizing authentication in an open system.
A major contribution of our work is the strong integration, on the one hand on
the dimension of data minimization, trust delegation, accountability, and the further
functionality crucial for an open privacy-enhanced authentication system, and on the
other hand on the dimension of integration of the functionality into a single coherent
system. Parts of our results have been validated with implementations and a use
case prototype for an end-to-end authentication flow for a simplified system.
In addition to the abovementioned core contributions related to the authenti-
cation system, we have obtained complementary contributions in the areas of user
interfaces for identity selection as part of the authentication process, a formal-model-
based verification of a fragment of the cryptographic protocols, a taxonomy of user
centricity in identity management, and a discussion of the various notions of trust
in an open identity management system.
Orthogonal to the authentication system, we have, among other issues, addressed
the problem of access control in electronic social networks. The results can substan-
tially contribute to user privacy by enforcing user preferences and thereby solve a
main problem in the social network space. We also discuss how social networks can
be leveraged to bootstrap a public key infrastructure, and how to automate profile
management in social networks. We put forth an approach for integrating privacy-
enhanced authentication with a virtual world system and for giving presentations
in public areas therein while ensuring confidentiality of the content.
With our core contributions related to the privacy-enhanced authentication sys-
tem and the additional contributions around and orthogonal to it, we address an
important fraction of the overall space of privacy issues.

Zusammenfassung
Ein wesentlicher Teil der Interaktionen von Menschen wird heutzutage u¨ber elek-
tronische Kommunikationsnetzwerke abgewickelt, was zu einem komplexen Prob-
lemraum im Bereich des Datenschutzes fu¨hrt. Der U¨bergang von manueller zu
elektronischer Datenverarbeitung hat die Datenschutzprobleme, welche im Rahmen
von Datenverarbeitung auftreten, durch automatische Datenverarbeitung und Ex-
traktion von Wissen u¨ber die Benutzer massiv verscha¨rft. Benutzer mu¨ssen in vielen
Interaktionen unverha¨ltnisma¨ßig viele Daten herausgeben, um Zugang zu Services
zu erlangen und sind u¨blicherweise identifiziert, wohingegen Diensteanbieter und
Drittparteien extensive Profile von Benutzern anlegen und, als Teil der sogenannten
Personal Data Economy, mit kommerziellem Nutzen auswerten.
Die perso¨nlichen Daten, welche in online-Interaktionen herausgegeben werden
mu¨ssen, u¨berschreiten oftmals das Minimum an Daten, auf Basis dessen ein Service
angeboten werden ko¨nnte. Weiters werden die Benutzer typischerweise identifiziert,
auch wenn es fu¨r den Service nicht notwendig wa¨re. Zusammen mit der Tatsache,
dass es keine weit verbreiteten Authentifikationssysteme fu¨r sichere Authentifika-
tion im Internet gibt, kann das Identita¨tsdiebstahl, z.B. basierend auf von Hackern
gestohlenen Datensa¨tzen, begu¨nstigen – mit schwerwiegenden Folgen fu¨r Benutzer
und Diensteanbieter. Weitere Datenschutzprobleme entstehen durch die Personal
Data Economy selbst, v.a. durch die immer besser werdenden Mechanismen, Wis-
sen aus (unstrukturierten) Daten abzuleiten. Diese Problematik wird durch die
weite Verbreitung solcher Mechanismen in Zukunft verscha¨rft werden.
In dieser Dissertation addressieren wir benutzerzentrisches, datenschutzfreund-
liches Identitita¨tsmanagement, wobei der Fokus auf datenminimierende Authen-
tifikation von Attributaussagen u¨ber Benutzer, welche von Zertifizierern gepru¨ft
sind, gelegt ist. Authentifizierte Benutzerattribute erlauben es, die Menge ange-
fragter Daten im Rahmen eines Sevices zu reduzieren, weil dadurch Hintergrund-
checks basierend auf der Benutzeridentita¨t, z.B. fu¨r eine Alters- oder Kreditwu¨rdig-
keitsu¨berpru¨fung, unno¨tig werden. Datenminimierung hilft dabei sowohl Benutzern,
deren Privatspha¨re zu schu¨tzen, als auch Diensteanbietern, durch die Reduktion von
erwarteten Kosten im Kontext mit der Exponierung von Kundendaten und durch
erho¨hte Datenqualita¨t durch zertifizierte Attributsinformation, was u.a. auch zur
Verhinderung von Betrug benutzt werden kann.
Große Herausforderungen fu¨r ein offenes datenschutzfreundliches Authentifika-
tionssystem sind die Realisierung von Datenminimierung, Delegierung von Ver-
xix
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trauensentscheidungen, Benutzer-Accountability und Delegierung von Attributen,
unterstu¨tzt durch ein integriertes System, d.h., die Bereitstellung von genau den
beno¨tigten Attributinformationen durch Benutzer, die Entscheidung, welche Partei-
en fu¨r das Zertifizieren von Attributen oder die Bereitstellung anderen maschinen-
verarbeitbaren Wissens vertrauenswu¨rdig sind, die Mo¨glichkeit, Benutzer, welche
gegen die Regeln eines Diensteanbieters verstoßen, haftbar machen zu ko¨nnen, auch
wenn sie anonym interagieren, und den Benutzern zu erlauben, Attribute an an-
dere Benutzer, welchen sie dafu¨r vertrauen, zu delegieren. Heutige Systeme oder
Forschungsresultate haben es nicht geschafft, all diese Punkte in einer integrieren-
den Art und Weise zu adressieren. Ein System, welches all dies adressiert, muss
auf aus Teilprotokollen komponierten kryptographischen Protokollen aufbauen, um
die Datenschutzeigenschaften zu erreichen, wobei ein solches Protokoll eine Funktion
u¨ber die Daten ist, welche herausgegeben werden sollen. Die Semantik der Protokolle
bzgl. Datenherausgabe muss in einer formalen Sprache, welche von kryptographis-
chen Details abstrahiert und Semantik auf der Ebene von Identita¨tsmanagement hat,
ausgedru¨ckt werden. Der Nachrichtenaustausch im Rahmen einer Authentifikation
muss in ein standardisiertes Framework hierfu¨r passen, welches in der Praxis benutzt
wird. Weiters mu¨ssen einfache Benutzerinterfaces gebaut werden, um die Benutzer
in den Identita¨tsmanagementprozess einzubeziehen.
Die Arbeit an dieser Dissertation hat mit den vorhandenen kryptographischen
Protokollen zur datenminimierenden Herausgabe zertifizierter Attribute unter min-
imalen Vertrauensannahmen bzgl. dritter Parteien begonnen, mit dem Ziel, diese
na¨her an die Praxis zu bringen. Wir adressieren die oben genannten Herausforderun-
gen durch ein umfassendes System, welches um die kryptographischen Protokolle
gebaut worden ist, um diese als Teil eines offenen Identita¨tsmanagementsystems fu¨r
die Praxis nutzbar zu machen.
Als einen Hauptbeitrag definieren wir eine logikbasierte Sprache, welche Date-
nanfragen (Policies), Aussagen, Protokollinterfaceelemente und Wissen in der Form
von Ontologien ausdru¨cken kann. Die Sprachen ko¨nnen automatisch verarbeitet wer-
den, z.B. um eine Attributaussage zu machen, welche eine Policy erfu¨llt. Formeln in
den Sprachen dru¨cken das Systemverhalten aus, wobei die technischen Details der
kryptographischen Protokolle eingekapselt bleiben ko¨nnen.
Wir definieren ein abstraktes Authentifikationsmodell fu¨r datenschutzfreundliche
Authentifikation, welches mit seinen Regeln die notwendigen Bedingungen fu¨r die
Durchfu¨hrbarkeit von Authentifikationstransaktionen ausdru¨ckt, d.h., Bedingun-
gen, um einen authentifizierten Kommunikationskanal aufbauen zu ko¨nnen. Au-
thentifizierte Attributaussagen werden in der logikbasierten Aussagensprache aus-
gedru¨ckt.
Wir diskutieren, wie die kryptographischen Authentifikationsprotokolle durch
Formeln in den logikbasierten Sprachen spezifiziert werden und zeigen, wie man mit
Hilfe der kryptographischen Protokolle die Kanaltransformationsregeln des Authen-
tifikationsmodells realisieren kann.
Ein kryptographisches Protokoll zur datenminimalen Herausgabe zertifizierter
Attributaussagen ist ein Protokoll aus einer Protokollfamilie und kann als Funktion
u¨ber die Aussage betrachtet werden. Weil es praktisch unmo¨glich ist, alle Protokolle
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fu¨r alle gu¨ltigen zu authentifizierenden Attributaussagen erscho¨pfend anzugeben,
diskutieren wir ein Subsystem zur Laufzeitgenerierung von kryptographischen Pro-
tokollen aus den Attributaussagen. Diese Laufzeitgenerierung resultiert in kryp-
tographischen Programmen, welche von einem Interpreter ausgefu¨hrt werden ko¨n-
nen. Die Vorteile dieses Ansatzes liegen darin, dass die ausdrucksstarke Se-
mantik der logikbasierten Sprache fu¨r Attributaussagen durch einen mehrstufi-
gen Prozess zu einem Protokoll transformiert wird, und dadurch die Komplexita¨t
der einzelnen Stufen ausreichend niedrig gehalten werden kann, und dass spu¨rbare
Performanzsteigerungen fu¨r die Protokollausfu¨hrung, z.B. durch Ausnutzen des den
kryptographischen Protokollen inha¨renten Instruktionsparallelismus, erzielt werden
ko¨nnen.
Diese Resultate ergeben, zusammen betrachtet, ein integriertes System zur dat-
enminimierenden Authentifikation zertifizierter Attributstatements mittels krypto-
graphischer Protokolle und lo¨st damit einige große technische Herausforderungen
offener datenminimierender Authentifikationssysteme.
Ein Hauptresultat dieser Arbeit ist die enge Integration, einerseits im Sinne
einer Integration der Funktionen miteinander, und andererseits Integration in ein
koha¨rentes System. Teile dieser Arbeit sind durch Prototypenimplementierungen
validiert worden, u.a. einem Prototypen eines vereinfachten Systems, welcher einen
vollsta¨ndigen Authentifikationsnachrichtenfluss realisiert.
Zusa¨tzlich zu den oben genannten Hauptresultaten im Rahmen des Authentifika-
tionssystems haben wir noch weitere Resultate komplementa¨r dazu erarbeitet. Diese
Resultate umfassen Benutzerinterfaces fu¨r die Auswahl von Attributaussagen, eine
Modellierung eines Teils der kryptographischen Protokolle basierend auf formalen
Modellen, eine Taxonomie fu¨r benutzerzentrisches Identita¨tsmanagement, und eine
Diskussion der unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen des Vertrauenskonzeptes im Rahmen
eines Identita¨tsmanagementsystems.
Orthogonal dazu haben wir Zugriffskontrolle zu Profildaten in elektronischen
sozialen Netzwerken behandelt, wobei unsere Resultate dem Datenschutz von Profil-
daten zutra¨glich sind. Ein weiteres Resultat behandelt das Bootstrappen von Public-
Key-Infrastrukturen mittels elektronischer sozialer Netzwerke. Weiters wurde gez-
eigt, wie man ein Authentifikationssystem, wie das hier behandelte, in virtuelle
Welten integrieren kann und wie man Pra¨sentationen mit vertraulichem Inhalt in
solchen virtuellen Welten halten kann.
Mit unseren Hauptresultaten im Rahmen des Authentifikationssystems und den
weiteren komplementa¨ren und orthogonalen Resultaten ist ein wichtiger Teil des
Problembereiches Datenschutz in Kommunikationsnetzwerken adressiert worden.
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Chapter1
Introduction
In the recent years, an increasing number of people’s interactions has been carried
out over electronic communication networks. This has given rise to a complex set
of issues related to privacy in the domain of user data being held and processed by
organizations.
Using services on the Web leads to the release of a multitude of data items,
some being released explicitly by the user, many implicitly without the user noticing.
Explicit release of data is mainly performed through providing uncertified attributes,
e.g., in Web forms, interactions through Web interfaces, or uploading any kind of
content to service providers. Implicit release happens through mechanisms such as
tracking based on cookies or the collection of clickstream data, with the purpose
of building behavioral profiles about the users [OEC08]. When using services on
the Web through a web browser, almost all implicit release of data happens on
the application layer, that is, through Web technologies such as cookies, related
application technologies, e.g., Flash Cookies, or code embedded in Web sites.1 At
the communication layer, the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are revealed to the
other communication endpoint as part of the communication protocol.
The use of the Web in people’s everyday interactions causes privacy problems
of different kinds. A main issue is the lack of awareness of users regarding the
implicit data release and the processing being performed, particularly the inference
of knowledge through data mining, as well as the purposes of the data collection
1Note that we often use the terms Web and Internet synonymously as is common practice.
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and processing. Users are neither aware of the far-reachingness of the implicit data
collection during their browsing activities, nor of the use of the data by the service
providers and third parties. Related to this, the consent users give when using
services may be seen as entirely insufficient. Another issue is the excessive collection
of personal data, partly due to user-provided attributes not being authenticated.
This leads to large collections of identifying personal data residing in databases of
service providers, being at the risk of getting compromised, e.g., through hacking
attacks.
This thesis defines, as its main contribution, a privacy-enhanced identity man-
agement system with a focus on data-minimizing authentication of certified attribute
statements. That is, we propose technology for minimizing the amount of data that
needs to be released in electronic interactions, with the advantages of certified data,
where minimal means exactly the data required for providing the service. Relying
on minimal data possibly requires a redesign of the underlying business processes.
We have thereby overcome substantial challenges with respect to integrating tech-
nologies into a coherent system. We next motivate how such technology can help
both users and service providers in today’s complex Web ecosystem and outline
the regulatory context. We give an overview of how we achieve data-minimizing
authentication based on cryptographic protocols, discuss the main challenges for
this in an open system, and summarize our contributions in this space as well as
additional results. We also clarify that such technology is a solution only to a part
of the privacy problem in the complex ecosystem of today’s Internet.
1.1 Motivation
We motivate the need for data minimization through arguing how it can substan-
tially improve the privacy of citizens and at the same time benefit service providers
by reducing the expected risk-related cost by mitigating the effect of data breaches
and potentially following identity theft and through the increased data quality, re-
sulting in a reduction of the potential for e-commerce-related fraud as well. Also,
we motivate how data minimization can help re-establish a balance in the light
of the excessive information collection practices in today’s personal data economy.
We discuss privacy regulations as a potential driver for the deployment of privacy-
enhancing technologies and the recent dynamics worldwide in this field as an indi-
cation that policy makers increasingly see the importance of data protection for the
economy.
1.1.1 Data Disclosure
Today’s established approach of service providers acquiring required personal data
is collecting attribute information the users disclose. Some of those data items
are explicitly released as uncertified attribute claims the user makes to the service
provider. Most prominently, this is done through Web interfaces today, potentially
with support through form-filling tools, and, once released, the data are associated
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with the user in a corresponding user account. Users can log on to the account after
its creation through an authentication mechanism, most prominently providing a
username and password established during account creation. Further data needed
for providing the service or for commercial exploitation of the data may be acquired
by the service provider through profiling as explained later.
There are multiple privacy and trust problems associated with today’s approach:
Users need to release more data than minimally required for the service in case the
service provider needs to authenticate certain attributes of the user through on-
line third-party services, thereby requiring the identification of the user through
excessive release of data not otherwise required for the service provision. This ex-
cessive data release may be seen as a privacy concern, because of not following
regulatory principles and creating the possibility of data being exposed. Examples
for third-party-authenticated attributes are minimum age or credit rating of a re-
quester. Furthermore, attributes cannot be reliably authenticated in this setting as
no strong mechanism for binding the requester to the attributes is available. This
poses a trust problem related to attribute data and may result in low data quality,
meaning that attributes may comprise unintended errors or wrong attribute values
may be provided by users on purpose, e.g., to protect their privacy when excessive
data are requested or in the context of criminal actions related to identity theft.
The problems of excessive data release and low data quality are rooted in that
attributes users provide are neither endorsed by third parties trusted for this pur-
pose, also referred to as certifiers, nor linked to the users in a strong way in that
only legitimate holders of attributes can make those attribute claims. Many of to-
day’s online services could build on a small set of reliably certified attributes bound
to their legitimate holders which those can authenticate to the service providers,
instead of today’s excessive set of attributes, thus following the principle of mini-
mizing data release. Defining a system for authenticating data-minimizing attribute
statements is the main contribution of this thesis.
1.1.2 Data Breaches
A data breach, or privacy breach, is the unintended exposure of personal data held
by a party through an attack or, in a minority of the cases, the exposure through
error. Alone the annual report of a major international investigation organization
reports that 174 million records were compromised through 855 confirmed breaches
in 2011 [Ver12]. For 2012, the same investigations team reports 44 million compro-
mised records in 621 confirmed data disclosures. From 2004 to 2012, a total of 2500
confirmed data disclosures lead to 1.1 billion compromised records [Ver13]. Those
reports combine data from 19 global organizations researching data breaches—it is
unclear what the fraction between reported and investigated breaches is among the
total number of breaches happening. Particularly, it is not ensured that breaches
are always detected or, if detected, reported and reflected in the statistics.
Most breaches are caused through hacking, followed by using malware and social
engineering attacks [Ver13]. Data breaches may expose huge sets of personal data
records, including financial data, such as credit card records. Data breaches through
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hacking are mainly caused by financially motivated attackers, targeting assets such
as payment data or other valuable personal data at rest [Ver13]. Not only large
corporations are targets of hackers, lately smaller firms are increasingly targeted
due to their easier-to-circumvent security measures [FW11].
Exploitation of the data for criminal activities through what is referred to as
identity theft may be an action following the breach [RSA10], particularly in the case
of financially motivated organizations being the attackers.2 For example, financial
fraud or shopping online using stolen personal data and reshipping through a third
party are common misuse actions [OEC08, Hed12]. Thus, data breaches through
hacking attacks by financially motivated attackers may have a direct financial im-
pact on citizens and cause them substantial additional trouble. Individuals subject
to identity theft incur damage in terms of cost, time to restore reputation, repu-
tation damage incurred from identity theft, and required efforts for re-establishing
creditworthiness [OEC08] as a direct consequence of an identity theft and misuse
incident.
Considering estimated damage figures, identity theft is a major problem having
caused a direct financial damage of USD 49.3 billion to the affected consumers alone
in the USA in 2006, with a total damage to the economy of USD 61 billion [RS09].
One reason why such substantial damage can be caused are the weak authentication
requirements—often it is sufficient to know personal data attributes to conduct a
transaction in the name of a party. Massive data breaches allow attackers to obtain
large sets of records in a single attack, thereby providing potential of incurring
substantial further damage through subsequent misuse of the data.
A major recent privacy breach within the Sony Playstation network has lead to
the exposure of records of 77 million users, comprising personal data such as names,
addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, and credit card data [BF11, SW11]. Ac-
cording to Sony, 10 million credit card records may have been exposed [Osa11] in
this breach. An additional breach preceding this one has lead to the exposure of
addition personal data records, making a total of around 100 million records held
by Sony being exposed within a few days.
A company being subject to a data breach is subject to cost in different cate-
gories, such as forensic examination, breach notification, credit monitoring, public
relations, legal defense, or penalties [Zur11]. The overall cost of the data breach for
Sony is estimated to amount to around USD 1.25 billion resulting from, e.g., lost
business, compensation cost, and new investments [Osa11]. The total costs of the
breach are estimated to be substantially higher, including the decrease of the share
price of the company [Osa11]. This shows that data breaches can have a substantial
economic impact on a company and the financial ecosystem, which can be seen as
a motivating argument for employing stronger privacy protection.
The fine, although considered high in terms of the applicable data protection
legislation, imposed by the U.K. Information Commissioner on Sony related to the
breach—with the reasoning that the security measures in place have not been suffi-
cient, although the company would have had access to the knowledge and resources
2Attacks by activists are mostly targeted at causing disruption of operations of their victims,
while espionage attacks often focus on trade secrets.
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to keep its customer data secure [Flo13]—is a negligible cost item compared to
the overall breach cost. As of now, companies incurring data breaches are hardly
penalized severely in the United States [Dow08b], thus, regulatory instruments do
currently not incentivize investments in technical and organizational measures for
data protection or data-minimizing identity management. The regulation proposal
for the EU’s revision of its Data Protection Directive phrasing maximum penalties
for non-compliance as a fraction of the annual world-wide turnover of the com-
pany [Eur12] may be, if adopted, a driver for regulatory compliance and the implied
technology investments and application of data minimization technologies. In the
light of such penalty provisions in European legislation, storing less data and em-
ploying data-minimizing authentication techniques may lead to lower expected costs
due to reduced risks of data breaches.
Prevention of identity theft, or misuse of stolen identity information, can be ac-
complished through the following approaches: Conservatively, identity theft result-
ing from data breaches can be countered by investing in data security and reacting
accordingly in case of a breach. Proactively, employing data minimization when
collecting customer data can solve the problem of data breaches already in its roots.
A system for data-minimizing authentication is discussed in this thesis.
This discussion on data breaches and related identity theft can be used as an ar-
gument for data minimization—collecting and storing only the minimum amount of
data needed—to reduce the expected cost of data breaches for companies. According
to the Wall Street Journal, companies themselves have meanwhile realized advan-
tages of data scarceness with respect to credit card data when data are not needed
for clearly defined business purposes, and have realized that, in such case, storing
data is creating additional risk without creating much additional value [Dow08a].
Such rethinking may lead to a change of today’s situation which is characterized by
identifying personal data being collected by companies in excess and being insuffi-
ciently protected against exposure [RS09].
According to Gartner, the concern of data breaches is expected to have conse-
quences in the form of privacy policy revisions within companies because the value of
privacy and sensitive personal information and the risk of financial losses is increas-
ingly recognized [Gar11, Cas11]. Related to this, data growth has been identified
by Gartner as a major technical challenge for companies: companies need to invest
in data archiving and retirement and protection in the light of growing amounts of
data [MA10, AM10]—holding data securely incurs a large overhead.
1.1.3 Personal Data Economy
With the rise of the Internet and its mostly Web-based applications, a personal
data economy of multiple hundred billion dollars annually has been evolving and
is growing fast. This economy builds on collecting data about users and exploiting
the data for purposes such as directed advertising on the Web. In exchange, users
get access to services such as email, social networks, and the like free of monetary
charge—the currency users pay with is personal data.
The personal data economy is closely related to profiling, that is, analyzing events
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originating from one entity (the user) with the purpose of computing knowledge
about the entity. Crucial technologies for collecting data in the scope of behavioral
profiling are tracking technologies such as HTML cookies, Flash cookies, beacons,
and browser fingerprinting [Cas12, Eck10, RKW12]. Interacting with a single web
site may involve dozens of third parties tracking the user and building behavioral
profiles. Also the Internet Protocol (IP) address of a user may be used for practical
tracking of a user’s interactions. In addition to Web tracking, profiling builds on
data that service providers receive as direct consequence of the service provisioning
model, e.g., emails, calendars, location data, or social network profiles. Profiling is
done in relation to identified users holding accounts, as well as on Web sites where
users do not need to have an account. Certain service providers, e.g., a leading mail
and a leading social network provider, can associate extensive profiles to (weakly)
identified customer accounts. As of today, it can be argued that the personal data
economy has created a plethora of value-added services for users, though it can also
be argued that the exploitation of personal data of users is going too far.
Profiling is about knowledge—and not only data—as the process inductively
creates knowledge from the data obtained through profiling. This generation of
knowledge which the profiled individuals do not have access to, shifts the balance
of power between the profiling parties and the individuals being profiled [Hil06].
This asymmetry is seen as a problem as users cannot exert sufficient control over
their data. It is expected that upcoming analytics over massive scales of data, also
known as Big Data analytics, will increase the imbalance between profiling parties
and those being profiled.
The knowledge inferred from profiles on the one hand gives service providers the
ability of offering personalized services to the users, and on the other hand allows for
serving personalized advertisements and further exploitation of the data. Personal-
izing services and also advertising can, to a certain degree, be seen as desirable for
users, though, users should, in our view, themselves be able to establish a balance
between the collection and exploitation of data and personalization of services and
advertisements, thereby realizing user control.
Such user control over implicit release of personal data is possible to some ex-
tent [RKW12], particularly also easy to accomplish for end users by using tools
[VD10]. Certain categories of data, e.g., clickstream data and data directly required
for the service, will still be revealed to the service provider during an interaction. A
notable recent initiative in the tracking domain is W3C’s Do Not Track, which has
attempted to allow users to specify a non-binding intention of an opt-out of Web
tracking [Tra12]. The technical realization of the underlying policy mechanism is
trivial—comprising essentially communcation of a single bit of information—while
the semantics is still under intense discussion. Preventing the implicit release of
information at the communication layer can be achieved with technologies such as
onion routing as proposed by Dingledine et al. [DMS04] or mix networks, originally
proposed by Chaum [Cha81]. Applying a combination of the mentioned approaches
can help re-establish a balance between the interests of users, service providers,
and third-party data aggregators, thereby replacing today’s rather imbalanced data
economy.
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Proponents of the unregulated exploitation of personal data frequently bring up
the argument that exploiting personal data does not lead to privacy problems when
data are anonymized. This argument is increasingly challenged by new results on
the re-identification of anonymized records through linking them against external
data sets [And09, Ohm10]. This argument is further underlined through the fre-
quent mergers and acquisitions during the consolidation the Web industry has been
subjected in recent years, and the resulting single points of data holdership and the
implied integration of massive data sets.
1.1.4 Data Protection Regulations
Frequently, regulations are a main driver for a widespread adoption of technolo-
gies in a market. For privacy technologies this may apply as well, for which rea-
son we discuss important regional and global regulations and recommendations for
data protection next, with a focus on the European tradition. Notably, the first
comprehensive national data protection regulation was the Data Act 1973 in Swe-
den [Gre12a].
An early instrument regulating data protection is The European Convention on
Human Rights of 1950 [Cou50] by the Council of Europe. Article 8 thereof stipulates
that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.” and also that interference by a public authority shall be limited
for specific interests such as national security. Article 8 of the Convention can be
seen as a foundation of data protection regulations. These provisions are generically
applicable, that is, also to today’s electronic interactions.
The OECD has recognized the need for data protection as a prerequisite for
transborder flows of personal data in the OECD Council Recommendation of 1980
[OEC80]. It has recognized that OECD members have different national laws and
policies, though, “a common interest in protecting privacy and individual liberties,
and in reconciling fundamental but competing values such as privacy and the free
flow of information.” The goal of the non-binding recommendations is that member
countries adopt them in their national regulations and thereby make them legally
binding, with the aim of balancing free transborder flows of (personal) data and pri-
vacy rights of individuals through an approach harmonized within OECD members.
The OECD recommendations have set forth a number of basic principles for data
protection: the collection limitation principle, data quality principle, purpose spec-
ification principle, use limitation principle, security safeguards principle, openness
principle, individual participation principle, and accountability principle. Those and
related data protection principles are often referred to as Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs). In the context of this thesis, the collection limitation, data qual-
ity, and purpose specification principles are of particular relevance as they relate to
data-minimizing authentication.
The Convention 108 of the Council of Europe [Cou81] is the first and only in-
ternational legally binding instrument in the field of data protection [Cou10] with
regard to automatic processing of personal data. The Convention needs to be imple-
mented in national legislation by the countries acceding to it in order to apply the
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convention’s principles. The principles stipulated therein are similar to those of the
OECD recommendations. An addition are sanctions and remedies to be applied in
case of non-compliance with the national instruments implementing the Convention.
Convention 108 and its additional protocol on independent supervisory authorities
and transborder flows of data are the baseline for currently 44 states in Europe and
one in South America, which has acceded to the convention as the 45th and first
non-European state in 2013 [Cou13]. A further trend towards internationalization
can be observed in the current ambitions of the revision of Convention 108 [Con12].
Directive 95/46/EC [Eur95], the European Data Protection Directive, regulates
the protection of personal data on the EU level. Being a Directive, it needs to be
implemented through national regulations by the member states, e.g., the federal
data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) in Germany [Deu03] or the corre-
sponding instrument in the U.K., to become effective. It attempts to balance the
right to data protection of individuals with the free flow of data within EU member
states. It defines general rules for lawfulness of personal data processing and stipu-
lates, as part thereof, data protection principles similar to those of Convention 108.
The Directive has been strongly influenced by the Convention 108 of the Council.
Directive 2002/58/EC [Eur02] has been issued as part of a wide legislative frame-
work to regulate the electronic communications sector in the European Union. It
regulates data retention of connection data, use of cookies, unsolicited email, and
posting personal data in public directories. The European Data Retention Direc-
tive put forth by the EU in 2006 [The06] marked a significant exception to Europe’s
strong history of data protection by requiring that excessive amounts of traffic data
related to electronic communication be stored by service providers, and thereby has
opened the field for major discussions in the legal area.
Both the Convention 108 of the Council of Europe as well as Directive 95/46/EC
of the EC are currently in the process of being revised. A reason for this is the
recognition that changes in the technological landscape need to be considered in
those instruments. The revision of Convention 108 [Con12] attempts, among others
things, to further internationalize the convention with the goal of obtaining a global
data privacy agreement [Gre12c, Gre12b]: “The call for global standards was repeat-
edly expressed by business and civil society communities. . . ” [Cou10]. The update
to the convention also attempts to take new information and communication tech-
nologies into consideration [Cou10]. The revision of Directive 95/46/EC has lead
to a proposal of substantial changes [Eur12]. The type of instrument will change
from Directive to Regulation, that is, it is valid in the members states without the
need of prior implementation in national laws, with the intention of a stronger har-
monization within Europe than with Directive 95/46/EC. The proposal includes
far-reaching changes, such as making the so-far implicit right to be forgotton ex-
plicit, increasing penalties for severe violations to substantial levels, or to redefine
the semantics of the role of data processor, to only name a few. Multiple provi-
sions of the proposal have been under heavy critique from industry [AGBR13] and
will continue to be so in the ongoing discussions and associated lobbying process of
unprecedented intensity.
The above-discussed instruments reflect the European tradition of human rights
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and the approach of balancing rights and interests between people, commercial
institutions, and governments.
In the United States—the region of the world, where most personal data are
stored and processed—no cross-sector privacy legislation for protecting consumers
is in place—in contrast to the situation in Europe. There are multiple sector-specific
regulations available, such as HIPPA [Con96] in the healthcare sector. Otherwise,
the private sector is largely unregulated, having allowed today’s personal data econ-
omy to establish. Only recently, a need for a more comprehensive protection of the
consumers has been recognized by the publication of a White House report on a
Consumer Data Privacy Bill of Rights [The12] intended to also regulate the private
sector, based on the widely accepted FIPPs principles—also comprising the data
minimization, referred to as collection limitation, principle.
In the Asia-Pacific region, an overarching privacy framework has been published,
referred to as APEC Privacy Framework [Asi05, Asi12]. A key goal thereof is bal-
ancing privacy protection on the one hand with cross-border information flow on the
other hand, with a potential to global applicability [Asi05, Asi12]. The framework is
under critique and perceived to not be a very capable privacy protection framework
for multiple reasons, e.g., its weakened principles compared to the already generic
OECD principles, not being compatible with the EC approach, that is, not capable
of fulfilling the adequacy requirement for data protection of the EC, or having little
impact on ongoing policy development in the Asia-Pacific region [Gre03, Gre04].
Notable development in the region is Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act
2012 [Rep12] requiring, among others, consent to personal data processing.
A notable exception to data protection legislation has always been national se-
curity as already captured in Convention 108 as exception in Article 9, allowing
for derogation from articles mandating data protection as far as it constitutes a
necessary measure for “protecting State security, public safety, the monetary in-
terests of the State” [Cou81]. National regulations incorporate such exceptions,
resulting in different degrees of balance between surveillance and, for example, the
right to privacy. Particularly some legislative acts in the USA as well as the Di-
rective 2006/24/EC [The06] are notable in this domain. Although many privacy
activists defend the opinion that some current surveillance regulations are going too
far, certain measures can legitimately be argued for the national security purpose.
Contrasting the approaches to privacy regulations in the world’s regions, the
European tradition balances different rights of the citizens, companies, and govern-
ments, and uses so-called omnibus legislation applying to both the private sector
and the public sector, while the United States has sector-specific legislation in place
e.g., HIPPA [Con96] in the healthcare sector, leading to a cluttered, less effective,
legal framework lacking private sector coverage. The recent proposal of a Privacy
Bill of Rights [The12] is a notable development in the United States. Asia has not
progressed as far in terms of privacy protection yet, with strong regulations having
come up only recently, e.g., in Singapore [Rep12], and many countries being without
privacy laws, at least in either the private or the public sector or both. The Central
and South American region is catching up with regulations, with multiple countries
in the region having enacted privacy laws in 2012 or planning to do so in the near
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term, thereby mostly following the European tradition. Australia shows a strong
engagement in privacy, rather building on the European value system than that of
the Asia-Pacific region. Africa is, as developing region, rather slow in the adoption
of privacy regulations.
On a world-wide scale, the observation is that the strongest data protection reg-
ulations have evolved from the European value system. Another observation is that
an increasing number of coutries in all regions of the world enact data protection
legislation [Gre12a]. Reasons are not only the protection of citizens’ data, but also
fostering economic development, e.g., through adequacy of data protection with the
European requirements expressed by Directive 95/46/EC. Notably, provisions for
data minimization and consent are prominently comprised as principles in regula-
tions, for example, the regulations following the European tradition, as well as the
proposal for a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights in the United States. Those pro-
visions may act as a driver for the technologies of data-minimizing authentication
we propose in this thesis. Regulations usually mandate the use of state-of-the-art
technology for fulfilling protection provisions. Through research initiatives and pi-
lot studies, new technologies become part of the state of the art and thus closer
to being mandated by regulations, or at least recommended. Having observed the
cryptographic techniques we build upon from their inception, over first practical
instantiations, to today’s state, and considering the interest of key industry players
and players in the policy debate in those technologies, we are optimistic that data-
minimizing authentication technologies will be deployed within the mid-term future
and that both regulators and private-sector demand will accelerate this process.
1.2 Privacy
We next give some background on what privacy means, based on earlier definitions
in the literature body. The concept of privacy predates the existence of electronic
communication and data processing systems. Privacy is a hard-to-define concept
and, as a result, authors have proposed definitions varying in connotation and scope.
Warren and Brandeis define privacy as “the right to be left alone” [WB90], a broad
definition that has received substantial attention. Warren and Brandeis’ publication
is the first one in the USA necessitating a right to privacy [Gla79]. Westin’s defini-
tion of privacy is important in the field of modern information and communication
technologies. Westin defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups or institu-
tions to determine for themselves, when, how, and to what extent information about
themselves is communicated to others.”[Wes67] In other words, privacy is about con-
trol over the data related to a person through this person. This definition of privacy
has influenced much of the discourse on privacy in electronic communication sys-
tems and is closely related to the concept of informational self-determination, as
originated in Germany. We use the term privacy with the connotation of Westin’s
definition and stress that the possibility of data minimization implied by this defi-
nition plays a strong role in our notion.
The threat of information technology to privacy has already been observed early
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on in a Supreme Court decision in 1963 in the USA, where the judge has observed
that “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a
great danger to the privacy of the individual.”[Car10] This has related to surveillance
of voice telephone communication, while it is more true than ever in today’s Internet,
considering the increase of processing power, degree of interconnection, decrease
of storage cost, automation of processing and generation of inferred knowledge,
governmental surveillance, and the size of the massively growing economy around
personal data.
Overall, the privacy issues have become substantially more complex since the
rise of electronic data processing and communication compared to the times of
non-electronic record keeping and processing. Automated data processing allows
for unprecedented ways of induction of knowledge through data mining such that
today’s concept of user consent is at stake. It can be argued that today’s tracking
and automated data processing practices severely undermine users’ privacy.
In the government surveillance context, an argument frequently brought up
against privacy is that government surveillance is not problematic if people have
nothing to hide. This “nothing to hide” argument is so frequently used so that it
has been investigated and found to be flawed in its roots because of assuming the
equivalence of privacy and keeping (illegal) things secret [Sol07], while privacy in
fact has a much broader connotation.
1.3 Data-minimizing Authentication
The issues of excessive data release and insufficient data quality related to the dis-
closure of uncertified data to service providers as discussed in Sec. 1.1 can be ad-
dressed by users releasing certified data in an authenticated manner. Ideally, a user
can authenticate exactly the attribute statement required by the service provider
for providing the service to the requester, without revealing any excessive infor-
mation to the transaction partner, a third-party identity provider, or further third
parties. Because of the authentication property, no additional attributes need to
be requested to perform a third-party-vouched authentication of the few attributes
that are required authentically. Overall, this can lead to a substantial reduction in
the release of attribute information for the same service to be provided. That is,
the principle of data minimization can be achieved in a strong sense.
1.3.1 Cryptographic Protocols
The technology for realizing the data-minimizing authentication of certified at-
tribute statements exists in the form of cryptographic mechanisms. These mech-
anisms comprise signature schemes and protocols with privacy-enhancing proper-
ties [CL02b, CL04], mechanisms for ensuring accountability in data-minimizing
settings [CS03, CD00], as well as mechanisms for proving properties in a data-
minimizing way and combining such proof protocols [Sch91, CS97a, DF02, CDS94,
Cra96, Bou00, CS97b, CKY09, BKS+09, FS86], the security of all those mechanisms
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being based on the assumption of the intractability of certain number-theoretic prob-
lems.
Additionally, when employing tamper-resistant hardware tokens with authenti-
cation mechanisms for users to those tokens and using the tokens for storing private
keys and computing a subset of the cryptographic protocol steps, the binding of at-
tributes to the authenticating user can be substantially stronger and the attributes
may not be as easily exploited in the context of identity theft. Thus, it can be argued
that those cryptographic protocols are the basis for a system for protecting privacy
in the best-possible manner while allowing for stronger accountability properties at
the same time.
The work on this thesis has started with (a subset of) those cryptographic mech-
anisms being available to the author and has set out to build a comprehensive
system and framework around them for privacy-enhancing authentication of cer-
tified attributes. As our work inherits concepts from the more general field of
privacy-enhancing identity management for privacy-enhanced authentication, we
often equally use this term for referring to the concept of privacy-enhanced authen-
tication.
The basic idea of our work is that a party (user) can obtain certificates of a special
kind, denoted as private certificates or credentials. A private certificate comprises
attributes about the user or a third party and comprises a signature by a certifier
over the attributes. Service providers can trust certifiers for vouching for certain
attributes for given purposes and phrase attribute requirements in the data request
section of an authorization policy for a resource to be protected, e.g., a service they
offer.
A user, when attempting to access a protected resource, can use private cer-
tificates she holds for fulfilling the corresponding data request. To this end, she
constructs a data statement that fulfills the request and creates a cryptographic
proof of correctness of this statement based on her private certificates. Such a proof
proves knowledge (holdership) of private certificates and private keys and addition-
ally proves properties over the attributes, e.g., an inequality over a date of birth
attribute. The service provider can verify the proof and gain, based on trust it has
in certifiers vouching for attributes, assurance in the correctness of the statement
made by the user. Through a binding of private certificates to private keys of the
user, which may be contained on tamper-resistant hardware tokens, a strong binding
of attributes to users can be achieved with all the implied properties.
The system we propose can not only be used for authenticating data-minimal
attribute statements, it can also replace authentication to an established account,
thereby replacing today’s password-based authentication. To this end, a newly
generated public key (pseudonym) can be used for each account, while all those
public keys can be bound to the same private key and hardware token and thus
party.
A comparable solution using traditional signature schemes such as the RSA,
DSA, or ECDSA schemes [RSA78, RSA83, Nat09] for revealing attribute infor-
mation could solve the authenticity problem of attributes, though, would lead to
excessive release of data. This would be an entirely inacceptable situation from a
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privacy point of view as the revealed attributes would carry high assurance proper-
ties, thus even worsening today’s situation of excessive release where users may still
provide falsified information by creating different personas for different contexts or
transactions in the course of their identity management. When applying such tra-
ditional technology for re-authentication to established accounts, one would need to
use a different private key for each public key and thereby run into a problem when
using hardware tokens for containing the key material. The approach of a party
using the same unique public key for each account it has would pose a severe pri-
vacy problem through linkability of all transactions. Following this argumentation,
the traditional signature technologies are not a suitable choice for authentication
in open systems such as the Internet, because they violate basic privacy principles,
despite being secure. Similarly, today’s identity federation protocols with online
certifiers all have the property that the certifier (identity provider) learns about the
transactions a user performs and can create detailed profiles of the user’s interac-
tions. Thus it becomes a single point of failure in terms of data breach or misuse.
That is, all prominent identity management technologies of today for transferring
certified attributes reveal excessive information—conventional certificates as in elec-
tronic identity cards based on RSA, DSA, or ECDSA signatures and protocols with
on-line certifiers issuing identity statements on behalf of the authenticating parties
alike.
The system and framework proposed in this thesis is capable of solving the prob-
lem of privacy-enhancing authentication, while conventional technologies would re-
sult in inacceptable privacy problems when being employed for securely authenticat-
ing attribute statements or authenticating to accounts. Using strong authentication
technologies provided by our work also in the back-end systems may raise the bar-
rier for hackers and thus help avoid data breaches, especially when considering that
around 80% of all hacking attacks leading to data breaches exploit weaknesses of
single-factor password-based authentication [Ver13].
Thus, our work can lead to a stronger protection of user privacy compared to
today’s situation both in terms of revealing substantially less data as in today’s
interactions and thereby mitigating the issue of data breaches by companies not
storing the resulting large amounts of personal data and also mitigating further
privacy issues related to excessive attribute release, as well as reducing the chance
of attackers attempting to steal personal data once released and decreasing their
utility. In terms of security, it can reduce the propability of user account credentials
being obtained by attackers and misused when using tamper-resistant hardware
tokens to contain private key material. Service providers obtain higher assurance
in terms of the person authenticating an attribute statement being the person to
which the statement applies, as well as the assurance that only account holders can
authenticate to already-established accounts.
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1.4 Challenges of Data-minimizing Authentication
A privacy-enhancing, user-centric, open identity management system to be used
in a practical setting poses a plurality of technical and non-technical challenges as
presented next.
First and foremost, security in the sense of integrity of authenticated attribute
statements is a required property of an authentication system. That is, a statement
that a requester authenticates through cryptographic protocols must be verifiable by
its recipient with respect to well-defined semantics such that, in case the statement
can be verified successfully, its verifier can be assured about its integrity. The
cryptographic mechanisms referred to above in Sec. 1.3.1 can be used to realize this
while maintaining privacy and user accountability at the same time. Authenticated
statements can not only be statements about requesters’ attributes, they can also be
statements for logging on to accounts analogous to using username/password tuples
today—only secure and based on a private key strongly bound to the legitimate
key holder. Thus, such an authentication system will also be capable of replacing
the less secure password scheme in use today. As password insecurity is not only a
problem for accounts of users with service providers, our authentication system can
also contribute to better security in this domain, especially as studies have shown
that a majority of hacking attacks on organizations exploits weak (password-based)
authentication, leading to substantial damages [Ver13].
The key capability of an open authentication system is the authentication of
attribute statements. A main problem in such system is trust management for
determining which certifiers to trust for vouching for a particular attribute and how
to specify this in a data request. This is a non-trivial problem in an open world-wide
system with a large number of certifiers. This challenge has been phrased in the
context of trust management systems as delegation of attribute authority [BFL96,
LGF03], though, without account to privacy.
A crucial feature of an authentication system of the kind we are interested in
is that it protects user privacy by employing data minimization, the importance of
which has been motivated extensively earlier. Data minimization in the authentica-
tion context means that requesters authenticate data-minimal attribute statements
by revealing the statements together with proofs showing their correctness.
Using data-minimizing authentication compared to today’s approach of excessive
data collection implies the need for a re-design of business processes to work on the
scarce amounts of data provided. In certain cases, the overall system requirements
for service providers will be simplified through this, an example being an online wine
shop requiring age verification for its customers. Instead of performing an age veri-
fication through a third-party service provider based on the requester’s identifying
attributes, resulting in a medium-assurance age attribute only and a weak binding
to the requester, the attribute is authenticated by the requester itself. The redesign
of business processes is out of scope of this work—we provide the technical solution.
A practical open authentication system should support delegation of authority
over authenticating attribute statements. This is crucial for widespread use of such
system, e.g., for electronic identity cards used for government interactions: The age
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structure of a population is likely to imply that a fraction of the population will
consist of digital non-natives who have not acquired the skills for using tomorrow’s
data processing systems. Delegating authority to authenticate attribute statements
about them to other parties, e.g., their children, enables required government inter-
actions for them to be conductible using the standard electronic processes. Prior
work has considered delegation based on parties with a system-wide identifier, see,
e.g., more recent work on trust management [BGF06, BFG10]. Such delegation can
be realized as a special case of an authorization system based on our authentication
approach.
Data minimization may frequently lead to anonymous or pseudonymous trans-
actions, which may pose the challenge of maintaining the legitimate interests of the
service providers and the law enforcement system. Having unconditionally anony-
mous or pseudonymous transactions is, in our view, not a situation desired from a
societal perspective as it may put service providers and law enforcement to a dis-
advantage against (organized) dishonest users. For this reason, we advocate that a
future authentication system needs to strike a balance between data minimization
and accountability. With the technical approach we propose, privacy and account-
ability properties can be obtained at the same time, thus resulting in a balance when
also considering trust model limitations, that is, additional trust required in third
parties. Our system allows for privacy and anonymity particularly also in delega-
tion scenarios in a flexible manner, such that either of the delegater or delegatee in
an interaction can be held accountable, depending on the policy employed for the
transaction.
An authentication system with the discussed properties needs to, in order to be
practical, integrate with standards that are crucial for the area. Not much research
work has been done in terms of standard integration that would predate our work.
A technical system for realizing the above-discussed properties needs to integrate
those properties into a single system and various of its constituents, e.g., formal
languages, cryptographic components, or the authorization system. Desparate so-
lutions realizing only parts of the properties or such that do not consider the full
technology stack may be interesting in theory, though, are of less use in practice
because a large part of the challenge lies in the integration.
Major properties for an authentication system to be successful are convenience
and usability. The system should make interactions more streamlined than they
are today and be easy to use at the same time. For example, the password man-
agement and field auto-filling of modern Web browsers today is an example for a
convenience feature. An open authentication system we describe should lead to
convenient interactions by automation of routine tasks and ease of use.
The abovementioned challenges require, as basic technology, cryptographic cre-
dential protocols which are complex and hard to understand. A particular resulting
challenge is the integration of those protocols and their authentication semantics
into a coherent system.
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1.5 Contributions
Our contributions related to this thesis are presented next, partitioned into the fol-
lowing classes: Contributions reported in or directly related to the thesis (Sec. 1.5.1),
contributions that complement the further (Sec. 1.5.2), and contributions that are
orthogonal to the further two, for protecting privacy from a wider point of view
(Sec. 1.5.3).
1.5.1 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are the definition of an open system and framework
for user-centric privacy-preserving authentication based on cryptographic protocols,
with the ability of balancing data minimization and accountability and delegation
support. This, on the one hand, comprises basic mechanisms, and, on the other
hand, integrates those mechanisms into a comprehensive system and framework.
The contributions range from a high-level model for authentication, over a logic-
based data representation and request language and a related logic-based calculus,
to cryptographic protocols for implementing the semantics of statements in the
data representation language using cryptographic mechanisms. Overall, this has led
to interdisciplinary work between the disciplines logic, access control, and crypto-
graphic protocols. The resulting system and framework provides solutions to the
beforementioned challenges related to an open, privacy-enhancing authentication
system.
From a technology perspective, our work combines concepts from both trust
management and trust negotiation, while taking a privacy-enhancing approach and
relating the level of logic-based languages with the underlying cryptographic pro-
tocols. Also, we support powerful delegation of attribute authority, accountability
features, and mechanisms for ensuring a strong binding of attributes with parties
without constraining system openness with unrealistically strong assumptions.
The thesis builds on published results of the author and extends and integrates
those results towards a comprehensive identity management system. Besides the
individual results, the integration is a further major contribution, particularly rele-
vant for understanding challenges which cannot be anticipated in the limited scope
of the individual mechanisms research, though, which arise only at the system per-
spective. Next, we present an overview of the contributions we have made in the
context of this thesis and relate those contributions to the publications of the author
and the chapters of the thesis.
Parts of the results have been obtained during the PRIME project [PRI08],
which was also helpful in obtaining requirements for the later work on the system
to obtain the generalized and extended results presented here.
Authentication model. We have extended the secure channel model of Mau-
rer and Schmid [MS94, MS96] to obtain an abstract model capable of expressing
the privacy-preserving and accountable authentication mechanisms of this thesis at
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a high level. The model is a semi-formal model that is capable of expressing au-
thentication and confidentiality properties of communication channels between par-
ties using a graphical channel notation with bullet annotation symbols for channel
endpoints as main syntactic element for representing security properties of chan-
nels. Authenticated properties are represented through an annotation specifying
the (authenticated) data statement being made. Channel derivation rules—loosely
speaking, a channel composition algebra—have been defined for deriving new chan-
nels with certain properties from a set of existing channels. We relate our crypto-
graphic protocols to this model and explain which protocols are required for real-
izing a given channel composition rule. This model is presented in Chapter 3 and
is a refinement of the formerly published model of Bichsel, Camenisch, and Som-
mer [BCS12a, BCS12b]. The presented model establishes a more explicit link to our
data representation language without the simplifying abstractions of the original
publication.
Logic-based data representation, reasoning, and ontologies. A major con-
tribution of the thesis is a formalism based on first-order logic for representing
identity data and requests thereof, alongside with the required conceptual ground-
work. The result is a data model which is suitable for expressing certified identity
statements to be released to other parties as well as other identity data required in
a comprehensive identity management architecture. It serves also as the basis for
a data request language and access control language based on it. The data request
language is the dual language to the data representation language. A semantics for
the data representation language is presented as well as the language formalization.
Calculi based on extensions of multi-sorted first-order logic are discussed and we
show how ontologies can be used for representing knowledge and how to perform
automated deductions over formulae of the language.
Earlier work with contributions by the author on an authorization language with
privacy features for exploiting (parts of) the semantics of cryptographic credential
protocols [ACK+10] is an extension of work by Bonatti and Samarati [BS02]. The
languages related to data representation and request have been presented in ear-
lier work by the author in the context of a comprehensive identity management
architecture [Som11] and are based on work on languages for privacy-preserving
identity management [BCS05, CSZ06a] and an approach to ontology-based reason-
ing for privacy-enhanced authorization [HS06] by the author. The approach to data
modeling and underlying concepts, the data request language, the logic calculus,
ontology aspects, and the language semantics are discussed in Chapter 4. Based on
the data representation language, a privacy-preserving authorization language and
system have been defined by the author [Som11] based on the data request language
presented in generalized form in this thesis.
Protocol integration. In Chapter 5, we present the integration of the protocols
required for realizing our authentication system, with a focus on protocol interfaces
expressed using our approach to data representation. The protocol interfaces es-
tablish a link between the authentication model of Chapter 3, the logic-based data
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representation of Chapter 4, and the cryptographic protocols, the run-time gener-
ation framework for which is summarized in Chapter 6. They also relate different
instances of the cryptographic protocols with each other, based on the data repre-
sentation language. A much simplified protocol interface for an earlier version of
the protocols [Som07] has been presented as a part of the work by Camenisch et
al. [CSZ06a].
Run-time protocol generation. Another major contribution of this thesis is
a framework and system for the run-time generation of cryptographic protocols
for data-minimizing release of identity information to parties on the network. The
cryptographic protocols allow for authenticating data-minimizing statements to-
wards other parties and performing other relevant actions, based on cryptographic
primitives and zero-knowledge proof of knowledge composition frameworks [CKY09,
BKS+09]. The approach is characterized by a multi-layered processing stack for
transforming a logic-based high-level data statement into a cryptographic protocol
to be executed proving the statement correct. The approach of run-time genera-
tion is not only suitable for the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature schemes we build
upon [CL02b, CL04], that is, multi-show unlinkable signatures, but also for signature
schemes of the kind Brands has proposed [Bra00], that is, single-show unlinkable
signatures.
The contributions in this space are multifold and comprise the definition of for-
mal languages at different layers of the protocol generation stack, mappings between
those languages, and finally efficiency improvements of the protocols. Efficiency im-
provements of the cryptographic protocols are possible at multiple layers of protocol
generation and execution, starting with optimizations on protocols in their abstract
cryptographic form, precomputation of protocol fragments, as well as exploitation
of instruction-level parallelism at protocol execution time.
Earlier work of the author is related to a multi-layered stack for generating
cryptographic protocols from high-level statements [Som07, BCS05]. We discuss
a logic-based data representation from which to generate the protocols and sketch
the protocol primitives [BCS05], while we realize an implementation of a simplified
fragment of the protocols in a JAVA-based software library [Som07]. The subsequent
version of the protocols is the official Identity Mixer (idemix) protocol specification
of IBM [BBC+09, Sec10], which has been evolving. The earlier implementation
[Som07] is based on a simplified 2-layer architecture.
Another contribution resulting from run-time protocol generation is our ap-
proach for specifying complex cryptographic protocols by specifying the protocols
through specifying a series of compilers translating from a logic-based data repre-
sentation language to a formal language specifying executable cryptographic pro-
tocols. Due to the genericity of the supported protocols, the presentation of the
specification is more complex than the protocol specification of the basic proto-
cols [BBC+09, Sec10] for Identity Mixer.
The work on run-time protocol generation in this thesis builds on those earlier
results and takes them further, resulting in a 5-layer architecture capable of handling
the complexity of the extended protocols of this thesis and ensuring their efficient
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execution. Our approach to run-time generation of protocols is briefly summarized
in Chapter 6—the full version thereof could not be presented due to page limitations
for the thesis.
1.5.1.1 Supported Functionality
The identity management system we define has expressive capabilities that go far
beyond that of related work in this domain, particularly in terms of data mini-
mization, trust management, and accountability. Those capabilities are supported
throughout the stack, ranging from the authentication model, via the data request
and representation languages and computations over sentences expressed in them,
to the generation and execution of the cryptographic protocols for proving, that is,
authenticating, data statements to other parties.
Monotonous Boolean formulae. Our data model allows for specifying data-
minimizing requests and statements. Formulae are monotonous boolean formulae,
the predicates of which can make assertions about attributes of a user and machine.
Data minimization is supported through the following crucial properties: (1) Predi-
cates expressed over attributes instead of always revealing them; and (2) disjunctions
over sub-formulae can further reduce the amount of information revealed about a
party. Expressing disjunctions over sub-formulae takes data minimization further
than only supporting predicates over attributes and goes beyond what most current
approaches can support. Business processes can, in the light of data-minimizing
transactions, still get the information they need to operate, while users can reveal
less data than in traditional data-minimizing systems. Disjunctions are supported in
the data representation and request languages, and thus the access control language,
as well as on all layers of the framework for run-time generating the credential-based
cryptographic protocols. Supporting disjunctions in data statements has raised chal-
lenges in multiple places of the framework and system, e.g., logic-based reasoning
support over ontologies. The full support of disjunctions, and thus monotonous
formulae for making identity statements is a major contribution of our work.
Delegation of authority. Overall, delegation of authority over identity informa-
tion is an important aspect that is discussed in various parts of the work due to
its importance in practical identity management systems.3 Particularly, it is han-
dled in conceptual discussions, in the data model, its semantics, the access control
policies, and the protocol generation framework, which are the main areas where
this concept needs to be covered in order for it to be tightly integrated into the
framework. The tight integration of delegation into relevant parts of the architec-
ture allows for expressing policies including delegation, finding suitable pseudonyms
and credentials that fulfill such policies, and using those in cryptographic protocols.
3This is not to be confused with delegation of attribute authority as discussed in trust manage-
ment systems [LGF03], which we clearly also support as a key feature.
20 1 Introduction
Delegation is still a missing feature in recent notable work on privacy-enhanced au-
thorization languages, e.g., [CMN+10] and associated cryptographic protocols for
private certificates and their implementations.
Outsourcing of trust decisions. An open identity system as the one defined
in this thesis requires its players to make certain trust decisions when interacting
with each other. For example, a service provider needs to decide which certifiers
to trust for certifying user attributes used for a given purpose, or both a user and
service provider need to decide which trustee they trust related to accountability
of transactions. Such and analogous decisions cannot realistically be made by end
users and in many cases they will be too cumbersome, complex, or time-consuming
to be made by organizations such as service providers on the Internet. The reason
for this is that we target an open system with a plurality of parties of each of the
kinds, e.g., certifiers, where the number of such parties is too big that users or
service providers can reasonably be assumed to have an overview over those parties
and their properties. At a first glance, the intention to create an open system and
parties being able to exploit this seems to create a dilemma. This has first been
addressed in the context of the field of trust management [LGF00, LGF03].
We provide a solution to this dilemma by defining mechanisms for the outsourc-
ing of trust to third parties as a logical consequence. This means that only few
high-level or aggregate trust decisions need to be made by a party on which parties
to trust for making trust decisions on behalf of the party. This is realized through
ontologies, where an ontology is a formal specification of parts of the considered
world, e.g., describing attributes or properties of parties or the relations between
parties. Using those ontologies in an automated deduction system exploits the con-
tained formalized knowledge for automatically making certain trust decisions.
Pseudonymous certifiers. As a special privacy-enhancing feature, our languages,
protocols, and overall system allow for supporting pseudonymous certifiers, which
extends the traditional and predominant model of professional identity providers.
Thereby, we allow certifiers to act under a pseudonym or under specified proper-
ties (attributes) that are endorsed by certifiers as usual. The trust decisions by
relying parties are then made based on such pseudonyms or certified properties of
pseudonymous or anonymous certifiers. This leads to a much more open trust model
where certifiers can be addressed in a general way through their properties and not
only identifying attributes. This carries the idea of users authenticating attributes
instead of identifying information towards certifiers. We think that on-line com-
munities might be an interesting field of application where pseudonymous certifiers
can issue identities to community users while building up reputation w.r.t. their
pseudonyms.
Privacy with accountability. Defining technical means for balancing privacy
and accountability is a contribution which is crucial for practical systems. Based on
our early results of expressing anonymity-preserving data statements while ensuring
1.5 Contributions 21
user accountability of the transactions [BCS05], we have integrated those results into
our data model and protocols. Our system allows for transactions to be anonymous,
while, under pre-agreed conditions, further (identifying) attribute information can
be learnt by the relying, or a third, party, or both.
Registration. Our framework and system furthermore supports registration of
parties in the system and the binding of credentials to registration credentials. A
registration credential is one which is considered to offer sufficient security to prevent
its illegitimate use by its holder or other parties, e.g., through sharing or theft, as well
as sufficiently strong identity verification of the credential holder. An example for a
suitable registration credential is a smart-card-based electronic identity document.
Certifiers have the freedom of choosing which credentials they accept as regis-
tration credentials and to issue their credentials with respect to those. Leaving such
trust decisions to certifiers is, in our view, crucial for an open system. A registra-
tion domain comprises all credentials issued on a registration credential. Challenges
arise in terms of authoring authorization policies related to registration credentials,
particularly in the context of using ontology-based generalizations for referring to
credential types or certifiers. We provide solutions to those challenges and support
registration binding throughout the framework.
Bridging registration domains. Another contribution relevant in the light of
making the identity management system more practical is the support for bridging
registration domains. Bridging registration domains means that a user can make use
of credentials of different registration domains in a single protocol for releasing data.
We have designed our system from the logic-based data representation language to
the cryptographic protocols layer to support that a party can have and use multiple
registration credentials, even in a single data release protocol. This helps keep our
system open by not mandating a single registration per user, which would lead to
rather unrealistic assumptions.
1.5.1.2 System Aspects
Related to building a functional integrated system, we have made multiple contri-
butions as outlined next.
Integration with standards. For being compliant with standard means of com-
munication between parties, data requests and data statements with accompany-
ing proof protocols have been integrated into the Web Services stack [CGS06,
GSC07]. This work presents a general method for transferring the semantics of
zero-knowledge proof protocols to XML signatures [ERS02]. The authors then show
how this can be used to transfer the semantics of zero-knowledge proofs also to
WS-Security [WSS04] and thus also WS-Trust [KN03a]. This enables a new WS-
Federation Active Requestor profile [KN03b], using private certificates instead of
traditional tokens, thereby immediately leveraging the advantages of private certifi-
cate systems.
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A complete implementation of the cryptographic protocols [Som07] and XML
messaging has been done to achieve the integration with the WS-Trust standard
[CGS06]. It has been presented as part of a larger showcase [BSBC+07] using an
older version of the cryptographic credential protocols. The mechanism can be
equally applied to the extended data representation language and cryptographic
protocols presented in this thesis. The work on WS-Trust integration [CGS06] is
a practical example of how the limitations of current standards can be overcome
for integrating novel mechanisms into standards and overcome corresponding lack
of extensibility in their design.
Integration with commercial products. The implementation results have ad-
ditionally been integrated with the access control and identity federation products
of a major software vendor to showcase the practical feasibility of our approach.
In its entirety, the resulting prototype shows the realization of a privacy-enhanced
identity management setting, including an integration with major standards as
well as major commercial products in the identity and access management space.
Through this prototype we could prove the technical feasibility of privacy-enhanced
identity management systems in a real-world environment constrained through ex-
isting standards and products. Those encouraging results can act as a driver for
the further development of credential systems and their deployment in real-world
environments.
Implementation of a use case. Using the protocol implementation [Som07] and
its WS-Trust integration [CGS06], an application prototype featuring a privacy-
enabled healthcare scenario has been implemented and shown at the IIW 2007
event [BSBC+07]. The showcase was built upon the Tomcat4 application server,
the standard access control system of which was exploited to accept authentications
using credential-based proofs of attribute statements instead of username/password
authentication.
1.5.1.3 An Integrated Approach
The work performed in relation to this thesis has progressed the state of the art in
the area of privacy-preserving identity management based on credential systems at
large as outlined above, and in orthogonal areas in various ways. The main result of
the work is the definition of a system and framework for realizing protocols for data-
minimizing authentication based on private credentials. Our contributions thereby
are multifold and comprise contributions in multiple dimensions.
Regarding the dimension of technical contributions, we have obtained results
related to a framework and system for privacy-preserving identity management as
discussed already above.
Substantial value of our work, in addition to mentioned individual contributions,
can be found in the dimension of system integration. Our technical contributions
4http://tomcat.apache.org/
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have been tightly integrated to form a system and framework. This has required the
alignment of the mechanisms with each other, that is, the technical contributions
have not been considered from a limited perspective, rather, from the perspective of
a holistic framework and system, with the additional challenges resulting from this.
Further value of our work results from a function integration on multiple di-
mensions: We have designed our system to exceed existing approaches in terms of
privacy-related functionality. Also, it has been crucial for our work that the resulting
system be an open system and that realistic assumptions for practical deployments
be made. Bringing those aspects together has further increased the complexity of
the work. As a concrete example for privacy functionality, we allow for data state-
ments comprising disjunctions for further minimizing release of non-required data
throughout the whole system, which has resulted in a substantial increase of the
technical complexity in multiple areas. An example for functionality for facilitating
system openness is the support of ontologies for, among other things, the outsourc-
ing of trust decisions. Examples for realistic assumptions are the generic support
of binding credentials to any of a set of (hardware-based) registration credentials or
the support of multiple registrations of a party in the system. Combining multiple
functionalities of those kinds has lead to a further increase of the complexity of the
resulting mechanisms and framework and system.
Other work often neglects the system integration perspective, function integra-
tion perspective, or both. They address isolated aspects of contributions only, while
neglecting the crucial integration aspects. Our holistic view distinguishes our work
from much of the other work in the area and has been an overall focus. For example,
many other works focusing on a system for privacy-enhanced authorization do not
consider other protocols than revealing data, thus neglecting additional complica-
tions. As another example, various works address privacy-friendly credential-based
access control, while neglecting trust outsourcing or specificities of registration of
parties in the system. Those results thereby neglect requirements for practical de-
ployments and are thus, in practice, not suitable as generic building blocks for an
open identity management system we propose.
The approach of the tight integration of our contributions implies that not all
chapters of this thesis are self-standing results, rather, some of the chapters bring
together results from other chapters to obtain the integrated framework and system.
An example for this is Chapter 5 which brings together the secure channel model,
the logic-based data representation, and the cryptographic protocols. Particularly,
this means that those results cannot be independently published because their value
comes from the integrated perspective in the context of our overall work.
The complexity of some of our results, or the presentation thereof, has resulted
from their tight integration. Many of the aspects can be much simplified when
considering isolated results, e.g., the data request language without the aspects of
how it integrates in terms of the cryptographic protocols.
Building a system based on the concepts we have discussed is a comprehensive
effort. What has been presented earlier as contributions of this thesis forms the
conceptual and technical core of such system. Additionally to this, further elements
need to be thought of in a complete implementation, which have only been touched
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on in this thesis. This comprises the support of standard Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) mechanisms for distributing public keys, ontologies, and the like in an
integrity-protected way. This requires extensions, also of the underlying standards,
for handling items not being public keys of traditional cryptographic schemes for
which PKI standards exist and have originally been defined for.
An integrated system for user-centric privacy-enhanced identity management
with a focus on data minimization co-designed by the author has been proposed by
results of the PRIME project [CSS+05, CLS11]. A system prototype of it has been
built as part of the project [PRI08, CLS11]. Within this project, a subsystem has
been built for privacy-enhancing authorization based on credential protocols as one
part of the project efforts. Ontology-based reasoning support was demonstrated to
be feasible as well. Further work done in the project includes the (semi-)automated
assurance assessment of parties included in the negotiation flow, life-cycle data man-
agement, usability, or anonymous communication.
1.5.2 Complementary Contributions
We next present further results related to the framework and system presented in
this thesis. Those results complement the presented results by being closely related
to or extending the work.
Taxonomy. User-centricity is a significant concept of federated identity manage-
ment as it relates to strong user control and privacy. As multiple different notations
of user centricity have been used in the identity management community, its mean-
ing has been unclear. The author considers user centricity abstractly and estab-
lishes a taxonomy to clarify its meaning [BSCGS06, BSCGS07]. These works show
the different mechanisms to realize user-centric systems and the different result-
ing trust assumptions. The authors classify the mechanisms into two predominant
variants of user-centric federated identity management systems: credential-focused
systems with oﬄine identity providers and long-term credentials at a user’s client,
and relationship-focused systems with online identity providers that issue short-term
credentials during transactions.
Formal model of Identity Mixer. A complementary result to the work pre-
sented in this thesis is a formal model of the Identity Mixer credential proto-
cols [CMS10]. The model has been successfully checked using Mo¨dersheim and
Vigano`’s OFMC model checker [MV09a]. This result nicely complements the frame-
work and system presented in this thesis in increasing the assurance we can have
in the underlying cryptographic protocols through model checking of a simplified
variant thereof.
User interfaces. We have obtained results in the area of user interfaces for choos-
ing identity information to release in order to fulfill a data request (policy) of a
requesting party, henceforth also referrred to as identity selection. In Camenisch et
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al. [CSSZ06], we have shown an approach for identity selection tightly integrated
with the Firefox Web browser and consuming minimal browser area, while being
easy to use. This has been fully implemented together with the credential system
protocols and part of our healthcare prototype of Bhargav-Spantzel, Bussani et
al. [BSBC+07]. In our later work, we have investigated a user interface for identity
selection which allows for greater expressiveness of the underlying specification lan-
guage [BCPS09]. The resulting interface consumes more screen space, though can
cope with the higher expressiveness, while providing for more explicit consideration
of informed consent requirements as put forth in the European Data Protection Di-
rective [Eur95]. Another approach for the dynamic selection of identity information
has been attempted [BBCS10]. All those results on user interfaces are based on sim-
plified data representation languages compared to the one presented in this thesis.
We leave the challenges resulting from a user interface capturing the complexity of
the language of this thesis to future work and think that preferences-based decision
support is required to handle the resulting complexity. Our results precede relevant
conceptual work on user interfaces for privacy-enhancing authentication and privacy
management in general resulting from the PrimeLife project [WAFH11, AFHWP12]
and are among the earliest results in this area.
Notions of trust. The term trust has a plurality of meanings in the context
of user-centric privacy-enhanced identity management as discussed as part of the
efforts related to the PRIME project [ACC+05, CPS11]. We discuss the different
dimensions of trust, ranging from the social to the technical dimension, as well as
its temporal, risk, delegation, and dynamic aspects. Those discussions equally play
a role for the system and framework presented in this thesis, which is an evolved
subsystem of the one elaborated within the PRIME project.
1.5.3 Orthogonal Contributions
The results presented in this thesis and the complementary results are targeted
at defining a comprehensive framework and system for privacy-preserving identity
management using private certificates, thereby resolving systemic challenges of such
system. The thesis is only focused on this narrow, yet important, topic, while, in
order to comprehensively protect the privacy of citizens, further areas need to be
addressed outside of the thesis scope. To this end, further contributions to topics
related to privacy and security have been made by the author in the course of
the research in the field of privacy. As those results address privacy from different
standpoints than our framework and system, they can thereby be seen as orthogonal
results. The areas touched by those results are such where privacy is at risk to a high
degree: social networking, virtual reality systems, and identity resolution. Next,
we present an overview of those additional contributions, their value to privacy,
as well as how they relate to our core results of the thesis by addressing a more
comprehensive view on privacy.
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Access control in electronic social networks. A privacy protection issue
which is completely orthogonal to that of minimizing data to be released by a party
in a transaction has come up with the widespread use of electronic social networks.
An electronic social network (ESN) holds profile data of users and it is the very
purpose of an ESN that those data be available to other users. That is, data mini-
mization towards the service provider is not applicable in today’s service-provider-
centric architecture models for ESNs—the service provider learns, by definition of
the architecture, all profile data elements of all users. In this model, the goal for
privacy is that the profile data of a user is available to other users only as decided
by the holder (owner) of the profile. However, with the growing number of contacts
a user has, it becomes an increasingly unrealistic assumption that the user is able
to reasonably define the access control function for her profile data. A part of the
definition of such access control function realizes the concept of audience segregation
for social networks as discussed by van den Berg and Leenes [vdBL10, vdBL11].
We propose a method for access control to profile data which is based on users
assigning ratings with respect to metrics on other users in a generic manner in Mu¨ller
and Sommer [MS12a]. Those ratings act as inputs to an access control function
which is used for computing decisions on which profile data items to make available
to an ESN user. For example, if a user rates another user as highly competent in a
certain area, this may lead to the other user gaining access to high-value business
contacts of the user. This approach realizes user-defined access control to profile
data the user holds in a generic manner, implying also the capability for realizing
audience segregation as a special case. Thereby, the approach follows the principle
put forth by Westin [Wes67] of users deciding on which data to release to which
parties.
Further work we did in the area of electronic social networks relates to automat-
ing certain aspects of relationship management [MS10a], exploitation of contextual
information in social networks [MS10b], negotiable information access [MS12b], or
aspects of data integration of social networks [SM09].
Trust through electronic social networks. One main problem of the so-called
Web of Trust [Zim95] public key infrastructure is that it depends on the ability
of its users to ensure the association between public keys and their owners. Such
association can, for example, be achieved by signing public keys once their binding
to persons has been checked in physical meetings, e.g., through verifying credentials
such as identity cards or passports of the claimed key holders. Such procedure is
rather time consuming and not suitable for the average user, which may be one of
the main inhibitors of the success of the Web of Trust PKI. We propose mechanisms
for simplifying such trust management by utilizing electronic social networks (ESNs)
as they already comprise a rich set of identity and trust information. We thereby
build on dynamically changing profile information and interaction between users of
social networks. In our model, we consider both trust establishment between parties
as well as trust management of established trust relationships over time as relations
change over time. The basic approach has been originally proposed by Mu¨ller and
Sommer and published later [BMP+09]. The idea of exploiting electronic social
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networks for trust management has also been discussed by Hogben [Hog09] in a
parallel effort, though our work takes the ideas further and to a greater level of
detail.
Our approach of leveraging electronic social networks for the management of
the Web of Trust PKI can allow, once implemented using appropriate usability
concepts, average users to leverage their ESN profiles and data to manage their
Web of Trust public keys. This can allow one to overcome the non-acceptance of
such PKI as of today, caused through today’s tedious and complicated management
processes for the users and thereby help move towards encryption and signing of
electronic communication of users. This can substantially contribute to privacy
of users by addressing communication privacy as well as better accountability of
communication, should this be required. Again, this is orthogonal to the privacy
benefits of the core part of this thesis. However, it also touches on important and
still unresolved privacy and accountability issues of today’s deployed systems of
electronic communication. Realizing such idea is possible through extensions of
social network platforms, either in their core or through applications, and does not
require the interplay of a plurality of different players.
Privacy-enhanced authentication in virtual worlds. At the time when vir-
tual worlds have gained strong public attention, we have investigated the integration
of privacy-enhanced authentication in virtual worlds [BCH+09, BHSS10]. As virtual
worlds are typically based on a centralized architecture such that the provider learns
all information being exchanged in the virtual world, a main idea was to detach the
authentication infrastructure from the virtual world and maintain it as part of a
separate authentication infrastructure, connecting to the virtual world over simple
interfaces. Another main idea was to allow real-world credentials, e.g., an electronic
identity card, to be used in the virtual world, e.g., for age verification. The reason-
ing behind this is that in many use cases (certified) attributes of the human behind
the avatar, that is, secure real-world identities, are relevant for an authentication
of the avatar in the virtual world. Consider age verification in the virtual world as
an example for this. The possibility of the use of real-world credentials is implied
by integrating a standard authentication infrastructure with the virtual world. The
proposed architecture ensures that the virtual world platform provider learns the
minimum amount of information with respect to authentication transactions of the
users.
The feasibility of the ideas has been shown through a prototype implementation
of the architecture based on our privacy-enhancing authentication architecture and
prototypes [Som07, CGS06, CSSZ06, CSSZ07] used withing the Second Life5 virtual
world platform as an authentication mechanism outside of, and integrated with, the
virtual world system.
A further item of work relates to privacy-enhanced presentations in virtual world
infrastructures [BCG+10], which allows an authenticated group of parties to attend
a presentation and view it in a confidential manner on a public screen, while non-
5http://secondlife.com
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authenticated parties see public image material on this screen.
Privacy-enhanced database matching. Contributions in the field of privacy
that are orthogonal to our privacy management system have been made in the area
of identity resolution, which is the processing of multiple databases for identifying
entries of different data sets that match in terms of specific criteria. Thereby, fields
of data records of different databases (from different data suppliers) are compared
with each other to identify similar records that probably belong to the same person.
Such systems are used, e.g., for identifying fraud when a single person uses multiple
(similar) identities, to consolidate customer databases, or for threat detection in
the national security context. Our work was performed as a possible extension of a
product in this area from a major IT services company to better protect personal
data in the identity resolution context.
The simplest approach is that the matching party, or matcher, obtains all to-be-
matched databases and runs the processing on those local copies. This, of course,
reveals the complete databases to the matcher. An extension of this basic scheme
is based on computing salted cryptographic hashes of data items which improves
on the basic scheme but is susceptible to phone book attacks through which it
is not hard to reconstruct large portions of a database. Products implementing
such schemes are available and used in practice, both by governmental and private
organizations. Overall, the idea of applying identity resolution schemes counters
the idea of data minimization because of the potentially excessive sharing of user
data between parties. Though, as this is done in practice with mechanisms worth
improving, we investigated this field and proposed schemes with better privacy
protection. Thereby, we contribute to a field orthogonal to our main part of the
work in order to improve on users’ privacy from a more comprehensive perspective.
We improve on currently implemented identity resolution technology by propos-
ing a family of schemes in which all parties contributing a database to an identity
resolution process need to acknowledge all data of all other data contributors, where
they obtain the data in an obfuscated form only. This effectively prevents phone
book attacks of previous schemes that uncover large parts of the databases and also
allows for quantitative control of the identity resolutions being done by the match-
ing party. We provide a system architecture as well as a proposal for a realization
of what we refer to as commutative obfuscation function, of which commutative en-
cryption can be an instantiation. On top of our basic scheme we propose a number
of extensions for further strengthening privacy protection of the databases resulting
in a family of privacy-enhanced identity resolution schemes [VPCS11a, VPCS11b].
Privacy-enhancing identity resolution may reduce the disclosure of identifying per-
sonal data while retaining utility of the data in the private sector context. In the
national security domain, it is expected that unobfuscated personal data will be
preferred.
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1.5.4 Summary of Contributions
Summarized, a major contribution of this thesis is to show how the theory in the form
of cryptographic protocols can be transferred towards practice6 through a system
design and framework that is comprehensive in multiple dimensions. The overall
work has started with a vision of privacy-preserving identity management and the
basic cryptographic protocols. We present a comprehensive architecture for a system
that comprises data representation, authorization, reasoning over ontologies, and
cryptographic protocols to realize this vision. All those aspects have been developed
to be aligned with each other for obtaining a coherent system. We have realized
multiple prototype implementations of selected aspects of our work for validating
our approaches, e.g., a version of the credential protocols with a first set of features
targeted at practical deployments, an integration with standards thereof, and a user
interface, and shown through a complete showcase that application of the protocols
for practical Internet authentication scenarios is feasible today. This fully functional
identity management showcase based on our implementation results has integrated
all implementation results at the time for obtaining a complete system. In this
respect, our results fill substantial gaps in the domain of privacy-enhanced identity
management that have not been addressed before, particularly also in making the
cryptographic protocols practical. We have overcome main challenges related to
integrating the complex cryptographic protocols into a system, while exposing their
semantics through a logic-based language.
In addition to those core results related to the thesis, we have obtained comple-
mentary and orthogonal contributions in the domain of privacy-enhanced identity
management as discussed above. Jointly, the contributions cover the system for
data-minimizing identity management as well as related domains crucial for the
protection of user privacy deeply and cover the wider problem domain of privacy
and security with further selected results in key practical problem domains.
1.6 The Need for Data-minimizing Authentication
for the Future Internet
Considering the rapidly evolving personal data economy, the potential cost, in both
monetary terms and hassle, of data breaches, the excessive release of data by users
for performing online transactions, and the direction of regulatory initiatives in
both Europe and the United States as discussed in Sec. 1.1 above, we conclude
that there is a strong need for data-minimizing authentication on the Internet.
We see such technology to be used in conjunction with tools for allowing for user
control of profiling and network-level unlinkability, the (semi-)automated agreement
of data handling policies with service providers, and an automated preferences-
driven approach for applying those technologies in a concerted manner. Using such
concerted approach for controlling both explicit as well as implicit release of data
6This is made explicit in the subtitle “From Cryptography to Practice” we have chosen for the
thesis.
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can help balance the privacy interests of the users with the economic interests of
service providers and third parties, while keeping services free of monetary charge.
This is, in our view, a likely scenario in the future. Clearly, users should have
the possibility of choosing to be fully untraceable for certain interactions, while
still being capable of asserting certified attributes, when they feel sensitive personal
data is involved and needs to be protected. Otherwise, a certain (user-controlled)
amount of data release is necessary for personalization of services and targeting of
advertising. Thus, our proposed privacy-enhanced authentication system provides
a strong solution to parts of the privacy problem space, helping users get better
control over their personal data release.
Both Europe and the United States have launched government-funded research
programs for progressing the state of the art in privacy-enhanced identity manage-
ment. The European PRIME program [PRI08] has addressed data minimization
in identity management in the direction of this thesis, while the PrimeLife pro-
gram [Pri10] has taken a broader perspective, particularly also taking new challenges
resulting from user-generated content, particularly social networking, into account.
A more recent initiative in Europe is the ABC4Trust project [ABC13] which pilots
privacy-enhanced authentication technology based on credentials. A notable and
more recent initiative in the USA is the NSTIC program [The11, Nat10], which also
addresses data-minimizing authentication as one of its topics, while piloting the
technologies. This further underlines the interest of major governments in privacy-
enhancing technologies like those proposed in this thesis.
The author has made substantial technical contributions to the PRIME program
and managed the PrimeLife program at the time he was working on this thesis. The
work in PRIME has lead to the earlier results and publications related to the thesis
and has resulted in requirements for the later refinement of the results presented in
the thesis.
A potential game-changing paradigm shift in the future towards a market for
personal data in which users trade personal data against monetary payments could
radically change the personal data economy of today and put the user into an overall
stronger position. In case of such changing paradigm on how personal data gets
handled, using our privacy-enhanced authentication approaches and other identity
management techniques may give those willing to pay for privacy close-to-perfect
privacy, while users who want to earn by having their (personal) data exploited, let
companies use them at their discretion.
1.7 Thesis Outline
After this introduction in the current Chapter 1, we first provide an introduction
to terminology and concepts in Chapter 2, for this being instrumental for the un-
derstanding. Thereafter, we present the secure channel model, with a focus on
authentication in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 on the data model we go into details on
how data and requests are represented in a formal calculus and discuss ontology-
based deductions for the authentication context. In Chapter 5 we apply the data
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model to specifying the interfaces of our cryptographic protocols. In Chapter 6, we
give an overview of our run-time generation framework for cryptographic protocols.
Due to space constraints, a full specification thereof cannot be given in this the-
sis. In Chapter 7, we summarize the implementation efforts related to the results
in the thesis. We conclude in Chapter 8 with future work and an outlook on the
deployment of privacy-enhanced authentication technologies.

Chapter2
Concepts and Terminology
In this chapter, we introduce basic terminology and present some general yet impor-
tant concepts for privacy-enhanced identity management which we will build upon
and adapt towards our needs. Thereby we build on the terminology presented by
Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH, PH10] and adapt or extend it where necessary. We rec-
ommend their work to the reader as an excellent and comprehensive introduction
to privacy terminology with a focus on data minimization and privacy.
2.1 Basic Terminology
An identifier is a bitstring or name that refers to a party in the system. An identifier
can reveal attribute information about a party, e.g., the legal name of a party, or
can be semanticless, as is the case for a pseudonym. Attribute statements can
be associated with an identifier, without the referred-to party necessarily being
identified through its legal identity. A special kind of identifiers are pseudonyms as
introduced further below.
The civil identity or legal identity of a party comprises the attributes of the
party that have been assigned to it officially, e.g., through governmental institutions.
Examples for attributes comprising legal identities are the first name, last name,
date of birth, or social security number. Attributes such as the passport number
and identity card number as contained in concrete credentials of the party are further
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examples of attributes of the legal identity.
A transaction between parties is a sequence of messages exchanged between
the parties to accomplish a given task. In this thesis, we are mainly interested
in transactions for establishing authentications between parties. A transaction does
not have the strong properties, e.g., atomicity, of transactions in the database world.
A party is identifiable within a set of parties, the identifiability set, if the party
is uniquely characterized through the knowledge available about it to an observer.
Anonymity of a party is defined as the party not being identifiable by an observer
within a set of parties, the anonymity set. The anonymity set is defined through
the information known about the party and the distribution of attributes among
parties.
A party is pseudonymous if it uses a pseudonym identifier for referring to itself
in a transaction with another party, or if another party uses a pseudonym identifier
for referring to this party. Pseudonymity does not make a statement about the
anonymity of the party.
Unlinkability of two transactions is defined as the observer not being able to
decide whether the same party has been involved in both transactions. When con-
sidering unlinkability, the observer is often one of the parties involved in the trans-
action or a coalition of multiple such parties. Linkability of two transactions, on the
contrary, means that the observer has information allowing it to deduce that the
same party is involved in both transactions.
The observer referred to above can be any party from the perspective of which
the above properties are to be assessed. Note that a common case when considering
privacy is that the observer is comprised of a coalition of multiple parties in a system,
e.g., a service provider a user authenticates to and involved certifiers of identity
attributes. The identifiability and anonymity properties are always relative to the
observer which we consider. When we mean an observer with malicious intentions,
we may refer to it as an attacker. An observer is a passive attacker, while an active
attacker may execute actions not corresponding to the agreed protocol.
A party’s civil identity attributes typically make a party identifiable consider-
ing the identifiability set comprising all players in the system, while a pseudonym
without any further attribute statements associated with it, will usually not make
the party identifiable, but let it remain anonymous w.r.t. the anonymity set com-
prising all parties in the system. When a party uses the same pseudonym in two
transactions, those transactions are trivially linkable.
Identity management in this work is following a wider definition than that in
Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH10], which is essentially constrained to the management
of a party’s partial identities comprising the development of partial identities and
choice of such and pseudonyms for use in a transaction. The notion of identity
management used in this thesis takes a broader perspective and covers all aspects of
handling digital identity data throughout their life cycle by all parties involved. This
comprises particularly, but is not limited to, a party’s (user’s) management of partial
identities in the sense of the related earlier work [PH10], the release of identity data
to recipients including user interactions, aspects related to authorization to resources
of a party through release of identity data, and the enforcement of agreed policies for
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handling released data. This matches the prevalent notion of identity management
in the literature body [CLHS11, HBC+04, Koh10, PLFK11, PKK+11]. The identity
management system presented in this thesis focuses on the data-minimizing release
of attribute statements, including the handling of credentials, policies, and user
interactions. The system can be seen as part of a larger system with additional
functionality as that proposed in the PRIME project [PRI08, Som11].
Another part of the literature views identity management from the enterprise
perspective as the management of identity data and related identifiers of parties,
e.g., employees and customers, relevant in the enterprise context. The common
meaning of the term is aligned with this enterprise-centric notion [Bla11] rather
than with the research notion adopted in this work.
Privacy-enhanced identity management is identity management that can realize
data minimization, that is, facilitates unlinkability of transactions where desired,
and keeps partial identities minimal. In a broader scope, such system provides
further mechanisms for protecting user privacy, e.g., a policy-based data life-cycle
management subsystem. User-centric identity management refers to the approach
of allowing the users to have control over their identity data and the use thereof.
Privacy-enhancing user-centric identity management is the combination of both
above concepts of user-centric identity management and privacy-enhancing identity
management and is the approach followed in this thesis. [BSCGS06, BSCGS07]
2.2 Data Minimization
The concept of data minimization refers to constraining the collection of personal
data by a data controller to the minimum required for a specified purpose. It
is crucial that this minimum is to be seen relative to the purpose the data are
collected for—according to the closely related purpose specification principle, data
may only be collected by a data controller for a specified purpose. Following the
definition given in related work [PH10], data minimization also encompasses that
the mere possibility of collecting personal data about others be limited as well as
the temporal dimension, that is, that the time that collected data is stored by the
data controller be minimized.
The data protection principle of data minimization has its legal roots in the
early foundations of European and international data protection, namely the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) [Cou50], the Data Protection Conven-
tion of the Council of Europe7 [Cou81], the OECD guidelines on data protection
for transborder data flows [OEC80], and the European Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC [Eur95]. The principle has not been referred to as data minimization
principle explicitly, rather it can be derived from other principles—the purpose
specification principle and the proportionality principle. The purpose specification
principle, also known as finality principle, can be derived from Art. 6.1(b) of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC [Eur95], Article 5(b) and (c) of the Convention 108 and Art. 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The proportionality principle has been put
7This is the Convention 108 of the Council of Europe and often referred to as such.
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forth in Art. 6.1(c) of Directive 95/46/EC and Art. 5(c) of the Data Protection Con-
vention of the Council of Europe [Cou81]. Article 6.1(e) Directive 95/46/EC implies
that data may be kept only in anonymized form or must be deleted once not required
for the purposes for which they have been collected. The principle of data mini-
mization is denoted as such explicitly in some data protection acts that implement
the Directive 95/46/EC, e.g., Article 3(a) of the German federal data protection
law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)) [Deu03]. See, e.g., Schnabel [Sch09], for a
discussion of the basic legal principles underpinning data protection in Europe.
The guidelines and legal regulations consider the general notion of collection of
data by the data controller. The setting of the release of certified identity data rel-
evant in this thesis is a special case of this and data minimization becomes mainly
relevant in the context of a party, the user (data subject), releasing data to an-
other party, the service provider (data controller). Also worth considering in this
context are the certifiers facilitating the release of certified data, to which, when
interpreting the guidelines and regulations in the light of the technology used, the
principle of data minimization should be applied equally. We leave the discussion
on whether certifiers are data controllers or only data processors in a data release
transaction as an open issue for the legal domain. Using such interpretation, private
certificate technology is the only technology capable of realizing data minimization
in the setting of certified attribute information as it prevents certifiers from learn-
ing information about a user’s transactions and prevents service providers from
learning excessive information through the intrinsic properties of other certification
technologies.
Data minimization is the key privacy property we target to achieve with our
approach for the release of certified data which constitutes the main part of the
thesis. The notion of data minimization we adopt is the one of data minimization
towards the data recipient (data controller or data processor acting on behalf of
the data controller) and also towards third parties that may be involved in the
transaction of releasing data. We are not particularly interested here in data a data
controller has obtained from different channels than the release by a user—this is
part of a larger architecture and system, aspects of which are, e.g., discussed in
related work by the author [Som11].
Data minimization is a concept that, if it is to be realized in practice, does not
only require support at the technical level which we are discussing in this work, but
also at the level of business processes that need to be (re)defined accordingly to
operate on the minimum amount of data possible. Also legal considerations come
into play when discussing data minimization, e.g., the consequences in the case of
a dispute related to anonymous transactions, or whether anonymous interactions
are legal in certain jurisdictions. The non-technical issues are equally important as
the technical ones for a practical deployment and are treated in the corresponding
literature.
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2.3 Pseudonyms
Our model is, as mentioned already, targeted at interactions between parties where
parties are not necessarily revealing their legal identities to each other. They rather
use identifiers that do not comprise any other attribute semantics than being an
identifier, or name, for the party in a specific interaction with another party. Such
an identifier is used as a mutually known reference to the subject this identifier
refers to. Thereby it can serve as a reference to the party used by one or more other
parties. A party can have many such identifiers, particularly also multiple ones with
a single other party, and can control by itself whether it wants to link any of those
or keep them unlinked in the view of the other party or another observer. We call
such identifiers pseudonyms or subject identifiers.8 The term pseudonym has its
roots in the ancient Greek term “pseudonumon” which means falsely named.
Definition 2.1 (Pseudonym) A pseudonym is an identifier of one specific party
A that is established with one, multiple, or all other parties in the system.
A pseudonym can refer to the party who uses it which is the most prominent
case for pseudonyms, or it can refer to other parties which is, for example, required
for referring to a third party in a delegation interaction or for a service provider
making statements about data about one of its customers to another service provider
while using different names for the customer for different parties it talks to or in
different interactions. Our concept of pseudonyms thereby generalizes the notion of
pseudonyms in the identity management literature where a pseudonym is defined as
being an identifier of the party that uses the identifier [PH10].
Pseudonyms have been introduced by Chaum, who referred to the concept of
a digital pseudonym as a public key with respect to which holdership of a pri-
vate key can be proven through a digital signature [Cha81]. The application of
pseudonyms together with credentials has been first discussed in Chaum’s later
publications [Cha85, Cha86, Cha90].
Certain scenarios merit from a party having a single pseudonym it uses in com-
munication with all parties. As an example, a well-known service provider or certifier
on the Internet may benefit from, or even require, having only one pseudonym and
it does (and need) not take advantage of the privacy that multiple pseudonyms of-
fer. Such pseudonyms are denoted as public pseudonyms and are commonly used
for referring to parties acting under their legal identity at all times, such as service
providers, certifiers, or trustees.
Different kinds of pseudonyms have been discussed in the literature, with differ-
ent properties in terms of unlinkability of transactions referring to such pseudonyms,
namely person pseudonyms, role pseudonyms, relationship pseudonyms, role-rela-
tionship pseudonyms, and transaction pseudonyms [PH10]. This classification de-
pends on the contexts a pseudonym is (re)used in and affects linkability. For a
8Note that the term identifier does not imply that any attribute information about the party’s
civil identity be known. The purpose of an identifier is only to distinguish the party within a given
context.
38 2 Concepts and Terminology
detailed discussion of pseudonyms and related concepts, we refer the reader to the
already-mentioned seminal paper [PH] and its extended version [PH10].
2.4 Credentials
The term credential in the context of privacy-enhancing identity management has
been introduced by Chaum in his seminal paper on credential systems [Cha85].
Chaum has considered a credential issued to a pseudonym of a party by a certify-
ing organization (i.e., certifier) to be a statement by this organization that can be
transferred under a different pseudonym of the party to another organization in an
untraceable way. The statement was determined through the kind of credential be-
ing issued, and no attributes could be endorsed. Expressed differently, a credential
is an object that allows its holder to prove its relationship with one organization
to another organization in an untraceable way. The ideas presented in this early
paper are the basis for later practical approaches to credential systems, though, no
practical system was defined there. Chaum presented a first cryptographic imple-
mentation of a credential system in his later papers [Cha86, Cha90].
Lysyanskaya et al. [LRSW00] provide a formal definition of pseudonym and cre-
dential systems, a theoretical construction based on any one-way function, and an
efficient and practical scheme for single-use credentials. Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [CL01] define a first practical scheme for credentials with multi-show unlink-
ability, that is, a credential can be shown a polynomial (in a security parameter)
number of times and all those transactions are unlinkable to each other and the issu-
ing transaction. Their work is the basis for the Identity Mixer or idemix credential
system which is the basis of the protocols presented later in this thesis. For this
thesis, we define credentials in a more generic manner as a set of typed attributed
with their values and a signature on those.
Definition 2.2 (Credential) A credential is a cryptographic certificate compris-
ing typed attributes and their values, issued on a pseudonym of a party to this party
by a certifier (issuer). Holdership of a credential can be proven to other parties by
its holder under different pseudonyms than the one it was issued on. Such proof
of holdership means transferring the credential from a pseudonym with the issuer
to another pseudonym with the recipient party and optionally revealing parts of the
attribute information contained therein. The credential transfers are, like in the
original definitions, unlinkable to the credential issuing transaction.
This non-formal definition of credentials is aligned with the formal definitions of
[LRSW00] and [CL01], while in addition considering attributes. In this thesis, we
also refer to credentials as private credentials or private certificates. Those names
emphasize that the credential is not released in a transaction of transferring it. We
may also refer to them only as certificates when it is clear from the context that we
mean credentials.
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2.5 Partial Identity
A partial identity has originally been defined as a set of identity-related attributes
of a person, where an attribute is the pair of attribute name and value [PH, PH10].
A partial identity thus exposes a certain facet of the identity9 of a person and the
person should be in control of defining and using partial identities in interactions
with other parties at her own discretion. That is, a person can decide which partial
identity to expose to another party in an interaction. See again the related seminal
work for a discussion of partial identities and related concepts [PH, PH10].
As we take the approach of data minimization even further than envisioned in
previous work on the subject [PH, PH10], we also generalize the above definition of
the concept of partial identity of a subject to take stronger ideas in terms of data
minimization that we employ in this work into consideration. The main generaliza-
tion is that logic formulae define a partial identity, not only sets of attribute-value
pairs.
Definition 2.3 (Partial identity) A partial identity of a party A is a set of state-
ments about A, where a statement is a formula comprising assertions about A’s at-
tributes, expressed through predicates in a formula comprising the logical connectives
∧ and ∨ with their standard meaning.
Details on how those statements can be expressed in a formal language are presented
in Chapter 4. Like in the original definition, a partial identity exposes a certain facet
of the identity of a subject (party) and the party should have control over defining
(controlling) her partial identities with other parties. Our extension of the definition
accounts for our requirement of expressing predicates over attributes in addition to
only attribute values as well as disjunction as logical connective to take data mini-
mization even further without leaving the domain of efficient cryptographic protocols
for releasing such data-minimizing statements.10 Using such features allows a user
to define a partial identity based on any such statement, thereby preventing certain
unnecessary releases of attribute values where this is not required for the purpose
of the data release. Our changes retain the conceptual ideas of the notion of partial
identity and can be seen as an extension thereof for obtaining better data minimiza-
tion by using formulae making statements about identities to specify the data about
a subject instead of only sets of attribute-value pairs. The concept of conditionally
released identities as introduced in Sec. 4.4 also contributes to the concept of partial
identity in the sense of comprising information that a data recipient or third party
may obtain under certain conditions at a later point. Both conditionally released
and opaque identities may, if used within a formula, reveal, through their relations
9The term identity is used here as the totality of attributes of a party, in contrast to the pre-
dominant meaning in this work of an identity being a named set of tuples, each tuple representing
information about an attribute of the identity, as introduced in Chapter 4.4.
10Note that an attribute predicate can always be expressed as an attribute reflecting the pred-
icate, though, this approach is conceptually not clean as it unnecessarily creates new attributes
“hardcoding” the predicates for emulating those. Thus, this is not a practical approach in the
general case and particularly not a substitute for our extensions.
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to other identities, information on which third-party endorsed attributes the party
holds credentials for.
Note that the concept of identity that we introduce in Sec. 4.4 deviates from the
well-established term of identity being the set of all identity attributes of a person.
An identity in our definition is rather a set of tuples of attribute name, attribute
value, and data type certified by a certifying party. Any entity can be holder and
subject of an identity, where entities can, among others, be natural persons, legal
persons, or data processing systems or services.
2.6 Accountability
Accountability is a term that is hard to define precisely and that has contextual
meaning. It is often used in the public and private sector governance contexts,
where the common notion of accountability of a party towards another party is that
the accountable party must give account to and is liable for its actions towards the
other party, which is also well-aligned with the common meaning of the term.
In this thesis, we are interested in accountability of parties executing electronic
transactions with other parties, such that the parties can be held responsible and
liable for their actions towards the other parties in case of misconduct. We also
refer to accountability of a transaction, with the meaning that sufficient evidence is
created in the transaction which allows to hold the party executing the transaction
in case of misbehaviour liable towards the other party involved in the transaction.
For the case of a transaction using delegation, both the delegatee and delegater may
be accountable towards the other involved party of the transaction. Following this,
we define accountability with respect to a transaction between an authenticating
party A and a verifier B as presented in Definition 2.4.
Definition 2.4 (Accountability enabling, accountable) A transaction bet-
ween an authenticating party A and a party B is accountability enabling if sufficient
evidence is established at B’s side which allows B to obtain, once a pre-agreed con-
dition c becomes fulfilled at a later point in time, a set of typed attribute-value pairs
about A and/or another party D, authenticated by A and certified by one or mul-
tiple identity providers. The attributes allow to identify A or D in a given context
in order to establish the possiblity to hold it or them responsible or liable for its or
their actions. Parties A and/or D are accountable towards B in the sense that,
once the condition c becomes fulfilled, B can identify A and/or D and hold it/them
responsible and liable through external mechanisms.
Accountability is crucial in the context of compliance with legal regulations and
protecting a service provider’s interests against the interests of dishonest users.
Thereby, it allows for establishing a balance between the stakeholders in the system.
Our system achieves accountability in a setting where parties need not be identified
w.r.t. (parts of) their legal identity in order to be accountable.
A formal definition of accountability in the context of cryptographic protocols
has been presented by Ku¨sters et al. [KTV10], which defines accountability as the
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property of a protocol that, if a desired goal of the protocol cannot be met due
to misbehavior of participants, those participants can be blamed. This definition
captures only the cryptographic protocol, though, in a very generic manner, while
our informal notion is more appropriate for the context of privacy-enhancing identity
management.
2.7 Unconditional and Conditional Release
When a party A releases (parts of) an authenticated data statement to another
party B, this release can be either unconditional or conditional. When data are
released unconditionally, they are learnt by the recipient upon or before completion
of the corresponding release protocol. Conditionally released data, on the contrary,
are only learnt by their recipient once an agreed condition—the release condition—
becomes fulfilled.
Definition 2.5 (Unconditional release) Unconditional release of data by a party
A to a party B is defined through party B learning the data at the latest upon suc-
cessful completion of the release protocol.
Unconditional release is the common case for releasing data and used in most of
today’s transactions when data are revealed by parties to data recipients.
Definition 2.6 (Conditional release) Conditional release of data by a party A
to a conditional data recipient T under an agreed release condition c means that T
only learns the data once and if c becomes fulfilled after completion of the release
protocol.
Conditional release can be used to realize accountability of A towards B by condi-
tionally releasing attribute information about A, allowing A to be identified in a
certain context if the condition is fulfilled, in an otherwise pseudonymous or anony-
mous interaction.
The concept of conditional release has been introduced in the context of creden-
tial protocols in the framework of Bangerter et al. [BCL04]. Using cryptographic
mechanisms, this concept can be realized in a strong trust model [BCL04]. Con-
cretely, it can be realized through verifiable encryption [CD00, CS03], where A
encrypts certified attributes under the public encryption key of T and the condition
c as a label of the encryption, releases the ciphertext to B with which it executes
a data release protocol, and proves—as part of the protocol—that the ciphertext
contains the certified attributes as stated.
Multiple trust models can be overlayed over a verifiable encryption protocol for
enforcing the conditional aspect of the release: Either or both parties may be trusted
to enforce the condition c. When trusting party B to enforce the condition, B will
only forward the ciphertext to T once c is fulfilled, otherwise it may forward it
immediately. When trusting T to enforce the condition, we can assume it will only
decrypt a ciphertext it receives once c holds. In either setting, a third party, e.g.,
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a law enforcement agency, or, if B is not the only party assumed to be trusted for
enforcing c, B can be the ultimate recipient of the data. A typical setting is that
B has no incentive to send the ciphertext to T unless c holds, and T is trusted for
enforcing the condition.
For settings where T is trusted for enforcing the condition, we refer to it also
as conditional-release trustee, or trustee. The party needs to be trusted by the au-
thenticating party that it will not allow another party or itself to learn conditionally
released data before the condition is fulfilled. And it needs to be trusted by the ver-
ifier that it will allow it to learn the conditionally released data once the condition
is fulfilled.
2.8 Delegation
In practical information systems, it is often a requirement that parties can receive
the right to act on behalf of other parties. We next present a generic definition of
delegation that is aligned with common definitions.
Definition 2.7 (Delegation, delegater, delegatee) Delegation is defined as a
party, the delegater, giving a subset of its rights it holds in a system to a party, the
delegatee, who can then exercise those rights on behalf of the delegater.
We next present the traditional model for delegation and the delegation of at-
tribute authority. Those approaches to delegation differ fundamentally in terms of
how the delegation is achieved and the identifiability requirements of parties, or,
stated positively, the possibility of parties of remaining anonymous or pseudony-
mous, only known under attribute statements.
Traditional delegation model. In a system where parties are identified, dele-
gation can be realized through an access control policy capturing a delegation of
actions or a role for granting the delegatee access to a resource in addition to, or in
place of, the delegater, based on the delegatee’s identifying attributes or a unique
identifier. Such traditional approach to delegation is thus realized through autho-
rization policies and the authentication system can remain largely unchanged and
does not need to reflect delegation. This approach is conceptually well aligned with
the paradigm of parties being identified towards each other with their civil identities
or unique identifiers. This works well in systems where no credentials for proving
holdership of attributes, capabilities, or roles are available, but users authenticate
always with respect to their unique identities and authorization is based on this. A
plurality of services offered on the Internet today that require authorization follow
this tradition. Use cases for this traditional delegation approach are numerous and
not elaborated in this work.
Delegation of attribute authority. Though, for the more general model of
attribute-based authorization and access control we build on for our work, delegation
can be extended to the delegation of authority over the use of a delegater’s (certified)
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attributes to a delegatee. The delegatee can authenticate attribute statements to
verifiers on behalf of the delegater and get authorized to perform actions on the
verifier’s behalf. This realizes the model of delegation in a system where parties are
not necessarily known under a unique identifier or their legal identity, but known
under pseudonyms and attribute assertions.
This approach for delegation allows the delegatee to use the delegated attributes
as capabilities for gaining access to a resource. A special case is the pseudonymous
delegation of roles such that the access rights linked to a role are delegated with
the role, where roles are modeled through attributes. This is a generalized embodi-
ment of role-based access control compared to an embodiment based on traditional
identity schemes and identified users because in our scheme both the delegater and
delegatee can remain pseudonymous or anonymous to the service provider.
Any use case where a party or at least the delegatee need not be identified are
suitable for this approach to delegation. Use cases where both parties should be
identified can be handled with the traditional delegation model as a trivial case of
our system, the delegation being handled on the authorization layer.
Example 2.1 (Delegation) As a simple example, the holder of an access creden-
tial to an online resource, e.g., a commercial database, can delegate this credential to
a colleague to have actions related to the resource performed by this colleague, possi-
bly for a limited time duration. Thereby, neither of the parties needs to be identified
to the service provider, which is a main privacy advantage of our approach. Con-
crete examples are access to a patent search database delegated for parts of a project
or the booking of a trip by a secretary for her manager where the secretary can re-
main pseudonymous to the travel booking service and only prove her eligibility of
acting on behalf of the delegater without releasing a unique identifier or identifying
attributes.

Chapter3
Authentication Model
Following the motivation for the need of privacy-enhanced identity management
given in the introduction, we present our model for privacy-enhanced authentica-
tion in this chapter as part of a secure channel model. Authentication in the sense
of third-party corroborated attribute statements about parties being conveyed to a
verifier can be considered a crucial aspect related to digital identity management
because authentication poses severe privacy risks if not done with appropriate pro-
visions for privacy.
3.1 Introduction
The model presented in this chapter expresses the credential-based identity man-
agement approach that is at the core of this thesis and the system for identity
management that we define. The main goal of this system is the establishment
of authentication relationships, or authentications, between parties. Informally, we
mean with authentication that authenticity of a statement about a party, and pos-
sibly other parties, be established towards a recipient.
Using the concepts and terminology of the secure channel model and algebra of
Maurer and Schmid [MS94, MS96] and its recent extensions by the author [BCS12a]
and the model presented in this chapter, the main goal of our system is the estab-
lishment of authenticated channels between parties. Authorization policies are not
considered explicitly in the channel model we propose and it is assumed that parties
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authenticate attribute statements such that the recipient policies are fulfilled for
reaching the goal, e.g., accessing a resource.
The authentications to be established between parties in the system are governed
through the authorization policies of the parties. An authentication of a party with
another party is always established for a well-defined reason. Abstractly, this reason
can be modeled as an access to a resource of the party by the other party with
authorization policies being specified over this resource and governing the required
authentication.
We present the related work for the channel model in Sec. 3.2. Thereafter, we
present the Maurer–Schmid model [MS94, MS96] for secure channel composition in
Sec. 3.3 as a prerequisite for the later work. Based on this and our previous work on
channel composition models by Bichsel et al. [BCS12a], we introduce our extended
secure channel model in Sec. 3.4 and thereby keep a focus on the authentication
property. We present a set of transformation rules of a channel composition algebra
for our extended model in Sec. 3.5. We explain the separation of authentication and
authorization functionality for our system in Sec. 3.6 and elaborate on the concept
of evidence for authenticating statements in Sec. 3.7. We discuss in Sec. 3.8 how
one can factor trust in parties out of the authentication layer and consider it in the
orthogonal authorization layer and we elaborate on the concept of registration of a
party in a system in the context of the model and its importance for bootstrapping
an identity system in Sec. 3.9. We conclude the chapter with thoughts about future
work in Sec. 3.10.
3.2 Related Work
In the area of modeling security of authentication and communication channels,
numerous recent papers are available. Typically, they focus on formally verify-
ing security properties of protocols in an automated fashion. Backes, Maffei, and
Unruh [BMU08] have integrated zero-knowledge proofs, a major building block of
privacy-friendly authentication, into an automated verification tool. Mo¨dersheim
and Vigano [MV09b] have later put forth a formal model of pseudonymous channels.
Following their approach of modeling pseudonyms, we could aim at a more formal
model of attribute-based statements and conditional release of information. How-
ever, we want to focus on the intuition and consider a rigorous formalization to be an
interesting future contribution. Notable work addressing pseudonymous authenti-
cation channels that provides a formal model and tool-based verification of a subset
of the Identity Mixer protocols has been published by Camenisch, Mo¨dersheim, and
Sommer [CMS10].
Regarding semi-formal models of authentication, Maurer and Schmid [MS94,
MS96] have introduced a simple, yet expressive, notation allowing for analyzing
and comparing protocols that establish secure channels based on standard crypto-
graphic technologies available at the time. This model represents the starting point
for various recent formal approaches towards modeling cryptographic functional-
ity [Mau11, MRT12]. In our paper, we have the same goals as the original model,
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but for substantially more complex protocols, the properties of which are harder to
grasp and only understood by a small group of privacy or cryptography researchers.
In contrast to the aforementioned proposals [BMU08, CMS10, MV09b] that use
more complex and less intuitive notation for achieving their protocol specification
and automated verification goals, our model extends the intuitive notation of the
model of Maurer and Schmid while retaining its basic concepts and—partially—
its simplicity. Our model can, like Maurer and Schmid’s, be used for comparing
and analyzing security properties, especially for today’s authentication protocols.
In addition, our calculus can act as a teaching model for the goals and properties
of complex protocols and thereby contribute to a wider understanding of privacy-
friendly authentication and accountability technologies and their future deployment.
Therefore, our work closes the gap in the space of semi-formal models of expressing
cryptographic schemes for privacy-friendly authentication with an intuitive yet for-
malized method. In this respect our work is orthogonal to the results in the space
of formal protocol verification that have been presented before.
Our extension for attribute-based authentication requires authentication proper-
ties to be expressed in a suitable language. Sommer [Som11] presents a logic-based
requirements language and dual specification language for attribute-based authenti-
cation supporting advanced schemes such as the Identity Mixer anonymous creden-
tial system. A closely related language for specifying attribute-based authentication
requirements has been put forth by Camenisch et al. [CMN+10]. Both contributions
allow for combining anonymity of transactions with user accountability based on the
ideas originally put forth by Backes, Camenisch, and Sommer [BCS05].
3.3 Maurer–Schmid Channel Model
For our model of authentication, we build on the secure channel model proposed
by Maurer and Schmid [MS94, MS96] and its extension by Bichsel, Camenisch,
and Sommer [BCS12a]. Those works model communication relationships between
parties as channels that can have certain security properties. Messages sent over
such channels then are authenticated or confidential with respect to the properties of
the channel. A channel transformation algebra defines tranformation rules to obtain
new channels with certain security properties from a set of available channels with
certain security properties.
The choice of the Maurer–Schmid model as a basis of our earlier work [BCS12a]
and the results of this chapter is founded by its simplicity and capability of modeling
security associations between parties in an easy-to-grasp way. We use their model
despite it not having a fully formalized association with cryptographic protocols
realizing channel transformation rules.
Maurer and Schmid [MS94, MS96] have created their model for comparing the
security properties of cryptographic protocols and reason about establishment of
secure channels in open communication networks. Their model captures the security
properties authentication and confidentiality. The transformation rules for obtaining
new channels from existing channels are entirely based on traditional, in the sense
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of non-privacy-enhancing, cryptographic primitives, such as message authentication
codes, symmetric key cryptography, public-key cryptography, and digital signature
schemes, existing at the time they devised their model.
Maurer and Schmid define channels to connect parties where parties can have
security assurances regarding each other depending on the security annotations on
the channel. Maurer and Schmid use the notation (3.1) for an insecure channel
from A to B, (3.2) for an authentic channel where A is authentically known to B,
and (3.3) for a confidential channel where A rests assured that its messages can
be only read by B. A secure channel fulfills the authentication and confidentiality
properties of the respective channel endpoints and is denoted as in (3.4). In their
notation a bullet, a security annotation of the channel, denotes a security property,
that is, either authentication or confidentiality of the respective channel endpoint.
A security annotation on a channel means, in other words, that the party denoted
as channel endpoint is the only party having access to the channel. For an authentic
channel, this means, only the endpoint party with a security annotation can send a
message over the channel, for a confidential channel, that only the endpoint party
with a security annotation can receive a message on the channel [MS94]. In the
channel notation used by Maurer and Schmid, a channel endpoint party always
learns the identity of the denoted other endpoint of the channel. In the case of
presence of a security annotation symbol, the party learning the identity can be
assured of this identity being additionally authenticated.
A−−−→B (3.1)
A•−−→B (3.2)
A−−→•B (3.3)
A•−−→•B (3.4)
When it comes to channel transformations achieved by using cryptographic pro-
tocols, the time at which a channel is available is of importance. Thus, the model
defines a channel over which a message, fixed or chosen at time t1, can be sent at
time t2 to be denoted as A•t2[t1]−−−→ B, where t2 > t1 must hold. For example, (3.5)
shows that a message can only be forwarded from a party A to C if the time t3 at
which the relaying party B can choose its message is after the time t2 when it has
received the original message from party A.
A
t2[t1]−−−→B, B t4[t3]−−−→C, t3 > t2 =⇒ A t4[t1]−−−→C (3.5)
Maurer and Schmid conclude that, using the basic cryptographic primitives they
discuss, a security property (i.e., a bullet symbol) at one end of a channel existing
at time t can be re-established at time t′ using an insecure channel given a bullet on
the same side of the channel at time t, given t′ > t. However, they state that two
things cannot be achieved through cryptographic protocols: (1) bullets cannot be
created, and (2) bullets cannot be moved from one side of the channel to the other.
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3.4 Extended Channel Model
We have extended Maurer and Schmid’s model with concepts and transformation
rules to additionally accommodate modern cryptographic protocols for obtaining
privacy-enhancing authentication and accountability in Bichsel, Camenisch, and
Sommer [BCS12a]. This extended model is the basis of the (fragment of) the model
presented in the current chapter. Thereby, we also adopt the concept of channels
between parties to model security properties between the parties.
We start with presenting the foundations of our model and put it in context with
the approach taken by Maurer and Schmid in their work. Like Maurer and Schmid,
we use channels to model that parties may exchange information and we use a bullet
to annotate a channel endpoint for indicating a security assurance. More concretely,
a bullet at the source of a channel denotes an authenticated communication partner
at this side of the channel and a bullet at the destination stands for a confidential
channel. A channel without bullet annotations does not have any security assurances
and is called an insecure channel.
We extend, following the ideas in Bichsel et al. [BCS12a], the Maurer-Schmid
approach as follows: (1) parties act under pseudonyms instead of under their unique
identities, (2) parties are known to other parties through attribute statements com-
prising particularly also their pseudonyms, and (3) the attribute statements about
parties are authenticated towards the other parties.
3.4.1 Pseudonyms
In the original Maurer–Schmid model, a party is assumed to have a unique, system-
wide identifier that identifies the party among all parties in the system and the
identifiers are used to refer to the parties in the channel notation. Technology-wise,
such an identifier can, e.g., be implemented by the unique public key of the party
in a system where each party has exactly one such public key. In each authentic
or confidential channel, the party with the security annotation (i.e., the bullet) is
known to its communication partner by this unique identifier. This is a core prop-
erty of the model, based on which channels can be composed to obtain a target
channel. A major drawback of this modeling approach is that it cannot reflect the
capabilities of today’s privacy-enhanced authentication technologies. We overcome
this limitation by allowing parties to have and act under multiple pseudonyms and
thereby use a pseudonym as one identifier. Therefore, we define channels to connect
two parties known to each other under pseudonyms instead of their unique iden-
tifiers. Technically, a pseudonym can be seen as the equivalent of a public key in
that it (provably) can be related to a secret key. However, a party A can generate
an arbitrary number of pseudonyms using a single secret key. Note that a party
knowing a set of pseudonyms (without the corresponding secret information) can-
not distinguish whether or not they have been generated using the same secret key.
Thus, pseudonyms are unlinkable, that is, cannot be linked to the same party unless
further information is available. Furthermore, pseudonyms are unique, that is, a
pseudonym can only be held by a single party.
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Because of the uniqueness of pseudonyms we can define a mapping function p(·)
using a pseudonym as input and providing the corresponding party as output. This
mapping function p between parties and their pseudonyms is needed for expressing
our channel composition rules. More concretely, we use this function to compose
channels with different pseudonyms, where the composition requires the party being
the holder of those pseudonyms to be the same. Note that this function is not
available to parties within the system since this would invalidate the unlinkability
property—it is solely used for modeling authentication.
In our channel model we often use an intuitive notation for pseudonyms, where
we denote a pseudonym of a party A in a communication with party B as Ab.
This notational convention should facilitate readability and does not expose any
information about the parties. A pseudonym always is a name of a party with-
out carrying further semantics. This notion closely relates to what is denoted as
[A]i by Mo¨dersheim and Vigano [MV09b]. However, our unlinkability property of
pseudonyms goes further than their perspective in which pseudonyms model sender
invariance, where a recipient is assured to be communicating with the same sender
(e.g., through the use of an unauthenticated public key). Sender invariance for
unauthenticated channels is not explicitly captured in our model, however, it could
be achieved, e.g., with using unauthenticated public keys. In any practical system,
pseudonyms can be realized through cryptographic mechanisms, for example, using a
commitment scheme as in anonymous credential systems [CL01]. A user may gener-
ate a polynomial number of pseudonyms Ai such that uniqueness of the pseudonyms
is attained with overwhelming probability. Depending on the cryptographic scheme,
the unlinkability property can hold computationally or even information theoreti-
cally. We denote a public pseudonym of a party C as C, omitting the index, in our
notational convention.
In contrast to our earlier channel model [BCS12a], we do not explicitly model
the channel endpoints as the pseudonyms of their holding parties. We use the origi-
nal approach of Maurer and Schmid of denoting channel endpoints with parties and
modeling the pseudonyms as part of the statement-based annotation of the channel
endpoint and additional predicates. However, we use the terminology of [BCS12a]
of a pseudonym being a channel endpoint, with the meaning of the holding party
of this pseudonym being the endpoint. The reasons for our modeling choice of not
making pseudonyms explicit through the channel endpoints are the following: We
align the model with our formal data representation presented in Chapter 4 and not
only a less-expressive fragment of it as in our earlier work [BCS12a]. That is, a part
of the semantics that has been made explicit in our earlier channel model [BCS12a]
is now expressed through the statement annotations and not made explicit in the
model. Furthermore, in our generalized approach, a statement annotation φ may
make statements about multiple parties which cannot be captured using the mod-
eling of pseudonyms as done previously [BCS12a]. As a consequence, pseudonyms
and conditional release are not explicitly expressed in our channel model, thereby
not having channel conditions expressed on channels and pseudonyms as channel
endpoints as Bichsel et al. [BCS12a] do.
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3.4.2 Statement-based Party Annotations
For modeling privacy-friendly authentication we not only need to model pseudonyms
of parties, but also the exchange of attribute statements about parties. This goes
well beyond what Maurer and Schmid can express in their model where authenti-
cation is a binary property indicated through the bullet annotation and the precise
authentication information remains implicit. Due to the importance of attribute-
based authentication in today’s information systems and application scenarios, we
make an extension to the Maurer–Schmid model to capture this concept.
We implement this by annotating a channel endpoint party with a formula φ
that expresses the attribute statements associated with the party and that is op-
tionally authenticated by the party. We refer to such annotation as party annotation,
endpoint annotation, or annotation, possibly with the prefix “statement-based” to
further emphasize the nature of the annotation.
Definition 3.1 (Statement-based annotation) A statement-based annotation
of a party A being a channel endpoint is defined as the statement(s) φ about A and
optionally other parties learnt by the other channel endpoint B.
Definition 3.1 means that the channel endpoint party B learns attribute statements
as specified by φ, which are expressed as a logic-based formula. In case the endpoint
is annotated with a bullet security annotation, this allows its communication partner
to derive that the statements are authenticated w.r.t. the semantics of the formula
φ. Without a bullet, the statement is purely a declaration about an (unverified)
statement. Consequently, the presence or absence of a bullet annotation of a party
having an attribute-based statement annotation plays the crucial role of assuring
the other party whether it communicates with an authenticated party or not. Note
that we often use the notion of a party being authenticated w.r.t. a statement
synonymously to the more general notion of a party authenticating a statement.
Also note that the direction of the channel between Ab and Ba is orthogonal to the
attribute-based statement annotation and indicates the direction in which a message
can be sent over the channel. That is, we assume that the attributes can be learnt
by the communication partner even if the channel direction does not suggest so.
A logic-based language for the representation of data statements is introduced
in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 and a semantics for this language formally specifying the
denotation of statements expressed in the language is presented in Sec. 4.11 of
Chapter 4.
3.4.3 Authenticating a Statement
The main process behind our model is the authentication of a statement about
parties as captured in Def. 3.2. This serves as a basis for the authentication and
confidentiality of a channel that we define later.
Definition 3.2 (Statement authentication) Statement authentication of a
party A, the authenticating party, is the process of evidence for the truth of a
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data statement (formula) φ according to its underlying semantics being provided to
and verified by a party B, the verifier. The formula φ can make assertions about
A and possibly other parties A1, . . . ,Ak, including assertions about pseudonymous
identifiers of the parties A,A1, . . . ,Ak. The parties A,A1, . . . ,Ak about which
statements are made through the formula are denoted as authenticatees.
The formula φ comprises assertions about authenticatees A,A1, . . . ,Ak, referred
to by pseudonyms, made by or on behalf of A, and also information about the parties
C1, . . . ,Cl that certify, that is, vouch for the truth of the assertions, where each
Ci can certify assertions made about any of the authenticatees. Parties that certify
assertions about other parties and thus vouch for those towards verifiers are denoted
as certifiers.
The formula φ need not identify any of the parties it makes assertions about,
and thus parties can remain pseudonymous and known to B only with respect to a
pseudonym and attribute information. This means that authentication is considered
in a very broad sense, and releasing attributes about the civil identity of a party is
only one very special case. The formula φ makes clear which of its assertions are
about the authenticating party and other parties by referring to those parties with
(pseudonymous) identifiers. The assertion can make very general statements about
parties, including conditionally releasing attribute data to third parties. For details
on the statement language we refer to the definition of the language in Sections 4.4
and 4.5.
An authentication as explained establishes statements about the authenticating
party and possibly further parties towards the verifier B which can be verified with
sufficient strength by B through trust relations in place between it and certifying
parties. The authenticity is given with respect to statements the certifying parties
make about A and possibly other parties which are conveyed to B.
The term “party” in Def. 3.2 can refer to any entity as in the definition of entity
authentication in [MvOV01], e.g., also devices or services. The term “entity” could
be used to underline such more generic meaning. We use the term “party” in this
work to emphasize that people are our main focus of the model and system proposed
in this thesis. The wording “being provided” in Definition 3.2 does not only capture
the case where a party A provides evidence for the truth of a formula, but also third
parties can do so. This is, for example, required, when A uses an authentication
mechanism where a third party provides evidence of the truth of the formula on
behalf of A, which is, for example, the case for protocols with online certifiers which
authenticate a data statement on behalf of a user.
The definition also captures the case of attribute statements only being made
about other authenticatees than A, with only a pseudonym statement being made
about A. The minimal statement made about the authenticating party is a state-
ment about the pseudonym it acts under which is often required for expressing
channel composition rules.
Using statement authentication, an authenticated channel between the authen-
ticating party and the verifier can be established. A message originating at the
authenticating party is authenticated with the formula φ established in the state-
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ment authentication for the channel.
The authenticating party is also denoted as data provider in this work because
it communicates the formula and then performs authentication of it. The authenti-
cator is also denoted as data recipient as this captures the role of receiving authen-
ticated data.
Relation to traditional definitions. An important generalization we make in
Def. 3.2 in terms of privacy protection over standard definitions of authentication
consists in the formula φ comprising statements with attribute assertions about the
parties that may, but do not necessarily, identify the parties. Particularly, a formula
can contain pseudonyms of parties being the subjects of the assertions being made
and can express predicates over attributes without revealing the attribute values.
This is in stark contrast to the traditional definitions, e.g., the one by Menezes
et al. [MvOV01], that assume authenticated parties to be known under a (unique)
identifier. Our approach of pseudonym and attribute assertions being made about
parties is a major facilitator of privacy due to the data-minimizing statements that
can be expressed.
Another notable generalization over traditional definitions is that a formula φ
used in a statement authentication can express attribute assertions about multiple
parties. Making authenticated statements about other parties in addition to the
authenticating party is required, for example, in the context of the delegation of
authority over identity data. This is also a generalization over our definition of
pseudonym authentication—a form of privacy-enhanced authentication—in our ear-
lier work [BCS12a], which builds on a similar data representation as we do in this
thesis, however, it neither makes statements about multiple parties explicit, nor
supports them explicitly through channel composition rules.
Also, our definition is not phrased such that the authenticating party authen-
ticates itself, rather the party authenticates a data statement that is about itself
and possibly also other parties. Through authenticating the statement, it also au-
thenticates itself w.r.t. the assertions of the statement applying to it. Our definition
can be reduced to a special case with the statement φ only making assertions about
the authenticating party A, thereby being congruent to the standard definition for
attribute-based authentication of a party. By not necessarily having A provide the
statement to B, the definition is also suitable for bootstrapping a system through
covering authentications of the party through out-of-band means.
Considering the above, our definition of authentication is substantially more
general than the traditional definitions that comprise conveying of identifying infor-
mation applying to a single entity (party) to the verifier, as, e.g., the definition of
entity authentication by Menezes et al. [MvOV01].
3.4.4 Authentication and Confidentiality
As we specify channels between parties acting under pseudonyms, and not under
their unique identifiers, we need to update the definition of authentication of chan-
nels to fit our model.
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Definition 3.3 (Statement authenticated) A channel from an entity A with
statement annotation φA and pseudonym Ab to an entity B with statement anno-
tation φB and pseudonym Ba is statement authenticated if B is assured of only a
party being able to authenticate the statement φA having access to the other endpoint
of the channel and therefore being able to send messages on the channel.
Definition 3.3 covers the prominent case of φA making assertions about A, authenti-
cated by or on behalf of A. This implies A being authenticated towards B through
an attribute statement which is a main use case for our secure channel model.
The intuition behind this definition is aligned with the original model, with the
difference that B is assured that it communicates with a party that has authen-
ticated φA and acts under Ab instead of being assured that it communicates with
party A that it knows under its unique identifier. The difference articulates in the
situation where a party A repeatedly communicates with another entity. In such
case, we can see that A using the different formulae φA and φ
′
A and pseudonyms
Ab and Ab′ allows A to maintain two authenticated but unlinkable channels with
her communication partner. Consequently, parties are only linkable when using
the same pseudonym or other identifying attributes within the statements on sev-
eral channels. The definition generalizes the authentication definition in Bichsel et
al. [BCS12a] where a—possibly annotated—pseudonym is authenticated.
In the Maurer–Schmid model, the dual property to authentication is confiden-
tiality. Dual to the authenticity concept, we introduce the notion of statement
confidentiality.
Definition 3.4 (Statement confidential) A channel from an entity A with state-
ment annotation φA and pseudonym Ab to an entity B with statement annotation
φB and pseudonym Ba is statement confidential if A is assured of only a party be-
ing able to authenticate the statement φB having access to the other endpoint of the
channel and therefore being able to receive messages on the channel.
Clearly, authentication and confidentiality as modeled by Maurer and Schmid are a
special case of our extended model, because in their model every party is constrained
to having one unique, system-wide identifier. We can obtain their setup as a special
case by allowing each entity to use only one pseudonym which represents its unique
identity and not allow for general attribute statements about parties. How our
changes affect the model can be most easily expressed through the basic channels,
i.e., the insecure, authenticated, confidential, and secure channel. Next, we present
those channels and thereby introduce our notation for expressing our channel model.
Combining both definitions, one can informally characterize a security annota-
tion of a channel endpoint such that presence of a bullet symbol means that the
channel endpoint party can authenticate its annotation statement φ and has exclu-
sive access to the channel at its side. Note that, even though multiple parties may be
able to authenticate a certain attribute statement, only one party can authenticate
a specific statement comprising a pseudonym.
Insecure channel. We start with an insecure channel from A annotated with
formula φA to B annotated with formula φB . We model this similarly to the Maurer–
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Schmid model, with the difference that parties act and are known to each other
under pseudonyms and further attribute statements. Thus, we denote such insecure
channel as
AφA
t1[t2]−−−→φBB . (3.6)
In this channel notation, the pseudonyms of the parties are modeled as part of the
endpoint annotation formulae, φA and φB in the channel in (3.6). Unlike in the
Maurer–Schmid model, the channel endpoint parties do not learn the identities of
the respective other endpoint in our model. A party only learns the annotation
formula, comprising also the pseudonym, of the other endpoint and whether the
formula is authenticated.
For making the pseudonyms explicit to express that A is acting under pseudonym
Ab and party B under pseudonym Ba, we can add notational elements and express
this as
AφA
t1[t2]−−−→φBB, λ(φA) = Ab, λ(φB) = Ba . (3.7)
The function λ(φ) extracts the pseudonym of the party annotated with the formula
φ from the formula. In the above example, λ(φA) = Ab and thus also A = p(Ab)
holds as A is the annotated party. Making pseudonyms explicit is done implicitly
in our earlier model model [BCS12a] as the channel endpoints are denoted by the
pseudonyms instead of the parties and thus equalities of parties holding pseudonyms
need to be stated explicitly. The two modeling approaches are very close to each
other and one can claim the differences are mainly of syntactic nature. Making
pseudonyms explicit in the current model is required to name the parties towards
each other when applying a sequence of transformation rules for composing channels.
Rules are only applicable in case also the pseudonyms of parties match.
Note that, because the channel in (3.1) is insecure, the index of a pseudonym
denotes the intended communication partner, e.g., Ab for A communicating with
B.
We can look at an insecure channel in two different ways. First, it visualizes the
security information (authentication or confidentiality) available to the communi-
cating parties. From this point of view, the party A = p(Ab) may be any party in
the system. This results from the fact that the pseudonym does not have a security
annotation (i.e., a bullet symbol at the endpoint). Ab here is simply a name used to
refer to the pseudonym of the intended channel endpoint. Party B = p(Ba) learns
only the unauthenticated formula φA including a pseudonym about its communi-
cation partner. This is what we define as an insecure channel: similar to using
an unauthenticated public key, the pseudonym does not imply communication with
the party legitimately holding the pseudonym. Second, an insecure channel denotes
the availability of a channel between the parties. For our channel transformations
presented later we often use insecure channels between two parties to denote that
the parties have access to a communication channel.
Authentic channel. An example of a channel from A, authenticating and thus
authenticated through φA and pseudonym Ab, to B, known to A under unauthen-
ticated formula φB and acting under the unauthenticated pseudonym Ba is denoted
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as
AφA •t2[t1]−−−→φBB, λ(φA) = Ab, λ(φB) = Ba . (3.8)
Note that B only knows the other channel endpoint as specified through the formula
φA, particularly as holding pseudonym AB . This results from the unlinkability of
pseudonyms as well as the fact that parties within the system do not have access to
the function p to map pseudonyms to parties. Party A can send messages authenti-
cated with φA to B over this channel where the former does not have any (authentic)
information on the statement φB including pseudonym Ba about the latter. This
is the notation of a statement-authenticated channel based on the notation of an
authenticated channel in the model of Maurer and Schmid where authentication is
defined in a more restrictive way through a party authenticating under its system-
wide identifier.
A statement-authenticated channel from A to B with statement φ implies that B
can be ensured that only a party which is able to establish the validity of φ—or can
have it established—can send a message to B over this channel. Technically, A itself
or another party on behalf of it can perform the authentication of the statement and
establish this validity, without this resulting in a difference in authentication seman-
tics, however, possibly resulting in a difference of the obtained privacy properties of
the authentication protocol.
Confidential channel. A confidential channel is generalized similar to an au-
thentic channel. Instead of knowing that the channel is established with an entity
specified by a unique identifier, a message sent over a statement-confidential chan-
nel is known to be exclusively available to a party being able to authenticate its
annotation statement, φB in the example channel (3.9). Particularly, the recipient
is also specified through φB , including the pseudonym it acts under. In an example,
we denote a pseudonym-confidential channel from a pseudonymous party A acting
under Ab to a party B acting under Ba as
AφA
t2[t1]−−−→•φBB, λ(φA) = Ab, λ(φB) = Ba . (3.9)
In this example, A can be assured that only the party being able to authenticate a
formula φB , including pseudonym Ba, has access to the channel, that is, can read
messages sent over the channel.
Secure channel. A secure channel between parties with annotations φA and φB ,
acting under pseudonyms Ab and Ba, assures the parties A = p(Ab) and B = p(Ba),
holding the pseudonyms Ab and Ba, that their communication partner is the party
being able to authenticate the formula φA and φB , respectively. We denote a secure
channel as
AφA •t2[t1]−−−→•φBB, λ(φA) = Ab, λ(φB) = Ba . (3.10)
Note that we simplify the notation in the remainder of the paper by using the
phrase that a pseudonym Ab has a channel to a pseudonym Ba as shorthand for the
party A = p(Ab), i.e., party A holding pseudonym Ab, having a channel to party
B = p(Ba).
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3.5 Channel Transformation Algebra
For defining a channel transformation algebra, we need to specify the transforma-
tion rules for our extended channel model. The transformation rules of the original
model of Maurer and Schmid can be carried over to our extended model by enrich-
ing them with our extensions. We refer to those transformations as basic channel
transformations and provide some examples of how we change the original rules to
the setting of our model, without doing this exhaustively for all rules. Addition-
ally, we require new rules for specifying how party annotations and pseudonyms of
parties are handled in channel transformations. Those new rules are referred to as
statement-based transformations in this thesis.
The rule set comprising the basic channel transformation rules and the statement-
based transformation rules as presented in this section form the basis for our ex-
tended Maurer–Schmid channel composition algebra. This small rule set is sufficient
for the channel derivation calculus we propose.
There are three ways how an authentication relationship in the form of an au-
thenticated channel from party A to a party C can be established: (1) through
out-of-band authentication, (2) through party C assigning attributes to A, or (3)
through cryptographic transformations based on already-existing authentic channels
using channel composition rules. In terms of our symbolic notation, option (1) and
(2) are reflected through existing authentic channels from A to C with the security
annotation on the side of A. Option (3) reflects applications of rules of our channel
composition algebra to obtain new channels from existing channels. There is no dif-
ference in terms of the security annotation of a statement depending on the way a
channel is established. The different ways of establishing an authentication can also
be combined to obtain a single channel with authenticated endpoint annotation.
Insecure channels exist between parties in an open communication infrastructure
such as the Internet at certain times and represent the possibility of parties to
communicate with each other. Some initial secure channels between parties need
to be assumed to exist, established through option (1) and optionally also (2) as
explained above in an initial setup phase of a system.
Based on the available secure and insecure channels between parties, new se-
cure channels with desired security—particularly authentication—properties can be
constructed using cryptographic transformations. Maurer and Schmid’s model and
algebra are based on traditional cryptographic mechanisms such as symmetric cryp-
tography, message authentication codes (MACs), public key encryption schemes,
and signature schemes. We next present our extension of Maurer and Schmid’s
algebra towards privacy-enhanced cryptographic credential protocols. When apply-
ing a channel transformation rule, bullet annotations on prerequisite channels of the
rule may—as in Maurer and Schmid’s model—be dropped as this only results in a
weaker channel, derivability of which is implied by the one with annotation.
We need to use the function λ(φ) on a statement φ introduced earlier for spec-
ifying relevant aspects of the transformation rules: Through the function λ we
make pseudonyms of parties explicit as part of a transformation rule and relate
pseudonyms of different formulae with each other. Further notational elements re-
58 3 Authentication Model
quired for some rules will be introduced with those rules for ease of reading.
3.5.1 Basic Transformations
The channel transformation rules of Maurer and Schmid need to be adapted to fit
our extended model. We show this through some example rules to present the idea
how this is done, however, we do not exhaustively extend all basic rules.
3.5.1.1 Symmetric Cryptography
The rule for transferring a secure channel using an insecure channel available at a
later time extends to Rule Sec-Symm in our model, presented in (3.11) below.
Sec-Symm
AφA,1 •t2[t1]−−−→•φB,1B, AφA,2 t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B (3.11)
λ(φA,1) = λ(φA,2) = Ab, λ(φB,1) = λ(φB,2) = Ba
=⇒ AφA,1 •t4[t3]−−−→•φB,1B
This rule transfers the security properties of a channel to an insecure channel avail-
able at a later point in time using symmetric cryptography. Concretely, this trans-
formation rule can be realized with a mutually authenticated shared secret key.
In addition to Maurer and Schmid’s rule we build upon, the rule features party
annotations, that, among others, specify the pseudonyms parties act under.
3.5.1.2 Public-key Encryption
The transformation rule AuthCon-PKEnc in (3.12) specifies that an authenticated
channel from A annotated with φA,1 and acting under Ab to B annotated with φB,1
and acting under Ba over which a message fixed at time t1 can be sent at time t2
can be used to create a confidential channel from Ba to Ab at a later time.
AuthCon-PKEnc
AφA,1 •t2[t1]−−−→φB,1B, AφA,2 t4[t3]←−−−φB,2B, (3.12)
λ(φA,1) = λ(φA,2) = Ab, λ(φB,1) = λ(φB,2) = Ba, t3 > t2
=⇒ AφA,1 • t4[t3]←−−−φB,2B
This can be easily achieved by A authenticating a public encryption key for which
it holds the private key as message over the first channel. In the setting of credential
systems, the authentication of the encryption key can be achieved through a Fiat-
Shamir signature [FS86] based on the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. This
amounts to applying the concept of credential-authenticated key exchange for the
public key.
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3.5.1.3 Transferring Authenticity
Rule Auth-Sig presented in (3.13) is the extension of the rule for transferring the
authenticity property of a channel between party A annotated with statement φA,1
to party B annotated with φB,1 to an insecure channel available at a later point in
time between the parties to fit our extended model.
Auth-Sig
AφA,1 •t2[t1]−−−→φB,1B, AφA,2 t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B, (3.13)
λ(φA,1) = λ(φA,2) = Ab, λ(φB,1) = λ(φB,2) = Ba, t3 > t2
=⇒ AφA,1 •t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B
Such transfer of authenticity without secrecy is a transformation that can be
realized with a signature scheme, while transferring both authenticity and secrecy
of a channel can be achieved with symmetric cryptography using a shared symmetric
key as discussed earlier [MS94].
Once the authentication of φA,1 has been obtained through a private certificate
protocol, the target channel of the rule can be obtained through a signature of the
message to be sent over this channel using the pseudonym Ab under which A acts
on the first channel.
3.5.1.4 Trust-based Transformation
The generalization of the rule of the Maurer–Schmid model for transferring authen-
ticity to a later channel based on trust to fit our extensions is presented next. Rule
ConnectAnn-Trust in (3.14) transfers the authenticity property for the annotation φ1
of a channel between A and T to a channel from party A to B, using a channel from
T to B. The rule can be viewed as an extension of Rule ConnectAnn with A au-
thenticating a statement φA to T instead of the statement being non-authenticated.
The rule models the trust-based transformation of the security properties of the first
channel to the target channel Aφ1 •t4[t1]−−−→φBB.
ConnectAnn-Trust
Aφ1 •t2[t1]−−−→φT,AT, TφT,B •t4[t3]−−−→φBB, (3.14)
λ(φ1) = Ab, λ(φT,A) = Ta, λ(φT,B) = Tb, λ(φB) = B,
B trusts T, t3 > t2
=⇒ Aφ1 •t4[t1]−−−→φBB
The rule shows how a party annotation φ1 of A can be transferred from the first
channel to the target channel, using a party T as trusted intermediary. That is, it
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models the transfer of φ1 in an integrity-protected way to B through T, for which
trust of the recipient in T is required.
A noteworthy aspect of this rule is that the second prerequisite channel of the
rule needs a security annotation on the side of T because otherwise the required
trust relation does not have any meaning as T could be any party. B does not need
to be authenticated to T—in case a security annotation for it is required on the
target channel, the rule needs to be composed with another rule for obtaining the
annotation.
The target channel does not require direct communication, that is, an insecure
channel, between A and B being available. Still, A also learns φB , as specified
through the target channel of the rule, for the following reason: This rule models
that A requests from T that T forward the message to a party that is known under
statement φB and pseudonym λ(φB) = B.
Note that T can act under different pseudonyms and have different annotations
towards parties A and B. This generalizes the model of Bichsel et al. [BCS12a]
which constrains T to act under a public pseudonym. Party B always acts under
the same (public) pseudonym towards both parties which simplifies handling of the
related annotation formula φB .
3.5.2 Statement-based Transformations
The new transformation rules required for modeling channel transformations con-
sidering statement-based party annotations and pseudonyms and defining how
statement-based party annotations are propagated between channels are presented
next. Both rules that operate on unauthenticated as well as authenticated annota-
tion statements are considered. The rules with authenticated annotation statements
are most interesting to us as they model the cryptographic protocols discussed later
in this thesis.
It is, to the best of our knowledge, not possible to transfer the authentications
orthogonally to the statement-based endpoint annotations in all situations. Thus,
Rule CombineAnn for combining statement annotations is of limited practical ap-
plicability because in order to obtain a target channel with authentication of φ3
using orthogonal authentication transfer requires transfer of authentication for the
combined formula φ3. In practice, we are mainly interested in combining channels
with authenticated annotations as in the rule for combining authenticated statement
annotations modeling credential protocols.
3.5.2.1 Combining Statement Annotations
A basic rule CombineAnn, presented in (3.15) below, defines how pseudonym anno-
tations of two channels between the same entities can be combined. This is relevant
in a scenario where two parties A and B repeatedly communicate using the same
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pseudonyms Ab and Ba.
CombineAnn
Aφ1
t2[t1]−−−→φB,1B, Aφ2 t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B, (3.15)
λ(φ1) = λ(φ2) = Ab, λ(φB,1) = λ(φB,2) = Ba
=⇒ Aφ3 t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B, φ3 = φ1 ∧ φ2, λ(φ3) = λ(φ1)
The intuition behind this rule is that statements made by a party A acting under
a pseudonym with a party B over different channels can be combined into a new
channel revealing a statement that is the conjunction of both statements.
For this and selected other rules, only the pseudonym of the annotation function
of B is relevant. A conjunction of the formulae B acts under can, in the case of
this being interesting in a given situation, be done by application of an appropriate
transformation rule.
3.5.2.2 Combining Authenticated Statement Annotations
Combining authenticated statement-based annotations is the generalization of the
rule for combining statement-based party annotations to authenticated statement-
based party annotations. The rule CombineAuthAnn-Cred in (3.16) specifies how the
authenticated annotations of a party A of two channels with the same other party
B can be combined to a single annotation on a new channel when the parties use
the same pseudonyms.
CombineAuthAnn-Cred
Aφ1 •t2[t1]−−−→φB,1B, Aφ2 •t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B, (3.16)
λ(φ1) = λ(φ2) = Ab, λ(φB,1) = λ(φB,2) = Ba
=⇒ Aφ3 •t4[t3]−−−→φB,2B, φ3 = φ1 ∧ φ2, λ(φ3) = λ(φ1)
To the best of our knowledge, no cryptographic protocols that would combine φ1
and φ2 with other operations than conjunction exist. This rule can, like any other
rule, be applied recursively to combine security properties from k > 2 channels into
a single newly created channel.
The rule models multiple pseudonymous statement authentications A has with B
under the same pseudonym. Cryptographically, this can be realized with multiple
instances of authentication protocols using private certificates and exposing the
same pseudonym of A. Note that this also captures the case of A making multiple
authenticated statements about a delegater D to B. Both the pseudonyms for A
and D are the same in both prerequisite channels of the rule in this case. The rule
models only the combination of annotations of A and if one is interested in the
annotations of party B, this needs to be handled independently.
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3.5.2.3 Reducing a Statement-based Annotation
Rule ReduceAnn in (3.17) expresses that a channel where A is known under a formula
φA by a party B also represents a channel where A is known by a formula φ
′
A that
follows syntactically from φA in the underlying calculus.
ReduceAnn
AφA
t2[t1]−−−→φBB, λ(φA) = Ab, λ(φB) = Ba (3.17)
=⇒ Aφ′A t2[t1]−−−→φBB, φA `O φ′A
We do not formalize the corresponding rule for a security annotation being
present on the side of A here, because cryptographically an existing authentica-
tion based on credential protocols cannot be “reduced” like this. However, the
general concept that, when a statement φA is authenticated towards a party, then
also a formula φ′A, where φA `O φ′A, is authenticated, clearly applies, where O is an
ontology as introduced later in this work.
3.5.2.4 Connecting Statement-annotated Channels
Another new rule, ConnectAnn, specifies how annotations propagate to a new chan-
nel that is created through a party T connecting two channels. Similar to the trust-
based rule ConnectAnn-Trust that allows for propagation of a security annotation,
trust enables propagation of statement-based endpoint annotations.
ConnectAnn
Aφ1
t2[t1]−−−→φT,AT, TφT,B •t4[t3]−−−→φBB,
λ(φ1) = Ab, λ(φT,A) = Ta, λ(φT,B) = Tb, λ(φB) = B,
B trusts T, t3 > t2
=⇒ Aφ1 t4[t1]−−−→φBB
(3.18)
The discussions for Rule ConnectAnn-Trust carry over to this rule and apply
analogously.
3.5.2.5 Transfer of Authentications with k Certifiers
The use of a credential system for authentication is modeled with Rule Auth-Cred.
This rule models that party A obtains credentials from the certifiers C1, . . . ,Ck
and uses the credentials for authenticating an annotation statement φ′ to another
entity, B.
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Auth-Cred(
Aφi •ti2 [ti1 ]←−−−−φCi,ACi, CiφCi,B •
ti4 [ti3 ]−−−−→φB,CiB,
t5 > ti2 , t5 > ti4 , B trusts Ci,
λ(φi) = Aci , λ(φCi,A) = Ci,a, λ(φCi,B) = Ci,b, λ(φB,Ci) = Bci ,
)
∀1≤i≤k
(3.19)
Aφ
′ t6[t5]−−−→φB,AB, λ(φ′) = Ab, λ(φB,A) = Ba,
FP
((
k∧
i=1
FR (F(φi,Ci,ℵi),PA)
)
∧ θt5A,B ∧ ηt5A,B ∧ χt5A,B
)
`O φ′
=⇒ Aφ′ •t6[t5]−−−→φB,AB
The rule requires as prerequisite that party A have authentic channels with
certifiers C1, . . . ,Ck at times ti2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Those authentic channels model the
authentication of a statement of A with the certifiers based on which the certifiers
issue private certificates to A. Those certificates are used at a later time by A to
authenticate a statement φ′ to B. Certificates can, once obtained, be used for multi-
ple authentications to other entities due to the multi-show unlinkability property of
credential systems. Expressed in terms of the rule, a prerequisite channel modeling
A obtaining a credential can be reused for multiple applications of the rule.
The timing condition t5 > ti2 models that the statement on the target channel
can only be fixed once A has obtained the credentials from the certifiers because
authentication is done through a protocol based on the credentials. A similar ar-
gumentation holds for the condition t5 > ti4 relating the time for B obtaining the
public keys of the certifiers and that of the target channel. B needs to trust the cer-
tifiers C1, . . . ,Ck in the standard notion of Maurer and Schmid which is expressed
with the trusts predicates in the rule. Furthermore, authentic channels between each
certifier and B need to exist over which B can obtain their authentic public keys to
verify proofs A makes based on credentials. Those authentic channels can be real-
ized with channel transformation rules modeling standard public key infrastructure
(PKI) protocols [MS94, MS96].
The channel Aφ
′ t6[t5]−−−→φB,AB with the unauthenticated annotation φ′ on A’s side
models the statement φ′ with which A is annotated towards B. The rule transfers
the k authentications of A with annotations φi with the certifiers C1, . . . ,Ck to this
channel for obtaining the target channel Aφ
′ •t6[t5]−−−→φB,AB. Expressed differently, the
bullet security symbols of the channels with the certifiers are transferred to a single
security symbol for the annotation formula φ′ on the target channel.
Multiple new notational elements as outlined next are required for expressing
the relationship between the formulae φi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and the target formula φ′.
Those elements are closely related to the technical modeling of data as discussed in
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Chapter 4. Those have not been required in our earlier model [BCS12a] mainly due
to the higher level of abstraction and the different modeling approach.
θt5A,B comprises the conjunction of all specification formulae of identifier objects
that party A has previously established with B about itself and other parties, cor-
responding to pseudonyms. Those need to be expressed separately for the reason
that the pseudonym statements are not captured by the formulae φi. For expressing
conditional release, we introduce ηt5A,B which captures sets of conditionally released
attributes created by A which φ′ can make statements about, again as a conjunc-
tion of formulae. Analogously, χt5A,B specifies opaque identities to be established by
A with B. This way of modeling of conditionally released identities and opaque
identities results from the definition of the semantics of our data representation lan-
guage, see Chapter 4 for details regarding this. The timestamp t5 in θ
t5
A,B, η
t5
A,B,
and χt5A,B indicates that those structures be considered as of this time. The time
t5 specifies when the message on the target channel needs to be fixed. In the ear-
lier model [BCS12a], conditional release has been modeled as the release of a data
statement over a channel with which a condition has been associated as a gener-
alized notion of the channel timings of the original Maurer–Schmid model, thus,
the model also requires specific notational elements. Those make, however, the
conditional release more prominent in terms of the channel model.
The formula φi under which A is authenticated towards Ci needs to undergo a
transformation F by Ci, and the result of this needs to undergo a transformation FR
by A. The result of applying both transformations is a formula that represents the
data Ci vouches for using A’s data representation. Those transformations account
for properties of the data representation of Sections 4.4 and 4.5 and are required for
accurately expressing the relations between the parties.
F(φi,Ci,ℵi) refers to the certifier part of the transformation that a statement
φi under which a party A is authenticated towards a certifier Ci needs to undergo
in order that it can be used as one of the formulae which the target formula φ′ is
derived from. Thereby, F models aspects that depend on a variety of factors related
to an issuing transaction of a credential and cannot be expressed more explicitly in
the channel model. Because this information is required for expressing the target
formula φ′, it needs to be expressed as an additional notational element in the
specification of the transformation rule. The function is parameterized with the
certifier Ci and a transaction context ℵi that abstractly captures the full context
determining the transformation.
FR refers to A’s part of the transformation to obtain a formula the target formula
φ′ is derived from. As explained in greater detail in Sec. 5.3, this function represents
a term renaming on the formula in order to obtain terms used by A. Note that PA
refers to party A’s data repository required for the processing.
Details on the transformations F and FP are presented in Chapter 5—they rely
on concepts introduced in Chapter 4 and thus cannot be treated at this point in
detail. We anticipate only that F removes pseudonym statements of its argument
φi, as well as certification metadata and, optionally, also attribute statements. As
well, it introduces a new term to refer to the new identity (certificate) being created
through the credential issuing.
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The target formula φ′ must be derivable from a conjunction of the formulae
FR (F(φi,Ci,ℵi),PA) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k with respect to the `O-operator of our logic
discussed in Sec. 4.9, the pseudonym statements θt5A,B of pseudonyms A has estab-
lished with B, and the conditionally released attribute statements ηt5A,B and opaque
attribute statements χt5A,B, after applying a term renaming function FP that imple-
ments a renaming of terms used by A locally to terms exposed to a data recipient.
The decoration O of the `-symbol in the rule refers to the use of an ontology
considered for the deductions. Details of this are presented in Sec. 4.10, for now
we anticipate that the ontology comprises a formal specification of identity types
for having the necessary information for being able to derive formulae comprising
disjunction statements referring to identities (credentials) the party does not have
identity relationships (credentials) for. Without the ontology being considered, only
simpler, and less data-minimizing, statements would be possible to be derived as no
information on credentials not held by A would be available to the party. This
limitation holds because of the nature of deductions in first-order logic, or our
calculus based on such logic.
Note that because of how the formulae φi and φ
′ are related through the `-symbol
with its standard meaning in first-order logic and our ontology extension, it is not
possible to express this rule through a recursive application of a rule with only one
certifier because φ′ can be composed in more general ways than through conjunction
of formulae F(φi,Ci,ℵi). This more general composition is a substantial advantage
of the employed cryptographic protocols which can prove such formulae correct over
traditional protocols.
In terms of authentication, the rule transforms k channels with authenticated
annotation formulae φi of a party A with parties Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, authentic channels
of a verifier B with the parties Ci, an insecure channel between A and B, and
trust relationships between B and the certifiers to an authenticated channel from
A to B where A can authenticate a statement annotation φ′ based on the formulae
φi, pseudonym statements, and conditionally released and opaque identity specifi-
cations in a generic way. Expressing the intuition behind the rule differently, the
authentications of A with the parties Ci are transferred to the target channel of A
with B.
Discussion. The authentication transfer expressed in the rule is exactly what
is achieved through a proof in zero knowledge of the correctness of a pseudonym
and attribute statement φ′ based on the credentials party A has obtained from
C1, . . . ,Ck. Thus, the credentials are used as cryptographic tool for transferring
authentications between parties. This relates closely to Chaum’s terminology of
transferring credentials between organizations in his less general model of attribute-
less credentials.
A different approach to abstractly viewing the certification of data than as a
transfer of authentication is the following: a statement about a party A is expressed
and vouched for by a certifier C regardless of the statement A is authenticated un-
der towards C. Of course, this does not prevent C from taking such authentications
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into account, but does not limit it to those statements. Trust of verifiers in C and
the statements it makes allows us to establish authentications between A and the
verifiers based on the statements by C about A. In this model, only an authentica-
tion of A towards C must be in place such that it can be ensured that the statement
of C is assigned to the proper party A, but the statement is not necessarily the main
input determining the statement C vouches for.
When viewing a statement that a certifier C makes about a party A as an
authenticated statement annotation of A towards C in the model, both above views
of certification of data are combined in the model.
In a practical setting, a channel with an authenticated annotation of A towards
Ci can be composed from multiple authenticated channels between the parties where
A acts under the same pseudonym using Rule CombineAuthAnn-Cred and particu-
larly captures also the case of Ci making additional statements about A which are
seen as trivially authenticated statements on the endpoint A. This allows for always
obtaining a single channel of A with an authenticated annotation formula with each
certifier as required by Rule Auth-Cred.
Of particular interest is the relation of the annotation formulae of the channel
of A with parties Ci and the target channel in terms of pseudonyms as expressed
in the rule: The party A can be known to all parties Ci and party B under differ-
ent pseudonyms, namely λ(φi) = Aci and λ(φ′) = Ab and—as formalized further
above—the formula on the target channel can comprise partial information of the
formulae φi.
Note that the authenticity property of a channel between A and B obtained using
Rule Auth-Cred and credential systems as underlying technology can be transferred
to a channel that is available at a later time between A and B using rules Sec-Symm
or Auth-Sig and their cryptographic transformations.
Note also that the transformation rule does not consider prerequisite channel
requirements for supporting revocation of credentials. Revocation may require ad-
ditional prerequisite channels to the certifiers or third parties being available at a
time before authenticating φ′ in order to allow A to update the credentials it has
previously obtained. We do not further elaborate on this and leave those extensions
to future work. The concepts available in the model are sufficient for extending our
model for reflecting this.
Modeling traditional protocols. Using conventional certificates is captured as
well by the rule, however, constrains it in multiple ways, most notably, such that
the pseudonym of A used with a certifier and the verifier is the same and the
information released by A as part of φ′ for a certificate is all information comprised
in F(φi,Ci,ℵi) and both FR and FP are the identity function. Structurally, the
rule applies to conventional certificate protocols.
The rule does not capture certification protocols with an online certifier that
vouches for statements on behalf of party A towards B instead of A executing
the protocol with certificates obtained from the certifier. In such protocols, it is
possible to reduce the information formula φ′ comprises compared to a φi, much
like in Rule Auth-Cred modeling private certificate protocols. The reason for this
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not being captured is the lack of prerequisite channels involving the certifier at the
time the formula φ′ is to be authenticated.
3.5.2.6 Delegation of Attribute Authority
A crucial feature we are interested in expressing in our model is delegation of au-
thority over attribute statements as discussed in Sec. 2.8. Such delegation allows a
party D, the delegater, to delegate authority over authenticating a statement—or
statements derivable from this statement in a calculus—to a delegatee A, where D is
itself capable of authenticating the statement. Using credential protocols, authority
over the statements that a credential holder (i.e., the delegater) can make based on
a credential—or a subset thereof—may be delegated.
Rule AuthDele-Cred presented in (3.20) models delegation in combination with
the transfer of k authentications with certifiers C1, . . . ,Ck of Rule Auth-Cred. This
combination is required in order to model a general statement φ′ being made by
A based on its authentications with certifiers in conjunction with the delegated
statement.
The rule has the same prerequisites as Rule Auth-Cred regarding authentic chan-
nels with certifiers C1, . . . ,Ck, trust of B in those, and authentic channels from the
certifiers to B for transferring an authentic credential verification public key to B.
This extends to B trusting certifier Ck+1 and an authentic channel from Ck+1 to B
being in place for allowing the latter to also obtain the authentic public credential
verification key of Ck+1. For further details on those prerequisite channels, see the
discussions related to Rule Auth-Cred.
Delegation establishment. The delegation establishment is modeled as follows:
The delegater D has a channel with an authenticated annotation φD to certifier
Ck+1 for obtaining a credential that is to be delegated later. The delegation is
initiated by D through authenticating an annotation statement φ∗D towards Ck+1
with λ(φ∗D) = Dck+1|a and also comprising a second pseudonym statement with
pseudonym Dck+1 , both of which refer to D, and informs the certifier that it intends
to delegate a statement. The intention of delegation is signed with a Fiat-Shamir
signature [FS86] based on φ∗D. The channel D
φ′D•t10[t9]−−−−→•φA,DA is established for D
instructing A about its intention to delegate authority over an attribute statement.
For establishing this channel, it is crucial that D learn the pseudonym Ack+1|d that
A acts under towards both the certifier Ck+1 and D such that it can include it in
the authenticated message for initiating delegation sent to A. For φ′D we assume
that only statements based on φD and a pseudonym be comprised and no further
credentials be involved. D authenticates φ′D under the same pseudonym Dck+1|a
towards A as next step of initiating the delegation and instructs A through an
authenticated message, comprising a delegation authorization token Y, over the
channel that it intends to delegate authority over the attributes contained in φ′D
to A. The authorization token Y particularly includes also A’s pseudonym Ack+1|d
and the content of the token is signed with a Fiat-Shamir signature based on the
authenticated statement φ′D. The pseudonym Ack+1|d needs to be authenticated by
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AuthDele-Cred(
Aφi •ti2 [ti1 ]←−−−−φCi,ACi, CiφCi,B •
ti4 [ti3 ]−−−−→φB,CiB,
t13 > ti2 , t13 > ti4 , B trusts Ci,
λ(φi) = Aci , λ(φCi,A) = Ci,a, λ(φCi,B) = Ci,b, λ(φB,Ci) = Bci ,
)
∀1≤i≤k
DφD •t6[t5]←−−φCk+1,DCk+1, Dφ∗D •t
∗
6 [t
∗
5 ]−−−→φ
∗
Ck+1,DCk+1,
Ck+1
φCk+1,B •t8[t7]−−→φB,Ck+1B,
λ(φD) = Dck+1 , λ(φ∗D) = Dck+1|a, λ(φCk+1,D) = λ(φ∗Ck+1,D) = Ck+1,d,
λ(φCk+1,B) = Ck+1,b, λ(φB,Ck+1) = Bck+1 ,
B trusts Ck+1,
Dφ
′
D •t10[t9]−−−−→•φA,DA, Aφ′A • t12[t11]←−−−−φCk+1,ACk+1, (3.20)
λ(φ′D) = Dck+1|a, λ(φA,D) = Ack+1|d,
λ(φ′A) = Ack+1|d, λD(φ′A) = D[a]ck+1 , p(D[a]ck+1) = D,
λ(φCk+1,A) = Ck+1,A, D trustsD A,
t∗5 > t6, t9 > t
∗
6, t11 > t10, t13 > t5, t13 > t
∗
5, t13 > t7, t13 > t11,
FP
(
FR (F(φD,Ci+1,ℵi+1),PD) ∧ θt9D,A ∧ ηt9D,A ∧ χt9D,A
)
`OD φ′D,
Aφ
′ t14[t13]−−−−→φB,AB, λ(φ′) = Ab, λD(φ′) = D[a]b, p(D[a]b) = D,
λ(φB,A) = Ba,
FP
((
k∧
i=1
FR (F(φi,Ci,ℵi),PA)
)
∧ FDR (FD(φD, φ′D,Ck+1,ℵk+1),PA)
∧ θt13A,B ∧ ηt13A,B ∧ χt13A,B
)
`OA φ′
=⇒ Aφ′ •t14[t13]−−−−→φB,AB
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A to Ck+1 as part of the statement φ
′
A. The authentication of this pseudonym and
it being comprised in Y allows Ck+1 for cryptographically binding the delegation
credential to the correct pseudonym and thus the correct party A.
Note that the model captures the annotations, pseudonyms, and security sym-
bols in place for a delegation to be possible, however, does not make the action of
instructing the delegation to Ck+1 explicit—this is done through messages sent over
the accordingly authenticated channels as explained above. Note furthermore that,
through the use of Fiat-Shamir signatures related to the initiation of the delega-
tion, we can obtain non-repudiation of the intention to delegate. With pseudonyms
Dck+1|a and Dck+1 associated with the same party, the link to the attribute infor-
mation to be delegated and held by Ck+1 is established unambiguously.
The above is sufficient for initiating a delegation and it is left as a potential
future extension to the rule to allow for a further statement to be made by D to
further authenticate towards A using the principles of Rule Auth-Cred. The formula
φ′D captures the parts of the credential issued originally to D based on φD to be
delegated to A and is defined analogous to φ′ of Rule Auth-Cred, only based on a
single φi, and without requiring any trust assumptions of A in the certifier Ck+1.
11
For the differences to an application of Auth-Cred, this part of Rule Auth-Cred needs
to be expressed explicitly again in Rule AuthDele-Cred and cannot leverage the
already-defined Rule Auth-Cred.
A authenticates a statement φ′A towards Ck+1, as required by the latter’s au-
thorization policy for issuing a delegation credential, which is done through an
application of Rule Auth-Cred—possibly with different certifiers than those referred
to in the current rule—and provides the token Y with the contained Fiat-Shamir
signature it has received from D as proof of authorization to receive a delegation
credential. Then, A receives, on the channel Aφ
′
A• t12[t11]←−−−−φCk+1,ACk+1, a delegation
credential from Ck+1 corresponding to an attribute statement obtained through a
transformation of both φD and φ
′
D using FD(φD, φ′D,Ck+1,ℵk+1). The channel over
which A receives the credential is assumed to be available, its prerequisites, which
are not made explicit in the rule, must be fulfilled as per the channel transformation
rules used to derive this channel. The issued credential is bound to party A as its
holder through its pseudonym Ack+1|d = λ(φ′A) and D as its subject through the
pseudonym D[a]ck+1 = λD(φ′A) of the authenticated formula φ′A.
Release of authenticated statements. For modeling the release of delegated
attributes by A, we require additionally a function FD that captures the issuing
of a delegation credential and the inherent transformations of the authenticated
statement of its recipient with the issuer, analogous to F , however, taking specific
aspects of delegation into account. The first argument of FD is the formula specify-
ing the original authenticated formula φD of the delegater to the certifier on which
the original credential is based, the second argument the constrained formula φ′D
11A is not relying on authenticated attributes vouched for by Ck+1, rather, it gets a credential
issued from this certifier. The trusts-relation needs to hold between the data recipient B and Ck+1
because B relies on attributes the certifier vouches for.
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specifying which fragments of this original credential to delegate. The third and
fourth arguments are analogous to the rightmost two arguments in the signature
of the function F . FDR is, analogous to FR in the non-delegation case, a function
reflecting a term renaming of terms used in the formula to reflect the terms used by
A. The symbol P refers, as above, to the data repository of the party indicated as
its index.
The channel Aφ
′ t14[t13]−−−−→ φB,AB from A to B, where A is annotated with the
unauthenticated formula φ′, models the statement A makes to B. The definition of
φ′ is an extension of that of formula φ′ in Rule Auth-Cred in that in addition the for-
mula FDR(FD(φD, φ′D,Ck+1,ℵk+1),PA) representing the delegated attributes and
further pseudonym statements captured in θt13A,B, namely those made by A having
D as subject, can influence the derived formula φ′. ηt13A,B and χ
t13
A,B are defined anal-
ogously as in rule Auth-Cred specifying conditionally released identities and opaque
identities, respectively. Note that P· is the repository of the party as indicated in
the index.
It is a crucial feature that A can make, through formula φ′, a pseudonym state-
ment about D, that is, having D as subject. We use the function λD for referring
to the pseudonym D[a]b of the delegater who may be the subject of parts of the
assertions made through φ′: λD(φ′) = D[a]b. Through the authority over attributes
delegated to A, party A can make attribute statements about D as part of φ′
consistent with FDR (FD(φD, φ′D,Ck+1,ℵk+1),PA).
Multiple applications of Rule AuthDele-Cred for a delegatee A and the same
delegater D using the same pseudonyms for those and the same issued delegation
credential allow A to make further authenticated statements about itself and D,
and create corresponding evidence that they are about the legitimate pseudonym
holders. It is also possible that new pseudonyms are used for the parties in further
statements A makes about itself and D. Thus, pseudonyms, also those referring to
a delegater, can be used much like in a regular credential system.
The relationship of D with A, expressed through the predicate trustsD, expresses
a different flavor of trust, relevant in the delegation context, than our standard
notion thereof. It captures trust of D that A does not misuse the delegated attribute
authority, i.e., only uses it as agreed, where such an agreement is out of the scope
of the model.
Note that the ontologies O· being referred to in the rule are the respective on-
tologies used by the party as indicated in the index.
Discussion. The rule transfers authentications of A with certifiers Ci for i ∈
{1..k} and of D with Ck+1, with an authorized delegation of parts of the latter
to A, to B. The rule is atomic in the sense that it cannot be split into multiple
rules and still retain its full expressive power of combining the transfer of multiple
authentications of A with certifiers while also comprising the delegation semantics.
In terms of cryptographic protocols, the establishment of pseudonyms, establish-
ment of authentications used on prerequisite channels, and the issuing of credentials
and delegation credentials are separate cryptographic protocols, and so is the proof
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of a formula φ′ using credential protocols, much of this being analogous to Rule
Auth-Cred.
Through application of Rule Auth-Cred, A can remain non-identified and still
accountable towards Ck+1 by conditionally releasing uniquely identifying data when
authenticating φ′A on the channel of A with Ck+1. In addition, as an extension of the
strong accountability features of privacy-enhanced transactions of Rule Auth-Cred,
Rule AuthDele-Cred models the capability that both delegater D and delegatee A
can remain anonymous yet be accountable—through the conditional release of (iden-
tifying) information about either or both those parties—towards B on the target
channel, thereby realizing an accountability-enabling authentication transaction as
discussed in Chapter 2. That is, a transaction with both strong privacy and ac-
countability properties can be executed, while not compromising either property.
This is a crucial property of the system discussed in this thesis.
The delegation Rule AuthDele-Cred is the only rule which allows a bullet-decor-
ated endpoint annotation statement to move from one party (A) to another party
(D), together with its bullet symbol. This does not conflict with the general principle
of the Maurer and Schmid model and our model that security annotations cannot—
speaking intuitively—change sides on channels. The crucial aspect here is that the
statement is adapted in terms of who states it, namely A instead of D, while its
subject remains the same, namely the delegater D, and so do the attribute assertions
about D. That is, a different party receives the possibility to authenticate such
adapted statement.
3.6 Authentication vs. Authorization
The presented channel model expresses security properties between parties through
the conceptualization of channels between the parties. It captures the authentication
properties of parties, but does not model authorization. However, the operation of a
practical system is governed through authorization policies based on which authen-
tications are performed. We proceed with presenting the definition of authorization
used for our system.
Definition 3.5 (Authorization) Authorization is the process of computing the
rights of a party to access a resource at another party based on the statements that
the first party has authenticated.
Whenever a party A intends to access a resource of another party P, it is required
to get authorized for this. The authorization policies of party P specify the set of
possible statements of which A needs to proof one statement correct for getting
authorized for accessing the resource at P. That is, there are two separate layers in
the system architecture for authentication and authorization. Loosely speaking, the
authentication layer is responsible for transferring authentications with certifiers to
verifiers as captured in our channel model. The authorization layer is responsible
for computing a decision on whether an authenticated statement, or multiple such
statements, give the party access to a resource. Determining which (of possibly many
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eligible) statements are to be authenticated in an interaction is a related process
at the party that wants to be authorized. See Sommer [Som11] for further details
on a system architecture following this design of separating the authentication and
authorization layer, or the PRIME architecture [Som04b, Som05, CCS06, Som08]
for an earlier and related approach. Separating authentication and authorization is
a fundamental design principle for a privacy-enhanced identity management system.
In the context of the secure channel model, authorization governs the authen-
tications a party A must have with another party P in order that the other party
will grant the party access to a requested resource. The resources of a party P
requiring authorization are thereby any of the following: a service offered by P or
data about itself or other parties held by it, the resource representing the service
of P of allowing for transferring an authentication with it to another party through
issuing of a credential, or the resource representing the transfer of authentication in
the context of delegation.
That is, parties have policies in place that govern when those parties act accord-
ingly such that cryptographic transformations for realizing a channel transformation
rule can be executed. This explains the relevance of authorization for the channel
model, namely in determining which formulae need to be authenticated to make
rules applicable, that is, their prerequisites fulfilled.
Because all parties have authorization policies in place to protect their data which
are also considered to be resources, each release of data needs to be authorized, that
is, may require the potential data recipient in an interaction to also authenticate
statements to fulfill authorization policies. This leads, in most practical settings,
to the use of negotiation protocols for the mutual release of certified data or—
phrased in terms of the channel model—transfer of authentications with certifiers.
We have developed a simple privacy-enhanced negotiation protocol for use in our
architecture [Som11] considering also the agreement of data handling policies.
Concretely, for Rule Auth-Cred, each certifier Ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ k has authorization
policies in place that govern when a credential can be issued and thereby determine
the required formula φi to be authenticated by a party A that wants an authenti-
cation to be transferrable to other parties.12
Similarly, for Rule AuthDele-Cred, in addition to the certifiers as above, also Ck+1
has authorization policies in place that govern the issuing of a delegation credential
to the delegatee. Such an authorization policy demands a delegation request by
the delegater that uniquely identifies the delegater within the scope of Ck+1 and
an authentication of the delegatee following business and legal requirements, e.g.,
in terms of accountability of a pseudonymous delegatee. Parties A and D—users
in the envisioned practical scenarios—decide, based on business or other needs,
what actions to take, that is, whether and when to perform a delegation or act as
delegatee. This is not modeled and governed through authorization policies of the
parties.
For our system we use ontologies to capture, in a formal model, a subset of the
relevant world. Ontologies are used by parties for the computation of authorization
12As the formula φi can be combined from multiple formulae as explained earlier, only a formula
comprising partial information thereof may need to be authenticated by A.
3.7 Evidence and its Verification 73
decisions and the decision which credentials they can use to authenticate a statement
that is to fulfill a policy. Details on the use of ontologies are presented in Chapter 4
and particularly Sec. 4.10.
3.7 Evidence and its Verification
The rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred build on the concept of certifiers authenti-
cations with which are transferred to target channels. Authentications of a party
with certifiers reflect what the certifiers vouch for towards other parties that trust
them for this. The rules are closely related to the definition of statement authenti-
cation and statement-authenticated channels. A key concept hereto is evidence for
the truth of a statement. A trivial case of evidence is when a certifier trusted by the
verifier directly expresses such statement towards the verifier as then no further evi-
dence for the truth of a statement is required—the declaration by the trusted party
suffices. This can be achieved with standard—and rather straightforward—identity
management protocols with online certifiers that are not the focus of this thesis.13
More interesting to us is cryptographic evidence for the correctness of a statement,
concretely cryptographic proofs based on private certificate protocols, which are the
subject of Chapter 6 of this thesis.
During statement authentication, an authenticating party A provides evidence
Ξ to a verifier B that a formula φ holds. The verifier needs to verify the statement
φ w.r.t. the provided evidence Ξ with a well-defined procedure to assess whether
the statement is true following its semantics. Upon successful completion of such
procedure, B can be assured of the truth of φ. The process of generation of evidence
by A and verification thereof by B is determined by φ and is discussed later in this
thesis. Intuitively, truth of a statement φ means that its assertions are consistent
with what the referred-to certifiers vouch for.
For the approach chosen in this thesis, evidence is created through cryptographic
protocols. The cryptographic protocols we will further elaborate on at later points
in this thesis are the following: establishing a pseudonym with another party, issuing
a credential on a pseudonym, proving holdership of k credentials and their relations
to conditionally released attribute groups, groups of opaque attributes, as well as
one or more pseudonyms. The protocol for proving allows one to compute a Fiat-
Shamir signature on a message using the statement that is proven. Traditional
cryptographic protocols required for some channel transformations are not dealt
with in this work and may have been referred to in the discussion of the rules above
or discussed by Maurer and Schmid for their model [MS94, MS96].
13Note that the approach of an online certifier making a statement to the data recipient is not
captured in those rules due to the channels with the certifier not being available as prerequisites—
the rules are designed for private certificate technology.
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3.8 Authentication with Credential Protocols
The semantics for the language in which formulae being authenticated are expressed
is defined in Sec. 4.11. Roughly speaking, authentication of a formula φ is equivalent
to the verifier being able to verify the evidence, that is, cryptographic proof Ξ, sup-
plementing the formula. Recall that the formula makes statements about possibly
multiple parties and about the certifiers that endorse those statements. A proof
Ξ of a formula particularly is evidence verifiable by the verifier that the certifiers
indeed vouch for the assertions as specified in the statement φ.
For the rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred building on credential protocols as
cryptographic mechanisms, a proof Ξ is a cryptographic protocol based on a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge for the truth of the formula φ. We explain in Chap-
ter 6 how such proof is generated and verified using run-time-generated crypto-
graphic protocols as a contribution of this thesis.
One specificity is worth exploring further, namely the trust relationships of ver-
ifiers in certifiers, expressed through the trusts predicates in the model. In an over-
simplified system, those can be accounted for by a verifier considering all certifiers to
which it has such trust relation as certifiers statements vouched by which it accepts
as valid, independent of the attributes concerned or their use.
However, trust is, in an open identity system, not a binary factor, but dependent
on the context of the transaction. That is, whether a verifier trusts a certifier for
making a statement about a certain attribute of some party, depends, for example,
on which attribute this is and what the verifier uses the attribute for. Thus, ex-
pressing the trust relationships as a binary predicate as in our model presented so
far is not sufficient for an open authentication system.
Therefore, we move the trust decisions of a verifier in certifiers from the au-
thentication to the authorization stage of a transaction. For authentication it is
therefore irrelevant for the verification of a proof Ξ for a party annotation state-
ment φ whether the certifiers of the assertions in the statement are trusted by the
verifier. What matters is only a cryptographically correct verification of the proof
with the proper (authentic) key material of the stated certifiers. For our channel
model this is equivalent to removing the trusts predicates from rules expressing the
trust relations of verifiers in certifiers. The notion of authentication implied by such
adopted system is equivalent to a more relaxed notion of authentication which does
not consider the trusts predicates and thus trust relationships of the verifier, as well
as party registration. We refer to this notion of authentication also as cryptographic
authentication, or, just as authentication if the flavor of authentication we mean
should become clear from the context. The verification process through a run-time-
generated cryptographic protocol is summarized in Chapter 6 on the cryptographic
protocols. It strongly connects the intuitive channel calculus with the formal seman-
tics of the logic for expressing statements. Note that the fact whether a statement is
authenticated by a party that is registered in the system is ignored for the property
of cryptographic authentication as well and considered at the authorization layer.
In the authorization process following the authentication process, the trust re-
lationships of a verifier with certifiers are considered in a fine-granular and flexible
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way by the verifier when computing authorizations based on statements authen-
ticated following the above relaxed notion of cryptographic authentication. Also,
party registration, see Sec. 3.9, can be accounted for in the authorization process
by having authorization policies capture requirements on credentials to be included
in the statement to authenticate for establishing that a party is a registered party
in the system.
This way of separating authentication from authorization, in particular with re-
spect to trust relationships parties have with certifiers, is beneficial for open identity
systems with a plurality of certifiers and verifiers as it allows for a degree of expres-
siveness that cannot be achieved when fixing trust decisions already at the level of
authentication as is done in today’s practice. Particularly, it allows a verifier to
specify trust requirements in certifiers depending, e.g., on the attributes and their
use. The reader is referred to Sec. 4.6 and Chapter 4 for details on how those trust
requirements are expressed in the elements related to expressing data requirements
of authorization policies. Through referring to ontology concepts, we can achieve
what we refer to as outsourcing of trust, that is, deferring certain decisions related
to trust, e.g., trust in parties such as certifiers, to third parties, as discussed in
Sec. 4.10.
In Chapter 6 we summarize how a party computes—based on a formula φ the
cryptographic proof Ξ of which can be verified successfully, that is, an authenticated
formula in the model without considering trust in the channel model—whether a
given data request is fulfilled through this formula. A formula, the cryptographic
proof of which does not verify, is not authenticated.
Authenticity of public keys. Cryptographically verifying evidence based on cre-
dential protocols requires the use of public keys, e.g., those of certifiers (credential
issuers) and conditional data recipients. The trust relationships related to the cer-
tification of the public keys of credential issuers through traditional PKI technology
may be handled through standard mechanisms of processing certificate chains and
having trusted certification authorities. Expressed differently, those trust relation-
ships can be considered already for the cryptographic authentication. The reasons
for this approach are the following: (1) we ensure technical compatibility with the
existing PKI infrastructure—except for the formats of the keys to be certified—and
thus simplify a deployment of our system, and (2) we remain compatible with the
trust approach in the current infrastructure and thereby do not further complicate
our policy system by also making generalized trust statements about those standard
PKI certification authorities. Such general approach is the one possible in the re-
lated setting of trust management [BFL96, LGF03]. A generalization of this to also
defer those trust decisions to the authorization computation is possible and would
account for the idea that also trust in certification authorities is not binary, thereby
making authorization policies more complex. This generic approach is only followed
for pseudonymous credential issuers as explained next.
The certification of public keys of pseudonymous certifiers, see Sec. 4.4.10 for de-
tails about this concept, is based on Fiat-Shamir signatures using credential proof of
knowledge protocols executed by parties known under attribute statements, instead
76 3 Authentication Model
of on conventional signatures issued by certification authorities as in the standard
case of identified issuers. Thus, the related trust decisions regarding the creden-
tial issuers (certifiers) for the public key certification need to be taken as part of
the authorization decision like for a regular authentication using credentials. The
cryptographic authentication comprises the cryptographic verification of the certi-
fication of the public key, like in the case of a traditionally certified public key. A
pseudonymous certification of a public key and a party A′ obtaining such certified
key can be modeled with Rule Auth-Cred: A credential public key of A is signed by
A by computing a Fiat-Shamir signature on it w.r.t. the pseudonym and attribute
statement it intends to be known under as evidence. Assertions based on attributes
certified by multiple certifiers can be combined for the certification of the key. The
signed key is then provided to party A′ who needs to verify the signature w.r.t. the
pseudonym and attribute statement and thus knows the public key certifier by an
authenticated pseudonym and attribute statement and not necessarily its legal iden-
tity. Subsequently, A′ can use the public key for verifying cryptographic evidence
relying on this key. Each public key of a pseudonymous certifier to be obtained
by a party A′ requires application of one instance of the Rule Auth-Cred to let A′
obtain the key authentically. Using standard means of key distribution through a
key directory can be expressed as well with the concepts of our model.
Our authorization language presented in [Som11]—see Sec. 4.6 for the data-
related aspects thereof—is envisioned to be mainly used such that the certifier of
attribute assertions of a statement to be authenticated is specified through a state-
ment revealing the certifier’s legal identity. Certification authorities certifying the
public key of such certifier are captured statically and are not explicitly mentioned
in a policy, much like in the standard PKI setting where one relies on exhaustively
specified lists of trusted certifiers. The authorization language allows for making
more than those levels of certification explicit in a statement, however, this is adding
complexity to the policy authoring process and the gained flexibility is, in our view,
not required in most scenarios we envision.
3.9 Registration and Derived Authentications
The authentications of party A with certifiers Ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ k in rules Auth-Cred and
AuthDele-Cred and the authentication of D with certifier Ci+1 in Rule AuthDele-Cred
can be of either of the following forms, or a combination thereof:14 (1) established
through out-of-band means or assigned by the certifier; or (2) established based on
existing channels through the application of channel transformation rules. Prac-
tically, it is also possible to combine those cases to obtain a single authentication
through channel transformation rules.
Case (1) models party A getting registered in the authentication system, where
an initial authentication of a statement based on out-of-band means is performed
and optionally further attribute statements are assigned to A by C. This is modeled
14In the discussions in Sec. 3.5, Case (1) here has been split into separate cases, which we abstract
from here.
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through a channel with bullet-decorated annotation formula on the side of A that
is assumed to exist. We refer to this as a registration of a party in the system,
and the authentication of the statement as registration authentication. The key
characteristics of a registration authentication modeled with such a channel is that
it is not transferred from existing channels through transformation rules, but is
original in the meaning of the model. The statement of the initial authentication
can, at its minimum, only be a pseudonym statement about A to which further
statements are bound.
Case (2) models authentication of A through the authentication system, that is,
the channel with bullet-decorated endpoint annotation on the side of A is derived
through the application of channel transformation rules based on existing authenti-
cated channels, each of which being of either kind (1) or (2) or combinations of such.
We refer to the authentication of the statement on such a channel as non-registration
authentication, or derived authentication.
Based on either kind of channel, its authenticated annotation can be transferred
to new channels using channel transformation rules. As per the rules Auth-Cred and
AuthDele-Cred, the annotation formulae of multiple authenticated channels of any
kind can be combined for deriving the authenticated target annotation φ′ towards
a party B. This reflects the generic application of channel transformation rules,
where B can be any data recipient, also a certifier.
Within the Maurer–Schmid model, the concept of a registration is, similarly to
our model, not made explicit, however, it is realized with channels from users to
certifiers, having a security symbol on the side of the user, which are assumed to
exist and can be used for deriving further channels, also with a security symbol on
the side of the user.
Channels established following Case (1) are required for bootstrapping a system
because security symbols cannot be “created” through applying channel transforma-
tion rules and need to exist originally. At least one such original channel is required
per used in order to be able to derive new channels with authenticated annota-
tion statements, that is, to be able to authenticate certified attribute statements to
parties.
Based on a single registration, an arbitrary number of non-registration authen-
tications with certifiers can be established, corresponding to authenticated channels
with those certifiers, the authenticated statements of which can be transferred to
other channels with verifiers using rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred. Typically,
certain kinds of attributes, such as access rights to services, are assigned by a certi-
fier that has acted as verifier of a statement before, as additional statements about
the party. This reflects the standard model of a credential system where a user
performs a single registration, as, e.g., in Lysyanskaya, Rivest et al. [LRSW00] or
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01], resulting in a registration pseudonym and cre-
dential based on which further credentials can be obtained from other certifiers.
Those works denote the party at which users register as certification authority, and
in [CL01] one of its purposes is to realize non-transferability of the user’s private
key and thus credentials. Both works assume for a system to comprise a central reg-
istration certifier that needs to be accepted by all users, which is—in our view—a
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severe limitation for a practical system.
Security symbol. Intuitively, a bullet symbol on a channel from A to B means
that the evidence provided for the corresponding statement can be verified success-
fully by B as well as that the statement the symbol decorates is being authenticated
by a party A registered in the system. That is, (1) the evidence underlying the
statement can be verified by B, and (2) according to B’s authorization policy, the
statement ensures that A is a registered party. As a counterexample to (2), a
pseudonym statement made without establishing that it is based on the private user
key generated in a registration with a certifier does not receive a bullet symbol, even
though its cryptographic evidence verifies correctly.15 For the credential protocols
of this thesis, this means that for a pseudonym statement to be authenticatable, it
must build on the same user private key as one of this user’s pseudonyms created
in a registration interaction with a registration certifier.
Combining multiple registrations. An interesting case captured by the model
is when multiple channels representing registrations based on formulae φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
are combined by A through rules Auth-Cred or AuthDele-Cred for authenticating a
new statement φ′ towards B while ensuring that A is the same on all the channels.
Using multiple registrations of A means that additional consideration is required
for establishing that the party referred to in the different resulting statements of
the channels is the same party A. This can be achieved by a (potentially different)
certifier C′ making a statement that (a subset of) the pseudonyms related to the
statements φi of the different registrations refer to the same party and this being
considered in φ′. In order to achieve this, A needs to proof with additional means
to C′ that the pseudonyms it proves holdership of to C′ refer to the same party.
This can, e.g., be accomplished through revealing identifying attribute statements
on both pseudonyms strongly bound to the pseudonyms. This and also the sub-
sequent binding of the different pseudonyms to the same party through C′ can be
accomplished through private certificate protocols. The sameness of the pseudonyms
can be vouched for by C′ through issuing a so-called binding certificate or binding
credential. For A being able to convince B about the sameness of the party behind
the pseudonyms, it needs to include a statement into φ′ on the sameness of the
pseudonyms and proof thereof based on the binding credential obtained from C′.
The intuition on security symbols and registrations given further above generalizes
to this setting of multiple registrations being the basis for an authenticated state-
ment. Such setting is interesting for practical credential systems as it allows for
greater system openness by not mandating a single registration per user and thus
giving users the choice of their preferred registration certifier.
Basing a statement a party A authenticates towards a party B on multiple regis-
tration authentications without additionally establishing party equality as discussed
15Note that in our open system, any party can assume the role of a certifier—whether it is
recognized as such depends on the authorization policies of the verifiers of certified attribute
statements.
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results in an identity statement authenticated by one party without binding of the
different parts of the formula to the same party, and thus is of limited use.
Bootstrapping of authentication. As has been explained in Sec. 3.5 on chan-
nel transformation rules, security annotations over formulae can only be transferred
from prerequisite channels to target channels, however, annotations cannot be cre-
ated through application of the channel composition algebra. That is, at least one
channel where a party A is authenticated to another party needs to exist in a
system for allowing one to establish further authenticated channels with A being
authenticated. That is, the system needs to be bootstrapped by establishing initial
authentications of the system participants.
Once a user has been registered, w.l.o.g. with a certifier C and thereby obtained
a registration credential, another certifier C2 can issue, after A has authenticated
a statement towards C2 using the registration credential, a credential comprising
a subset of the attributes of the registration credential and further attributes, e.g.,
such specifying access rights to an on-line service, while being ensured that the
credential be issued, in a cryptographically strong manner, to the party authenti-
cated with a statement endorsed by C with which A was authenticated through
out-of-band means.
Depending on the trust relationships between parties in a system, a single out-
of-band authentication can be sufficient for each player in an identity system, or
multiple out-of-band authentications can be required or at least increase flexibility
of the system. In open systems like the one that is the subject of this thesis, the
typical case will be that a party has performed multiple out-of-band authentications
and that multiple certifiers offer the service of registering parties. Our open approach
allows a party to choose which of the available registration certifiers to rely on and
does not force a single registration certifier on them.
3.10 Future Work
The property of endpoint invariance, that is, sender or receiver invariance of a
channel for an endpoint with a non-authenticated annotation formula is currently
not captured. Endpoint invariance for a channel endpoint means that the other
endpoint party of the channel is assured to communicate with the same party known
under a pseudonym, although the pseudonym is not authenticated in the sense
of the model. This property is denoted as pseudonym invariance by Mo¨dersheim
and Vigano [MV09b]. The endpoint invariance property can be used for modeling
settings where a party does not authenticate any statement (yet), however, the
other party it interacts with can be assured of always talking to the same party. An
example is the setup of a one-way authenticated secure channel based on standard
mechanisms between an unauthenticated user and a service provider authenticated
through PKI technology. This is relevant also for our system because channels
between users and service providers are such channels on which users authenticate
statements using credential protocols once the channel has been established to obtain
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a channel of interest. Endpoint invariance can be realized through cryptographic
mechanisms, e.g., a cryptographic pseudonym without assuring that it be based on
a registered user private key, or an unauthenticated encryption key pair.
Further open aspects related to the model are capturing the revocation of cre-
dentials in the model as well as defining a channel transformation rule modeling
authentication transfer based on conventional certificates as a special case of Rule
Auth-Cred and a rule modeling protocols with online certifiers as an extension of
rule Auth-Cred. Delegation can be considered for those technologies by deriving
according rules using the ideas of AuthDele-Cred.
A generalization of Rule AuthDele-Cred for modeling delegation is capturing l
authentications of a delegater D with certifiers Ck+1, . . . ,Ck+l and delegation of
authority over the corresponding statements and is left to future work to not further
explode the already complicated rule. A complication here is that it must be ensured
that a statement constructed from multiple delegated statements is about the same
delegater. This may require the release of additional information to the certifiers
in order to ensure this property using the cryptographic techniques available in
our framework or the development of new cryptographic protocols. This extension
may be relevant in practical settings when a user needs to delegate authority for
allowing for authentications with more involved policies requiring statements about
identities from multiple certifiers. An extension to support that a party is able to
make statements about multiple delegaters in a single formula is less relevant from
a use case perspective.
Further future work involves developing the secure channel model further towards
a stronger formalization, analogous to what Maurer et al. have discussed in their
work on constructive cryptography [Mau10, Mau11, MRT12] based on their original
model.
Chapter4
Data Representation, Logic,
Ontologies, and Semantics
Our authentication model discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the secure channel model
captures the authentication of statements, or data statements, by parties, the au-
thenticating parties. Such statements made towards data recipients (relying parties)
are typically endorsed (certified) by third parties, the certifiers. The authentications
are governed by the authorization policies, concretely their parts expressing data re-
quests, of the relying parties. Both the data statements parties make towards other
parties and the data requests in authorization policies need to be expressed in a
machine-processable language for a computer-implemented system. In the current
chapter we discuss a logic-based formal representation of statements and data re-
quests required for realizing a system based on our authentication model. The
logic-based data modeling approach we present is technology agnostic and based
on concepts related to digital identities, though, we focus on its use for private
certificate systems as underlying cryptographic technology.
In a practical computer-implemented authentication system following our model
of Chapter 3, further formal languages are required in addition to such for express-
ing data statements and requests. This comprises languages for locally expressing
inputs and outputs to cryptographic protocols to be executed, e.g., for establishing
identity or identifier relationships, or for specifying established identifier or identity
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relationships of the party. We present the main aspects of further formal languages
in our discussions of the cryptographic protocol integration of private certificate
protocols into our system in Chapter 5 and Sec. 4.7 on specifying identifier and
identity relationships. The language for representing data statements is not only
used for statements made to other parties—we additionally express transaction logs
and profiles about other parties to be stored locally through formulae in this lan-
guage.
4.1 Introduction
The main driver for a commonly understood formal language used by the parties in
an open system is interoperability. In an open system, a plurality of parties need to
communicate with each other, requiring them to authenticate statements towards
each other based on authorization policies of the respective other party in an inter-
action. The parties in a system thus need to understand, that is, make, through
automated processing, sense of identity requests and authenticated statements be-
ing presented to each other. This is made possible by a common and mutually-
understood formalism being used for representing data and knowledge related to
the interactions between the parties. Such a formalism has the same meaning—or
semantics—for all parties in the system and is a prerequisite for achieving identity
management interoperability between different parties in a system.
Within the scope of a single party’s system, formally represented information is
subjected to multiple forms of machine processing. This comprises, e.g., storing or
retrieving (finding) formulae, computing formulae based on the party’s portfolio for
fulfilling a data request, or associating and enforcing data handling policies to data
items. Those processing instances done within a party also require a well-defined
common understanding of the meaning of the data.
We use ontologies issued by third parties to formally conceptualize certain struc-
tural aspects or facts about our domain of interest or a given system. Such ontolo-
gies are an integral input for the automated processing of data, e.g., for computing
formulae fulfilling a data request based on the party’s portfolio. Ontologies are a
crucial means for facilitating openness of the system and are also based on our data
modeling formalism.
Using a single, unified, approach for representing data throughout the system
avoids the need for mappings between different data representations at different
places—each such mapping requiring a formal specification and implementation
thereof—thereby greatly simplifying the overall architecture. For this reason we
build upon a unified approach of data representation for representing data through-
out the system. Henceforth, we refer to this as our data model or data representation,
discussed in Sec. 4.4.
In terms of expressiveness, the data statement and request languages are able
to model a wide range of statements about entities and at the same time to allow
for the parties’ privacy to be protected. The design has been strongly governed
by the concept of data minimization, that is, the concept of the minimum possible
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amount of data required by the data recipient for the purpose the transaction is ex-
ecuted for being revealed in a transaction. This includes the support of expressing
disjunctions in formulae, predicates for reducing the amount of information being
revealed about attributes instead of always revealing the attribute values, achieving
conditional accountability in the setting of pseudonymous or anonymous parties, or
expressing pseudonymous certifiers. Thus, the data model allows for shifting from
today’s prevailing paradigm of identifying parties uniquely to an attribute-based
specification of the parties for stronger data minimization. Overall, the data model
has been designed towards enabling user-centric privacy-enhancing identity manage-
ment with unprecedented expressive power, when compared to existing approaches
in research or deployed mechanisms. Delegation and openness have been considered
throughout the design and use of the data model.
Simplified and rich specification of data requests is facilitated by supporting
ontology-based abstractions, generalizing the idea of attribute-based specification
of parties to certifiers of attributes in policies, and the type system. This allows
for capturing a potentially large set of fulfilling formulae through a simple policy
expression, thus making authorization policies simpler and more expressive in terms
of the number of different statements fulfilling them, which is important for an
open system. Another crucial facet of the language is the support of delegation,
particularly in the setting of either delegating party or delegatee or both not being
identified.
While the overall data model and the derived languages for making data state-
ments and for requesting data are technology independent, we present technology-
dependent aspects thereof related to credential system technology as this is the most
advanced technology for preserving privacy and thus is the technology employed in
the context of this thesis.
Chapter outline. Following the current introduction section, we present impor-
tant related work in Sec. 4.2. After a brief presentation of preliminaries in Sec. 4.3,
we present our generic approach to data modeling based on which concrete formal
languages used in our system are derived in Sec. 4.4. In Sec. 4.5, we present the
data statement language used for specifying statements to be released with creden-
tial protocols as underlying technology or further statement-type formulae required
in our system, e.g., for specifying credentials. This is followed by a discussion of
the corresponding data request language in Sec. 4.6. We discuss architectural as-
pects for an implementation of our system, presenting details on which data parties
represent locally and how the data model is used for this, in Sec. 4.7.
In Sec. 4.8, we present how pseudonyms and credentials, respectively the techno-
logy-independent concepts corresponding to those, formally relate to each other and
to the registration of parties, also considering delegation. Furthermore, we formally
specify a renaming operation that a party needs to apply when releasing (certified)
data to another party in order to ensure unlinkability and enforce properties required
for the semantics.
As our data model builds on formal logic, we discuss the calculus, or derivative
system, we build upon through an extension of first-order logic. We also discuss
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realizing computer-implemented processing in this calculus for computing syntactic
derivations therein. We discuss those aspects, as well as the relations of our work to
standard calculi, tool implementations, and how to obtain a computer-implemented
apparatus realizing the calculus in Sec. 4.9.
For our identity management system, we also formally model certain aspects
of the structure and concrete entities in our domain of interest. Such knowledge
is expressed in so-called ontologies that parties use for processing formulae in the
calculus. We explain the types of ontologies of our architecture and how they are
used in computer-implemented processing of formulae. Particularly, we elaborate
on the concept of trust outsourcing, that is, giving third parties that are trusted for
this purpose authority over certain definitional aspects of the structure and concrete
facts of the system and its parties. Ontologies and trust outsourcing are discussed
in Sec. 4.10.
Finally, we present the formal semantics for statement-type formulae based on
the data model in Sec. 4.11 which globally defines the denotations for such formulae
in the system.
4.2 Related Work
As this chapter takes a comprehensive approach to formally modeling identity data
and related trust aspects for an open identity management system, related work
from different domains needs to be addressed. We next relate our results to some of
the existing relevant work. Further details on the relation thereto is presented later
in the chapter in the appropriate context.
The work presented in this chapter is a substantial extension of earlier results
of the author [Som11, BCS05, CSZ06a, HS06], particularly in terms of expressive-
ness and ontology support. Work on this has started as an effort related to the
architecture for a privacy-enhancing identity management system in the PRIME
project [Som04b, Som05, CCS06, Som08]. This line of work has, in terms of access
control languages, built on Bonatti and Samarati’s work [BS02]. The author has
contributed to extensions thereof towards data-minimizing access control based on
credential systems as underlying protocols [ACK+10].
The author has introduced the basis for attribute-based access control while,
at the same time, obtaining the property of requester accountability in earlier
work [BCS05], as a basis for anonymous yet accountable access control. The lan-
guage presented therein already supports the grouping of attributes into conceptual
units which has been presented in a more explicit way in the follow-up work on a
privacy-enhancing data request language [CMN+10]. As specific technology for re-
alizing the combination of the anonymity and accountability properties, these prior
works also build on private certificate protocols. Further work by the author defines
a framework for privacy-preserving identity management [CSZ06b, CSZ06a] based
on various technologies and thereby builds on the language of Backes et al. [BCS05].
This work can be seen as introducing some of the language concepts of this thesis as
well as the protocol interfaces of Chapter 5. The earliest attempt for expressing a
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data statement to be released in the context of an early variant of the Identity Mixer
anonymous credential system [Cam03] was realized directly through the application
programming interface (API) of the protocol implementation which was feasible due
to the limited identity semantics the credential system implementation supported.
The author and Hogben were, to the best of our knowledge, the first to use
ontology-based reasoning for privacy-enhancing identity management, particularly
for outsourcing certain aspects of specification to third parties, in 2006 within the
PRIME project [PRI08, HS06]. They have implemented ontology-based reasoning
in a prototype using W3C’s RDF [ME04] and OWL [MvHE04] languages for ex-
pressing ontologies, policies, and data statements. This work by Hogben and the
author [HS06] can be seen as an early predecessor of the ontology-based work pre-
sented in this thesis.
Other approaches for authentication and distributed access control in open sys-
tems build upon formal logic for specifying attribute requirements for distributed
access control, while using a technology-agnostic language [AF99, LGF00, LGF03,
GBB+06, BBG+07]. Notably, some works employ logic with non-standard prop-
erties, e.g., linear logic to express consumption semantics of credentials [GBB+06,
BBG+07].
An important related field is trust management, which discusses authentication
in open distributed systems. The trust management concept has been put forth
in the first publication on the topic by Blaze et al. [BFL96]. Notable early trust
management systems are PolicyMaker [BFL96, BFK99, BFS98] and the KeyNote
trust management system [BFIK99]. Work on trust management has introduced
the concept of delegation of attribute authority in the sense of delegation of trust in
allowing parties to formally define in an expressive way which parties they trust for
making statements about attributes of users [LGF00, LGF03]. This is also one of
the main themes of our work as it is crucial for an open system. Though, parties in
those trust management systems have a unique identity, e.g., public key, to which
attributes are associated. Thus, privacy is not at all considered in this line of work,
which results in a simpler formalism compared to our approach.
Further noteworthy approaches to trust management and distributed authenti-
cation include the logic-based distributed authorization language SecPAL [BGF06,
BFG10], which not only supports delegation of trust, but also delegation of author-
ity in the common meaning. A later language related to SecPAL is DKAL [GN08a,
GN08b].
Our work realizes the most crucial functionality of trust management systems,
namely trust delegation, though, in a different way than trust management systems
do. Furthermore, our system is capable of protecting user privacy through data-
minimizing interactions, while retaining user accountability.
Another related field is that of trust negotiation, the process of two parties mu-
tually exchanging certified attribute information as governed by policies protecting
this information until a policy for an initial request triggering a negotiation proto-
col is fulfilled. This concept has been introduced by Winsborough et al. [WSJ00],
further discussed by Winsborough and Li [WL02, WL04]. Those results on trust
negotiation do, like the trust management work, not consider privacy. Later work by
86 4 Data Representation, Logic, Ontologies, and Semantics
Li, Li, and Winsborough [LLW05, LLW09] has extended trust negotiation such that
the protocols consider data minimization. Trust negotiation systems do not have
the powerful mechanisms for trust delegation as trust management systems, which
can be seen as a major inhibitor in practical open systems with a large number of
certifiers.
The data request and statement languages we define can be used as the formal
language foundation for the data exchange part of a privacy-enhancing trust negotia-
tion system. A trust negotiation system may require that multiple received formulae
be considered in a single evaluation of policies protecting a resource, for which pur-
pose our globally valid semantics is beneficial. Non-trivial problems needed to be
overcome for our privacy-enhanced system to achieve this. Also, we have defined
a simple algorithm for trust negotiation based on our approach to data represen-
tation [Som11]. Through leveraging the properties of our formal data model and
semantics, this algorithm can achieve stronger data minimization than previous ap-
proaches and combine privacy and accountability.
Additional relevant work can be found in the areas related to logic and calculi
as well as ontologies and is reported in the respective sections of this chapter.
4.3 Architectural Preliminaries
We next discuss architecture aspects for an implementation of a user-centric au-
thentication system realizing the secure channel model presented in Chapter 3. The
basic idea is that data in a system is represented through logic-based formulae held
and communicated by parties. Furthermore, formulae can have underlying (cryp-
tographic) material associated, e.g., tokens that allow the party to prove (parts of)
such formulae to other parties, or a ciphertext or cryptographic commitment cor-
responding to elements referred to in a formula received from another party, or a
proof of a formula.
A party has a repository or data repository comprising all data the party holds in
its formalized representation. The repository consists of the identifier relationships
and identity relationships of the party, profile data the party holds, and the data
track of the party.
The portfolio16 of a party comprises the subset of the repository which is required
by the party for making data statements, proven correct through corresponding
(cryptographic) proofs, to parties, or—expressed in terms of the channel model
of Chapter 3—transferring authentications to parties. It comprises the identifier
relationships, identity relationships, and object specification formulae for opaque
and conditionally released identities, both of which are part of the data track that the
party has created in interactions with other parties, with their associated metadata.
Those architecture concepts apply to any party in a system, regardless of whether
it is a user, service provider, certifier, or other party. From this perspective, the
underlying architecture is symmetric by not distinguishing between different parties,
16The term “portfolio” has been adopted from prior work on user-centric privacy-enhancing
access control by Bonatti and Samarati [BS02].
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respectively. It also facilitates the approach that parties act under certain roles, e.g.,
data provider (user), certifier, or relying party, instead of statically being of such
type. In Sec. 4.7, we provide details on the repository and portfolio of a party based
on the approach to data representation introduced in this section.
4.4 Data Model and Concepts
In this section, we present the data model underlying the formal representation of
all kinds of data and knowledge as well as data requests required for our system.
The section proceeds by introducing crucial concepts and our approach for formally
representing them in the data model.
The model has sufficient expressiveness to satisfy, from a data model perspec-
tive, many use cases we have in mind for user-centric privacy-enhancing identity
management. The fragment of first-order logic with extensions will be introduced
in a step-by-step manner, with explanation of the underlying concepts and examples
for illustration.
Our contribution is a language that allows one to express identity information
about entities in a general way and that is particularly suitable for use with private
certificate systems, today’s most privacy-protecting mechanism for authenticating
users to other parties, as data exchange technology. As already mentioned, we stress
again that a concrete data model as we propose is a necessary precondition for a
deployment of such private certificate systems in practice because an expressive
and machine-processable representation of the identity data with clear semantics is
required for integration with authorization and trust negotiation frameworks.
4.4.1 Basics
Our approach of data representation builds on typed first-order logic and is based
on formulae in such a logic. Following concepts of first-order logic, things of interest
are referred to using notational elements such as constant or variable terms, function
symbols, expressions in the form of recursively composed terms, or predicates as is
standard.
For the foundational mechanism for data representation, we assume that data
about parties are captured as attributes of identities, conditionally released identi-
ties, opaque identities and identifier objects referred to through constant or variable
terms. Henceforth, all those are referred to as objects, unless a distinction is required.
Each object o comprises attributes and an attribute a of object o is referred to as
o.a through qualification of the object with the attribute using the “.”-notation.
The “.”-notation used for addressing attributes of an object is a shorthand notation
for a function that realizes the object in first-order logic as explained in Sec. 4.11.
Both the object and attribute are terms of the language, either constant terms or
variable terms. The attribute reference o.a refers to the value of the attribute with
name a of object o.
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Later in this section we introduce a set of reserved, or special, attributes of
objects that have predefined meaning required for the purpose of facilitating identity
management, while any other attributes but those, are definable and denoted as user
attributes.
As in standard first-order logic, a constant refers to a concrete object in an
interpretation of a formula, while a variable is to be thought of as a variable in
standard first-order logic, where both free and bound variables are permitted.
As we use a sorted logic, terms are typed through the logic and thus have assigned
“built-in” types. We use the ::-operator as is standard for indicating the type of an
element. Predicates and functions have a signature specified through the types of
their arguments, and expressions are composed of terms through which their type
is derived. The signature of predicates and functions is specified using the standard
notation Rβ1×...×βk , with R a predicate or function symbol and βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k being
the types of the arguments.
Our formulae are built from predicates for expressing relations between attributes
of objects, constants, variables, or—more generally—expressions. We support a set
of relation predicates, depending on the data types of the arguments. This comprises
Eq,Neq, Lt, Leq, Geq, and Gt which are the standard relations on totally ordered sets
with their standard meaning. Negations of each of those can be expressed—using
their standard semantics—with a corresponding predicate: The negation of ‘less
than’ can be expressed through ‘greater than or equal,’ for example. Details on the
available predicates for the supported argument types are presented in Sec. 4.4.11
on the type system.
Note that we may, for brevity, use the same predicate term for expressing re-
lations on arguments of different data types by overloading the predicates for the
different argument types in our notation. For example, the predicate Eq is used for
expressing equality for arguments of any of the data types with the common equality
semantics. Formally, the predicate needs to be referred to as, for example, Eqint×int
in case of the predicate over the integers. Thus, predicate overloading is only a
simplification of notation, instead of always making the argument types explicit.
Regarding notation, we note that in this thesis we use fonts and styles for dif-
ferentiating different kinds of elements of the data representation language, which
should become clear from their use. On another dimension, we may, with such nota-
tion refer to the language itself or a meta-language for discussing the language and
related processing over formulae expressed in it. For example, in the meta language,
we may use meta-variables that may correspond to a concrete variable or constant in
the concrete language. The difference between language and meta-language should
be clear from the context.
Example 4.1 (Predicate) The following is an example for referring to the at-
tribute named firstName of identity c1234 and stating that it is equal to the individ-
ual constant “Jane”. The notation in the second line shows the simplified notation
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with omitted types from the predicate signature.
Eqstr×str(c1234.firstName, “Jane”)
Eq(c1234.firstName, “Jane”)
4.4.2 Connectives and Formulae
Two or more predicates are connected to a more comprehensive formula through
the standard connectives ∧ and ∨ of first-order logic using infix notation. We allow
for using parantheses in the standard way for setting precedences that deviate from
the built-in precedences of the language, which are based on the standard ones used
in first-order logic, that is, conjunction binds more strongly than disjunction.17
Example 4.2 (Simple formula) A simple formula using a disjunction over at-
tribute predicates is given next:
Eq(c1234.firstName, “Jane”) ∨ Eq(c1234.firstName, “John”) . (4.1)
Particularly the possibility of the ∨-connective greatly improves our approach
for representing data in terms of data minimization functionality compared to the
standard name-value pairs widely used today. Furthermore, the formula-based lan-
guage is able to express parties’ data together with certification metadata for the
data. This is useful in terms of integrating both data and trust aspects related to
the data in a single model and allowing for policy decisions based on both.
Formulae expressed in our logic are the entities used to represent data or requests
thereof or other aspects of the system. A formula can be used for representing data or
requests in different places, such as in an identity relationship, in a data track entry,
in profile data, in a data request, in a data statement made towards a party, or a data
request specification in an authorization policy. A formula thereby expresses two
conceptually different kinds of data: identity data related to one or more subjects
and related metadata. The identity data comprises information on attributes related
to the subjects of the formula, while the metadata comprises information on the
certifiers of the identity data, the temporal validity of certification, and possibly
other metadata. All of this forms a unit, the formula expressed in our data model.
Note that different syntaxes apply to different kinds of formulae as explained later
in this work.
4.4.3 Functions of Parties
In the context of an identity and identifier object, a party can have a defined func-
tion, where functions are subject and holder and for an identity additionally also
certifier. For a conditionally released identity, a party can have the function of
conditional recipient. The subject and object terms are, for example, used to re-
late the subjects and objects of multiple identities or identifier objects used in a
17For a simplified language, one can use prefix notation for expressing formulae and precedences
and suffice with parantheses for only delimiting the scope of a logical connective symbol.
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formula with each other through equality, thereby establishing that they comprise
information about the same party.
Worth noting is that the holder and subject attributes are not directly refer-
ring to cryptographic keys at the level of the data model, but relate to the identity
management concept of a pseudonym, one of possibly many identifiers of a party.
Cryptographic keys are only one technical means for realizing those abstract con-
cepts through using cryptographic mechanisms, such as credential systems. Pro-
tocols with on-line certifiers do not require keys for implementing those concepts,
but can do so directly based on the attribute values. Our technology-agnostic way
of modeling leads to some of the complications with respect to holder and subject
functions.
4.4.3.1 Subject
The subject of an identity or identifier object is the entity or party which the data
represented through the object is about. The object is associated with a subject
through a subject term of type pty assigned to the subject attribute of the identity.
We establish the convention that the subject attribute, being a reserved, or special,
attribute, be available for each identity and identifier object. The following example
shows an equality statement being expressed over the subject of identity c and a
constant term, that is, the release of the subject term.
c.subject = “user4567”
We note that the subject of an identity is not necessarily the party using the
identity, that is, releasing attribute predicates over the identity, e.g., in delegation
use cases the subject is different from the delegatee.
Also note that there are multiple different uses of the =-symbol in this thesis
which we do not distinguish notationally as the different uses should be clear from
the respective context. The use above is as object equality symbol as part of the
formal language. Other uses include the that of equality symbol of the meta language
about out formal languages.
4.4.3.2 Holder
The holder of an identity or identifier object is the party that has special privileges
with respect to the identity that no other party has, allowing the party to make
statements over the object using security tokens or other information it holds to
prove the statements correct. In other words, the holder can be viewed as the owner
of the object that can legitimately make use of it for releasing (certified) data and
prove holdership of it. Holdership is independent of the party also being the subject,
although those functions often coincide, particularly for standard use cases of private
certificates. Delegation is a notable case when the holding party is different to the
subject. Analogous to the subject, the holder of an object is referred to through a
term of type pty being the value of the holder attribute of the object.
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From a technical perspective, the holder of an identity is the party that holds
the metadata, such as certificates, private keys, or other data, allowing it to make
certifier-endorsed statements about this identity or have them made by the certifier,
depending on the protocol. Analogously, for an identifier object, the holder is the
party that holds the metadata to establish holdership of the identifier object towards
another party.
An example of a holder of an identity is the party P that holds an identity
relationship based on a private certificate that has been issued to P. Only this
party P is able to make statements about the identity of this identity relationship,
proving them correct using the certificate and its private key.
Another example is an identity based on a relationship with an on-line identity
provider. The prominent protocols where an on-line identity provider asserts at-
tributes about its users are another possible underlying technology for an identity.
The holder is the party who can request the identity provider to make identity state-
ments about the identity to other parties, that is, it can use the identity. The holder
has private information, e.g., a password or authentication key, associated with the
identity that allows it to authenticate at the identity provider and ensure that only
it can make use of the identity by having the identity provider make statements
about it. The security depends on the strength of the authentication mechanism to
authenticate with the identity provider.
4.4.3.3 Certifier
The certifier is a term referring to the party certifying the identity, that is, vouching
for its attributes. Details on this are presented below in Sec. 4.4.10.
4.4.3.4 Conditional Recipient
For a conditionally released identity used for modeling conditional release of data,
a party can have the function of conditional recipient of the data—see Sec. 4.4.5
below for details.
4.4.4 Identities
A foundational concept in our formalism for representing identity data is the identity,
a named function from a set of attributes to their typed attribute values.
Definition 4.1 (Identity) An identity is a function from a set of attributes to a
set of typed attribute values.
The function representing an identity is, following the standard definition of a func-
tion, equivalent to a named set of tuples, each comprising an attribute name and a
typed attribute value.
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Example 4.3 (Identity) We give an example identity c1234 comprising the at-
tributes firstName, lastName, and income, indicating also the types.
c1234 = {(firstName :: att, “Jane” :: str),
(lastName :: att, “Doe” :: str),
(income :: att, 3000 :: int)}
The example relates the attributes firstName and lastName to string constants and
income to an integer constant.
Note that using the function paradigm for associating attributes of an identity with
constants implies that equality is expressed between an attribute and its associ-
ated constant. Using relations other than equality is possible through the operator
extension to our data model presented in Sec. 4.4.17.
Identities are referred to by terms of type id of the language, where such term
can be an individual constant or a variable, e.g., the constant c1234 or the variable
C.
The use of the logical connectives allows one to build comprehensive formulae
in our data model, e.g., for making (data-minimizing) statements about parties or
requests for such. The example formula (4.1) on page 89 shows how to express a
disjunction over two predicates expressed over the same identity.
An identity is used as a conceptual grouping of attributes, as it often occurs
in real life. For example, government-issued credentials such as passports, driver’s
licenses, or residence permits each comprise a group of attributes relevant in their
respective context. This grouping provides additional semantics to the contained
attributes of the identity by stating that those attributes belong together. For
example, both an account balance and a currency attribute for a bank statement
need to be grouped together, otherwise they will not have the intended meaning of
denoting the balance of a given account in its associated currency. Further below,
we introduce the type of an identity expressed through a reserved attribute as a
means of associating further meaning with an identity and its attributes.
In our credential-based protocols, an identity corresponds to a credential, or
private certificate based on the SRSA-CL scheme [CL02b] or BL-CL scheme [CL04],
that a party holds.
A given identity is immutable, that is, it cannot change over time within a
concrete system as a prerequisite for a monotonous logic underlying the language.
Changes to an identity are implemented by establishing a new identity with the
changed information and rendering the to-be-changed identity obsolete through at-
tached metadata governing its use in the system. Obsolete identities are not any
more used for any processing in the system—cryptographically, an obsolete identity
of an identity relationship can be revoked. Making an identity obsolete and enforc-
ing this depends on the kind of identity and its uses. The change of objects over time
is not modeled formally through the logic, because a more powerful logic required
for expressing this does not provide a substantial improvement of functionality for
our purposes, though, leads to complications.
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A reserved attribute of an identity is a unique object identification number of the
identity. Such number must be unique in the scope of all identities of a given type
issued by a certifier. We prefer the generic concept of unique identification number
to that of a serial number as it does not reveal information on the number of issued
identities, though, we use serial numbers in this thesis for the same purpose. Note
that neither number should be revealed in practical use cases, it is rather intended to
serve the purpose of showing the (non-)equality between identities without revealing
an identifier.
Relation to related work. The term card is used for a related concept in Ca-
menisch et al. [CMN+10], namely the concept of an identity as defined here together
with (cryptographic) tokens endorsing it. Various other works in the literature body
use the term credential for referring to a similar concept. Other semantically mean-
ingful names to refer to the identity concept are attribute group or attribute set.
We chose the term identity for its genericity as well as the fact that it resembles
the concept of partial identity which is well established in the privacy-enhancing
identity management research community [PH10], see also Sec. 2. A partial identity
is commonly known as a part of a party’s complete set of attributes it holds about
itself that it exposes to another party in an interaction or a set of related (linked)
interactions, whereby an identity in our definition captures a part of a party’s at-
tribute information, but not in the context of the identity’s complete comprised set
of attribute information being revealed to another party.
Multiple earlier works where we used the concept of an identity to group at-
tributes in a privacy-enhanced identity management context using private certifi-
cates or other technologies have been published [BCS05, CSZ06a, CMN+10, Som11],
with Backes et al. [BCS05] being the first in this series of works introducing the idea.
Camenisch et at. [CMN+10] and the author [Som11] have already proposed the
technology independence of the concept while [BCS05] was focused on private cer-
tificate protocols for achieving the strong combination of accountability and privacy.
Use of identities. Identities are used for a plurality of purposes, of which we
present some next. An identity may characterize a party in terms of the party’s
attributes of its civil identity (or legal identity), such as its name, address, date and
place of birth etc., other assigned attributes, such as the name and grade of an online
course a user has completed, or assign rights to the party, e.g., specify the rights
of the party for accessing an online resource such as for a subscription to an online
newspaper or movie rental store. Although all those cases are different in terms
of what parts of the identity of a party are concerned, there is, from a technical
perspective, no need to handle those cases of the identity of a party (in terms of
attributes) in the strict sense and rights assigned to the party differently. Thus, we
subsume all of those into the concept of identity and its attributes. This gives rise
to a wide meaning of the term identity in the data model. In this thesis, the use
of the term identity should mostly become clear from the context of use, otherwise,
we may explicitly clarify it.
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Indirection of attribute association. From an identity management perspec-
tive, the concept of associating attribute information with identities and identities
with entities—in particular people—has the major advantages over associating at-
tributes directly with parties that parties can be assigned multiple (different) at-
tribute values for the same attribute and that attributes are grouped. The possibility
of having different attribute values for an attribute is commonly leveraged in today’s
Web interactions by users, e.g., by using pseudonyms and picking different names for
different accounts resulting in the various pseudonyms people can have in different
contexts on the Web, or by releasing different attribute values for other attributes,
e.g., a date of birth, where no purpose of data collection for such attribute is evi-
dent to the user. This is foundational to privacy-enhanced identity management in
general, see discussions in related work [PH10] for a detailed account.
Subject and certifier. An identity technically pertains to exactly one subject,
the subject of the data represented through the identity. The subject is indi-
cated with the subject attribute of the identity.18 An identity contains an attribute
subjectIdWithCertifier comprising the subject identifier under which the identity’s
subject is known by the certifier. This identifier is the identifier of the subject with
the certifier and can be used, for example, for the revocation of the anonymity of a
party carrying out a data release transaction. A formula over multiple identities may
make statements over identities with different subjects, that is, talk about different
parties which can, for example, be useful in scenarios with user-centric delegation
where one needs to express data about the delegater and the delegatee within a
single formula.
An identity is also associated with at most one certifier, that is, an entity (e.g.,
a single party or a logical party comprising multiple physical entities) who vouches
for the identity and attribute information it comprises.
Another view of identities being part of identity relationships is that such an
identity is a view the certifier of the identity has about the subject and that it has
decided to vouch towards other parties, so-called relying parties. This represents
well what an identity actually is, namely what a party who makes a statement
about another party claims about this party. Thus, this view is not about the actual
correctness of the attributes with respect to any real-world reference attributes, e.g.,
the ones in a party’s government-issued credentials such as their passport, rather it
is about claims someone, who is trusted by others for this, makes about someone
else. Depending on the claiming party and its policy of validating attributes it
vouches for, those claims may have a certain degree of attribute assurance and thus
be suitable for practical purposes of identity management for other parties, such as
service providers relying on those claims for given purposes. Actual correctness of
the attributes with respect to the real attribute values, such as the civil identity of a
18The concept of subject corresponds to the concept of data subject of the European data protec-
tion Directive 95/46/EC [Eur95] in case the subject is a user and only data about a single person is
represented in the identity. This legal term does not apply in case the subject is a service provider.
Note that we use the term in its technical, that is, less constrained, meaning in this chapter unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
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user, largely is not a technical question, but rather a question of processes executed
and verification performed by the certifier when establishing the attributes of a
party whose attributes it intends to vouch for as well as of this information being
accessible to the other parties, that is, relying parties.
4.4.5 Conditionally Released Identities
Conditionally released identities are used in our formal language for modeling the
concept of conditional release as discussed by the author earlier [Som11] and orig-
inally presented by Bangerter et al. [BCL04]. A conditionally released identity is
similar to a regular identity in that it is a function that maps attributes to their
typed values and thereby represents a set of tuples associating attribute names with
typed attribute values. Statements can be made about the attributes of a condi-
tionally released identity through predicates, e.g., by relating them to attributes of
regular identities in a formula. The attributes condition of type str and recipient
of type pty are reserved attributes of conditionally released identities. The further
expresses the release condition, the latter the conditional recipient, both explained
in Sec. 2.7.
As is also true for identities, the tuples related to conditionally released identities
are not obtained by the data recipient during a data release interaction the condi-
tionally released identity is created in—the data recipient only learns the predicates
expressed about it. Only once, and if, the associated condition is fulfilled after a
successful data release transaction, the recipient learns the tuples comprising the
conditionally released identity.
We give a fragment of a formula in (4.2) to show the use of conditionally released
identities within a formula to be released.
· · · ∧tid.subject = t ∧
Eq(tid.unique name, “Swiss revocation services”) ∧ · · ·
· · · ∧Eq(e.serialNumber , c.serialNumber)∧
Eq(e.condition, “Misuse of service”)∧
e.recipient = t ∧ · · ·
(4.2)
The example shows how the attribute serialNumber of conditionally released iden-
tity e is specified to be equal to the attribute serialNumber of the identity c without
revealing the latter. Typically, the predicate Eq for the data type of the attribute
being referred to is used for relating attributes of conditionally released identities
to attributes of certified identities. Furthermore, the example shows how the con-
ditional release condition is expressed through the reserved attribute condition and
the conditional recipient through the reserved attribute recipient of e. The recipient
is specified through term t being further specified through another identity tid.
This approach of specifying the attributes of conditionally released identities
by relating them to the attributes of identities representing private certificates has
first been put forth by Bangerter et al. [BCM05] in the context of a language at the
cryptographic level specifying data statements to be released—Backes et al. [BCS05]
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and the current work are extensions of those earlier results using a more expressive
language.
When using the technical realization of credential protocols, a conditionally re-
leased identity corresponds to a ciphertext encrypting a tuple of attributes using a
verifiable encryption scheme such as that of Camenisch and Shoup [CS03] or Ca-
menisch and Damg˚ard [CD00].
A conditionally released identity does not have a subject or holder attribute
because it may comprise attributes related to different subjects, e.g., attributes of
the delegater and delegatee may be present in a single conditionally released identity,
and the subject or holder should become clear from the formula the condition-
ally released identity is specified through, thus need not be made explicit in the
conditionally released identity itself.
4.4.5.1 Discussion
The choice of again reverting to the identity concept for expressing the conditional
recipient of the conditionally released identity is motivated as follows: First, it
conceptually fits the idea of using identities to specify attribute statements about
parties, and thus is integrated into the model and derivations over it naturally by
using the same language elements. Second, it allows for specifying in a flexible way
a set of parties as possible recipients through appropriate specification of the predi-
cates in a data request, e.g., through using ontology concepts, which is particularly
useful for giving choice over one of multiple data recipient parties to the data re-
leasing party in a data request of a policy. Particularly, this allows for specifying
the conditional recipient through properties instead of attributes of its identities, if
an ontology modeling this is defined.
Conditionally released identities are typically used in addition to other kinds of
identities in data release protocols for establishing revocability of anonymous inter-
actions through escrowing identity information that can identify the party once be-
ing recovered. An actual revocation of anonymity—the recovery protocol—requires
additional protocol flows, depending on the exact scheme being used.
Anonymity revocation. In systems where users can be pseudonymous or anony-
mous in an interaction, legal regulations or specific interests of parties may require
that anonymity or pseudonymity be revokable under well-specified circumstances.
We have defined a reserved attribute subjectIdWithCertifier for identities that is
set during creation of an identity relationship to the subject identifier the party is
known under to the certifier at the time of the creation of the identity relationship.
This approach of introducing a new attribute for modeling the subject identifier un-
der which the subject was known when the identity relationship was created avoids
the need to revert to more powerful logic for expressing this meaning. For realiz-
ing revocability of a specific transaction, the subjectIdWithCertifier attribute of an
identity referred to in the data formula to be released is conditionally released to the
data recipient and can be obtained only by the specified conditional data recipient
(trustee) once, and if, the associated conditional release condition gets fulfilled. The
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actual revocation of the anonymity, that is, obtaining the subject identifier, can be
carried out by the trustee if asked so by the data recipient or a third party and
after verifying that the condition holds. With this pseudonymous identifier it is,
depending on the setup, possible to obtain further, possibly identifying, attribute
information of the party from the certifier of the identity.
As a specific case, the attribute subjectIdWithCertifier can be the identifier the
party had with the registration certifier from which the registration identity for this
registration domain has been obtained—see Sec. 4.8 for what registration means in
the data model.
It does clearly not make sense to conditionally release a pseudonym value with
the party one interacts with as it has no benefit to the interaction partner to be
able to obtain this identifier conditionally. More generally, any technically feasible
combination of attributes can be conditionally released by a party (as required by a
data request), possibly to multiple conditional data recipients in a single transaction.
Depending on the technology being used, the releasing party need not execute a
protocol with the conditional recipient. Attributes of the basic data types and idf
can be conditionally released, while pty-typed attributes cannot. See Sec. 4.4.11 for
details on typing in our data model.
Formulae containing references to conditionally released identities are applicable
for making data statements to other parties, expressing the requests hereto, and
storing those formulae in the data track and profile data. Though, such formulae
are not applicable for modeling data in identity relationships.
Further consideration needs to be given to specifying conditionally released iden-
tities in data requests comprising disjunctions. It is crucial that it be ensured that,
once the conditional recipient obtains the attribute values of the conditionally re-
leased identity, it can be determined which identity an attribute is from. For exam-
ple, it may be crucial to know whether a unique identification number of an identity
is from a Swiss electronic identity card or a Swedish one, as otherwise it is not clear
which authority to request further attribute values from for a de-anonymization.
Such disambiguation can be done, for example, through an attribute of the con-
ditionally released identity that indicates, as a string, the identity an attribute is
from, in the case of using disjunctions in the specification formula.
4.4.6 Opaque Identities
Opaque identities are used for referring to attribute groups which a party holds and
can make statements about, while not necessarily revealing the attribute values to
its communication partner. That is, an opaque identity is a handle to a group of
attributes, where each attribute can be related to other attributes referred to in
a formula. An opaque identity is syntactically represented like the other kinds of
identities through qualifying the term referring to the opaque identity through the
“.”-notation with the names of its attributes. Analogously to an opaque identity,
an identity correponds to a function specifying its attributes.
An opaque identity is typically used in a way that the values of its attributes
are specified through relating them with other attributes or predicates over such.
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This way of specifying an opaque identity is done in a formula specifying data
to be released. Once the formula has been released and proven correct with a
cryptographic protocol, the opaque identity is established and its attributes fixed.
For the communication partner, the opaque identity is a handle to the corresponding
attribute set, while not learning the attributes unless they are explicitly revealed.
Once established, the attributes of an opaque identity can be referred to in a
formula specifying a new identity to be established in order to determine their values
without the certifier learning them, or they can be referred to in further released
formulae, e.g., for proving equality with attributes of other identities of previously
released formulae.
Example 4.4 (Opaque identity) Let the formula fragment in (4.3) be the frag-
ment of a formula in which the opaque identity oid is specified by relating its lastName
and firstName attributes to the correspondingly named attributes of the electronic
driver’s license edl.
· · · ∧Eq(oid.lastName, edl.lastName)∧
Eq(oid.firstName, edl.firstName) ∧ · · · (4.3)
Once the formula has been released to its recipient and proven correct using a cor-
responding cryptographic protocol, oid can be referred to in other formulae and pro-
tocols.
4.4.7 Identifier Objects
A pseudonym is a name for a party following our definition of Sec. 2.3. We express
pseudonyms in our language through the concept of identifier objects, which are
entities represented in a syntactically similar way to identities. Identifier objects
equally comprise attributes that can be referred to by qualifying the term p repre-
senting an identifier object through . to refer to its attributes. Any identifier object
has the following reserved, or special, attributes with the indicated types:
holder :: pty, subject :: pty, subjectId :: idf .
The attribute subjectId is a constant term of type idf used as the identifier of the
party, while holder and subject are of type pty, referring to the holder and subject,
respectively, that is, the parties that may make use of the identifier object and the
subject the party which the identifier object is about, much like for an identity. The
value of subjectId represents the pseudonym being modeled.
Conceptual differences to identies are that identifier objects can only be released
to, by proving holdership, the parties they are established with and that they have an
exhaustively specified set of allowed attributes used to express their properties, while
identities can be used with any verifying party and can have sets of user attributes
associated with them as induced by their types in addition to the reserved attributes.
Due to these differences, identifier objects and identities cannot be cleanly modeled
with a single concept, though, their syntactic modeling is closely related.
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An identifier object is not only relevant for the use case where a user commu-
nicates with a service provider and uses the identifier object in this communication
to refer to itself. In a scenario where two service providers interact to exchange
customer data, the concept of identifier objects equally applies. Though, the trust
model is different in that in the former case, cryptographic protocols are employed
to enforce the correctness of subject identifiers while in the latter case, the service
providers need to trust each other in using correct identifiers. As the concepts are
equal—a party talks about another party, possibly itself, towards another party—
we use the same concept for modeling, while protocols with considerably different
properties and underlying trust models can be used for implementing the concept of
identifiers of parties. We focus on cryptographic pseudonym and credential protocols
in this thesis.
Identifier objects are referred to in different kinds of formulae for specifying
identifier relationships, being input and output of protocols for establishing identifier
and identity relationships, requesting data, as well as specifying data to be released,
and any formulae derived from the latter. The differences of those uses of identifier
objects are explained in Sec. 5.
Example 4.5 (Formula over identifier object) An example of a formula frag-
ment over an identifier object is given next, with the holder and subject being the
same term, thus referring to the same party.
· · ·p.holder = “user4567” ∧ p.subject = “user4567”∧
Eq(p.subjectId , “user4321”) · · ·
Registration identifier objects. When a party registers in a system as discussed
in Chapter 3, it first creates a registration identifier object on which a registration
identity can be issued. The specificity of a registration identifier object is that it
can be established without any preexisting relationship with the other party. In our
credential protocols, a registration identifier object corresponds to the generation of
a new private key of the party. Any other identifier object is established based on
an existing identifier object, that is, using the same private key.
Domain identifier objects. A domain identifier object is a special kind of iden-
tifier object with the meaning that a party may only establish a single such object
with one other party comprising the same domain identifier. This is a well-known
concept in privacy-enhanced identity management. The domain identifier can be
freely specified by the party the identifier is established with and typically delimits
different scopes of this party. A domain identifier object has an additional special
attribute domain :: str and realizes the concept of a domain pseudonym.
Example 4.6 (Domain identifier object) For example, in an e-learning ser-
vice, the service provider may require that users can register only under one identifier
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per course and thus require a domain identifier to be used:
· · ·p.holder = “user4567” ∧ p.subject = “user4567”∧
Eq(p.subjectId , “user4321”) ∧ Eq(p.domain, “Introduction to Economics”) · · · .
The use of such identifier objects allows a service provider to restrict users to
a single registration for a service. A cryptographic pseudonym system can enforce
the uniqueness of such identifier objects for each user (private key) and domain
string. When proving holdership of a domain identifier object, its domain needs to
be always revealed, otherwise the underlying cryptographic protocol must terminate
with failure as the purpose of the domain restriction would be defeated. Not all kinds
of identifier objects may also be domain identifier objects.
Domain identifier objects realize the concept of domain-specific pseudonyms or
domain pseudonyms. They are relevant for all practical applications where it needs
to be ensured that a party can only establish a single identifier with a service
provider. As an example for the area of e-government, federal regulations in Austria
stipulate that different domain-specific identifiers, denoted as sector-specific identi-
fiers, be used with different public sector domains.
Public pseudonyms. As introduced in Chapter 3, a public pseudonym is one a
party uses with all players in the system. For a party with a public key that is asso-
ciated with the party through standard PKI-based public key certificates (PKCs),
the public pseudonym can be uniquely derived from the PKC. For pseudonymous
certifiers, it can be computed from the Fiat-Shamir-signed statement, which con-
ceptually corresponds to a standard public key certificate—it associates attributes
of the key holder to the key. Because in our model only names that have been
established in some form as pseudonyms can be used with other parties, we define
a public pseudonym to be established with everyone or parties that have obtained
the certificate the pseudonym is derived from.
4.4.8 Delegation of Attribute Authority
Delegation of the authority of making attribute statements about a party as dis-
cussed in the model in Chapter 3 can be realized through delegation of identities.
We use the approach of delegating identities or parts thereof and indicating for
such identities that they are delegated ones. Delegation of an identity is defined as
the process of a delegater giving a delegatee the power to use the attributes of the
identity, possibly for an agreed constrained set of purposes.
The case of an identity being a delegated identity needs to be encoded in the
identity which we accomplish through the reserved attribute delegation of type bool
which is set to true for delegated identities and false otherwise. Our modeling
through an explicit delegation attribute allows for distinguishing the use cases of
delegation of an identity and making statements about third parties being the sub-
jects without delegation. The use of the attributes holder and subject of an identity
with and without delegation is discussed in Sec. 4.8.
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The holder of a delegated identity is, following our definition of holder, the
delegatee while the subject is the delegater. This assumes that the delegater is
the subject of the identity it delegates. The attributes holder and subject must be
instantiated accordingly to express those functions of the holder and subject parties.
The case of a third party being the subject is possible as well, but not discussed
further in this work.
Both a formula describing the identity in an identity relationship and a data
statement made to a verifier need to reflect the delegation attribute. In our examples
we often omit the delegation attribute, unless we focus on expressing such semantics.
When delegating an identity, the identity type of the delegated identity remains
the same as the type of the base identity of the delegation in our model. Concep-
tually there are use cases that can benefit from delegating a subset of the attribute
information of an identity and thereby realize a notion analogous to data minimiza-
tion towards the delegatee, namely to delegate only what is required for the intended
purposes of the delegation. This is, e.g., useful for limiting the damage in case of
misuse of the delegated identity by the delegatee or prevent certain cases of misuse
in the first place by not giving away authority over certain attributes. Though, we
make the simplification of not changing the identity type in a delegation for the
reason of the technically simpler handling. The main arising difficulties are that
reducing the delegated attribute information of an identity requires additional con-
sideration. It can be addressed, for example, through delegating a subtype of an
identity, or any part of the attribute information that is required while not chang-
ing the identity type. The first approach requires an elaborate subtype hierarchy
to function, while the second approach follows the approach of minimizing the dele-
gated attributes best with the implications of not having all attributes contained in
the delegated identity that its type mandates. Thus, the second approach is more
suitable in terms of privacy, though, may require issues with the type system to be
resolved. In terms of architecture, the second approach is realized by the formula
describing the delegated identity making assertions only about the attributes au-
thority of which has been delegated, and not about other attributes comprised in
the delegation identity type. This makes the matching process of identity relation-
ships with policies applicable without modifications. A detailed discussion of the
solutions for minimizing the delegation of attribute authority in the context of our
architecture is left open to future work.
4.4.9 Transfer of Identities
A related concept to the delegation of identities is the transfer of identities from
one party to another party. With transfer we mean that both the holdership and
subject function for an identity are transferred, on request of its current holder and
subject, to another party, the future holder. Transfer is realized by invalidating
the identity being transferred, the source identity, and creating a new transferred
identity, the target identity of the transfer. The concept of transfer of identities
may be important for many use cases in a future electronic society for replacing
traditional credentials with electronic ones in different domains of life.
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A transfer of identities is meaningful for identities with attributes specifying
transferable entitlements assigned to its holder, but not for identities the attributes
of which make statements about the civil (legal) identity of the holder. Prominent
examples for the further case are event tickets or vouchers which are allowed to be
transferred by their holder (owner), much like the corresponding credentials in the
physical world. Clearly, identities certifying civil identity attributes must not be
transferable as a transfer would change the subject, thereby violating the intention
of the issuer and allow for pooling of identities and thus allowing its holder to make
false statements and possibly obtain access to resources it would not be able to
access otherwise. The issuer needs to decide for each identity type based on the
kind of attributes it comprises whether identities of this type may be transferable.
This is out of scope of the data modeling formalism and depends on real-world
attribute semantics available to the issuer.
Transferable identities allow for realizing many real-world use cases of transfer-
able physical credentials. Examples for such are movie tickets a person buys for
a group of friends and then distributes to them, vouchers that can be passed on
through a chain of arbitrary length of holders, or a party invitation that can be
passed on to a friend. The identities in those use cases have the property that their
holder equals their subject as the attributes of such identities always apply to the
holder. If the latter were not the case, we would be speaking of a delegation and not
a transfer setting. Attributes of transferable identities typically make statements
about entitlements of the holder and subject.
There are two main differences to delegation, namely that the transferring party
gives away all rights and capabilities associated with the transferred identity, while
in the delegation setting the party may retain rights and capabilities or regain them
once the delegation has ended, and that the subject in a transfer is changed to the
new holder and does not remain the original subject as is the case for a delegation.
The subject is handled like this because for a delegation the main purpose is that
authority over the attributes of the delegater is (temporarily) given to the delegatee
with the intention that the latter make identity statements on behalf of the further.
For a practical system, an implementation of easy-to-use protocols for transfer-
ring (low-value) identities, such as cinema tickets, vouchers and similar items, can
leverage mobile handsets like smart phones for realizing real-world scenarios which
are currently handled with physical credentials as in the examples mentioned above.
Thus, the simplicity of real-world credential handling can be transferred to the elec-
tronic domain, thereby obtaining practically simple, yet effective, systems handling
those everyday use cases for credential management.
From a data modeling perspective, a transferred identity is modeled like any
identity. Transferability of an identity needs to be expressed as part of the identity
type as metadata outside of the data model.
4.4.10 Certification Metadata
Certification metadata are data associated with an identity, also denoted the base
identity in this context, and describe aspects related to the certification of this
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identity. This includes, as the main aspect, the specification of the certifier, e.g.,
by specifying it through a single identifying constant term, identifying combination
of attributes, or through a non-identifying combination of attributes. In addition,
certification metadata comprise the temporal validity of certification and protocol-
related parameters, such as the protocol suite the identity is based on.
Certification metadata are required in order to allow a holder of an identity
to compute a fulfilling statement for a data request and a recipient to express the
certification requirements when requesting data for an authentication of a data
statement as well as to make its trust decisions regarding the identity. Without
certification metadata being available for identity data, it is typically not possible
for a verifier of the identity data to make a decision on whether to trust the data
for the purpose at hand. For this reason, those metadata are equally important for
making a policy-based access control decision than the identity data itself they are
associated with.
4.4.10.1 Temporal Validity and Protocol Identifier
The temporal validity and protocol identifier are modeled as reserved attributes
of the identity in a straightforward way, thus also following the approach of tight
integration with the identity data and are used following the pattern of (4.4):
· · · ∧Eq(c.validFrom, d1) ∧ Eq(c.validUntil , d2)∧
Eq(c.protocolSuite, p) ∧ · · · . (4.4)
The attribute validFrom is defined to be equal to the constant d1 of type date or
one of its granularized subtypes and validUntil is defined to be equal to d2, also of
a date type. The protocol suite which the identity is based on is specified through
the attribute protocolSuite which is equal to a constant p of type str.
4.4.10.2 Certifier Metadata
For modeling its certifier metadata, an identity comprises the attribute certifier .
The certifier metadata for a base identity c are expressed by associating the identity
with its certifier using a term u, a constant term referring to the certifier. This is
accomplished through an equality relation between the certifier attribute of c and
constant term u and, optionally, expressing predicates, accordingly related to u, for
specifying the certifier. This can be achieved in either of the following ways or com-
binations thereof. (a) Specification of the certifier u to be the subject of another
identity, the certifier identity cid, through the subject attribute of the latter, or an
identifier object of the certifier, the certifier identifier object, in case it is only re-
ferred to through an identifier object, or a combination thereof or multiple objects
of either kind. In the following, we only present details for the case of using one cer-
tifier identity—certifier identifier objects or combinations are handled analogously.
The certifier identity cid is—like any identity—defined as a function specifying its
attributes and can be described through predicates over its attributes analogous to
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any identity. Analogously, the certifier identifier object is specified through its at-
tributes. The statements over a certifier identity cid or certifier identifier object form
a sub-formula φ˜. The formula fragment (4.5) shows the general pattern of expressing
the certifier metadata in statement-type formulae. In request-type formulae, this
may be generalized as explained in Sec. 4.6.
· · ·φ˜ ∧ cid.subject = u ∧ · · · ∧ c.certifier = u · · · (4.5)
The term u is a term used for referring to the certifier, that is, typically a publicly
used term corresponding to a public pseudonym of the certifier that is used to refer
to this certifier by every party or a term representing a pseudonym for the case of
a pseudonymous certifier. In either case, there is no need to use different terms
in different references to the referred-to certifier. The holder does not need to be
expressed for a certifier identity or certifier identifier object in a data statement
because this identity is used (referred-to) by a party who is not its holder and a
statement about the subject is sufficient for achieving the association of the certifier
identity, and thus the certifier, with the base identity. (b) Specification of the
certifier through property predicates and not referring to an identity or identifier
object of the certifier. This approach is suitable for specifying the certifier for
an identity in an abstract way in data requests and deriving the set of concrete
applicable certifiers through reasoning over a certifier ontology. For this approach,
the certifier is referred to through a variable u. The structure for this approach is
presented in (4.6).
· · · ∧Property(u, “MinimumAssuranceLevel”, “high”) ∧ · · · c.certifier = u · · · (4.6)
Note that the terms ‘certifier identity’ and ‘base identity’ used above are contex-
tual and meaningful only in the context of a formula, as both refer to, by definition,
identities. A base identity is an identity that has a subject that is not the certifier
of another identity in the formula. A certifier identity is an identity the subject
of which is the certifier of at least one other base or certifier identity. Without
considering the context of a formula, a certifier identity is a regular identity of the
certifier with the intention that it be used by other parties in relation to identities
of them.
The user attributes for characterizing a certifier identity should be aligned with
what the underlying technology, which is PKI technology in the standard case of
leveraging today’s public key infrastructures, supports for establishing integrity of
the statements about the identity.
Example 4.7 (Certifier metadata) The following example expresses that the
party referred to by term u is the certifier of dl and that u is as well the subject
of the identity cid, the certifier identity. Via the identity cid, the statements about
the certifier u are made, in the example only the statement that the value of its
attribute uniqueId equals “German eDL Issuer”.
· · · ∧Eq(cid.subject , u) ∧ Eq(cid.uniqueId , “German eDL Issuer”) ∧ · · ·
· · ·Eq(dl.certifier , u) · · ·
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The example uses the term cid for referring to the identity of the certifier u and
specifies the attribute uniqueId of the certifier to be equal to “German eDL Issuer”,
building on the assumption that this attribute can uniquely identify parties in the
system through a string. For X.509 certificates specifying attributes of a certifier,
the uniquely identifying name is the distinguished name presented in the certificate.
Clearly, more complex sub-formulae as in the example can be used for specifying the
certifier’s identity, including the use of disjunctions in data requests.
Our approach for specifying certifier metadata makes the language expressive in
terms of being able to refer to any of a set of certifiers. This is crucial for expressing
certification requirements in a data request being part of an access control policy.
Using this approach is also very dynamic as a policy author is free to refer to any
attributes of certifier identities in the specification of the certification requirements
as well as using ontology-based generalizations.
We argue that the idea of specifying a certifier by once again reverting to the
concept of identities is a natural choice. We cannot see a strong reason for intro-
ducing an additional concept for modeling the data of parties acting in the role of
a certifier and thereby complicating the language. Particularly, identities are issued
to certifiers in a way that is conceptually the same as identities being issued to
other parties: Attributes of which they are the subject are certified as part of an
identity. In addition, for a certifier, the attributes also include a public key, thereby
resembling a public key certificate. Thus, each party is described via identities in
our model regardless of what kind of party it is, that is, under which combination
of the roles data provider (user), service provider, certifier, or other roles it acts.
There is no conceptual or modeling difference between identities with the subject
being a certifier or identities with the subject being any other kind of party, e.g, a
user. This homogeneous modeling of identities contributes to a simple yet powerful
data model and resulting system for privacy-enhanced identity management.
Analogously, the conditional data recipient of a conditionally released identity
is specified like the certifier of an identity, that is, the discussions here apply analo-
gously. An opaque identity does not need a certifier to be specified as there might
be multiple certifiers for different attributes, deducible from the formula through
which it is specified.
Anonymous and pseudonymous certifiers. An interesting use case is that of
pseudonymous certifiers, e.g., users who may become certifiers in a certain context
and issue identities to other users, while being known on the basis of pseudonym
or attribute statements rather than unique identifiers. Such use cases take the idea
of attribute-based access control one level further towards certifiers being specified
through attributes instead of necessarily through unique identifiers. These use cases
can be expressed easily in our data model with its standard mechanisms by specifying
a certifier through its attributes using the presented approach.
A use case of a party being a pseudonymous certifier can be technically han-
dled as follows: The party creates an SRSA-CL [CL02b] or BL-CL [CL04] or other
suitable signature key pair for issuing private certificates and binds a pseudonym
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and attribute statement to the key using a Fiat-Shamir signature [FS86] based on a
data statement. The data statement comprises pseudonym and attribute informa-
tion about the party and conceptually corresponds to the certifier identity backed
by a public key certificate of an identified certifier. The party can subsequently use
the SRSA-CL, BL-CL, or other private key for issuing private certificates to other
parties, and other parties can verify proofs based on such certificates based on the
corresponding public key. The public key remains bound to the data statement such
that a reputation can be established and associated with it over time.
Following this, the case of a pseudonymous certifier can be handled with the
same concepts as any other certifier, which shows the generality and flexibility of our
architecture. A difference is in the concrete mechanism: the identity of a pseudony-
mous certifier is endorsed through a Fiat-Shamir signature over a statement created
by the party while in the conventional case standard PKI technology is used. That
is, the party can, in the Fiat-Shamir case, itself choose the attribute statement and
create a proof for it based on pseudonyms and credentials, instead of requiring that
a single other party certify the identity as in the PKI case. Conceptually, both cases
represent a pseudonym and attribute statement about the holder of the public key
the statement is cryptographically associated with.
The special case of a one-time signature key pair created through the above
approach technically works in the same way and for each such key pair any party
out of the group of parties specified through the data statement could be the holder
and subject. A fresh association between key and statement is created for each such
key pair using an appropriate statement specifying the key holder. This allows for
special-purpose use cases and has as a major drawback that no reputation can be
established for the individual issuer, but only for the group defined through the
attribute statement. Also, it increases the complixity of the key management as
public keys also need to be provided to the recipients of data statements made with
credentials issued by the key holder.
Use cases for the approach of pseudonymous certifiers can be found in collabo-
rative applications or communities where pseudonymous users can obtain identities
certifying attributes related to them from the collaboration or community platform
and, using attributes of those, create a signature key pair with an associated user-
chosen attribute statement. For example, attributes could be the member status or
compentence in certain areas of the community. The user can then assign attributes
to other users by issuing certificates much like any issuer can do. Thereby, those
users might obtain permissions on the platform by proving holdership of attributes
or statements about attributes issued by a party holding certain attributes without
regard to the issuer’s civil identity. In today’s open systems, one can think of a plu-
rality of further use cases where it makes sense that pseudonymous certifiers issue
identities to other parties and are not known by their civil identities, but only by
attributes showing a status or capabilities the party has. Use cases like this take
the idea of attribute-based specification of parties one level further and applies it
also to parties acting as certifiers in our identity system.
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Self-certified data. Another practically important use case in our architecture
is self-certified data, also referred to as declarations, where the latter term has been
established in related work [BS02]. The characteristic of a self-certified identity is
that its holder equals its certifier. The terms used for referring to the holder and
subject need to be derived accordingly at creation time of the identity as explained in
other parts of this thesis. In the data representation, this is handled by associating
the certifier attribute of the identity with the holder or subject term used for the
party.
Discussion. As one specifically interesting feature, our approach of modeling data
through attributes of identities and associating certifiers with such identities allows
for counter-intuitive and powerful functionality such as expressing predicates that
comprise attributes from multiple certifiers, that is, a single predicate can be jointly
endorsed by multiple certifiers. Such statements can be proven with private cer-
tificate technologies through applying cryptographic protocols accordingly. An ex-
ample for this is an equality predicate over the lastName attribute of two identity
relationships of a user, both backed with private certificates. In this example, the
whole predicate is stated by the user, with the not-released attribute values being
endorsed by different certifiers, leading to an interesting situation of endorsement
for the statement. Most other methods for specifying certifiers would not allow for
modeling such complex endorsements. This powerful feature of combined endorse-
ment of predicates is only one reason for having chosen our approach of specifying
certifiers in formulae.
In a technical realization, a certifier identity is in all currently envisioned sce-
narios backed either by a standard public key certificate as cryptographic material
or a Fiat-Shamir-based public-key certificate based on pseudonym and credential
protocols. See Sec. 4.8 for a brief discussion related to modeling of identities based
on credential protocols and conventional signatures.
4.4.11 Type System
We next explain the typing scheme underlying our language, comprising typing
of the terms of the language through a typed logic as is standard as well as an
additional typing mechanism for associating types with objects such as identities.
The types idfo, id, crid, and oid, define the terms that can be used for referring
to identifier objects, identities, conditionally released identities, and opaque identi-
ties, respectively. We do not specify those types here in terms of their extensional
definition, but leave this open to a concrete implementation. The type att specifies
the terms for attribute names and its detailed specification is also left to a concrete
system implementation.
Attributes not being any of the reserved attributes, e.g., the attributes holder ,
subject , certifier , recipient , condition, subjectId , subjectIdWithCertifier , or type, are
referred to as user attributes. The following basic data types are defined for the
user attributes, where the set {Y,M,D,h,m, s} of date granularities is introduced
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further below:
T dat = {int, str, bool, date,∪{dateξ : ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s}}} .
This set of basic data types can be extended with additional types and corresponding
relation predicates the signatures of which comprise arguments of those types in the
future. Such type extensions require also according additions in the semantics of the
language and its implementation through cryptographic protocols. We next present
details on the defined data types and explain the choices we have made for the type
definitions. Terms of the data types in T dat are self-referential, which means that
they are always interpreted with themselves.
The reserved attributes condition and type have values of type str ∈ T dat, and
subjectId and subjectIdWithCertifier of type idf. The reserved attributes holder ,
subject , certifier , and recipient have values of type pty and attribute names are
of type att. The type pty refers to parties in the system and different terms can
refer to the same party in an interpretation, which is crucial for the semantics
and discussed in great detail later. The type idf refers to identifiers of identifier
objects expressed through the subjectId attribute or identifiers of identities expressed
through the subjectIdWithCertifier attribute—terms of this type are self referential
in an interpretation like basic types.
Types are denoted through the operator ::, which we use for both the built-in
types of the logic as well as the static identity types for associating a language
element with a type. A constant or variable can have multiple types, which is
important for handling date-typed elements. Proper typing according to our typing
scheme is a prerequisite for the well-formedness of formulae in our language. We
refer the reader to related work [CMN+10] for a formal definition of a type derivation
calculus for a related language for specifying attribute requirements of parties for
privacy-preserving access control. For typing of identities, we define further typing
mechanisms as explained in Sec. 4.4.11.2 that enhance the expressiveness of our
language compared to the one of related work [CMN+10].
Types are stored and communicated with formulae in any implementation of our
system, though we often do not make the types explicit in this work for reasons of
notational conciseness when they are clear from, or not of primary interest in, the
context of the discussions.
4.4.11.1 Typing of Attributes
Attributes are assigned types through sorted logic as discussed further above and as
is standard. We permit subtyping for attribute types in order to make comparing
attribute values through predicates in such subtype hierarchy possible. An example
for this are our multiple data types for realizing date types of different granularities.
When expressing a predicate on two attributes or an attribute and a constant, this
can be done depending on the data types irrespective of the types of the identities
the attributes are part of—all identities are of the most abstract identity type id.
This approach is in line with the goal of having high expressivity and allowing for
uses as discussed above for the identity types in this section.
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Let a be an attribute with the type of its attribute value equaling β. For our
language we assume that each attribute name a is, in a concrete system, always
associated with a single type β for all of its uses in identities or other objects of
different types. This requires using a naming scheme that allows for world-wide
unique identifiers, though, allows for an open definition of attributes. The URI
scheme [BLFM05] of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is the best practical
example of a naming scheme achieving this. A given attribute has one of the basic
data types of the set T dat, the type pty, or the type idf as its type.
Basic data type system. For a system using our logic-based data representation,
we assume a fixed basic data type system T to be available. T defines the basic data
types T dat = {int, str, bool, date} ∪ {dateξ : ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s}}, function and
relation symbols defined on those types, and the corresponding interpretations.
The equality predicate Eqβ×β is available for any type β ∈ T dat of our basic data
types. The negation thereof, the non-equality relation Neqβ×β , is also available
for all basic data types β ∈ T dat. For totally ordered types, also relations on
the ordering are available for better expressiveness. We support the inequality
predicates Ltβ×β , Leqβ×β ,Geqβ×β ,Gtβ×β for the type β ∈ {int} and partially for
β ∈ {date}∪{dateξ : ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s}}. The basic data type system determines
the interpretation of ground terms of the basic data types for every interpretation
I for our logic. Thereby, it defines those aspects of the system that are related
to the definition of its basic data types, thus aspects common to all parties and
that require consideration already in the system implementation. Further aspects,
e.g., the typing of identities, are reflected in a more flexible way through additional
typing mechanisms.19 T is known by all parties in the system and required for
implementing the basic data type semantics in the automated deduction procedures
and interpreting formulae expressed in the logic.
Composed terms. We are only interested in formulae which are well-typed with
respect to our type system. Constants and variables have their type always “built
in” following the standard approach of sorted logic—cryptographic objects only the
respective generic type from the set Oobj = {idfo, id, crid, oid} corresponding to it.
For composed expressions, referred to as attribute references, for constants or
variables c referring to cryptographic objects, we have that c.a :: β if and only if the
attribute a is associated with type β. Such definition does not capture the subtyping
of c as defined through the static subtyping system of Sec. 4.4.11.2 below and it may
happen that for a formula, although well-typed according to the sorted logic, c.a
may be undefined because of the attribute a not being part of the object type for
c defined through static subtyping. Such formula is ill-typed in our extended type
system, although being well-typed in the sorted logic.
For typing the attribute reference c.a while ensuring that ill-typing cannot hap-
pen, we define the typing of such expressions based on the type of the object, e.g.,
19In a related approach [CMN+10], identity types are captured by the corresponding type system
already.
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identity, and thereby leave the standard typed-logic approach for typing: We de-
fine that c.a :: β if and only if there exists an object type τ such that a predicate
Eq(c.type, τ) is part of the top-level ∧-node20 of the formula comprising the attribute
reference to be typed or a predicate Type(c.type, τ) can be deduced from the for-
mula, a ∈ Aτ , and the type associated with a is β. Evaluating the type following
this definition requires the considered formula to express an Eq predicate over the
attribute type of c and a constant in its top-level ∧-node, otherwise the type of c is
undefined.21
For a constant or variable term C without its type being specified through a
predicate in the considered formula, its possible types can be deduced through
the referred-to attributes in the formula and their respective types with the effect
that multiple types may apply to C. This is a desired property when expressing
a data request because of keeping the applicable identity types open and governed
only through the referred-to attributes. This is referred to as dynamic typing and
introduced further below. The logic-defined type of C is always id or one of the
other types for cryptographic objects.
For arithmetic expressions composed through the application of operators (func-
tions), we have the following recursive definition, where DefOps is the set of opera-
tors defined for this type through T :22
t1 ◦ t2 :: β1 iff t1 :: β1, t2 :: β2, ◦ ∈ DefOps . (4.7)
Integer. The integer type int comprises the integers or, for formal reasons, an
interval over the integers which is sufficiently large for our practical purposes. In a
technical implementation using a credential system as done in this thesis, the type
is always constrained to a finite interval [−2lm − 1; 2lm − 1] over the integers. This
interval is specified through a length parameter lm, resulting in a 0-centered interval
over the integers for a concrete system, where the maximum length of elements of
the interval in binary representation is typically in the range of multiple hundred
bits. The type definition for int abstracts from those size limitations of integers and
uses the group of all integers as the set of permitted elements which is a practical
approach as integer attributes used in practical applications are typically contained
in the interval of length lm, for an appropriate lm. The finite integer interval is also
known as and henceforth also denoted as integer interval.
Date. Attributes resembling dates or times are prominently used in the identity
management context, e.g., to express dates of birth used for age verification, or the
expiration dates and times of certified identities. We henceforth refer to date and
20With top-level ∧-node of a formula φ we mean the root connective, which is conjunction, and
its successor predicates in a prefix notation of φ with respect to the connectives.
21For the case of the predicate over the type-attribute being located within an ∨-branch of the
formula, the situation is more complicated as the object’s type would hold only for this branch.
This situation is neither supported nor relevant for cryptographic protocols based on the private
certificate technology and the corresponding formulae.
22Note that for date-typed operands, the defined operators are defined over one operand speci-
fying a date and one integer operand specifying a duration.
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time also simply as date. We define multiple date types for expressing the date and
the time component using different granularities of the date and time.
The syntax for a date value is such that it comprises a sequence of components
and is represented starting with the most coarse-granular component, going to the
finest, each finer-granular component being appended to the right and having a
predefined number of digits. We express, for example, a date in day-granularity in
the format YYYY-MM-DD, where YYYY are 4 digits for the year, MM two digits
for the month, and DD two digits for the day, using the ISO date format [ISO04]
with separating “-”-symbols. When also considering the time of the day, the time
is indicated in 24-hour format analogously as follows and appended at the right to
the date: hh-mm-ss with hh being the hours, mm the minutes, and ss the seconds.
Using such granularized date types increases the expressivity of the system. A
concrete system instance can also be deployed with a simplified handling of date
types, e.g., only a single type, if this is considered sufficient.
Finer-granular types with accuracy below seconds can be represented in a
straightforward way, though, are not further discussed in this thesis because the
definition and handling is analogous to what is presented. Such finer granularities
are—as far as the validity times of identities are concerned—less relevant for the
identity system we have in mind for authentication through private certificate pro-
tocols over electronic communication networks, mainly the Internet, where commu-
nication latencies are often in the multi-hundred millisecond range already, thereby
ruling out the need for a finer granularity for those attributes.
We assume that in our system time values are always represented in UTC
time [ITU02] and time zones are considered outside of the system we discuss, e.g.,
through functionality at higher layers, e.g., in the user interface component or as
time offset in policies. This is conceptually clean and simplifies our discussion by
avoiding time zone issues without making practically limiting constraining assump-
tions on the system. Certain aspects related to time zones can be seen to be com-
pletely outside of the technical domain of the system, e.g., the question whether an
identity that is still valid in its issuing time zone, but invalid in the verifying time
zone, shall still be accepted as valid by a verifier.
Let the symbols Y,M,D,h,m, s be denoted as granularities and their order-
ing be defined through a transitive relation Gdate. The date types that we de-
fine are the generic type date and the granularized types dateξ for dates, where
ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s} indicates the granularity the corresponding date type is ex-
pressed in, using the granularity specifiers: Y for years, M for months, D for days,
h for hours, m for minutes, and s for seconds. The set {Y,M,D,h,m, s} of gran-
ularity specifiers is also referred to as T date and may be omitted when clear from
the context. The type date is the generic date type and an element of this type
can have any granularity and can be compared with another element of type date
of any granularity or with an element of any of the granularized date types dateξ
with ξ ∈ T date. For two arguments of granularized types, those types have to be
the same in order that the arguments be comparable, e.g., an argument of type
dateD can be compared with an argument of type dateD, but not with an argument
of type dateh. In terms of the extensional definition of the types, this means that
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[[date]] =
⋃
ξ∈{Y,M,D,h,m,s}[[date
ξ]].
Let the transitive relation Gdate be defined such that for the granularities intro-
duced above the following holds: {(Y,M), (M,D), (D,h), (h,m), (m, s)} ⊂ Gdate. All
elements resulting from the transitivity property of the relation are in addition part
of Gdate as well, only not exhaustively listed here.
Date types can be subtyped according to a subtype hierarchy which has the
generic type date as its root and the granularized date types dateξ as direct succes-
sors. An element typed with date can take on the value of an element typed with any
of the types {date} ∪ {dateξ : ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s}}, while an element typed with a
granularized type dateξ can only take on values from the domain corresponding to
this single type.
For identities of a given identity type, the certifier of the identity decides on
which data type to use for its date attributes, e.g., validity dates, depending on the
use case and issues the attributes in according granularity.
Only additive relations on dates are supported as this is sufficient for most
use cases requiring date arguments. For example, this allows us to specify that a
reference date against which a check of the expiration date of an identity is to be
performed has to be 3 months in the future, which may be interesting for travel-
related use cases.
String. For resembling real-world identities in a practical system, string attributes
are crucial as they are required for a plethora of natural persons’ attributes such as
name and address attributes.
A practical system needs to support both length-limited and length-unrestricted
strings, the further being interesting for modeling the length-limited attributes of
today’s physical credentials, the latter may be of importance for representing condi-
tional release conditions that may comprise general terms and conditions of service
providers or a facial image attribute of a photo id as those may be substantially
larger as standard users’ identity attributes.23 Note that length-unrestricted strings
may be strings of limited length which is sufficiently large for all practical purposes
in our model for formal reasons. From a modeling perspective, we have the options
of exposing a length restriction of one of multiple string types at the data repre-
sentation language or to only expose one type capturing both length-restricted and
unrestricted types.
Option (1). A first option we consider for realizing length-restricted types
is to enforce length restrictions for the appropriate types at the level of the type
system. Comparison predicates, such as multiple overloaded predicates for string
equality need to be defined such that they can be used to compare strings of the
different types with each other. Particularly, strings of types with different length
23We assume for simplicity of the type system that a biometric identifier such as a picture of
a face in a government-issued electronic identity (eID) document be represented as a str-typed
attribute in an identity. Extensions of the type system are possible, though, not crucial for the
understanding.
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restrictions should be comparable with each other as well as with a generic unre-
stricted type. This approach may be facilitated by a subtype hierarchy over the
types with subtypes of decreasing sizes being subtypes of the generic type.
Option (2). A second option we consider for modeling strings is to define
a single type str in the type system which does not have any limitations in length.
Any such restrictions need to be captured otherwise, such as in the metadata of
identities, and enforced in processes such as the protocol for establishing identity
relationships and for the definition of the relation predicates. This approach has the
advantage of only a single type str being exposed and thus there being no need for the
hierarchical type system and definition of multiple overloaded predicates operating
over the different string types of Option (1). The only noteworthy drawback is the
lack of explicit length restrictions of strings in the type system.
For its conceptual simplicity, we have chosen Option (2) of defining a single type
str of unconstrained-length strings, thereby avoiding the complications of Option (1).
In case a certifier needs to impose length restrictions—as is typical for common
credentials such as electronic identity (eID) cards or electronic driver’s licenses—it
can do so by enforcing such restrictions when setting up an identity relationship, that
is, through a certificate issuing protocol. The case of a certifier issuing an identity
with an attribute value being that of an opaque attribute it has received is similar
for both modeling options in that the certifier needs to trust that the issuing party
of the opaque attribute has enforced the length restrictions properly. The difference
is that the maximum attribute length is not captured formally in the data modeling
language in the chosen approach. Because such use of opaque attributes is anyway
based on trust that the other issuing party is honest, the additional requirement
of trusting the party to properly enforce the stated length of the attribute is not a
further limitation.
Boolean. The type bool comprises a domain with the elements true and false
and does not allow for expressions to be specified over this type. Unlike for inte-
gers, dates, and strings, its definition is straighforward and does not require further
discussion.
Identifier. The type idf is used for representing pseudonym identifiers used in
identifier objects. Like the basic data types, terms of this type are interpreted with
themselves in any interpretation.
Party. A term of type pty is used for referring to a party in the system. A
main difference to the basic data types is that this type is not self-referential in
interpretations. Multiple terms in the language can refer to the same party in an
interpretation.
Only the logic equality relation p1 = p2 can be expressed on arguments p1 and
p2 of type pty. Non-equality for parties is not supported to be expressed in data
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statements, because it would be impossible to generally establish such non-equality
in a cryptographic proof.
4.4.11.2 Typing of Identities
One specific kind of terms are those referring to identities, typed through sorted
logic like any other term as explained above. Identity terms and variables may, but
need not, have an identity type—in addition to the “built-in” type assigned through
the sorted logic—associated with them. This identity type defines the identity in
terms of its attributes, the data types of the attributes, and technical considerations
necessary to execute protocols associated with the identity. The type is realized in
the language as an attribute type of type str of the identity.
An identity referred to in a formula specifying an identity relationship always has
such type, while an identity (variable) referred to in other formulae, e.g., in a data
request, may not have such type associated for reasons of greater expressiveness in
specifying the request. The reason for having this type optional is to respond to
requirements of real-world identity management systems: A prominent use case is
to request attributes without imposing restrictions on the type of the identity the
attribute is comprised in, and defining the identity through imposing constraints on
the certification metadata for the attribute. This is an important use case when a
party requests values of attributes that need not be certified by a third party and
where the type of the identity they are contained in does not matter, or when they
need to be certified, though, regardless of the type of identity it is contained in.
We allow for such requests to be expressed in a succinct way through the identity
concept by not requiring the type of an identity to be always specified.
Example 4.8 (Age verification) Take as a practical example hereto the use case
of age verification which is a legal requirement in many jurisdictions for access to
certain services or purchasing certain restricted, e.g., dangerous, goods. For this
use case, a predicate over the date of birth attribute is requested, with a plethora of
identities being eligible as a basis for constructing and proving such predicate to be
valid, and a given minimum strength of certification being required.
The general structure of this and many other practical use cases based on requiring
the authentication of an attribute regardless of the credential it is comprised in
benefits from our approach to typing for succinctly expressing a data request for
such use cases without enumerating all eligible identity types or using statically
defined subtyping hierarchies.
Note that the definition of the type of an attribute of an identity or other cryp-
tographic object further above is non-standard due to the identity or other object
type not being expressed directly as a “built-in” type of the logic, for which reason
also the processing for type checking of a formula is non-standard.
The notation [[β]] is used in this work to explicitly refer to the extensional type
definition of the type β, that is, the set of its elements. For example, a variable
t :: int has type int associated, which has the set of the integers as its extensional
definition.
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A generic identity term c :: id, that is, a term typed with id, is a function symbol
for a function
c :: [[att]]→
⋃
βi∈{β1,...,βk}
[[βi]] , (4.8)
with {[[βi]] : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} being the data types related to the attributes of c. That is,
an identity term refers to a function from the set of attribute names to the union of
the sets corresponding to its attribute types.
The type β of a conditionally released identity or opaque identity is determined
implicitly through the attributes of it that are referred to throughout the single
formula through which the object is defined. The alternative approach of specifying
the type of such object explicitly is cleaner in terms of typing, though, requires that
the type be defined and distributed in an integrity-protected manner like for identity
types. This reduces the flexibility of specifying policies and complicates the system
for handling the additional types.
Static type system. The type, or static type, of an identity is specified through
the type-attribute, which we let, w.l.o.g., in the following be attribute aT . The static
type specifies the attributes with their types that identities of this type comprise,
expressed as a set of attributes with their types, and is referred to by its type
identifier which is a constant term of the language.
Formally, an identity type τ is defined through the attributes Aτ = {a1, . . . , ak}
of the identity with their respective types and the reserved attribute aT having value
τ to correspond to a set of functions c, each corresponding to one identity of the
identity type τ :
[[τ ]] = {c :: Aτ →
⋃
βi∈{β1,...,βk}
[[βi]]}
For this, it needs to hold that the relation Eq holds between c.aT and τ and that
c.ai is in the set [[βi]] for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This definition of the type extension of an
identity type does not take subtyping of identities into consideration as discussed
below.
Note the difference to the approach of related work [CMN+10] where each iden-
tity type, referred to as card type, is defined through its attributes a1, . . . , ak and
their respective types β1, . . . , βk only—see the extension of a card type in their
work for their definition of the typing. In our scheme it is possible to have mul-
tiple different identity types comprising the same attributes and their types. This
is necessary in a practical open identity management system for allowing different
parties to create differently named types with the same attributes and have different
parties issue those types. Assuming that not every certifier defines their own at-
tribute types for commonly used attributes, but standard attributes are reused, our
approach becomes even more important as the probability of structurally identical
identity types increases. Without our generalized view one would essentially require
a single responsible authority managing all identity types in the system, which is
too strong an assumption for an open system.
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Static subtyping. A type hierarchy is induced by relating identity types
through their type identifiers in a type hierarchy. The inheritance graph is specified
through the identity types being its vertices and each subtype specification (τ2, τ1)
a directed edge, thereby implementing an is a relation between τ2 and τ1. We use
the relation symbol ≤Otp for referring to the subtype relation, where Otp refers to a
subtype ontology as introduced later. This relation symbol is not part of the data
representation language and only used for the discussions related to it.
A type τ2 being a subtype of τ1 means that τ2 comprises all attributes of τ1 with
the same types (or subtypes thereof) and possibly additional attributes, thus for
types τ2 ≤Otp τ1, their respective attribute sets Aτ1 and Aτ2 are subsets of each
other:
Aτ1 ⊆ Aτ2 .
The type extension [[τ ]]O
tp
of an identity type τ with respect to the subtype
ontology Otp is defined as the union over the type extensions [[τi]] where the types τi
are τ and all its (direct and transitive) subtypes according to the subtyping ontology
Otp:
[[τ ]]O
tp
= [[τ ]] ∪
⋃
τi:τi≤Otpτ
[[τi]] .
We use single inheritance as it is sufficiently powerful for the requirements we
have in mind for our architecture and it is conceptually cleaner than multiple in-
heritance while avoiding its complications. Our approach to subtyping realizes key
aspects of the standard notion of inheritance, e.g., as used in object-oriented pro-
gramming languages.
In our model, the type hierarchy for identities is specified through a subtype
ontology Otp. The ontology captures the static subtype specifications relevant in a
given context in a formal way such that they can be machine processed. Details
about subtype ontologies are presented in Sec. 4.10.1.
For realizing the subtyping hierarchy, we define a predicate Typeid×str for spec-
ifying types of identities and a predicate Subtypestr×str for expressing the subtype
relations where Subtypestr×str(t
′, t) means that t′ is a subtype of t. Based on the
static type of an identity as assigned to it through its type attribute, the identity
takes on all types upwards a given type hierarchy induced through Otp in addition
to its static type. Any of those types can be used at places where one of the super-
types is required. The types an identity takes on are reflected through the predicate
Type.
The following rules in (4.9) and (4.10) implement the subtyping of identities in
the deduction system of our logic, where C :: id is a variable referring to an identity
and T′ :: type and T :: type are variables referring to concrete types:
∀C,T : Eq(C.type,T)→ Type(C,T) (4.9)
∀C,T′,T : Type(C,T′) ∧ Subtype(T′,T)→ Type(C,T) (4.10)
4.4 Data Model and Concepts 117
This rule and a subtyping ontology Otp needs to be part of the theory L used for
making derivations in our logic when subtyping is to be considered—see Sec. 4.9 for
details on this. Leveraging subtyping for a data request requires that the type of
identities be specified using the Typeid,str predicate instead of the type-attribute.
It is important for our language that we do not follow the approach of assigning
a concrete identity type to an identity through the means of typed logic as done in
related work [CMN+10], but rather assign each identity only the generic type id in
the logic. Also, the subtype hierarchy is handled in a more flexible way as in this
item of related work. The approach of using typed logic for typing identities would
prevent us from realizing important uses for our language which allow for elegant
and powerful ways of expressing data requests and data statements. Particularly,
this would rule out the dynamic typing and its expressive power as introduced below.
The interacting parties in a protocol for releasing data need to use compati-
ble subtype ontologies in order to obtain interoperability in terms of employing a
reasoning system that allows for making derivations in a mutually understood way.
Architecturally, the subtype ontology Otp used by a party is based on at least one
(partial) subtype ontology, issued and distributed through parties trusted for this
purpose. The integrity of the ontologies needs to be ensured, because integrity of
the type system is crucial for security of the overall identity management system. A
rogue type ontology used by a service provider can, for example, allow an attacker to
gain access to resources of this service provider with identities that would otherwise
not give it access.
The subtype ontologies used to compose Otp can be issued by parties acting as
ontology providers. This role can be held jointly with other roles, though, trust-
worthiness of the party for this purpose must be ensured. The support of subtype
ontologies from different providers is important for an open system, see Sec. 4.10
for further details.
The issuers of identities of a given type need to adhere to the discussed definition
of types. It is crucial that all identities that certifiers issue for a given type comprise
the same set of attribute types. If this is violated, identities with different sets of
attributes will not be usable for fulfilling certain policies, thus violating the type
system as well as the expected system behaviour. Though, it would not necessar-
ily have detrimental effects on security, but rather the availability property of the
system would be compromised.
The (static) subtyping of identity types allows for referring to an identity vari-
able of a specific type τ in a data request and fulfilling this request with a data
statement referring to a subtype of the policy-requested type τ . This leads to a
substantial increase of the expressive power of a policy language in terms of spec-
ifying sets of possible identities through those subtypes compared to one without
subtyping, analogous to using subtyping through sorted logic, though, with a more
open approach to the subtype definition through subtype ontologies.
Taking our identity typing model further, one could allow for different types for
one identity in different parts of a formula comprising disjunctions, also extending to
subtyping. Certain identity management protocols may be able to take advantage
of this, e.g., such based on online certifiers that make identity statements based on
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certified statements of other certifiers and can thereby relate different identities in
a weak trust model. For credential protocols, though, the language must be further
constrained and require an identity type to be fixed in the top-level ∧-node of a
formula.
Dynamic type system. In addition to the (static) type system explained above,
our definition of the language allows for implementing a dynamic type system which
proves beneficial in the context of reasoning in our logic. The dynamic type system
allows for an identity specified through a formula φ to have a dynamic type τ defined
through its attributes that are referred in the formula. It furthermore allows an
identity constant or variable used in φ to be of a dynamic subtype of another identity
constant or variable referred to in ψ, where ψ may be φ, merely by φ referring to at
least the attributes ψ refers to in making statements about the considered identity.24
We denote an identity term or variable C1 being of a dynamic subtype of an identity
term or variable C2, with C1 ≤dyn C2. A dynamic (sub)type is orthogonal to the
static types and subtyping of the identities specified through the type attributes
and Otp. A dynamic subtype relation C1 ≤dyn C2 can hold only if no type attribute
or predicate is specified for term C2 in the corresponding formula, that is, only
its attribute references determine the dynamic type, because otherwise the type-
attribute or predicate would immediately constrain typing to the static scheme and
rule out dynamic typing, thereby reducing expressiveness. Exactly for this reason
it is not possible to use the approach of subtyping over the identity types through
typed logic when the benefits of dynamic typing are to be leveraged. The definition
of the dynamic type of an identity generalizes to being defined through the attributes
referred to in a conjunction of formulae
∧k
i=1 φi.
Let the set of typed attributes Aτˆ = {a1, . . . , ak} of an identity instance or
variable C :: id be referred to in a formula φ, or conjunction of formulae. Let
furthermore the attribute type not be part of the set Aτˆ . Then, the extension [[τˆ ]] of
the dynamic type τˆ comprises all functions representing identities of identity types
τi which comprise at least the attributes of the set Aτˆ with the according types:
[[τˆ ]] =
⋃
{τi:Aτi⊇Aτˆ}
[[τi]] . (4.11)
That is, the extensional definition of the dynamic type comprises all identities that
match the specification of the dynamic type based on the referred-to attributes with
their types referred to in the formula.
The prominent use case for dynamic subtyping is to use any identity of an
identity relationship with static type τ with attribute set Aτ such that Aτ ⊇ Aτˆ in
place of an identity variable of dynamic type τˆ with attribute set Aτˆ . In this case,
it holds that τ ≤dyn τˆ which is a prerequisite for the identity of type τ of a data
statement matching the identity of dynamic type τˆ in the request. Dynamic types
24For simplicity we do not discuss the complications arising from the most general view where
the type may be different in different ∨-branches of the formula. Though, this general view of
dynamic subtyping is supported by our language and the underlying deductive system.
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apply to both constants and variables of identities, conditionally released identities,
and opaque identities.
In case a dynamic type of an identity of a data request corresponds to the empty
set of identities, this is not a problem in terms of typing. The main implication is
that such identity in the data request then cannot be matched by any identity in
the system.
The dynamic typing and subtyping is, for instance, beneficial in the context of the
matching of formulae φ1, . . . , φk of a party’s portfolio with a formula ψ representing a
data request or determining whether a statement expressed as formula fulfills a data
request. This is technically realized implicitly through automated reasoning in our
logic as presented in Sec. 4.9.2. Capturing the intuition behind this, a formula φi,
e.g., describing an identity, can match parts of a request formula ψ if the attributes
and their types and values match with those referred to in the request formula, with
the variable of the request being instantiated with the corresponding instance from
φi in the response. Considering this, the dynamic type system is orthogonal to the
“built-in” types of the logic.
The following examples sketch the classes of scenarios where dynamic (sub)typing
is beneficial and also the relevance of dynamic (sub)typing in practice for the match-
ing of data formulae representing the portfolio of a party against a request. Consider
a data request asking for an attribute of an identity without specifying any require-
ments on the certifier and type of the identity. This reflects the common case of a
self-stated (declared) attribute being provided as is used in almost all interactions in
today’s Web through form filling. The commonality of scenarios for which dynamic
(sub)typing is beneficial is that the certifier of identities can be specified in a generic
manner, independent of the type of the identities involved.
Example 4.9 (Dynamic subtyping for request predicate) A concrete exam-
ple request by a service provider comprises the predicate Eq(C.lastName, L) as the
attribute request part while not expressing constraints on the certifier or type of C.
A user can fulfill this part of the request by using any of its identities of its iden-
tity relationships, also such not endorsed by a third party, comprising the attribute
lastName by revealing the attribute value.
Example 4.10 (Dynamic subtyping and ontology-based abstractions)
Another example in this domain is the request of an attribute a of identity vari-
able C or a predicate expressed over it and the certifier being specified through the
certifier identity Cid which is further specified in an abstract manner, e.g., through
expressing property predicates based on ontology concepts on it, e.g., for specifying
that the securityLevel of the certification of this identity be greater than or equal
to 3. Regardless of the actual type of the identity C, any identity that fulfills those
requirement can be used for fulfilling the request.
Again, static subtyping as used in this work or in related works [CMN+10] would
not allow for such generic specification of a data request and thus severly constrain
the expressivity of the language.
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The above discussions and examples show why static typing for identities is in-
sufficient for realizing certain classes of practically important use cases: A static
type system is fixed and does not necessarily align, i.e., may be too restrictive,
with the requirements of a policy author for a specific situation. That is, a pol-
icy can, through referring to ontology concepts for specifying the certifiers in an
attribute-based way and through identity properties, be far more powerful than a
fixed subtyping hierarchy over identities. Thus, our work takes a more expressive
approach compared to notable related work [CMN+10] in terms of simplifying and
increasing the expressivity of specifying policies by using a non-standard approach
for typing. We find support for such functionality of importance in open systems
where data recipients might want to state data requests in a generic and abstract
way without policies being repetitive or requiring one to specify applicable certifiers
exhaustively.
In a data request, the type attribute may be unspecified for an identity in order to
use dynamic typing. Not specifying it in a data request means that any identity with
matching attributes can go in place of the requested identity. For a data statement
to be proven using credential protocols, the type must be specified for each identity
as the cryptographic key is determined through the type. For other technologies for
ensuring attribute integrity, the language could be extended to not require that the
type be specified for an identity. Though, this additional expressivity is not worth
the increased complexity and freedom in the language.
4.4.11.3 Discussion
The combination of our orthogonal type systems results in a flexible overall approach
to typing for identities, conditionally released identities, and opaque identities, com-
bining advantages of statically typed and untyped languages in terms of typing of
objects. Particularly, it allows for fulfilling real-world requirements of stating a
request for attributes without giving information on the type of the referred-to
identity. The related language of Camenisch et al. [CMN+10] has been designed
for similar purposes as ours and follows an approach of typing and subtyping of
identities through sorted logic with the inherent drawbacks, though resulting in a
simpler typing model and the advantages of using only typing through sorted logic.
4.4.12 Expressions
Expressions are used for realizing identity statements in which multiple attributes
of objects are algebraically related with each other. An expression is an arithmetic
expression over attributes of objects and constants of types with totally ordered
domains and can be an argument of a predicate that accepts an argument of the
type of the expression. Expressions are supported for the type int in a general
form and for the types date and dateξ, ξ ∈ T date in a simplified form, following
requirements of use cases. For str-typed elements we do not support expressions
for the reason that those would not be practical in terms of efficiency when being
realized with credential systems, our focal technology.
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Integer expressions. Expressions for int-typed elements have the form of being
l products of attribute references and constants and a constant connected through
the operator ◦ ∈ {+,−}, where + and − are the addition and subtraction operators
on the integers, and · is multiplication, as presented in (4.12).
uj1 · cj1 .ak1 ◦ uj2 · cj2 .ak2 ◦ . . . ◦ ujl · cjl .akl ◦ ujl+1 (4.12)
Examples for the use of integer expressions and relations other than equality
between attributes are use cases such as proving that the monthly total income
certified through salary statement identities c1 and c2 of a person from its two
part-time jobs exceeds a specified amount, as shown in the formula fragment (4.13).
· · ·Geq(c1.amount + c2.amount , 8000) · · · (4.13)
An example for multiplicative constants unequal to 1 is weighing of reputation
scores from different reputation providers who assess a party or other system en-
tity and issue reputation credentials to the party, where weighing is based on the
credibility or reputation of the providers, and where a minimum reputation score
sum based on multiple reputation identities (credentials) needs to be proven for
establishing one’s endorsed reputation towards another party.
Date expressions. For dates, the allowed expressions are much more constrained
than for the integers. Expressions formed in a more generic way would not add
to the functionality, though complicate the system for proving such expressions
considerably due to the additional complications resulting from the date types with
different granularities. Thus, an expression can be either of the following constructs:
a date constant, a date attribute reference, a date attribute connected through
◦ ∈ {+,−} with a constant specifying a constant date duration, or a date constant
connected through ◦ ∈ {+,−} with a constant date duration as shown in (4.14),
where u represents a date constant, c.a a date attribute, each of a date type, and d an
integer specifying a date duration in the respective granularity. For technical reasons
we only allow dates or date durations of the same granularity in one expression on
dates. This avoids implicit type conversions which are not generally feasible to be
computed in a data-minimizing way when the reference date is not revealed, due to
concepts such as leap years and seconds.
u
c.a
c.a ◦ d
u ◦ d
(4.14)
Although int-typed date durations are used as arguments in expressions besides
arguments of a date type, the type of an expression is always one of the date types.
The above-presented date expressions are—in our view—sufficient for handling
the requirements for the use of dates in our system. Expressions with an attribute
reference and an integer duration constant are used for comparing date attributes
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while ensuring that they be a certain time duration apart from each other, e.g., for
expressing that a passport is valid for an additional 30 days compared to another
identity. Simple expiration date checks require only expressing an inequality rela-
tion between an attribute reference and a constant date or an expression over two
constants if an offset to today’s date is specified.
Expression example. Next, we present an example of a data staement making
use of both integer and date expressions.
Example 4.11 (Expressions) A concrete example use case for expressions
evolves from the area of residence permits in Switzerland. Swiss authorities require,
as one option for an EU or EFTA national to obtain a residence permit, to prove
one owns sufficient funds. In the current process, this is implemented by the appli-
cant providing one or more account statements certified by the issuing bank to the
authorities, thereby also revealing, in addition to the account balance, information
such as the account number and possibly transaction records.
A privacy-preserving proof for a person fulfilling such requirement of ownership
of a minimum amount of funds can be realized by proving a Geq predicate on an ex-
pression comprising the sum of the balances of multiple bank account identities and
the reference constant determined by the authorities. Also, it needs to be ensured
that the different account identities referred to indeed represent different accounts,
e.g., by expressing non-equality predicates over the account number or serial number
attributes of the identities. How exactly non-equality of the identities is expressed
relates to details of the definition of the involved credentials and may require predi-
cates over further attributes. In addition, requirements on the freshness of the used
bank statements can be expressed through an inequality predicate on the correspond-
ing attributes of one of the types date or dateξ of the bank statements. Certification
metadata are omitted as usual in the example fragment of a data statement below and
need to, among other things, specify the permitted certifying financial institutions.
· · ·Geq(c1.balance + c2.balance, 200000)∧
Neq(c1.accountNumber , c2.accountNumber)∧
Eq(c1.currency , “CHF”)∧
Eq(c2.currency , “CHF”)∧
Geq(c1.stmtDate + 90, currentDateTime)∧
Geq(c2.stmtDate + 90, currentDateTime) · · ·
Example 4.11 explains how to represent expressions on both integers and dates. The
integer expression relates two attribute references with constant factors of 1. The
date expressions specify an offset to the attribute reference and compare this to
today’s date for establishing that the statements have a certain maximum age. The
stmtDate attributes are expressed in day granularity, thus, the integer 90 represents
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a number of days. In the practical use case, the party being the holder and subject of
those identities can be proven to be the same as the holder of another identity, e.g.,
an electronic passport, used to reveal further identity attributes for associating the
statement on monetary liquidity with the person’s civil identity. Thus, the above
example is to be seen as an isolated formula fragment which can be embedded into
a more comprehensive formula or relate to other formulae through opaque identities
established with the use of such.
Note that use cases like this can be expressed through a disjunction of data
requests, each specified for a different number k of identities referred to in the ex-
pression. Alternatively, the request language could be extended to comprise special
provisions for expressing such expression over k attributes of different identities
in a generic manner. This could be realized, e.g., through rules expressed in (an
extension of) the logic or a macro construct on top of the language.
Overall, use cases employing expressions in predicates are standard, e.g., for
specifying that the sum of multiple attributes is greater than or equal to another
attribute, for example one of a conditionally released identity, or a constant, or
specifying a verification of a date based on a given offset. Similar use cases as
the above can be thought of for other areas such as privacy-preserving checking of
creditworthiness of a party.
4.4.13 Relation Predicates and Equality
Predicates have been informally introduced already earlier in this section for pre-
senting the language basics. Now we discuss the details regarding the predicates on
arguments of the defined data types. The language and its semantics can be ex-
tended with further predicates if this is required in the future, possibly also aligned
with future extensions of the basic data type system.
Depending on the predicate, each argument can be a generic expression, at-
tribute reference, or constant term of the type matching the predicate signature.
No predicates can be expressed explicitly on objects as arguments. The reason for
this is that equality over objects can only be expressed implicitly through using
the same term in multiple references to the object for expressing that both are the
same. Non-equality over objects can be expressed through predicates on suitable
attributes, e.g., the unique object identification number or serial number attribute
of an identity. We prefer this approach of realizing the semantics of (non-)equality
predicates on objects through predicates on their attributes, because allowing for
(non-)equality predicates on objects would lead to complications in the mapping of
statements to cryptographic protocols while not considerably enriching the expres-
siveness of the language.
Also, no relation predicates are defined for terms representing attributes of cryp-
tographic objects for the reason that att-typed terms are known to recipient parties
of a statement. Thus, predicates over them would not enhance the expressiveness
of the language in terms of facilitating privacy or in any other useful way.
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4.4.13.1 Integer
For int arguments, which are all characterized by comprising totally ordered value
domains, we specify the predicates Eqint×int,Neqint×int, Ltint×int, Leqint×int,Geqint×int,
and Gtint×int with the usual meaning of the corresponding operators =, 6=, <,≤,≥,
and > over the group of integers, respectively. For each of the predicates, either of
its arguments can be an expression, attribute reference, or constant term.
4.4.13.2 Date types
For the different date types, predicates for expressing equality and order relations
exist analogous to the predicates on integers, though the setting is more complex as
a predicate may operate on date types of different granularities.
Relation predicates with both arguments being of the same granularized date
type dateξ with ξ ∈ T date are defined for all such types. Requiring a specific type
dateξ for both arguments ensures that the comparison is exact because the same
granularity of the arguments implies the same value domains. We also refer to this
as the respective predicate having tight comparison semantics.
For the cases of comparing arguments with date types of different granularities,
the comparison predicates are defined with more relaxed semantics considering the
coarser-grained value as range and the finer-grained value as value for which the
relation of the predicate has to hold with respect to the range. We refer to this as
the predicate having loose comparison semantics. The relation predicates supporting
this are defined over argument pairs with type date × date. As example, consider
a date of type dateD of day granularity and another date of type dateh of hour
granularity. Then the predicate Eqdate×date on those arguments holds if and only if
the latter is an hour on the day indicated by the further. This is a relaxed notion
of the equality relation that matches the intuition behind the comparison of date-
type arguments of different granularities. For equality, this concretely means that,
if a date is expressed in a certain granularity, the intention is that for any other
argument that may be finer granular and is within the range implied by the further,
those are considered equal in this loose semantics. Analogously, similar ideas apply
to the definition of the remaining relation predicates based on inequalities for dates
as specified in the semantics in Sec. 4.11. All granularized types are direct subtypes
of the date type—we have not defined a hierarchy over the granular types in order
to ensure tight matching semantics when using the latter.
This approach of defining one generic type date for dates as well as multiple
specific ones, dateξ with ξ ∈ T date, requires us to define different semantics for
the comparison relations for the different combinations of argument types. These
different semantics allow parties to find their ideal tradeoff for each use case in
terms of flexibility of specifying a predicate (e.g., within a policy) without imposing
additional constraints on the type of a date attribute and tightness of the comparison
semantics. Thus, our approach does not limit a system upfront, but leaves the choice
of semantics for date operations to the parties who can decide based on the use case
requirements. In a practical system, we expect that best practices will evolve and
govern this aspect.
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For selecting date attributes of to-be-issued identities, the above semantics needs
to be kept in mind in the light of potential policies against which the identities may
be presented in order to not enable system exploits based on misinterpretation
of date attributes. For the same reason, policy authors must keep this generic
semantics in mind when defining authorization policies.
Example 4.12 (Date granularities) We illustrate this further with an example
of a party specifying that an identity backed by a private certificate must be cur-
rently still valid in terms of its expiration date. Let the current date expressed
in day granularity be 2011-07-01 and let this be used as a reference date against
which the validity of the identity (certificate) c is assessed through the predicate
Geqdate×date(c.validUntil , 2011-07-01). For an identity, the expiration date of which
is encoded in day granularity with type dateD with the constant 2011-07-01, the non-
expiration requirement is clearly fulfilled for a reference date of type dateD with tight
(exact) comparison semantics. For the case of the identity having the hour-granular
expiration date 2011-07-01-12 :: dateh, that is, it is valid, in the strict semantics,
until 12-59-59 of July 1, 2012, the inequality predicate is fulfilled as the reference
date has type date, the reference value covers the whole day 2011-07-01 and loose
semantics can apply. Taking this further, even after noon that day, the holder of
the identity can still prove it valid in this loose semantics because the granularity of
the reference date is a day. This expresses exactly the intended semantics that the
identity be valid on this day and cannot capture the more fine-granular validity of
the identity. This can be a problem in case there is a strong reason for the identity
to be valid only until the given time that day for which reason a finer granularity has
been chosen, e.g., for a short-term delegated identity valid only for some hours on
a specific day. This example shows well that the granularity of an encoding might
carry semantics that may be uninterpreted if used in a predicate with a certain ref-
erence value with lower granularity. Such problems can be easily mitigated by the
policy author specifying a granularized date type with a specific granularity for which
only comparison operations with tight semantics are possible. Our generic date se-
mantics must also be considered in the light of ontology abstractions used in data
request parts of authorization policies. Using the generic date type in a policy means
that the relaxed semantics of the verification is accepted.
We overload the predicates for equality, non-equality, and inequalities for dates
to realize the different predicate signatures of interest to allow for the comparison
of dates with different types and granularities and let a party choose whether an ex-
pression with fewer restrictions but looser semantics or more restrictions and tighter
semantics is preferable for a specific policy rule. Note that, with our approach, we
do not fix the system to one of those semantics, but leave the choice to a policy
author for every single policy rule. This results in the following predicates over
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arguments of the date types:{
Eqτ1×τ2 ,Neqτ1×τ2 , Ltτ1×τ2 , Leqτ1×τ2 ,Geqτ1×τ2 ,Gtτ1×τ2 :
τ1, τ2 ∈
(
{date} ∪ {dateξ : ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s}}
)}
The language allows for each of those predicates to have as either of its arguments
an expression, attribute reference, or constant. When protocols based on certificates
are used for proving a formula correct, further restrictions apply on the permissible
arguments due to limitations of the zero-knowledge proof protocols summarized in
Chapter 6.
Note that we often do not make the types of the predicates explicit in this work,
unless we emphasize which of the predicates we talk about, because mostly it is
clear from the context which predicate is referred to.
Example 4.13 (Age verification) Next, we present an example where a tight
comparison semantics must be used in order to obtain the correct result in all cases,
namely a concrete example use case of verification of a minimum age. The prob-
lem here is that in case a date of birth would be encoded only as the year and this
value would be compared with a concrete reference date on day granularity, the loose
comparison semantics may establish the required minimum age while this may not
be true considering the date of birth in day granularity. The difference to expiration
dates of certificates with dates of birth is that when encoding a date of birth in a
lower granularity, e.g., year, then the actual date is located somewhere within this
year while for an expiration date, the meaning is always that the expiration is at
the end of the presented date/time unit. For this reason it is crucial that a date of
birth attribute always be encoded in the same granular type with day granularity and
different attributes be defined for other granularities, e.g., the attribute yearOfBirth.
For realizing expiration date checks of identities against the current date/time
or a constant offset to it, we propose a generic solution where the current date/time
is represented through a system-defined macro currentDateTime in a policy (data
request) that is expanded to the current date/time of one of the date types, with
the granularity being determined through the predicate the macro is an argument
of or the granularity of the other argument of this predicate once it becomes in-
stantiated during the policy matching. With this approach we always achieve tight
comparison semantics while not constraining a policy to a specific granularity for a
date predicate. Other workable solutions are to fix the granularity of the predicate
in the request to a specific granularity and through this make the policy more re-
strictive and possibly have fewer identity types match the policy than in the above
approaches. Loose comparison semantics can be achieved trivially by using an in-
equality predicate over the generic type date and use a constant date, typed with
date. The choice of the approach to take depends on requirements one needs to
fulfill and is left to the policy author.
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For validity dates of certificates, day granularity is often sufficient as it precisely
mimics the granularity of many kinds of today’s oﬄine credentials, such as eID
cards, passports, or public transport passes. The number of days to encode is
thereby sufficiently small and leads to very efficient inequality proofs using the zero-
knowledge proof protocol of Boudot [Bou00]. Doing the same with a granularity of
milliseconds makes the integer encodings of the dates larger and thereby reduces the
efficiency of the proofs of inequalities due to the time complexity of the algorithm
used. Thus, for many of our examples in this work we revert to the day-granular date
type as this is most practical for validity dates of identities as well as representation
of date of birth attributes, both of which are frequently used in our example use
cases as well as in practical systems.
4.4.13.3 String
For str-typed terms we only define the predicates Eqstr×str and Neqstr×str. This is a
restricted set of predicates without predicates for expressing lexicographic ordering
relations, the choice of which has been governed by the requirements for privacy-
enhancing identity management based on data minimization as well as what can be
efficiently implemented in practice through private certificate systems for proving
formulae correct.
Note that for an implementation of data release based on private certificate pro-
tocols, the Neqstr×str predicate on strings requires an extension of the cryptographic
protocols summarized in Chapter 6 for supporting commitments of arbitrary size
integers.
4.4.13.4 Boolean
For the type bool, only the predicates Eqbool×bool and Neqbool×bool are defined, with
either argument of one of the predicates being an attribute reference or constant
term.
4.4.13.5 Identifier
For arguments of type idf, the predicates Eqidf×idf and Neqidf×idf are defined. Either
of the arguments can be an attribute reference or constant term. Because those
identifiers are interpreted with themselves, equality holds exactly when the terms
are equal.
4.4.13.6 Party
For pty-typed arguments, the =-relation—logical object equality—is defined, which
expresses equality of the interpretations of the arguments. That is, the relation is
used for expressing equality of parties referred to through party identifiers. This
relation may be specified on either an attribute reference and a constant or two con-
stants of type pty. Because pty-typed terms are not self referential, object equality
can hold even if the terms are different.
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Infeasibility of proving non-equality. Proving non-equality on arguments of
type pty reliably is not possible for the reason that non-equality of parties cannot
be generally proven cryptographically in our setting. For this reason, a negation of
party equality cannot be proven generally and is therefore not supported to be used
in a formula to be released to another party.
Concretely, an implementation of the semantics of party non-equality through
credential systems based on a private key held by the party faces the problem that
the party may obtain different private keys in a real system, e.g., from different
registrations in the system as is possible in our open setting. Realizing non-equality
of parties by equating it with the non-equality of their private keys would counter
the approach of allowing for multiple registrations as in that case a party having two
different keys might be the same while non-equality on the respective party terms
would hold.
When making strong assumptions for a less open system than ours where parties
are guaranteed to have a single master secret key and this can be reliably enforced,
it may be possible to be able to prove non-equality on the holder or subject terms of
identifier objects or identities while realizing proper (non-)equality semantics with
respect to the underlying party. With delegation, this is hard to fully generalize be-
cause parties may have different keys in different contexts when using our approach
towards delegation, where a single-key requirement for a party is hard to enforce
practically in an open system.
4.4.14 Property Predicates
Another kind of predicates supported in our language are what we refer to as property
predicates. A property predicate associates a property comprising one or more
values, according to the arity of the property, with a party. There are two approaches
for specifying property predicates: (1) through a single predicate, e.g., Property per
property arity, or (2) a different property predicate for each property.
Approach (1) specifies the property by associating the property value(s) with a
property name and a subject. This requires k+ 2 different predicates for specifying
any 0-ary to k-ary property predicate. The following example in (4.15) assigns the
unary property value 8 of property “trustLevel” to a party using its subject s.
Property(s, “trustLevel”, 8) (4.15)
Approach (2) uses a separate predicate for expressing each property, with an arity
one less than the number of values for expressing the property. The example above
expressed through this alternative approach is presented in (4.16).
Trustlevel(s, 8) (4.16)
The premier use case for property predicates in our system is their use as part
of data requests for expressing ontology-based generalizations. This requires that
property predicates be specified through rule formulae in ontologies as explained in
Sec. 4.10. Predicates relying on properties cannot be expressed in data statements
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based on credential protocols because they cannot be directly proven to hold with
those cryptographic protocols for the reason that they do not refer to any attribute—
rather, property predicates are derived from attribute predicates being part of a
received proven formula.
4.4.15 Other Predicates
Our system requires that another class of predicates be available as discussed next.
4.4.15.1 Registration Binding
For expressing that for an identity being referred to in a formula also holdership
of its registration identity needs to be proven, we use the predicate RegBindid×id.
Using ontology-based automated deduction as explained later, this predicate can be
deduced to hold on a concrete identity and corresponding registration identity. The
registration binding predicate may be used in data requests for the above-expressed
purpose and can also be part of formulae derived from data requests through the
`-relation over an ontology.
There are multiple reasons for a data recipient to request statements over a
registration identity for a specific other identity, two of which we will explain in
the following. (1) The recipient does not want to rely on the certifier of the other
identity that it has properly executed the check of the registration of the party in
the system. Depending on whether such trust exists, obtaining proven statements
about the registration identity may be required for obtaining a bullet symbol on a
statement in our channel model of Chapter 3. (2) The recipient requires attributes
of the registration identity to be conditionally released for reasons of accountability.
Assuming attributes that are widely used in registration identities applied for the
other identity are requested, the request can be phrased through the registration
binding predicate. A unique object identification number, or identity serial number,
or the attribute subjectIdWithCertifier are suitable candidate attributes for this.
In case of no such predicate being expressed in a request, it is still ensured, when
using our credential protocols, that the same secret key of the party is used as was
used in the issuing of the credential corresponding to the other identity. If the issuer
is trusted to having done the verification of registration and binding of the other
identity to the party properly, a bullet symbol can be obtained in the channel model
on the proven statement without the registration identity being proven.
4.4.16 Features of an Identity
In addition to modeling user attributes and reserved attributes like the holder and
subject attributes, identities may support features that can be executed when using
the identity for releasing data.25 Features are dependent on the technology underly-
ing an identity and thus introduce a technology-dependent aspect into the modeling.
25Note that in early work on system aspects of the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya credential system,
the term features have a broader meaning [CH02].
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In this work, we only discuss features of identities related to private certificate sys-
tems. Examples for such features are certificate revocation checking [CL02a] or
limited show of certificates [CHK+06].
Our preferred modeling option is to express a feature as part of the data rep-
resentation language. This has the advantage that the feature can be referred to
in authorization policies and considered in the formal process of matching a party’s
identity relationships against policies, that is, the expressivity of the policy system
increases towards expressing security-relevant aspects of the identity relevant for its
assessment by a verifier. The inherent drawback of this approach is that policies
and data statements become more complex by expressing features.
The modeling is done through reserved attributes, denoted as feature attributes
expressing a feature’s availability and properties through one or more attributes of
the identity. Formulae referring to an identity can make statements about those fea-
ture attributes in identity relationships and data statements. The feature attributes
are similar to any other attributes, also in terms of semantics, that is, they behave
like regular attributes that can be revealed or remain hidden when making a data
statement based on an identity.
Feature attributes can be specified in any part of a formula representing a data
statement and the semantics of feature execution applies to the parts of the formula
following standard logic semantics, which is interesting only for formulae comprising
∨-connectives and trivial for formulae only comprising ∧-connectives.
This implies that the execution of a feature in a protocol is not part of the
semantics of the data representation language as introduced in Sec. 4.11, only its
specified properties are. Whether a feature is to be executed in an interaction can be
expressed through operational semantics in such a way that whenever an attribute
indicating the availability of a feature is released in a data statement, the feature
is executed in the corresponding proof protocol, e.g., by executing a cryptographic
protocol comprising a zero-knowledge proof protocol realizing the feature. Thus, the
semantics of feature execution is modeled only operationally through appropriate
implementation of the protocol and does not touch the denotational semantics of
Sec. 4.11. This approach is in line with the semantics of standard logic we build
upon and does not formally model the use of the feature, thereby following our
paradigm of not modeling most of the technical aspects of an identity in the seman-
tics. Also, expressing certain features using a dedicated logic-based approach would
require that a non-standard logic be used for this which comes with disadvantages.
Our approach completely avoids the use of non-standard logic, e.g., linear logic for
expressing consumption semantics of credentials [GBB+06, BBG+07].
For an identity that is based on private certificate protocols, some practically
relevant features for which cryptographic protocols exist are the revocation, k-show
per epoch, and 1-show feature.
Revocation of an identity. The possibility of an identity being revoked by its
certifier is indicated through the attribute revocation, the value of which indicates
the supported revocation method. The release of the attribute in a data statement
carries the operational semantics of the feature being executed in the cryptographic
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protocol used to prove the formula as follows:
Eq(c.revocation, “dynamicAccumulators”) .
Quantitative properties of the revocation feature and further details, e.g., the
maximum permitted age of revocation information, can be specified through meta-
data, though, not as part of the formal data model.
k-show per epoch of an identity. An identity can be constrained to be shown
at most k times during an epoch, e.g., time period, with the prover being traceable in
case this number is exceeded [CHK+06], therefore preventing (large-scale) sharing of
identities. For this feature we only express its availability through the limitedShow
attribute as follows:
Eq(c.limitedShow , “kShowPerEpoch”) .
The predicate indicates the availability of the feature realizing the property of k-
show per epoch for the identity when expressed in the corresponding object speci-
fication formula. Its release in a data statement has the operational semantics that
this feature be executed through execution of a corresponding cryptographic pro-
tocol [CHK+06]. For an identity backed by a private certificate—the setting which
this feature has been designed for—the details regarding the epoch and number of
permitted uses of the identity are encoded as part of the certificate or the certificate
structure.
1-show identity. Analogous to the above, 1-show identities can be specified with
the limitedShow attribute and constant “1show” as
Eq(c.limitedShow , “1show”) .
This concludes our discussion of identity features and their implementation
through operational semantics.
4.4.17 Extension: Operators
An extension to the definition of identities given earlier is that the function rep-
resenting an identity maps attributes to tuples comprising a typed attribute value
and operator from the set {eq, lt, leq, geq, gt}. The operator specifies the equality
or inequality relation that holds for the attribute value, in addition to the implicit
equality relation always applying in the earlier definition. The key idea of operators
is that they allow for expressing inequalities directly as part of an identity without
expressing a formula over its attributes, and thus adds to the expressive power.
Operators can be employed also for conditionally released and opaque identities in
addition to identities.
Next, we discuss some use cases for using inequality operators on attributes in
identities, which strengthens privacy by following the data minimization principle
132 4 Data Representation, Logic, Ontologies, and Semantics
in a more stringent way. Generally, the certification of identities with operators
other than the standard case of equality is useful in cases when the issuing of an
attribute with its concrete value, that is, using the equality operator, would not
reflect the targeted intention for the concerned identity and unnecessarily reveal too
much information.
For example, the credit rating agency in the example below intends to issue an
inequality over the salary attribute and not its precise value because this reflects
what the identity is to express.
Example 4.14 (Credit rating agency) Assume a credit rating agency assesses
the creditworthiness of its customers through, among other things, their monthly
salaries. Based on the assessment, it issues a customer an identity certifying its
assessed creditworthiness, also comprising an attribute about the customer’s salary
range. For the assessment, it need not learn the customer’s precise salary in order to
make a statement about the rating, but it is sufficient for it to learn about a salary
range in terms of a Geq predicate on the salary attribute which can be provided,
for example, through a proof by the customer using one or more bank or salary
statements. A credit rating identity comprising, among other attributes, the re-
certified salary range that can be issued based on the proven inequality statement,
or even be a different, less-revealing range, can be issued for the attribute. This
approach realizes data minimization towards the certifying party in a very aggressive
way by providing exactly the data required for the business process at hand and not
having the party learn excessive data than that needed for the business process at
hand, in a very strict sense.
Example 4.15 (Age verification service) Assume a service provider has spe-
cialized in issuing age proof identities that allow their holders to prove their major
age without revealing their date of birth. The service provider accepts a wide range
of identities or combination of identities for one’s major age being proven to it as
a basis for the prover getting issued the new age proof identity, that is, as breeder
credentials, even such not containing the date of birth as an attribute or it being
encoded differently such that it cannot be recertified through opaque identities, that
is, without the service provider learning it. The service provider includes the date
of birth attribute with an inequality stating that the date of birth is at least 18 years
in the past, or the appropriate threshold constants for major age applying in the
country at hand, from the presented issuing date of the identity using an inequality
operator on the date of birth attribute instead of certifying its precise value. This ap-
proach particularly allows the party to also issue such identities when using breeder
identities for the age validation that do not contain a date of birth attribute at all,
though still imply an age greater than or equal to the major age threshold.
The permissible combination of identities to establish major age is very specific,
e.g., to the legislation of the country the age proof identity is to be used in and
thus justifies a business case for specialized parties performing this task of identity
validation, possibly taking liability for properly validating the major age of parties,
and issuing new age proof identities.
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Use cases like the ones above can be realized with operators expressed on at-
tributes or, at least partially, also by re-certifying attributes of opaque identities
which are not learnt by the certifying party, though which it can certify. Because
of this, the examples also give a motivation for the use of opaque identities in our
system. Opaque identities will only be workable for realizing the presented scenarios
in case the new identity being certified is based on private certificate protocols.
Another possible—though conceptually not very clean solution in general for use
cases like the above—is to implicitly express the operator as part of the attribute,
e.g., integrating the inequality semantics as well as the constant into the attribute
name. The problem with this approach is that using such special attribute for each
inequality relation to be expressed will severely constrain certain capabilities of the
resulting data representation model, e.g., matching a predicate expressed over such
attribute with a data request comprising the inequality with respect to a different
implicitly encoded constant. The reason for this is the mixing of different kinds of
semantics, namely about the concerned attribute and a predicate expressed over it,
into a single entity.
4.5 Data Statement Language
Data statements made by parties towards other parties are based on the concepts
and syntax presented earlier in this chapter. Because the system we define in this
thesis also gives rise to a framework, there exists not a single such language in the
framework, rather, there exists one generic language Lp/g and one language per
protocol for proving data statements to be released correct.
Such generic language Lp/g is based on the language that would be supported
by the most expressive protocol we have in mind for our framework. Such protocol
is based on online certifiers making statements about certifiees, including making
statements comprising identities of multiple certifiers. This allows for better ex-
pressiveness for the language than with credential protocols as there is no need
for advanced cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring integrity of such statements,
though, with the weak trust model of the certifiers learning substantial information
about the transactions of the certifiees. We cannot think of a class of protocols
that would be more powerful in terms of expressiveness than this, thus this generic
language Lp/g is the language which all statement languages for concrete underlying
mechanisms are (proper) subsets of.
Any specific concrete embodiment for a data release protocol requires a (proper)
fragment of Lp/g for being able to model the capabilities of the concrete mechanism.
For example, the corresponding language for the abovementioned protocols with
online certifiers being able to make statements about identities of multiple certifiers
equals Lp/g. For credential protocols, a more constrained language Lp/c needs to be
defined. For conventional certificates, a substantially constrained fragment of Lp/g
applies. For example, this fragment does not allow for expressing disjunctions or
inequality predicates or the non-equality predicate to be expressed on attributes—
only equalities for revealing attributes are supported. Thus, for each technology,
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the corresponding language formalizes what the technology is capable of supporting
in terms of expressiveness and data minimization.
In the remainder of this section, we present the language Lp/c for expressing data
statements based on pseudonym and credential protocols as underlying technology,
building on the concepts and syntactical constructs introduced earlier in this chap-
ter. The language Lp/c is a fragment of the generic language Lp/g for expressing data
statements. By design, Lp/c is constructed such that it captures the expressivity of
private certificate systems in terms of privacy capabilities and integrates advanced
trust management capabilities.
The expressivity of Lp/c is greater than what mainstream mechanisms can sup-
port, e.g., standard protocols with a single online certifier or traditional certificates
in use as of today. Thus, the language captures, as special cases, what can be ex-
pressed with the other most prominent protocols available today, namely protocols
with an online certifier and such based on traditional certificates, and combinations
thereof. Protocols with online IdPs could, in certain areas, support higher expres-
sivity, e.g., disjunctions over the type of an identity. It would be straightforward to
extend the language further to accommodate this, following the overall ideas of the
language design. Though, in our opinion, protocols with online certifiers are not
based on a particularly privacy-friendly trust model and thus such extensions would
not provide much benefit in practice.
In addition to a corresponding fragment of Lp/g, each mechanism requires that
various other languages be defined for specifying the input and output of the pro-
tocols required for realizing the mechanism in a system. In Chapter 5 we present
the languages for credential protocols only. Further (cryptographic) mechanisms fit
into our framework by design, though, are not presented in this thesis. The author
discusses architectural aspects regarding the support of multiple protocols in related
work [Som11].
4.5.1 Syntax
A formula φ of Lp/c comprises a conjunction of multiple subformulae as indicated
in the grammar in Fig. 4.1, each of which is used for expressing certain aspects of
the data statement φ. One subformula is used for introducing identifier objects,
one for specifying third parties, one for introducing identities, one for introducing
conditionally released identities, and one for expressing the actual statement over
the attributes of the identifier objects, identities, and conditionally released and
opaque identities. The subformula comprising the conjunction of the first four of
the mentioned subformulae is referred-to as the preamble of the formula as it contains
aspects related to the definition of the objects we are interested in referring to for
making data statements. The last subformula is referred to as the attribute assertion
or attribute statement subformula.
The syntax notation we employ next uses underlining for expressing productions
and other elements related to the grammar notation, while non-underlined elements
are ground terms of the language Lp/c. We present the syntax for the subformulae
of a data statement in separate subsections together with their descriptions, with
4.5 Data Statement Language 135
φ ::= IdtfObjStmts ∧ ThirdPartySpecs ∧ IdtyIntroduction ∧
CRIdtyIntroduction ∧ AttrStmts
Figure 4.1: Grammar for Lp/c
common elements separated out and presented towards the end.
4.5.1.1 Identifier Object Introduction
In the first subformula of φ, as specified through the production IdtfObjStmts of the
grammar as specified in Fig. 4.2, we express identifier assertions through which all
identifier objects with the subject being the primary subject of the formula and, as
optional addition, zero to multiple delegaters, are introduced. The primary subject
is holder of all primary identifier objects, and, for the case of employing credential
technologies, is also the party performing the proof and one of the parties the as-
sertion subformula makes statements about. We refer to those identifier objects as
the primary identifier objects.
IdtfObjStmts ::= IdtfObjStmt ∧ IdtfObjStmts | IdtfObjStmt
IdtfObjStmt ::= Idtf . holder = ConsPty ∧
Idtf . subject = ConsPty ∧ Eq ( Idtf . subjectId , ConsIdtf )
[ ∧ Eq ( Idtf . domain , ConsStr ) ] [ ∧ ObjEqPtyConsCons ] *
Figure 4.2: Grammar for identifier object introduction subformulae
This subformula of φ serves the purpose of relating the attributes of the primary
identifier objects referred to in φ with constant terms. For each identifier object,
its holder and subject must be associated with a constant of type pty, its attribute
subjectId with a constant of type idf, and, in case of a domain identifier object,
the domain attribute with a str-typed constant. For each identifier object, the
subjectId is the pseudonym value, while the holder and subject attributes are used
for introducing the associated terms into the formula, binding the identifier object
to its holder and subject, and, in later parts of φ, for binding further objects to their
holders and subjects.
The optional production ObjEqPtyConsCons specifies the logical equality rela-
tions between pty-typed terms for stating holder or subject equality for different
identifier objects in the same registration domain or bridging registration domains.
That is, a constant t1 of type pty associated with the holder or subject attribute
of an identifier object as explained can be related through object equality with an-
other such constant t2 for relating pty-terms representing the holder or subject of
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different identifier objects through logical equality, particularly also objects from
different registration domains—the details of the use of such object equality in this
context, particularly also the use of different registration domains, are discussed in
Sec. 4.8.2. Such relation of terms results in the logical equality relation t1 = t2
between the terms.
Note that relaxing the ordering of predicates in the preamble subformulae is in-
line with the ideas behind the language. For better readability, though, we partition
the overall formula into its subformulae and constrain the ordering of predicates.
The language does not permit one to express predicates over attributes of pri-
mary identifier objects in any other parts of the formula, particularly not in dis-
junction branches. The reason for the latter is that this would not allow for useful
functionality either in terms of identity management or privacy. For each identi-
fier object a proof is made over, the data recipient knows the corresponding shared
cryptographic information, thus expressing a disjunction over the attributes cannot
help data minimization.
4.5.1.2 Third-party Specification
Third parties can be specified through statements over attributes of identifier ob-
jects and identities which they are subjects of. Such identifier objects and identities
are referred to as secondary identifier objects and secondary identities, respectively.
Currently required classes of third parties are certifiers of identities and conditional
data recipients associated with conditionally released identities. A third party of
either kind is specified through either of the approaches as we explain next. The syn-
tax for the third-party specifications of a formula is specified through the production
ThirdPartySpecs of the grammar presented in Fig. 4.3.
Most trivially, one can omit a third-party specification statement for a third
party being a certifier or conditional data recipient which is always referred to in
other parts of the formula through a subject term, in which case the third party is
specified only through this subject term.
Another means of specifying the third party further is to make a statement about
it being the subject of an identifier object which is then further specified through its
subjectId . The holder can, though, need not, be expressed for third-party identifier
objects, because the holder is, in the protocols we consider, always the same third
party already specified through the subject.
Yet another means is to specify the third party through statements over the
attributes of an identity with the third party as subject. Like for the case of iden-
tifier objects, the holder is again the third party and thus can be omitted from the
specification.
The approach of using an identifier object and identity can also be combined for
the specification of the third party. Also, multiple identifier objects and identities
can be introduced and related to each other for specifying the third party. This
may require that the subject terms associated with them be related through object
equality relations. Multiple objects are useful for exploiting the information of
multiple public-key or other certificates about the third party in a single statement.
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The identity with the third party as the subject has, much like any other iden-
tity, a certifier associated. This can be used for specifying this certifier as being
another third party, using the exactly same concepts recursively. Such recursion
can be terminated by declaring a party as a trusted Certification Authority (CA)
or not making a further statement about it. The very general way of stating a
certification chain explicitly may be relevant in special cases only, the regular case
is to specify the third party through an identifier object or identity or combination
thereof. Practically, referring to a unique public pseudonym is often sufficient—all
other information about the third party is not strictly required as it is known by the
recipient of the formula due to the object specification formulae of objects related
to third parties the recipient holds for verifying proofs. Particularly the approach
of using multiple objects and recursive specification of the certifier for specifying a
third party is mainly interesting in the data request language Lr/c dual to Lp/c.
When using multiple identifier objects or identities with the same third party as
subject, terms referring to the party are handled as discussed in Sec. 4.8.
4.5.1.3 Identity Introduction
The identity introduction subformula of a formula φ handles the introduction of pri-
mary identities, with a syntax as specified through the production IdtyIntroduction
as presented in Fig. 4.4. That is, each identity with the primary subject or a dele-
gater as subject that is to be later referenced in the formula needs to be introduced
at this point through specifying crucial aspects related to it. This comprises speci-
fication of the certifier term and the type of the identity. For credential protocols,
both those must be specified in the top-level ∧-node of a data statement formula,
that is, no disjunctions are allowed in this subformula, as the specification must
uniquely determine the third party and thus the public key to be used for verify-
ing the parts of the underlying cryptographic protocol related to the corresponding
private certificate.
Note that the association of the holder and subject of an identity with terms
referring to parties is done only in the attribute statement subformula for the reason
of being able to realize disjunction statements within the latter. Fixing those associ-
ations already in the top-level ∧-node of φ, e.g., as part of the identity introduction
subformula, would prevent us from expressing disjunctions over predicates in the at-
tribute statement subformula in a general way. Note also that registration domain
bridging identities, that is, identities for the purpose of bridging two registration
domains, must be introduced in the identity introduction subformula in case their
domain bridging capability is used through an according logical equality relation
over constant pty-typed terms related to identifier objects of different registration
domains given in the identifier object introduction subformula.
4.5.1.4 Conditionally Released Identity Introduction
This subformula introduces all conditionally released identities referred to in the
attribute statement subformula of φ. The purpose is to fix the conditional recipient
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ThirdPartySpecs ::= ThirdPartySpec ∧ ThirdPartySpecs | ThirdPartySpec
ThirdPartySpec ::= IdtfObjStmts3P ∧ IdtyStmts3P ∧ IdtfObjEqPtyAttrCons*
IdtfObjStmts3P ::= IdtfObjStmt3P ∧ IdtfObjStmts3P | IdtfObjStmt3P
IdtfObjStmt3P ::= Idtf . holder = ConsPty | Idtf . subject = ConsPty |
Eq ( Idtf . subjectId , ConsIdtf ) |
Eq ( Idtf . domain , ConsStr ) | ObjEqPtyConsCons
IdtyStmts3P ::= IdtyStmt3P ∧ IdtyStmts3P | IdtyStmt3P
IdtyStmt3P ::= AttrPred3P ∧ IdtyStmt3P | AttrPred3P
AttrPred3P ::= AttrRelPred3P | IdtyEqPtyAttrCons |
Property ( ConsPty , “trustedCA” )
AttrRelPred3P ::= PredInt3P | PredDate3P | PredStr3P | PredBool3P | PredIdtf3P
PredInt3P ::= PredSymInt ( ExprInt3P , ExprInt3P )
ExprInt3P ::= ConsInt · AttrRef3P AddOpInt ExprInt3P | ConsInt
PredDate3P ::= PredSymDate ( ExprDate3P , ExprDate3P )
ExprDate3P ::= ConsDate | AttrRef3P | AttrRef3P AddOpDate ConsInt |
ConsDate AddOpDate ConsInt
PredStr3P ::= PredSymStr ( ExprStr , ExprStr )
ExprStr ::= AttrRef3P | ConsStr
PredBool3P ::= PredSymBool ( ExprBool , ExprBool )
ExprBool ::= AttrRef3P | ConsBool
AttrRef3P ::= Obj3P . Attr
Obj3P ::= Idty
Figure 4.3: Grammar for third party specification subformula
IdtyIntroduction ::= Idty . certifier = ConsPty ∧ Eq ( Idty . type , ConsStr )
Figure 4.4: Grammar for identity introduction subformula
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as well as the condition associated with a conditionally released identity through-
out the formula. This is required, analogous to fixing the certifier and type of
identities, because the cryptographic protocol for realizing conditionally released
identities [CS03] requires that the used public key for encryption and the condition
be fixed throughout the formula. The syntax of the subformula is specified through
the CRIdtyIntroduction production presented in Fig. 4.5.
CRIdtyIntroduction ::= CRIdty . recipient = ConsPty ∧
Eq ( CRIdty . condition , ConsStr )
Figure 4.5: Grammar for conditionally released identity introduction subformula
The constant specifying the recipient can be related to the subject of one or
more identifier objects or identities in the third-party specification subformula, over
which further predicates can be expressed as explained. Except for the attribute
recipient , other attributes of a conditionally released identity must never be related
to pty-typed attributes or constants in any place in the formula. Note that the
requirement of fixing the condition for the complete formula can be relaxed when
using the Camenisch–Damg˚ard [CD00] verifiable encryption scheme instead of that
of Camenisch and Shoup [CS03] we support as only scheme in our system.
Note also that opaque identities need not be introduced in the preamble of the
formula as their cryptographic key material is derived in the protocol and thus need
not be specified explicitly—it is sufficient to associate their attributes to that of
other objects in the attribute specification subformula.
4.5.1.5 Attribute Assertions
The attribute assertions subformula specifies the attribute assertions, or attribute
statements, to be expressed over the introduced identifier objects, identities, con-
ditionally released identities, and zero or more opaque identities. The subformula
thereby relates attributes of those objects with each other or constants through the
relation predicates for the respective types. Predicates can be arranged in an ar-
bitrary structure connected through the logical ∧ and ∨ operators. Certification
metadata other than the certifier specification, e.g., expiration of identities, are
expressed using the same syntax as for regular attributes. The syntax for the at-
tribute assertions subformula is given through the production AttrStmts presented
in Fig. 4.6.
Logical equality relations can be used for associating the holder and subject
attributes of identities with constant terms introduced in the identifier object in-
troduction subformula. This realizes the binding of primary identities to primary
identifier objects and thus parties the formula is making statements about. Those
logical equality predicates should, by convention, appear in the topmost ∧-node of
the attribute assertions subformula where this is possible for a given identity in
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order to not require repetition of this in different disjunctive branches.26 Note that
the bridging of different registration domains or delegation registration domains is
accounted for in the identifier object introduction subformula.
AttrStmts ::= AttrPred LogicalConn AttrStmts | AttrPred
AttrPred ::= AttrRelPred | IdtfEqPtyAttrCons
AttrRelPred ::= PredInt | PredDate | PredStr | PredBool | PredIdtf
LogicalConn ::= ∧ | ∨
Figure 4.6: Grammar for attribute assertions subformula
In Fig. 4.7 we present the integer and date predicates including the expression
syntax of the arguments.
PredInt ::= PredSymInt ( ExprInt , ExprInt )
PredSymInt ::= Eqint×int | Neqint×int | Ltint×int | Leqint×int | Geqint×int | Gtint×int
ExprInt ::= ConsInt MulOpInt AttrRefAttrAssrt AddOpInt ExprInt | ConsInt
PredDate ::= PredSymDate ( ExprDate , ExprDate )
PredSymDate ::= Eqdate×date | Neqdate×date | Ltdate×date |
Leqdate×date | Geqdate×date | Gtdate×date
ExprDate ::= ConsDate | AttrRefAttrAssrt | AttrRefAttrAssrt AddOpDate
ConsInt | ConsDate AddOpDate ConsInt
Figure 4.7: Grammar for integer and date predicates
The syntax for predicates for the remaining data types str, bool, and idf is pre-
sented in Fig. 4.8.
Syntactical elements referred in productions earlier and that have not been in-
troduced yet are presented in Fig. 4.9. Note that the multiplicative and additive
operators are, for brevity, often referred to without their type annotation int or date.
4.5.1.6 Additional Syntax Elements
We have focused on the most important aspects of the language in the presentation
of the syntax, while leaving out certain elements, the precise specification of which is
26This cannot be handled in the top-level ∧-node of the formula for the reason that for a formula
with disjunctions, the non-fulfilled parts of the formula could not be cryptographically simulated
in all cases due to the association of the holder or subject.
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PredStr ::= PredSymStr ( ExprStr , ExprStr )
PredSymStr ::= Eqstr×str | Neqstr×str
ExprStr ::= AttrRefAttrAssrt | ConsStr
PredBool ::= PredSymBool ( ArgBool , ExprBool)
PredSymBool ::= Eqbool×bool | Neqbool×bool
ExprBool ::= AttrRefAttrAssrt | ConsBool
PredIdtf ::= PredSymIden ( ArgIden , ExprIdtf )
PredSymIden ::= Eqidf×idf | Neqidf×idf
ExprIdtf ::= AttrRefAttrAssrt | ConsIdtf
Figure 4.8: Grammar for string, boolean, and identifier predicates
MulOpInt ::= ·int
AddOpInt ::= +int | −int
AttrRefAttrAssrt ::= ObjAttrAssrt . Attr
ObjAttrAssrt ::= Idty | CRIdty | OIdty
ObjEqPtyConsCons ::= ConsPty = ConsPty
IdtfEqPtyAttrCons ::= IdtfAttrRefPty = ConsPty | ConsPty = IdtfAttrRefPty
IdtfAttrRefPty ::= Idtf . IdtfAttrPty
IdtfAttrPty ::= holder | subject
IdtyEqPtyAttrCons ::= IdtyAttrRefPty = ConsPty | ConsPty = IdtyAttrRefPty
IdtyAttrRefPty ::= Idty . IdtyAttrPty
IdtyAttrPty ::= holder | subject | certifier
Figure 4.9: Grammar for additional syntactical elements
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of less interest here. This comprises the details of the composition of ground terms
of the language, such as the definitions of the productions corresponding to pty,
the basic data types int, date and the variants of the latter, str, bool, and idf, or the
definition of the permissible ground terms through the productions Idtf, Idty,CRIdty,
and OIdty referring to identifier objects, identities, conditionally released identities,
and opaque identities, respectively. That is, the corresponding productions referred
above are not further defined. Particularly, the different date types have been
abstracted in the syntax as they are all handled analogous as the type date for
which the productions have been presented.
The 〈 〉 annotation for predicates has not been captured in the formal syntax.
This special language element has been introduced for supporting the cryptographic
proof of statements comprising disjunctions. Every predicate that is annotated with
the 〈 〉 annotation, is required to be backed with cryptographic material, e.g., private
certificates. Other predicates need not hold due to being comprised in disjunction
branches such that the formula is satisfied by only the 〈 〉-annotated predicates
being true. The purpose of the 〈 〉 annotation of a formula is to instruct the prover-
side cryptographic protocol on which parts of a formula to prove with available
cryptographic material and which to simulate. The annotation is removed after
computing (the parts of) the cryptographic protocol for generating a proof of the
formula and before the formula is revealed to the data recipient. This annotation
approach has been introduced in earlier work by the author [CSZ06b, CSZ06a].
Parentheses ( and ) for defining precedences in the formula have not been in-
cluded in the syntax either and are defined as is done commonly for related first-order
logic languages.
4.5.2 Interoperability Aspects
An important aspect of an implementation is how the names of attributes are real-
ized regarding the used namespace. It is crucial that different parties do not define
the same attribute name for different purposes. A properly chosen namespace re-
solves this issue and can allow the parties in the system to select attribute names only
from namespaces they control. The URI scheme [BLFM05] of the W3C is a prac-
tical and scalable namespace scheme that is suitable for our purposes. Analogous
considerations apply for types of identities that should thus be chosen accordingly.
In the context of earlier work in this area, experiments have been performed for
modeling and implementing a previous—and less powerful—variant of our data rep-
resentation language based on W3C’s RDF [ME04] and OWL [MvHE04] languages
because of the existing tools for those. In the current presentation of the archi-
tecture we do not constrain ourselves to any specific technology by using generic
first-order logic with the option of realizing a constrained system based on the pre-
sented approach.
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4.6 Data Request Language
An authentication system following our model of Chapter 3 requires that authoriza-
tion policies be expressed and communicated by a party to communication partners.
Authorization policies express, among other things, requirements that an access re-
quester needs to fulfill in order to gain access to a protected resource. Those data
requirements are expressed as one key part of such policies. In this section, we dis-
cuss a language Lr/c for specifying data requests based on our data model. We will
use the terms data request, authorization policy, or policy interchangeably when the
meaning is clear from the context.
The language Lr/c is dual to Lp/c in that formulae of Lp/c can be valid responses
to a formula in Lr/c. As for Lp/c, a generic language Lr/g is the most generic request
language dual to Lp/g. For every mechanism for releasing certified data that is
to be supported in our framework, a pair comprising a request language and dual
statement language needs to be specified and considered for the process of matching
a party’s object specification formulae in its repository with policies.
A data statement expressed in Lp/c is characterized by being a concrete formula
without free variables, referring to concrete identities and other objects which it
makes statements about. A data request is a formula of Lr/c which has the meaning
that it can be fulfilled by any one of a potentially large set of data statement
formulae, and, it does not make a statement about objects, rather it has the meaning
of a request of statements. Requests are syntactically expressed in a related way
to data statements, though with important differences that lend them their data
request characteristics.
4.6.1 Syntax
The data request syntax is based on the syntax of the data formula language—we
next explain the differences of the request to the statement language, though, do not
present the complete syntax in formal notation to avoid repeating aspects already
presented earlier. Particularly, a request formula comprises sub-formulae analogous
to that of a statement formula.
A main concept of the request language is to use free variables instead of constant
terms, e.g., for referring to objects or attribute values. A free variable stands,
following standard logic, for any of a (potentially large) set of terms that the variable
can be instantiated with in a statement fulfilling the request. A free variable thus
realizes the general request semantics of referring to a set of matching instances
instead of only a concrete single instance.
Free variables are used for referring to different kinds of objects to realize the
request semantics of the formula. For example, the primary identifier objects and
identities of a formula are referred to with free variables instead of constants as
in a statement, meaning that any concrete identifier objects or identities fulfilling
the specified constraints can be used in a corresponding data statement. Similarly,
conditionally released and opaque identities can be represented through free vari-
ables. When not referring to a concrete third party and abstractly specifying a set
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of applicable third parties, either for being a certifier or conditional recipient, the
third-party identifier objects or identities can be referred to through free variables.
Requests of attribute values are expressed by specifying a predicate stating equal-
ity through the Eq predicate of the respective type over the attribute of an object
(variable) as one argument and a free variable instead of a constant representing
the attribute value as the other argument.
Parties can be referred to through free variables of type pty instead of through
constants. For associating a pty-typed attribute with a free variable, a logical equal-
ity relation is expressed between the attribute reference and a free variable.
A request can use property predicates, with their underlying ontology-based
abstractions, for associating properties with parties, where the parties are repre-
sented through free variables. Property predicates can be applied for abstracting
the specification of third parties or any other party referred to in the request through
abstract, ontology-defined, properties. Property predicates are expressed with the
following syntax, where TermPty refers to either a constant or free variable, where
the latter is useful for expressing generalizations, and ConsBasicType to a constant
of a basic data type:
PropertyPred ::= Property ( TermPty , ConsStr [ , ConsBasicType ] * ) .
A trivial, degenerate, form of data requests exactly uses the syntax of data state-
ment formulae and thus does not comprise free variables. Such requests resemble a
set of size 1 of formulae that can fulfill it—the request itself is its only fulfilling state-
ment. Despite being formally valid, those requests are a special case and not very
interesting in terms of the language and for practical applications as such requests
are tailored to specific identifier objects or identities and thus to a specific requester
and not generally applicable for requesting authentication from any potential service
accessor.
Identifier object introduction. The identifier object introduction sub-formula
is expressed analogous to the corresponding sub-formula in a data statement, with
the difference that variables can be—and are typically—used instead of only con-
stants for referring to the identifier objects and the values of their attributes.
Through this, the general request semantics of referring to a set of eligible ob-
jects rather than only specific objects is realized. An identifier object referred to
through a free variable and its attributes being equated to free variables refers to
the set of the identifier objects other parties have established with the originator of
such request.
Regarding different registration domains, a request can be phrased to refer to a
party with a single pty-typed term, or multiple such, related through equality rela-
tions, reflecting multiple possible registration domains. Both approaches can result
in logically equivalent requests and can thus be fulfilled through the same responses.
If not every potential registration domain is reflected through a different identifier
for a party, a responding data statement may require the introduction of identifier
objects with no corresponding object in the request into the response, which is valid
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as it corresponds to the release of additional information to what is requested. As
the partition of identifier objects and identities of a potential respondent to a request
is not known in general by the requester, a request should not make the registration
domains explicit and allow respondents to respond with a formula with objects from
multiple bridged registration domains, for not unnecessarily constraining the set of
eligible responses.
Third-party specification. The third-party specification sub-formula in a re-
quest builds on multiple generalizations—in addition to using free variables instead
of constant terms—over the third-party specification sub-formula of data statements.
Predicates expressed over the identifier objects and identities of the third party
through their attributes can be connected with disjunctions instead of only con-
junction. Furthermore, property predicates can be used for specifying properties
of third parties through ontology concepts. A property predicate is expressed over
the subject variable referring to the third party to be specified. Both approaches
can be combined for further generalizing the expressiveness for requests. A prop-
erty predicate over a pty-typed variable can represent a possibly large set of parties,
disjunction over multiple such resulting in the union of the corresponding sets.
A simple third-party specification sub-formula of a request specifying a concrete,
well-defined third party can do so through the public pseudonym of the third party
of one of its identifier objects or identifying attributes of an identity the third party
is subject of. The simplest way of specifying a third party is not having a third-
party specification for this party, though, only specifying it through a unique pty-
typed term related to the certifier or conditional recipient attribute of an object or
conditionally released identity.
Using the approach of recursively specifying the certifiers of third-party identities
may be interesting for specifying third parties based on their properties or that of
the certifiers of identities comprising attributes those properties can be deduced
from.
Identity introduction. Like in a data statement, identities are introduced
through a sub-formula. Though, a request can be substantially more generic than
a statement in that it does not need to uniquely specify an identity type, certifier,
or even concrete identity. Rather, it can specify a requested identity abstractly
such that identities of types with certain criteria certified by certifiers with certain
criteria, as specified in the third-party specification sub-formula, can match it.
The type of an identity can be specified through a type defined in a subtype
ontology in place of a concrete type as used in a statement. Using further ontology
concepts can be done easily in our language without any conceptual extensions
other than requiring an ontology making statements about such concepts. This is
an advantage related to building on extensions of first-order logic and calculi. Not
constraining the type of the identity in any way leaves the type open to dynamic
typing as introduced in Sec. 4.4.11.2 for finding matching identities.
Disjunctions over logical equality predicates over the certifier attribute with dif-
ferent subject variables for the certifier can be expressed. The same semantics of
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expressing a disjunction over certifiers can be achieved through specifying a dis-
junction in the third-party specification sub-formula over a single subject variable
for the certifier. Both approaches can be combined in practical data requests for
increased flexibility.
By convention, the static type of an identity should be specified through the
Type predicate instead of the type attribute of the identity in order to leverage the
subtyping scheme for identities of Sec. 4.4.11.2. Type and certifier predicates can
be mixed in a sub-formula for an identity in order to have very generic expressivity
of also being able to express dependencies between type and certifier. Disjunctions
can be expressed over the predicates in the sub-formula.
A predicate RegBind is defined for requesting the corresponding registration
binding identity CR of an identity C as presented in (4.17). Expressing registra-
tion binding semantics without such predicate would require a disjunction over all
possible kinds of registration identities for C. Such predicate is always comprised in
the top-level ∧-node of the formula. The usual concepts can be applied for further
specifying CR. Further specification of the registration identity is not required in
the standard case of requesting it, unless specific constraints need to be imposed on
it.
RegBind(C,CR) (4.17)
Conditionally released identity introduction. Next, we assume that B has
specified a request formula and A is a potential respondent. Opaque and conditional-
ly released identities A has established with B in earlier instances of a protocol for
releasing data as specified through data statements can be referenced through the
constant terms shared between A and B referring to those objects. Free variables of
type crid or oid are used either for indicating that such objects be established in the
protocol corresponding to a fulfilling response, or that any previously generated such
object matching the request be used. Which of the two should apply in a request
cannot be expressed in our logic and needs to be communicated as metadata asso-
ciated with the constant or variable term referring to the (to-be-generated) object.
Note, though, that the meaning of a variable is the same as always—it can be in-
stantiated with any suitable object in a response, with the difference that potentially
this object does not exist yet.
Attribute statement. The attribute assertion sub-formula is specified analogous
to a data statement, with the possibility of using free variables for referring to objects
and attributes using the standard request semantics. This sub-formula comprises
the actual request for attribute data about a user and optionally delegaters, as well
as the specification of attribute values of uninstantiated conditionally released and
opaque identities.
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4.6.2 Meaning of Disjunctions and Ontological Concepts
The formal-logic-based language for expressing requests has the following inher-
ent limitation: A request which specifies an identity through its type or its certi-
fier through abstract ontology-based concepts such that a set of concrete identity
types of possibly different certifiers fulfills this specification and requests proof of ∧-
connected and ∨-connected predicates in the attribute statement sub-formula over
such identity can—from a perspective of the underlying logic—be fulfilled in multiple
ways: (1) Through the predicates referring to a single such identity type of a con-
crete certifier in the attribute statement sub-formula, or (2) through transforming
the part of the attribute sub-formula comprising the aforementioned predicates such
that disjunction semantics with respect to (a subset of) the permissible identities of
different types and certifiers is expressed over this part of the attribute sub-formula.
This applies analogously for the similar case of the request comprising a disjunc-
tion over sub-formulae explicitly instead of the ontology concept: Such request can
equally be fulfilled by fulfilling the disjunction through a satisfying assignment or
by proving the disjunction correct as a whole.
A possible means of expressing requirements on whether it shall be permissible
that such or similar requests be fulfilled with a disjunction or whether they must be
fulfilled otherwise is to use metadata outside of the logic-based language or extend
the language—the language itself cannot express those requirements. In our view,
such semantics technically is outside of first-order logic and thus should be modeled
through metadata.
We want to point out that when specifying an identity in a request in a generic
manner through using ontology concepts and disjunctions, not every attribute re-
ferred to through qualification of the identity variable needs to be contained in every
identity in the set of eligible identities. Dynamic typing rules out the non-applicable
identities when finding a fulfilling formula for the request. Otherwise, this would be
a severe limitation of our approach for practical systems.
Properties. In the general case, there is, also due to using ontology-based abstrac-
tions, no bijective correspondence between free variables in a request and constant
terms in a response. For example, a single property predicate may require a subfor-
mula with a conjunction of multiple predicates over attributes for fulfilling it. As
another example, a disjunction in a request over multiple predicates expressed over
attributes of different free variables representing identities may be fulfilled with a
single predicate over an attribute of one concrete identity following the semantics
of first-order logic.
A data request ψ represents the set Φrsp of formulae which are capable of fulfilling
the request. For a data statement φ ∈ Φrsp fulfilling a data request ψ we require
that it contain no free variables. An environment is, following standard terminology
in logic [HR04], a mapping from all free variables of a (request) formula to constant
terms.
A statement φ ∈ Φrsp fulfills a request ψ, with O an ontology and E an environ-
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ment instantiating free variables of ψ, if and only if the following holds:
φ `EO ψ . (4.18)
Definition 4.2 (Equivalence of requests) Two requests ψ1 and ψ2 are equiva-
lent with respect to an ontology O in a deductive system L if and only if they have the
same sets Φ1 and Φ2 of data statement formulae and corresponding environments,
where, for i ∈ {1, 2}, each formula φk,i ∈ Φrspi with its corresponding environment
Ek,i fulfills the respective request, that is, for which the sequent φk,i `Ek,iO ψi is ful-
filled.
4.6.3 Examples
We next give some simple examples for data requests as well as suitable responses
to the requests.
Example 4.16 (Data request) The following example is a fragment of a request
ψ requesting the firstName attribute as well as a proof that a given predicate holds
over the monthly salary of the party and that the account is in currency Euro, all
based on the same identity C of type “bank Statement”. Note the free variable C
standing for the identity as well as FirstName for the value of the requested attribute.
The certifier is specified through its subject constant “c4112” for a concrete party.
· · ·Eq(C.type, “bank Statement”) ∧ C.certifier = “c4112” · · ·
· · ·Eq(C.firstName,FirstName) ∧ Geq(C.monthlySalary , 3500)∧
Eq(C.currency , “EUR”) ∧ · · ·
A response to such a request needs to follow the rule that each of the request’s
free variables needs to be instantiated in the response formula. The free variables
are C representing an identity as well as FirstName representing the attribute value
of the firstName attribute of C.
Example 4.17 (Minimal data response) The following statement φ1 is a frag-
ment of a proper response to ψ based on the identity bs:
· · ·Eq(bs.type, “bank Statement”) ∧ bs.certifier = “c4112” · · ·
· · ·Eq(bs.firstName, “Jane”) ∧ Geq(bs.monthlySalary , 3500)∧
Eq(bs.currency , “EUR”) · · · .
Example 4.18 (Data response) So is the following statement fragment φ2, ex-
posing more information about the salary, but still fulfilling ψ and thus being a valid
response to it:
· · ·Eq(bs.type, “bank Statement”) ∧ bs.certifier = “c4112” · · ·
· · ·Eq(bs.firstName, “Jane”) ∧ Eq(bs.lastName, “Doe”)∧
Geq(bs.monthlySalary , 9200) ∧ Eq(bs.currency , “EUR”) · · · .
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The response φ2 releases, in addition to what is requested, the value of a further
attribute of the identity and more information on the monthly income.
Example 4.19 (Request for proving identifier object holdership) A frag-
ment for a request for proving holdership of an identifier relationship can be for-
malized as follows in our language, making use of the identifier variable P and
relating its attributes to free variables:
· · ·P.holder = Holder ∧ P.subject = Subject ∧ Eq(P.subjectId ,SubjectId) · · · .
Note that variable names in requests should be chosen according to a scheme to
avoid accidental clashes of them in data request parts of authorization policies the
data requests of which may be combined to a request to be sent to the other party.
Example 4.20 (Holdership of an electronic Swiss passport) The following
example is a request for holdership of an electronic Swiss passport without revealing
any of its data attributes. The system-defined macro currentDateTime gets expanded
to the current date within the protocol for releasing the formula to the other party.
· · ·Eq(P.type, “swissPassport”) ∧ P.certifier = “c4112” · · ·
· · ·Geq(P.validUntil , currentDateTime) · · ·
Requesting or expressing the fact of holding an identity of a specific identity
type without making any statements over its user attributes is a frequently required
operation in our view as many permissions in real-world scenarios can be expressed
through holdership of an identity of a certain type certified by a specific party.
This can be expressed by specifying the type of the identity and optionally possibly
further metadata contained therein such as the temporal validity of certification.
Expressing holdership of an identity usually requires that at least the type of the
identity be given as otherwise any identity would be suitable and thus insufficient
information about the identity would be available for an authorization decision.
This integrates well with our model without the need of introducing a new language
concept, because we have the type and other metadata expressed as attributes of
identities, equal to user attributes.
Example 4.21 (Entrance ticket) Another example where holdership and basic
attributes of an identity can be sufficient is for an entrance ticket for entering a dance
club: Only the type, certifier, and temporal validity of the ticket may be sufficient
for a decision on granting or denying the holder of the identity entrance to the club.
When thinking of a widespread use of an electronic identity system as ours,
many more examples of similar cases of authorization policies can be thought of.
Note that proving holdership can also be done with only revealing the certifier while
hiding the type, though this is possible for certain protocols only for which the type
is, unlike for private certificate protocols, not required for producing a proof for the
statement.
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4.6.4 Third-party Requests
The default data provider to answer (parts of) a request is the interaction partner.
Though, there are valid practical cases where the data about the interaction partner
are to be requested from a third party during an interaction. Take as an example
a user whose authorization policies protecting the data of its identity relationship
formulae require that the interaction partner have a certain minimum reputation
score as stated by a reputation provider the user trusts for the purpose of providing
such information. In this case, the request needs to specify information about
the subject of the to-be-requested data such that the third party can return the
requested data. Such a request is called third-party request. Specifying the data
subject is done by specifying relevant information in the request, e.g., a jointly
known or public identifier of the subject of the request, as in the following example.
For subjects with a publicly known identifier (public pseudonym) such as most
service providers in today’s Internet, the use of such an identifier is the simplest
approach as there is no need for an additional agreement of a new identifier between
the party and the third party for the subject.
Example 4.22 Request formula with identity specification Next, we present a re-
quest fragment for a third-party request for confirming a minimum reputation score:
· · ·R.certifier = c · · ·
· · ·Geq(R.reputationScore, 8)∧
Eq(R.uniqueName, “online Electronics Shop”) · · · .
The predicate over the reputationScore attribute needs to be answered in the
response, that is, the given predicate in the example expresses the usual request
semantics for attribute information, while the attribute uniqueName is provided
through its value and used for identifying the party about which the reputation is
requested. Using the concept of sanitizing policies (see Bonatti and Samarati [BS02]
or Ardagna et al. [ACDS08]) that can protect sensitive information contained in
policy rules on the side of the requesting party allows for transforming this request
into a request for the value of the reputation score before being sent to the third
party, thereby hiding the predicate expressed over the attribute value. This prevents
the subject expression, the Geq predicate and constant 8, of this policy rule of the
user from leaking to the third party. In this case, the predicate for requesting the
reputationScore being greater than or equal to 8 would be replaced by the following
predicate where variable Rep stands for the attribute value:
Eq(R.reputationScore,Rep) . (4.19)
Such transformations are relevant in the context of authorization policies based on
our data model and (trust) negotiation protocol based on it [Som11].
Architecture. Requests targeted at the interaction partner and asking for data
about it or other parties are processed by the interaction partner against its identifier
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and identity relationships as well as conditionally released and opaque identities and
profiles.
Realizing third-party requests requires that such requests be indicated as such
and that the third party can be determined from the request. Those requests are
executed against the third party and contribute further information for making an
authorization decision. Third-party requests are relevant for a generic system in the
context of realizing a negotiation protocol and can be seen as an extension of a basic
system.
4.6.5 Authorization Policy Model
The representation of data requests is a main component of our authorization policy
language presented by the author in related work [Som11]. Being based on our data
model implies that features that can be expressed in data requests become imme-
diately available in the authorization language. This makes it a powerful language
which allows, to mention only some crucial aspects, for privacy-enhancing requests
while retaining requester accountability and supports delegation over attribute au-
thority.
The author explains in related work [Som11] how the data request language is
extended to a full privacy-enhancing authorization language, building on concepts
of established work [BS02, ACDS08].
Through the delegation capabilities of our data model, our authorization policy
model allows a party to express its policies such that it can allow for a resource
both non-delegated and delegated accesses as those two cases are different in terms
of identity statements and thus policies. Thus, delegation can be precisely controlled
by the relying party with the disadvantage that it learns whether a delegation is in
place. Support of the traditional delegation model based on a delegation of rights
and handling thereof through unique party identities in the authorization policy is
easy to support in the authorization language in addition to our approach.
4.7 Repository and Portfolio
As briefly outlined in Sec. 4.3, a party holds a repository of data and a portfolio. The
repository comprises identifier relationships, identity relationships, the data track,
and the profile data of a party. The portfolio comprises a subset of the repository
and is used for matching data a party holds against policies to fulfill. For third-
party requests the profile data is considered in addition to what is needed for regular
requests about the party. In this section, we discuss the technical representation of
data by a party in our system and purposes of use of the data.
4.7.1 Identifier Relationships
The identifier relationships Ridf of a party represent identifiers, or pseudonyms, a
party has established, each one being about a single party—be it the party itself or
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another party, e.g., a delegatee—for use in communication with another party or
multiple other parties. The setRidf is a set of identifier relationships idfi , 1 ≤ i ≤ `R
idf
comprising both the data and metadata of the identifier relationship where the data
are represented using our data model as outlined in this subsection. Thereby, `R
idf
refers to the number of identifier relationships of the party at a given time, that is,
in a given state of the system.
An identifier relationship idf is a tuple comprising an element ̂idf and a set of
metadata predicates associated with the element. The element is a set of cardinality
1 of a tuple ˜idf comprising a formula φ specifying an identifier object p through its
holder, subject, and the subject identifier value and a set of metadata predicates
{3idfj }.27
The formulae used for expressing the attributes of an identifier object in an
identifier relationship and the formulae representing the input and output to the
protocols for establishing identifier relationships are elements of the formal lan-
guage Lidf . This language is a small fragment of what our data representation is
capable of expressing, focused on pseudonym-related aspects thereof. We introduce
the language informally in the following, as part of the explanation of identifier
relationships and the protocol interface.
Lidf can be characterized as the language comprising only Eq predicates ex-
pressed on attribute references of identifier objects, variables representing attribute
values, and constant attribute values as their arguments, connected only through
the ∧-connective. The identifier objects may either be denoted through variable or
constant terms. The language Lidf is the basis for the languages Lidf/p for specifying
the protocol for establishing an identifier relationship and Lidf/r for representing an
identifier relationship at its holding party once established. The relations Lidf ⊂ Lg,
Lidf/p ⊂ Lidf , and Lidf/r ⊂ Lidf hold for the languages.
The basic structure of a formula φ ∈ Lidf/r representing an identifier relationship
is presented in (4.20)—see Sec. 4.4.7 for the concepts. Such formula is henceforth
also referred to as identifier object specification formula. The formula makes a
statement about the attributes of the identifier object p of the identifier relationship.
The symbols h and s refer to concrete pty-typed constants specifying the holder
and subject , respectively, and sid to the pseudonym identifier of type idf. In an
interpretation of the formula, the values for the holder and subject will be interpreted
with the party, the subjectId with itself. The language Lidf/r is, incontrast to Lidf
and Lidf/p, characterized by comprising only constant terms.
φ =p.holder = h ∧ p.subject = s ∧ Eq(p.subjectId , sid) (4.20)
An identifier relationship idf contains a metadata predicate specifying the sub-
ject term, that is, a reference to the party to whom the identifier relationship applies.
The following metadata are associated with an identifier object specification formula:
27The identifier relationship is modeled with a set of tuples of formulae and metadata with a
restriction that the set be of cardinality 1 in order to use the same modeling as for the other kinds
of data. The restriction on the set applies as for identifier relationships only one formula is required
for its modeling.
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the subject identifier of the party with whom the relationship has been established,
the mapping from the locally used terms to the terms used in communication with
the other party, cryptographic material (e.g., a cryptographic pseudonym) for using
the identifier relationship, and further metadata. An identifier relationship can be
obtained by the party by executing an instance of the EstIdtfRel or EstIdtfRelReg
protocol with another party.
4.7.2 Identity Relationships
An identity relationship captures the decision of a certifier to vouch for data about a
party, also referred to as certifiee. A party holds a set Ridy of identity relationships.
An identity relationship idy is a tuple of an element ̂idy and a set of metadata
predicates on ̂idy. The element ̂idy is a set of tuples ˜idy each comprising a formula
φi and a set of metadata predicates on the formula. Let 
idy
1 , . . . , 
idy
`Ridy
be the identity
relationships of a party at a given time.
A strength of the modeling of certified identity data through identity relation-
ships is their embedding into the overall formalism and expressivity provided for by
our data model and thus integration into our architecture. Our approach particu-
larly allows for general ways of associating authorization policies with the data of
the identity relationship or selected parts of it as explained in earlier work [Som11].
4.7.2.1 Formulae for Specifying Identities
The key element of an identity relationship is an identity which is described by
the identity relationship and also referred to as base identity. This is the identity
comprising the attributes the identity relationship is about—additional identities,
typically one, may be used by a party to specify the certifier of the base identity. A
formula φ ∈ Lidy/r, henceforth denoted as identity specification formula, expresses
the identity data of the base identity c and its in-formula metadata in an integrated
way through our data representation approach. Thereby, it specifies exactly the data
that the certifier of the identity relationship vouches for and specifies the certifier
of the base identity. The permitted syntax for Lidy/r is governed by the protocol
underlying the identity relationship—our discussion will cover private certificate
systems.
We specify the language Lidy/r informally as a fragment of Lg comprising only ∧-
connected predicates. A formula φ in Lidy/r specifies the holder and subject through
a predicate each, relating the holder and subject attributes with a corresponding
contant term through the =-relation. The certifier attribute is related through
the =-symbol to a constant term referring to the certifier of the base identity. No
further predicates for specifying the certifier are required—it is specified outside
of the identity specification formula. The type and protocol attributes are related
to constants through Eq predicates. For specifying the user attributes of φ, the
formula expresses Eq predicates over attributes of the base identity, relating them
with constants or—for the extension of restrictions as explained below—variables,
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which is the only permitted use of variables here. Lidy/r is a fragment of the language
Lidy introduced in Sec. 5.3.
Certifier specification. In addition to a formula φ, the party holds—or obtains in
a sub-protocol or protocol preceding that for establishing the identity relationship—
another formula φ̂ that specifies the certifier of the base identity by making state-
ments about a certifier identity cid. The certifier identity is associated with the base
identity as explained in Sec. 4.4.10 through a term of type pty being used as value of
the certifier attribute of the base identity and subject attribute of the corresponding
certifier identity. The formula φ̂ is stored by the party as part of an entry of the
party’s profile data, flagged as certifier data related to the certifier of one of the
party’s identities. The subject of the certifier’s identity is the certifier of the base
identity. When multiple identities of identity relationships have the same party as
their certifier referred to through the same subject term and specified through the
same certifier identity, the certifier formula for the certifier needs to be specified
only once in the profile data of the party as it always describes the same identity of
the same certifier. The profile data entry based on the certifier’s identity cid results
from the certifier having an identity relationship with cid corresponding to a public
key certificate. See Sec. 4.8 for further details on how certification of keys based
on traditional RSA [RSA78, RSA83], DSA [Nat09], or other technologies is mod-
eled. Note that φ̂ can also make statements about an identifier object, or multiple
identities or identifier objects of the certifier in a more generic way.
In the most prominent case of an identified certifier that acts under a public
pseudonym, the formula φ̂ comprises identifying attribute statements about one
certifier’s identifier object or identity or both and the subject term for referring to
the certifier is a publicly used term corresponding to its public pseudonym used by
all parties for referring to this certifier. For the less prominent case of the certifier
remaining pseudonymous, it can appear under a pseudonym and attribute statement
to which its credential verification public key is bound.
Multiple data formulae and restrictions. Multiple formulae φ1, . . . , φl can be
associated with the same identity relationship idy. One formula, denoted as the core
formula and tagged through the metadata predicate 3(“coreFormula”, true) as such,
must specify precisely what the certifier vouches for. Let, without loss of generality,
be φ1 the core formula. Additional formulae may be used to specify a fragment of
the data of the identity relationship, that is, a fragment of the data the certifier
vouches for. This can be used for associating a different authorization policy with
such fragment [Som11]. Each of the other formulae must be derivable from the core
formula in the logic calculus, that is, it must hold for all φi that φ1 `φi for 2 ≤ i ≤ l.
A use case for this is that the core formula specifies a value for a specific attribute
of the identity while an additional formula φ2 specifies one or more predicates over
the attribute. Then, a restrictive authorization policy can be associated for the
release of the attribute value in φ1 while a less restrictive authorization policy can
be defined on the predicates over the attribute in φ2, e.g., for responding to age
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verification requests. We next introduce the concept of restrictions for more pow-
erful association of authorization policies governing the release of data based on an
example. Restrictions are an extension to our system and require a more complex
language for specifying identity specification formulae due to the use of variables.
Example 4.23 (Multiple formulae and restrictions) With this example we
show the use of an additional formula of an identity relationship and introduce the
concept of a restriction. Let the formula φ2 define a predicate on the attribute
monthlySalary of the salary statement identity b expressing that the attribute be
greater than or equal to the variable Lowerbound. Let furthermore the restriction
ρφ2 on φ2 specify predicates on the range of this variable.
φ2 =Geq(b.monthlySalary , Lowerbound)
ρφ2 =Leq(2500, Lowerbound) ∧ Leq(Lowerbound, 4000)
The above example formula φ2 and its restriction ρφ2 define that the salary attribute
of the identity be greater than or equal to the variable Lowerbound, where the latter
ranges—specified through the restriction ρφ2—from 2500 to 4000, both inclusive. A
different, e.g., less restrictive authorization policy than the one on the core formula
φ1, as φ1 specifies a concrete value for the attribute monthlySalary , can be defined
on the formula φ2, because it reveals only a predicate over the attribute and thus
much less information.
Matching formula φ2 with its restriction against a data request using reasoning
in our logic needs to consider the formula φ2 as well as its associated restriction
formula ρφ2 . Both need to be true under the chosen assignment of the variable
Lowerbound and considered in the choice of values in the matching algorithm. The
restriction never becomes part of the response to a data request, but is only used
for finding suitable responses.
Example 4.24 (Multiple formulae) As a special case of the previous example,
the following formula specifies the release of partial information on the attribute
using a constant reference value and without the flexibility of using a restriction.
Again, authorization policies governing the release of this predicate in negotiation
interactions can be associated with the predicate, see Sommer [Som11] for details.
φ3 =Geq(b.salary , 3000)
The approach of specifying ranges to be revealed fits well into our formalism for
data representation without the need of extensions. Authorization policies and data
handling policies can be associated with each formula φ of the identity relationship
as well as their predicates.
In addition to ranges over the integers as explained above or other attributes over
totally ordered sets, a use case for multiple formulae in identity relationships is that
the country of residence attribute of an electronic identity credential be released to
be in the set of all EU and EFTA member states without restrictions on the use of it.
For use cases, though, where the value of the country of residence is to be revealed, a
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stricter authorization policy or data handling policy may be required to be enforced,
e.g., the potential recipient would need to prove, in a negotiation protocol, that it
holds a certification by one of a set of data protection organizations of applying
a minimum standard regarding its privacy practices. Note that set membership
a ∈ S = {a1, . . . , al} can be expressed by a disjunction Eq(a, a1)∨ . . .∨Eq(a, al) for
all a ∈ S in our first-order logic.
4.7.2.2 Metadata
An identity relationship and its formulae require metadata to be associated with
them in order to be utilized for releasing data in interactions with other parties
through instances of the RelData protocol. We give an overview of the most impor-
tant metadata of identity relationships and its formulae next.
The metadata comprises cryptographic material, such as private certificates or
public keys, in case they are stored directly within the identity relationship. We
also need a metadata predicate that specifies whether an identity relationship is
one the party is holder of or whether it is one the party vouches for. If we do not
specify this explicitly in this work, we assume that it is clear from the context.
Another predicate expresses whether the identity relationship is still active or has
been deactivated, e.g., because it has expired, been revoked, or been superseded due
to a change of attribute data. The core formula of the identity relationship is flagged
through a metadata predicate as such. The metadata must express everything that
is (technically) needed for the identity relationship to be utilized in interactions for
releasing data and that is not contained yet in the data formula. For an identity
relationship based on a private certificate, this particularly comprises the certificate
structure, a technical specification of the internals of private certificates of a specific
type. We present the notation for metadata through metadata predicates in Sec. 5.2.
4.7.3 Data Track
The data track Rtrck of a party models data statements that have been released
by the party to other parties as well as associated metadata. The idea is that each
release of identity-related information that the party’s system is aware of is recorded
in the data track. Of our interest are particularly all release transactions through
instances of the RelData protocol.
A party’s data track Rtrck is a set of tuples, denoted data track entries or data
track records, where each tuple trck comprises an element ̂trck and a set of metadata
predicates on this element. Each such element ̂trck comprises a set of tuples ˜trck
of the form (ϕtrckk , {3ϕtrckk ,l}) of a formula ϕtrckk expressed in a technology-dependent
fragment of Lp/g and a set of metadata predicates associated with the formula.
A single data track record trck comprises data related to a single recipient.
Multiple data releases by the party within a single session and even within multiple
sessions with the same recipient can be captured by one record. Formulae in one
data track record can refer to multiple subjects, e.g., the party, delegaters, and
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certifiers, though, and each record is associated with the main subject the data is
about.
A formula represents a data statement that has been released to, through an
instance of the protocol RelData, or obtained by another party, expressed in Lp/g.
Metadata can be expressed, like for other kinds of data, on the data track record as
well as on each formula of a record in order to store relevant information.
4.7.3.1 Data Formula
Each formula of a data track record is a formula that has been previously released
to or otherwise obtained by another party that has been captured in the data track
after the data release interaction. The formula contains the identity data as well as
metadata sent to the other party.
The formula stored as part of a data track entry is that after applying the term
renaming to the formula the party has derived from its portfolio as explained in
detail in Sec. 4.8. That is, exactly the formula as released to the other party gets
stored. This immediately shows linkabilities that are explicitly established through
the used terms between different interactions with the other party or other parties.
As the mapping between local and released terms for the formula is available to
the party, it can always obtain the terms it uses itself for addressing parties and
objects.
4.7.3.2 Metadata
Metadata on a data track element ̂trck comprises a term specifying the recipient of
the data, that is, the party whom the record is associated with. The convention for
the choice of an identifier of the recipient is the subject term of the party the formula
has been released to. For each such subject there exists a profile data record with
the same identifier which may contain information about the other party data has
been released to, unless in the case that data has been released to a party that has
not provided any data about itself.28
The subject of the released data is already represented in the formula specifying
the data and is, for faster access, also stored as a metadata predicate. Note that
the subject is often the party itself, but can (additionally) be another party in case
the party releases data about other parties, e.g., delegaters, as may be the case for
a service provider who releases data of their customers to a business partner or a
user who acts for another party under a delegation relationship.
Metadata predicates expressed on each data formula of the data track record
comprise the following: the data handling policy under which the data has been
released (through its identifier or copy of the policy), identity and identifier rela-
tionships and profiles that the data statement is based on, expressed as references
28This case is prominent for a service provider who releases data about itself to anonymous
users who have not (yet) provided data about themselves. For commercial service providers it is
practically not interesting to track to whom data about their legal identity has been released to.
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to those and their formulae, the date and time of release, the subject of the re-
leased data, the proof used in the data exchange protocol, annotations by the party
(e.g., the user), the session identifier, and further metadata required for bookkeep-
ing. Particularly important metadata are the cryptographic objects corresponding
to the opaque and conditionally released identities generated in the instance of the
protocol for releasing data.
Relating a formula in the data track to the data handling policy it has been
released under allows the party to later assess in an interaction with the other party
the enforcement state of the data handling policy and, in case of issues, take further
actions.29 Annotations by the user may comprise comments, e.g., to distinguish
multiple partial identities she has with the other party. Work on those aspects of
user-centric identity management have been done within the PRIME project [PRI08,
CLS11]. In the current work, we integrate those aspects tightly with the privacy-
enhanced authentication mechanism and formalism for data representation.
4.7.4 Profile Data
The profile data Rpro of a party comprises a set of tuples, each comprising a profile
record, and a set of metadata predicates of the form (˜proi ,3˜proi ,j}). A profile record
˜proi is a set of tuples (ϕ
pro
k , {3ϕprok ,l}), each comprising a formula and a set of metadata
predicates. Note that this structure is the same as the structure of the other kinds
of data. A term referring to the subject for the party a record ˜proi applies to is
associated with the record through a metadata predicate.
Whenever a party obtains data about another party, e.g., by receiving them
from the other party, from third parties, or through any other means, those data
are stored in the profile record about the other party, thereby creating an identity
profile of the other party. A user creates a profile for each service provider she inter-
acts with to store the information she has obtained about the service provider. As
is done for all classes of data, such data are expressed through formulae. This is at
least the information stored in the service provider’s public key certificate, such as its
distinguished name, country, and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the service.
During a negotiation, the user may obtain further data, e.g., about the reputation,
assurance mechanisms, or trust assessment of the service provider [CLS11]. A ser-
vice provider creates, for such interaction, a profile data entry for each customer
it interacts with comprising the data received. When a customer uses transaction
pseudonyms, each time a new profile data entry is created about it by the service
provider. This approach reflects exactly the use of pseudonyms by a party.
A crucial class of profile data entries are those related to certifiers of identity
relationships the party is holder of and are, as explained earlier, flagged as such
entries. Those entries are required for the matching of a party’s portfolio against a
policy.
Profile data needs to, regardless of its potential of identifying the provider of the
data, be handled according to the data handling policies agreed with the provider.
29One can think of an electronic assistant for filing a complaint with the data protection authority
responsible for the data processing.
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Following European data protection legislation, users do not need to enforce any
policy on identity data received from a service provider as this is considered a
so-called household activity, the case of data received from (about) other users is
different and may impose the legal responsibility of being data controller on a user.
4.7.4.1 Data Formula
The identity data of profile entries is represented through formulae expressed in our
data model. Valid formulae are those that comply with the syntax of a fragment of
the data statement language Lp/g corresponding to the employed (cryptographic)
mechanism for releasing (certified) data.
4.7.4.2 Metadata
One metadata predicate on a profile record is the subject term of the party the
profile is about. All formulae received from or about the other party under the
same subject term can be stored under the same profile record.
For a formula, the following are examples of metadata items to be stored: date
and time of reception of the data, party identifier whom the data have been received
from, protocol transcript of the data release protocol including all cryptographic
tokens, and other metadata required for bookkeeping. An important metadata
predicate is the one indicating whether the party the entry is about is a certifier of
an identity of an identity relationship of the party as previously discussed. Based
on this, a subset of entries is retrieved for matching the party’s repository against
a policy as explained in Sec. 5.4.
4.7.4.3 Use
Profile data has multiple uses in our architecture. When evaluating an access request
to a resource of the party, profile data of the other party may be used to supply data
for the authorization decision in addition to the data obtained within the ongoing
transaction. This is possible only in case the other party is already known under at
least a subject term. When a user browses her data track, parts of the profile data
of the data recipients can be mapped into the view the user is presented with in
order to provide an enhanced user experience when assessing her releases of data.
For a user’s legal right under European legislation of access to data [Eur95], her
profile about the other party specifies relevant information on how to access data
at the other party, for example, the URL under which this service is provided.
4.7.5 Implementation
An implementation of the repository (and portfolio) can be done following stan-
dards, e.g., through a (relational) database. It is crucial that frequently used search
and retrieval operations be realized sufficiently fast, e.g., through indexing or index
relations. Our system is agnostic to the concrete technology employed for imple-
menting the repository.
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4.8 Applying the Data Model
We next present an overview on how to apply the data representation language for
two main purposes: (1) establishing identifier and identity relationships of a party
and establishing the local representation of corresponding specification formulae,
and (2) representing formulae to be released to data recipient parties, that is, data
statements, based on those identifier relationships and identity relationships. We
note that formulae derived in the logic calculus from formulae released to a party
through cryptographic protocols can be less constrained than data statements.
In this section, we first cover aspects related to (1) in Sec. 4.8.1 and aspects
related to (2) in Sec. 4.8.2 in detail for pseudonym and credential protocols and
thereafter give a brief account of those aspects for the simpler setting of conventional
certificates based on RSA, DSA, ECDSA, or other conventional signature algorithms
in Sec. 4.8.3.
4.8.1 Establishing Objects and their Local Representations
A party needs to represent its identifier and identity relationships locally, particu-
larly the formulae specifying the underlying identifier objects and identities.30
Note that, for the below discussions, there is a one-to-one correspondance be-
tween identifier objects and identifier relationships, and identities and identity rela-
tionships and we often use the corresponding terms interchangeably.
4.8.1.1 Identifier Objects
Recall that an identifier object pi and its object specification formula φi is estab-
lished as the core part of an identifier relationship idfi of the party with another party.
An identifier object is created through the protocol EstIdtfRel or EstIdtfRelReg for
establishing an identifier relationship and is discussed in Chapter 5. In the setting
of private certificate protocols, an identifier object is technically realized through a
corresponding cryptographic pseudonym.
We need to differentiate between registration identifier objects and non-registra-
tion identifier objects and the corresponding identifier relationships in one dimen-
sion, and whether the identifier is established for a party itself or a delegatee in the
other dimension, resulting in four cases in total. Those cases expose differences in
terms of the terms of the logic used for referring to the holder and subject attributes
of the established objects in the object specification formulae local to the party and
the term renaming between local representation and use of terms in data statements
to be disclosed.
During the establishment protocol for an identifier object, the holder , subject ,
and subjectId terms for the identifier object are created based on the underlying
(cryptographic) protocol, though, may be renamed to different terms used in the
30Note that conditionally released identities and opaque identities need to be represented as well
in our system, though, are of less interest in the current context because their attributes are not
related to holder and subject terms.
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specification formula for the created object locally to facilitate deductions in the
logic, depending on the case. When using the object in a data statement to be
released, the terms may be renamed back to the ones created for the particular
object.
Registration identifier object. A establishes a registration identifier object
pA,Ci,`r with itself being the subject and holder with party Ci to perform the first
step of a registration in the system. pA,Ci,`r is part of the identifier relationship
idfA,Ci,`r with object specification formula φA,Ci,`r specifying pA,Ci,`r . The term
tA,Ci,`r is generated through the protocol for referring to the holder and subject of
the identifier object. This term is used in the local data representation for specifying
the subject and holder of pA,Ci,`r in φA,Ci,`r , as well as when making statements
about the subject and holder towards Ci.
31 The term mapping function %idfpA,Ci,`r
is
the empty function.
Each registration identifier object pA,Ci,`r induces a registration domain referred-
to as RpA,Ci,`r . A registration domain comprises all identifier objects and identities
which are associated with the same party A holding pA,Ci,`r and in the party’s local
object specification formulae the holder is referred to with the same term tA,Ci,`r .
For objects with the party A as subject, also the subject is referred to with this
term. Using credential protocols, each such registration domain corresponds exactly
to a private key domain of the party—see Sec. 5.6. Two registration domains can
be bridged in the semantics of the data model by adding the relation ti = tj to the
party’s portfolio, where the terms ti and tj are the terms used for referring to the
party in the two domains. This bridging has the semantics that both (different)
terms in the relation refer to the same party.
Derived identifier object. A establishes a non-registration, or derived, identifier
object pA,C′j ,`o with itself being the subject and holder with party C
′
j . The object
is established with respect to a registration domain RpA,Ci,`r . The object pA,C′j ,`o
is part of the identifier relationship idfA,C′j ,`o
with specification formula φA,C′j ,`o .
For such non-registration, or derived, identifier object, the term for its holder and
subject attribute values used locally in φA,C′j ,`o and data statements before term
renaming is tA,Ci,`r , the term used in data statement formulae to be released to C
′
j
for both functions is th,sA,C′j ,`o
, generated as part of the establishment protocol of the
object. The terms used in data statements after term renaming are different to the
corresponding terms of the registration identifier object in the registration domain
of which pA,C′j ,`o is contained. The term mapping function %
idf
pA,C′
j
,`o
corresponding
to pA,C′j ,`o expresses the mapping between A’s local representation and the terms
to be used in communication with other parties.
31Those terms are not released in data statements to any other party than Ci, except for as
values of the subjectIdWithCertifier attribute of identities.
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Delegation registration identifier object. A establishes a delegation registra-
tion identifier object pA,C∗k,`d with itself being the holder and a delegater D being
the subject with a delegation certifier C∗k. The object is established with respect to
a registration domain RpA,Ci,`r of A. pA,C∗k,`d is part of the identifier relationship
idfA,C∗k,`d
with specification formula φA,C∗k,`d . Such identifier object is established by
a delegatee A with a delegation certifier C∗k before establishing a delegated identity
with party D as the subject. The terms used locally for the holder and subject in
φA,C∗k,`d and data statements before term renaming are tA,Ci,`r and t
s
A,C∗k,`d
, respec-
tively. The latter is used to refer to D in the local data representation of A. The
terms used when making statements about the object towards C∗k are t
h
A,C∗k,`d
and
tsA,C∗k,`d
, respectively.32 Both those terms are created during the establishment of
the identifier object. The mapping function %idfpA,C∗
k
,`d
specifies the mapping between
the local terms used by A and terms to be used with other parties.
A delegation registration identifier object pA,C∗k,`d induces a delegation registra-
tion domain RDpA,C∗
k
,`d
, analogous to a registration domain. The domain comprises
pA,C∗k,`d and all delegation identifier objects and delegation identities established
with D being the subject, and being referred to by A locally through tsA,C∗k,`d
.
Delegation identifier object. A establishes a delegation identifier object de-
noted as pA,D,B,`b with itself being the holder and the delegater D being the sub-
ject with party B. The object is established with respect to a registration domain
RpA,Ci,`r of A and a delegation registration domain RDpA,C∗
k
,`d
of A about delegater
D. pA,D,B,`b is part of the identifier relationship 
idf
A,D,B,`b
with specification formula
φA,D,B,`b . The holder and subject terms used locally are tA,Ci,`r and t
s
A,C∗k,`d
, the
terms used in data statements are the terms thA,D,B,`b and t
s
A,D,B,`b
, respectively,
created together with the identifier object. The renaming function %idfpA,D,B,`b
spec-
ifies the mapping between A’s locally used terms and those used with remotely
parties.
Discussion. For the local representation, a party always uses, as holder and sub-
ject terms for its identifier objects and identities, the terms created when establishing
the registration identifier object in the registration domain of which those identifier
objects and identities are contained in. For underlying cryptographic objects cre-
ated through private certificate protocols, this means that the same user private key
that is created for the establishment of the cryptographic pseudonym underlying
the registration identifier object is used for the cryptographic pseudonyms underly-
ing the identifier objects and the private certificates underlying the identities in the
same registration domain.
For an identifier object that a party establishes having another party (delegater)
as the subject, analogous cases of registration and non-registration identifier objects
32Note that, analogous to a registration identifier, ts
A,C∗
k
,`d
is only used towards C∗k.
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apply as for identifier objects with the party itself being the subject. Creating a
delegation registration identifier object is done by A for establishing an identifier
relation with a delegation certifier C∗k.
33 The holder term is handled as in the case
of identifier objects with the party itself being the subject, while the subject term is
handled analogously. The subject term is different to the holder term and refers to
the delegater. For a delegation identifier object, the subject term is created during
the establishment of the object and renamed, for local representation, to the subject
term generated in the protocol for establishing the delegation registration identifier
object in the delegation registration domain of which the newly generated object
resides. This again implements the idea of using the same term for the subject
throughout the registration domain locally, analogous to identifier objects with the
party as subject.
Note that the subject identifier subjectId :: idf of any identifier object is never
renamed to other terms, because it is the fixed pseudonym corresponding to the
identifier object. Also, the term p for referring to the identifier object itself is, by
convention, not renamed when using it, because the purpose of an identifier object
is to establish linkability between the transaction of its establishment and all of the
transactions in which it is referred. Both this holds for all kinds of identifier objects
discussed above.
Once established, an identifier relationship and its identifier object can be used
for proving holdership of the object, i.e., the underlying pseudonym, to any of the
parties it has been established with, as part of a data release protocol. The subject
and holder terms of the identifier object can be used also as subject and holder
terms for identities referred to in the same formula to be released.
Derived and delegation identifier objects can have the property of being domain
identifier objects, that is, A can only establish a single identifier object with each
data recipient for one domain string.
4.8.1.2 Identities
An identity relationship idyi comprises, as its core part, an object specification for-
mula ϕidyi specifying an identity ci. It is established through the protocol discussed
in Chapter 5. An identity relationship is established with respect to identifier ob-
jects which specify its holder and subject. An established identity relationship is
used for releasing data specified through its associated object specification formula
to another party.
Registration identity. A party A can obtain a registration identity cA,Ci,ˆ`r with
itself as holder and subject from a registration certifier Ci part of the registration
domain of a registration identifier object pA,Ci,`r . The subject and holder term used
to refer to A as the holder and subject of the identity locally is tA,Ci,`r related to
the registration identifier object pA,Ci,`r . The identity corresponds to an identity
33For our protocols based on credential systems, this delegation registration identifier object
corresponds to a new private delegation key of A.
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relationship idy
A,Ci,ˆ`r
with its specification formula φA,Ci,ˆ`r specifying cA,Ci,ˆ`r . The
identity is part of the registration domain RpA,Ci,`r .
Non-registration identity. A party A can obtain a non-registration identity, or
derived identity, cA,C′j ,ˆ`o
with itself as holder and subject from a certifier C′j with
respect to a derived identifier object pA,C′j ,`o part of RpA,Ci,`r . The subject and
holder term used to refer to A as the holder and subject of the identity locally is
tA,Ci,`r as for the registration identity pA,Ci,`r . The identity cA,C′j ,ˆ`o
corresponds
to an identity relationship idy
A,C′j ,ˆ`o
with its specification formula φA,C′j ,ˆ`o
specifying
cA,C′j ,ˆ`o
. The identity is also part of the registration domain RpA,Ci,`r .
Delegation identity. A party A can obtain a delegation identity cA,C∗k,ˆ`d
with
itself as holder and a delegater D as subject from a certifier C∗k with respect to a
registration or derived identifier object of A that is part of RpA,Ci,`r specifying the
holder and a delegation registration identifier object pA,C∗k,`d ∈ RpA,C∗k,`d determin-
ing the subject D of the identity. The term used to refer to A as the holder of the
identity locally is tA,Ci,`r as for the registration or derived identifier object, and the
subject term for specifying the delegater D is tsA,C∗k,`d
. The identity cA,C∗k,ˆ`d
is part
of the registration domain RpA,Ci,`r and delegation registration domain RpA,C∗k,`d ,
that is, the domains the identifier objects it is based on are part of. The iden-
tity corresponds to identity relationship idy
A,C∗k,ˆ`d
with object specification formula
φA,C∗k,ˆ`d
.
Discussion. To summarize, the subject and holder attributes used in a formula
specifying an identity relationship in a party’s portfolio are those of the formulae
specifying the identifier objects to which the identity relationship is associated,
that is, those which specify its holder and subject. This approach ensures that the
holder and subject terms used in the local formula for specifying the identity are the
ones used for the registration domains of the registration or delegation registration
identifier objects for the holder and the subject, respectively.
The underlying approach that a party always uses the holder and subject terms
created with registration or delegation registration identifier objects as the ones
to express the holder and subject of other identifier objects and identities in the
registration domain is crucial for the utility of the resulting system in terms of
being required for the automated deduction system being able to establish accord-
ing relations between different objects. The term renaming for obtaining the local
representation of formulae in a party’s identifier and identity relationships allows
for certain functionality with respect to the reasoning over formulae in our logic
calculus, e.g., for determining fulfilling formulae for a non-trivial data request. In
other words, this enables the party to use syntactic derivations over our calculus to
derive, from a party’s formulae in its repository, formulae that can be proven with
cryptographic credential protocols.
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If the term renaming were not followed and different, even though valid, terms
were used by the party to refer to the subject and holder of its identity relationships,
this would lead to a situation where either fewer statements that are satisfied can be
derived through reasoning over portfolio formulae and thus fewer policies could be
fulfilled, or derivable statements could not be proven with the underlying protocols.
Though, the semantics in such case were correct as it models the actual situation
and not the limitations of the (cryptographic) methods used to implement identity
relationships. Particularly, the term (re)naming realizes that the policy matching
process works for private certificate schemes for proving that the holder or subject
of multiple identities backed by private certificates are the same party.
Each protocol instance for establishing an identifier object or identity estab-
lishes a corresponding identifier relationship or identity relationship, together with
a corresponding object specification formula.
4.8.2 Data Release
When a party A intends to release a data statement φ′ to another party B, it
constructs such statement based on the formulae φ1, . . . , φk of a subset of size k of
its identifier and identity relationships as well as conditionally released and opaque
identities. Each φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k corresponds precisely to one such cryptographic object
oi. A formula φ
′ of a fragment of Lp/g comprises predicates expressed over identifier
objects, identities, conditionally released identities, and opaque identities, connected
through the connectives of the logic. Note that we simplify notation with respect
to the indices used for elements we refer to, in contrast to the notation of Sec. 4.8.1
above.
The formula φ′ is typically constructed by A to fulfill a data request ψ of a data
recipient, or relying party, B. Thereby, A uses at least one registration or derived
identifier object as identifier for itself, and delegation registration or delegation
identifier object as identifier for a delegater in case of making statements about
such party. Statements about multiple delegaters can be made, though this is of
less practical interest. Registration identities and derived identities are used for
making attribute statements about A itself, while delegation identities are used to
make attribute statements about delegaters. How all those objects relate to each
other has been sufficiently discussed further above and applies here as well due to φ′
being derived syntactically from the formulae φi in our logic calculus L as introduced
in Sec. 4.9.2.
We require that for each registration domain of A, of which objects are referred
in φ′, at least one identifier object of the same domain be referred to in φ′, and
that for each delegation registration domain from which cryptographic objects are
referred in φ′, at least one delegation identifier object from this domain be referred
in φ′. This establishes the convention that each subject and holder term used for
referring to parties in the formula is introduced through an identifier object in the
identifier object introduction sub-formula of φ. This is not a limiting assumption
as additional pseudonyms can be generated automatically as part of the process of
computing a formula fulfilling a policy expressed in the fragment of Lr/g of Sec. 4.6.
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For each identifier object pi, we additionally require that its corresponding object
specification formula φi only be part of φ1, . . . , φk if pi has been established with
the intended recipient B of φ′. Whether this holds can be determined through
metadata, because the recipient is not part of the logic-based formal data model.
As another constraint, a formula φ′ always refers to the holder and subject at-
tributes through constant terms and does not relate those attributes otherwise, that
is, through equality relations without revealing them. This unifies the processing of
those formulae when run-time generating the underlying cryptographic credential
protocols, and there is no need to hide those terms from the other party as they
represent identifiers revealed as part of the establishment of the identifier objects
they originate from.
The data statement φ′ uses, when being constructed by A, only the terms re-
ferred to in the object specification formulae φ1, . . . , φk represented locally in A’s
repository that specify the objects referred to in φ′. Construction of φ′ from the
formulae φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k requires that parts of the formulae φi be taken over into φ′,
or parts of φ′ be logically inferred from (parts of) the formulae φi.
Party A releases a formula φ constructed from φ′ to party B, where the terms
used for specifying the holder and subject may differ between φ′ and φ. That is,
the formulae φi held by party A as part of its identity and identifier relationships
and the formula φ to be generated from those can use different terms for referring
to certain attributes or objects. This holds for both the identifier objects as well as
the identities referred to in the formula. The transformation from a formula φ′ to a
formula φ that can be revealed comprises two steps, (1) a transformation related to
the holder and subject terms, and (2) a replacement of terms referring to identities,
opaque identities, and conditionally released identities.
4.8.2.1 Holder and Subject Term Transformation
The replacement of holder and subject terms in φ′ is a first transformation step
executed on φ′ for obtaining φ. The basic idea is that holder and subject terms used
locally by A are replaced with terms associated with identifier objects as computed
during their establishment based on the (cryptographic) protocols. In addition to
such replacements, certain logical equality relations on renamed terms need to be
introduced to make the result φ logically equivalent to φ′.
The need for this replacement of terms arises from the approach of using, for
all identifier objects, their associated subject and holder terms as defined through
the underlying cryptographic object in data statements because correctness of those
can be verified through the cryptographic protocol for releasing data. See Sec. 5.4.6
for details on how a formula φ is derived from (a subset of) the party’s repository
formulae φi.
We next formalize the renaming of the terms for a formula φ′ in a general setting
of the formula referring to multiple identifier objects with subjects being A or ad-
ditionally multiple delegaters, where the objects may be from different registration
domains or delegation registration domains. Note that we use, w.l.o.g., simplified
indexing of entities compared to the discussion above on their establishment.
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This term transformation is performed before computation of the cryptographic
protocol to ensure that both prover and verifier use equivalent input formulae based
on which to execute their respective cryptographic protocol for computing the to-
be-generated cryptographic objects and proving the formula correct and verifying
the created proof against the formula.
The formulae Φ̂ = {φ1, . . . , φk} specify their corresponding identifier objects and
identities and are part of corresponding identifier and identity relationships. The
terms used for referring to their holders and subjects are those as discussed in detail
further above. Let, without loss of generality, Φ = {φ1, . . . , φβ} be object specifica-
tion formulae specifying the corresponding identifier objects Q′ = {p1, . . . , pβ}. Let
E be an equivalence relation on Φ such that for (φi, φj), with i 6= j, it holds that
(φi, φj) ∈ E if and only if φi contains the predicate pi.holder = t and φj contains
the predicate pj .holder = t for a constant term t. Let, w.l.o.g. due to simplified
indexing, the partition on Φ induced by the relation E comprise the equivalence
classes Φ1, . . . ,Φ` with Φ1 = {φ1, . . . , φξ1}, where 1 ≤ ξ1 ≤ β, and, if ` > 1, for
1 < γ ≤ `, Φγ = {φξγ−1+1, . . . , φξγ}, where ξγ−1 < ξγ and 1 < ξγ ≤ β.
An equivalence class Φγ corresponds to the identifier objects with their holder
being represented through the same term in the formula φ′, that is, identifier objects
part of the same registration domain.
For each equivalence class Φγ for 1 ≤ γ ≤ `, let E′γ be an equivalence relation
on Φγ such that for all (φi, φj) ∈ Φγ , with i 6= j, (φi, φj) ∈ E′γ if and only if
φi contains the predicate pi.subject = t and φj the predicate pj .subject = t for a
constant term t, inducing, w.l.o.g. due to using an indexing scheme renaming the
indexes to include the equivalence class identifier γ and using simplified indexing
within the class analogous to above, a partition on Φγ with the equivalence classes
Φγ,1, . . . ,Φγ,`′γ as follows: Φγ,1 = {φγ,ξγ−1+1, . . . , φγ,ξˆ1} with ξγ−1 + 1 ≤ ξˆ1 ≤ ξγ
and ξ0 = 0 and, if `
′
γ > 1, Φγ,ηγ = {φγ,ξˆηγ−1+1, . . . , φγ,ξˆηγ } with ξˆγ,ηγ−1 < ξˆγ,ηγ for
1 < ηγ ≤ `′γ .
Each equivalence class Φγ,ηγ corresponds to identifier objects specified through
formulae φα having the same party as their subject, referred-to through the same
term tsα. Let t
h
α be the holder term specified for the holder of pα in φα and t
s
α the
subject term.
Let, w.l.o.g., Φγ,1 be the equivalence class of the partition induced by E
′
γ where
each identifier object has equal holder and subject terms, that is, both are referring
to party A. The other classes Φγ,ηγ for 1 < ηγ ≤ `′γ have formulae specifying
identifier objects with delegaters as subjects as elements. The renaming proceeds as
follows, with first choosing the identifier object corresponding to one of the formulae
of Φγ,1, through following a well-defined procedure, e.g., choosing the first one being
referred-to in φ′. Let, w.l.o.g., this identifier object be denoted as pγ,1,1 and its
holder and subject be thγ,1,1.
Next, we explain the required steps to be performed on φ′ for obtaining φ.
Replace all occurrences of thγ,1,1 in φ
′ with the term t
′h
γ,1,1 := %
idf
γ,1,1
(
thγ,1,1
)
resulting
from applying the renaming function %idfγ,1,1 for pγ,1,1 on t
h
γ,1,1, except for in logical
equality predicates expressed on the subject or holder attribute of other identifier
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objects than pγ,1,1. For each of the other identifier objects pγ,1,δ of Φγ,1, replace
its holder and subject in equality relations with the term obtained from evaluating
the renaming function %idfγ,1,δ of pγ,1,δ on the respective term resulting in t
′h
γ,1,δ and
introduce the object equality relation t
′h
γ,1,1 = t
′h
γ,1,δ. The equality relation ensures
that the party equality semantics expressed in φ′ through using the same term
remains specified in φ after the renaming.
For each equivalence class Φγ,ηγ other than Φγ,1, perform the following process-
ing: Choose, through a well-defined procedure, one of the identifier objects of Φγ,ηγ ,
and let, w.l.o.g., this be pγ,ηγ ,1. Replace all instances of t
s
γ,ηγ ,1 in φ
′ with the term
t
′s
γ,ηγ ,1 := %
idf
γ,ηγ ,1
(
tsγ,ηγ ,1
)
obtained through evaluating the renaming function cor-
responding to pγ,ηγ ,1 on the term, except for in logical equality relations expressed
on the subject or holder attribute of other identifier objects than pγ,ηγ ,1. Replace
thγ,ηγ ,1 with the corresponding term given by the renaming function. Replace, for
each identifier object pγ,ηγ ,δ of Φγ,ηγ other than pγ,ηγ ,1, its holder term t
h
γ,ηγ ,δ
with
the term t
′h
γ,ηγ ,δ
resulting from the application of renaming function of pγ,ηγ ,δ and
the subject tsγ,ηγ ,δ with the term t
′s
γ,ηγ ,δ
obtained through application of the renam-
ing function. Next, add the logical equality thγ,ηγ ,1 = t
h
γ,ηγ ,δ
for the holder and
logical equality relation tsγ,ηγ ,1 = t
s
γ,ηγ ,δ
for the subject to retain the party equality
semantics of φ′ in φ. Finally, the equality relation t
′h
γ,ηγ ,1 = t
′h
γ,1,1 is introduced for
linking the terms corresponding to different equivalence classes.
After each equivalence class Φγ,ηγ has been processed following the explained ap-
proach, the obtained formula φ is logically equivalent to φ′. What we have achieved
is that term names are used in compliance with the constraint expressed earlier of
being cryptographically verifiable based on the underlying cryptographic objects,
that is, as defined through the renaming function of the corresponding identifier ob-
ject. This is a strong property we achieve, while at the same time having identifiers
locally that allow parties to process their portfolio formulae.
Particularly, each logical equality relation expressed on the holder or subject
terms t
′h
γ,·,· and t
′h
γ′,·,· or t
′s
γ,1,· and t
′s
γ′,1,· of identifier objects of different equivalence
classes for bridging registration domains is properly handled by the term renaming
and expresses the domain bridging using the terms of the obtained formula.
This concludes the formal specification of the term renaming for the terms re-
ferring to the subject and holder of objects. In Sec. 5.4.2, we present the term
renaming for a less generic common case for pseudonym and credential protocols in
detail.
4.8.2.2 Object Term Replacement
Similarly, the terms used to refer to the identities themselves may differ between
local representation and use. This is crucial for the unlinkability properties and
explained in detail in Chapter 5. To summarize, each identity term is substituted
with a term derived from the cryptographic protocol for proving holdership of the
underlying cryptographic object. That is, this renaming step can only be executed
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once (part of) the cryptographic protocol has been computed by A.
Similarly, terms referring to opaque and conditionally released identities gener-
ated in the protocol are replaced with terms derived from the respective generated
cryptographic objects. This is required in order to replace the temporary terms
having been introduced for referring to those objects before their underlying cryp-
tographic objects have been generated.
4.8.2.3 Discussion
A formula φ to be released is obtained from A’s internal representation φ′ thereof,
as discussed, through a renaming of the terms of the holder and subject attributes
as well as the identities and conditionally released and opaque identities. This
is done as part of the protocol for releasing data. The holder and subject terms
used are those derived from the cryptographic object corresponding to the identifier
object. For private certificate protocols, the terms for identities are derived from
cryptographic values generated in the course of the protocol. The correctness of
terms is verified by the recipient of the data statement through the cryptographic
material.
Following the above, any use of a holder or subject attribute of an identity in a
formula released to a recipient party is constrained such that only terms must be
used for the attributes that are used for the holder or subject attribute of identifier
objects established with the party the formula is intended to be released to. This
reflects the natural property of an identifier object representing a shared identifier
(pseudonym) for a party used by a party in communication with data recipients.
The case of objects from more than one registration domain being used for
making statements about a party in a formula φ′ results in a number of different
terms used to refer to this party in holder and subject terms of the formula that
equals the number of registration domains. After the renaming transformation, the
resulting formula φ will refer to at least those identifiers and will have additional
object equalities added for equating pairs of terms relating to identifier objects of
the same registration domain.
If the renaming were not done following the cryptographic protocol, the resulting
formula might provide possibilities for an attacker to violate the semantics in a subtle
way. For example, for two bank accounts with different currencies of the same bank,
an attacker could, in case of random terms for identities being permitted, use an
improper identity name in a released data statement to a data recipient. This could
result in a “mixing” of the two identities in an instance of reasoning over the formula
and a previously released formula, thereby achieving that the reasoning party would
derive a statement over the mixed identity comprising, e.g., the account balance from
one and the currency from the other identity. This can be seen as being related to a
general variant of the identity mixing problem discussed in related work [CMN+10].
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4.8.2.4 Functions of Parties
Subject and holder terms are used in a formula to be released to refer to parties the
formula makes statements about. The terms are introduced in the identifier object
introduction sub-formula related to the primary identifier objects of the formula.
At least one identifier object referring to the party releasing the data statement
needs to be present. In a delegation relationship, the different parties, namely the
delegatee and delegater, or multiple delegaters, are referred to through identifier
objects. Their function of being holder or subject of the identifier objects and
identities being referred to is specified through equality predicates. This allows for
making statements about all parties in a formula and making clear what their roles
are in a data statement. The data request language defined in Sec. 4.6 earlier in
this chapter allows for expressing requirements related to both identifier objects and
identities relating to the delegater and delegatee of a delegation relationship.
The standard case for the use of a credential system is that both holder and
subject of an identity refer to the party holding the identity and using the identity
for making statements over its attributes, that is, about itself. In this case, the
interpretation of the subject term coincides with the interpretation of the holder
term of the identity. Another important case is when an identity is delegated, that
is, when its subject attribute is a term referring to a delegater that has delegated
authority over the identity to the party. The holder in this case is again the party
to whom the identity has been delegated. A third case is when the subject is a
third party about which a statement is to be made without a delegation being in
place, e.g., when a service provider releases data about a customer to another service
provider. This case is not relevant in the context of credential protocols, though, is
important for the overall identity management system.
The subject of a delegated identity in statements made by the delegatee can take
on different subject terms in different uses of the delegated identity, much like it can
be done for the party’s own identities in a standard interaction without delegation.
That is, multiple delegation identifier objects can be created by the delegatee with
the delegater as subject and a delegated identity be bound to those and attribute
statements of the delegated identity be revealed in interactions with data recipients.
The underlying delegation secret key can be used much like a party’s own secret
key, only being restricted to at most all delegation identities with the same subject
and by the same certifier.
In all the cases, the subject attribute is used for binding identities or identifier
objects to the same subject, that is, expressing that the subject attributes refer
to the same party. Analogously, the holder attribute can be used in all cases for
binding holdership of identities to a single party, that is, the party that is making
a statement and proof using credential protocols over multiple identities backed by
certificates. For each of the above cases, identifier objects for the holder and subject
are referred to in a formula to be released, for the non-delegation case a single such
object can be sufficient.
Repeatedly using the same identifier objects in data statements towards a data
recipient establishes the linking semantics of reusing pseudonyms and can augment
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the pseudonyms with further data that are associated with them. This applies to
both pseudonyms with the party releasing the data statement as well as such with
delegaters as subject. The concept of pseudonyms as “false names” of parties, that
is, semanticless identifiers, is important for the related discussions.
4.8.3 Conventional Certificates
The generic discussions above capture the semantics of term renaming relevant for
cryptographic credential protocols as underlying technology for revealing certified
data. Certain protocols based on online identity providers who vouch for statements
on behalf of the subjects can benefit from the presented ideas alike.
Conventional certificates based on signature schemes such as RSA, DSA, ECDSA,
or similar schemes and the application of an algebraic-structure-destroying hash
function such as a SHA variant on the message to be signed expose differences in
terms of how the data model is applied. We sketch how this is done next—the
details are not given, though, the basic ideas should suffice for an understanding
following the above discussions.
A signature key pair created by a party A corresponds to the creation of a new
registration identifier object. From the public key, the holder and subject terms as
well as a subjectId term can be computed. The registration identifier object induces a
registration domain and is specified through an object specification formula making
statements about the holder , subject , and subjectId through the computed terms.
The public key gets disseminated to possibly all parties in the system, all of which
refer to it using the same term related to the corresponding identifier object, as well
as the same terms for its holder and subject. The term for the subjectId is the same
one for every party by its definition.
A certificate issued by a certifier on such public key using a traditional signature
scheme has a corresponding registration identity relationship and the certifier is a
registration certifier. The terms used for referring to the holder and subject of the
certificate are those created in the context of the identifier object the public key
corresponds to. A certificate obtained by A corresponds to a new identity of A that
is specified through an object specification formula. Much like for any identity, the
specification formula and certificate are stored as part of an identity relationship.
Like the public key, the certificate gets disseminated to possibly all parties in the
system, each of which refers to it with the same term and uses the same terms for its
holder and subject A. Each party obtaining the certificate stores it as an entry in
its profile data, with the corresponding object specification formula specifying the
certified attributes and their values. If the certified public key is the public credential
verification key corresponding to an identity relationship of such other party, the
term used to refer to the certifier of the identity of such identity relationship is that
used for the identity relationship for certifying the public key. This model supports
also PKI certificate renewal, where holder and subject terms remain unchanged for
a new certificate issued on a given key.
Aspects such as generalizing this as for credential protocols as shown further
above is possible in our general approach, though, traditional certificate technology
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does not support this well and excessive information is released in each transaction.
Such extensions may comprise delegation or having multiple identities in the same
registration domain.
For each identity relationship a party establishes based on any kind of certificate,
the party always establishes an entry in its profile data repository for holding the
public key certificate for the public key corresponding to the certificate of the identity
relationship, including the key, and the corresponding specification formula. For
the credential protocols of our interest, those profile data entries are crucial for
the process of finding a fulfilling formula based on a party’s identifier and identity
relationships for a data request as discussed in Sec. 5.4.6: The specification formulae
of those profile entries comprise the information about the certifiers of the identity
relationships the party holds and thereby are required for finding formulae that
fulfill a data request of another party.
The above discussions apply to signature key pairs using the RSA, DSA, ECDSA,
or similar schemes and corresponding certificates as well as Camenisch–Lysyanskaya
signature key pairs [CL02b, CL04] used for our credential protocols and correspond-
ing private certificates. The further models key pairs and certificates used for estab-
lishing secured communication channels, for realizing PKI hierarchies, or for parties
to assert attribute statements to other parties based on conventional attribute cer-
tificates analogous to credential protocols, only with substantially less privacy. The
latter models the certification of credential signing keys of certifiers used for issuing
credentials. This gives rise to an architecture applicable independent of the kind
of party or the technology being used for protecting the integrity of attributes, in-
cluding standard PKI technology and extensions to PKI approaches for public key
certificates on credential system public keys.
The case of a party signing the public key of a Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature
key pair with a Fiat-Shamir-type signature based on a data statement it proves
using credential protocols does not fit this key certification model perfectly. The
difference is that there is no single certifying party of the key that would mandate the
establishment of an identity relationship. Rather, one or more identifier and identity
relationships are used for creating the signature over the key. The semantics of the
signature is still that the certifiers of the used identity relationships endorse the
data statement made in the context of the Fiat-Shamir signature. The Camenisch–
Lysyanskaya private signature key in this case is not cryptographically bound to
the party having signed it through a Fiat-Shamir signature. The best that can be
achieved with our protocols is that a cryptographic proof of knowledge of the private
signature key corresponding to the certified public key be made and included in the
resulting public key certificate. Our approach of realizing pseudonymous certifiers
is also captured in the secure channel model of Chapter 3 in that a certifier is known
to other parties under an authenticated statement in a generic way.
The above application of the data model to traditional certificate technologies
and Fiat-Shamir public key certificates shows very well how we can handle different
kinds of certificates and keys of parties acting in different roles in a unified way
through a party-symmetric architecture. Particularly, the different entities are all
modeled using the same approach to data representation. The advantages of this
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show in the data integration for automated reasoning and particularly the support
of ontologies for computing how to fulfill a data request or checking whether a
statement fulfills a request.
4.8.4 Discussion
Regarding technology, cryptographic pseudonyms as underlying cryptographic ob-
jects for identifier objects can be implemented through cryptographic means, e.g.,
through privacy-enhanced pseudonym and credential protocols such as that of Ca-
menisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01]. Alternatively, the implementation can be based
on trust in the party, e.g., a service provider releasing data about one of its customers
to another service provider and making a claim about the subject identifier. In the
further case of private certificate systems, derivation of terms and enforcement of the
use of only correct subject terms is realized through cryptographic means to prevent
attacks by dishonest users, while in the latter case trust in the service provider is
required that it is using the correct terms.
Overall, the seemingly complex (re)naming of terms in formulae of the local data
representation and formulae to be released serves the purpose of allowing for using
the calculi based on our first-order-logic-based language for making derivations and,
at the same time, having a well-defined semantics for this language.
Regarding the modeling of data, we note that the introduction of the existential
quantifier for data statements would allow for using a different modeling approach
where the party identifiers and identity names would be expressed using variables
bound through existential quantifiers. That is, the use of term renaming for such
entities could be substituted with variables quantified existentially. Overall, we
found this approach, though conceptually clean, to be more complex in terms of the
resulting language and reasoning over it. Thus, the renaming of terms as outlined
above and also in Chapter 5 has been chosen for our system.
4.9 Calculus
We next give an overview of the logic we use for representing our data model and
the deductive system for making inferences over formulae in the model. Regarding
foundations and terminology related to those aspects, we build on and refer the
reader to work in the domain [HR04, Gir90, Bus98, Pfe04]. The main goal of this
section is to point out key techniques related to implementing a deduction system
for our logic and related challenges. An in-depth discussion on an efficient deduc-
tion system for our logic, including the prevention of the effect of contradictions
introduced by an attacker, is left to future work.
Our system and framework comprises multiple languages based on our data
model for different purposes of representing data and interfacing with cryptographic
protocols. Those languages follow the same concepts and syntax. The differences
between the languages are that they are constrained according to their intended
use, e.g., specifying the release of data using a concrete protocol, or specifying
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the establishment of an identity relationship based on a private certificate. The
statement-type languages, e.g., for expressing object specification formulae and data
statements, have a single semantics as discussed in Sec. 4.11. Also, there is a single
set of axioms defined to make derivations in the logic.
We chose to build our calculus and languages on first-order logic for its high ex-
pressivity, simplicity, and available (open source) tool support. We use an extension
of a fragment of first-order logic, the main aspects of which are detailed next.
4.9.1 Properties of the Logic
Logic with equality. We use first-order logic with equality, that is, with the
symbol = expressing object equality. The logic symbol = allows for expressing that
two terms refer to the same object in an interpretation, even though the terms may
not be equal. This implies not building on the unique names assumption (UNA)
which states that different constants refer to different objects in every interpretation,
that is, every object is referred to through a single, unique, name in the syntax. This
consequently results in a logic which is not a Herbrand logic.
Equality and not using the unique names assumption is required for reaching
the desired degree of expressivity in terms of privacy in our modeling approach as
it allows for using different terms for referring to the same object, e.g., an identity
or holder or subject term. Object equality can relate such different terms with an
equality of the underlying object in an interpretation. Whenever there is a need for
specifying sameness of the objects referred-to through two (different) terms t and s
in a formula, an equation t = s is introduced to indicate the equality.
Sorted logic. We employ a typed logic, also denoted as sorted logic or many-
sorted logic, meaning that each term has a “built-in” type from a type system fixed
with the logic. A typed first-order logic is a standard extension of pure first-order
logic where the types are associated with all terms of the language. Any many-
sorted first-order logic with a finite number of types can be reduced to single-sorted
first-order logic.
In contrast to the language of Camenisch et al. [CMN+10] which uses sorts of the
logic also for the (sub)typing of identities, we use an even more flexible approach to
(sub)typing identities for gaining substantial advantages in the obtained expressivity
of the language. Only formulae being correctly typed are valid and further used for
processing by a party.
Open world assumption. Our logic builds on the open world assumption, that
is, there are no defaults as in calculi based on the closed-world assumption. This fits
well our purpose of modeling knowledge of aspects of the real world relevant to our
system and the incomplete way of specifying knowledge through ontologies, where
parties may only obtain a subset of the defined ontologies. A closed-world logic of
defaults may lead to inappropriate conclusions being deducible in such setting.
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Integer extensions. Our data model requires that extensions for supporting
types with a total order and very large, or infinite, value domains be in place.
The data types int and the different date types and predicates expressed over those
exploiting the total order of those types require this, where the latter types addition-
ally require support for the specific relations between dates of different granularities
as discussed in Sec. 4.4.13. We will refer to the related extensions as integer exten-
sions in this work.
4.9.2 Deductive System
A main reason for our choice of building our formalism on top of first-order logic
are the deduction systems that are available for such logic. A deduction system
is also referred to as deductive system, reasoning system, calculus, or deduction
apparatus. A main concern of the science of logic is reasoning, that is making
formal inferences in the logic. Because a deductive system can be applied to prove
formulae correct under given assumptions, it is frequently also referred to as proof
system. Henceforth, we denote the proof system of our calculus as L.
A basic concept related to deduction is the sequent, a standard logic concept
that expresses that a formula ψ, the succedent, can be deduced, or inferred, from a
list of formulae Γ = φ1, . . . , φk, the antecedent, through a given deductive system of
the logic:
φ1, . . . , φk `ψ .
Antecedent and succedent are referred to as cedents. A sequent is fulfilled if the
succedent can be formally inferred (deduced) from the antecedent, that is, assuming
the formulae in the antecedent are true, the succedent is true. In other words,
the antecedent expresses the hypotheses to hold, while the succedent models the
conclusion that can be inferred. In this thesis we use sequents to explicate formal
derivations to be done in the deduction system for our logic. We also allow for the
notation of having sets of formulae in the antecedent, with the meaning that all
formulae of a set are part of the list of formulae.
The succedent can, in general, comprise a list of formulae ψ1, . . . , ψl instead
of a single formula. For our treatment, the case of a single formulae forming the
succedent is sufficient. A sequent as presented above is equivalent to the conjunction
of formulae in the antecedent implying the disjunction of formulae in the succedent
being a tautology:
`
k∧
i=1
φi →
l∨
i=1
ψl .
An environment E , following standard terminology in logic [HR04], is a function
from free variables of a formula to constants of corresponding sorts, that is, an
assignment of free variables with values from the value domains of those variables.
We require that all free variables in all formulae in all cedents be instantiated through
an environment E or a free variable have the meaning that any of its possible
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assignments results in the same denotation, before invoking the deduction apparatus
for the sequent.
Deduction and proofs. Deduction in a formal logic is done based on a proof
system for the logic, through an application of rules and use of logical axioms.
A plurality of deduction systems with the same deductive power, differentiated
through their rules, axioms, and proof strategies, can be defined for a given logic.
For first-order logic, various seminal calculi have been proposed. Most prominently,
this comprises the Hilbert or Frege proof system, natural deduction, the sequent
calculus, and the resolution proof system—the reader is referred to work in the
logic domain [Bus98, Gir90, Wal11, HR04] for an overview of the calculi.
A deductive system for a language is defined independent of any interpretation
of the language, that is, it is only about syntactic consequences following from
the logic’s proof theory. For first-order logic, completeness and soundness of the
deduction systems mentioned below is a well-established result. Completeness means
that every formula that is true in an interpretation can be inferred in the deductive
system. Soundness means that every formula that can be inferred is true in an
interpretation.
Proofs in a proof system are often denoted as a tree-like structure—rooted at
the bottom—from the axioms assumed to hold at the top to the proof goal at the
bottom, and each step of the deduction procedure corresponding to an inner node
of the proof tree. Using such notation, a deduction can proceed in a bottom-up way
from the goal to be proven to the axioms, or top down, starting from the axioms,
or as a combination thereof. It can be observed that, unless the search space is
substantially constrained during this selection process, a top-down approach will
result in a search space of unmanageable size [Bus98] for general first-order logic.
Practical deductive systems. Hilbert-style proof systems are based on multiple
axioms or axiom schemas and only one or two deduction rules and result in lengthy
proofs. Although the system is simple and powerful in terms of its deductive ca-
pabilities, implementing computerized procedures for finding proofs in Hilbert-style
proof systems has proven to be hard [Bus98].
Natural deduction has been proposed by Gentzen [Gen35] as an approach that
comes as close as possible to human reasoning. Natural deduction calculi operate
on a comprehensive set of deduction rules while not requiring axioms for basic first-
order logic. The resulting calculus is extremely intuitive to handle by humans and
comprises applying a rule to derive a new theorem valid under the given axioms
in each deduction step, operating in a top-down manner. The main drawback of
natural deduction is that it cannot be reasonably implemented as a computerized
algorithm due to the huge search space and the difficulty of realizing proof strategies
that reduce the search space [Bus98, HR04].
The sequent calculus by Gentzen [Gen35] is based on a comprehensive set of rules
compared to Hilbert-style calculi. Each step in a proof in the sequent calculus is a
sequent constructed through application of a single rule, where deduction operates
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in a bottom-up manner, that is, starting from the proof goal. The sequent calculus
has been introduced by Gentzen as an extension to natural deduction. It is arguably
the most elegant and flexible system for writing proofs [Bus98]. The sequent calculus
is closely related to natural deduction and can be obtained by first applying natural
deduction introduction rules both bottom-up and elimination rules top-down in a
derivation, resulting in a so-called intercalation calculus, and then reformulating
the rules to obtain a bottom-up-only calculus [Pfe04]. The sequent calculus can be
extended towards realizing practical automated deduction systems [Pfe04], though,
is not practically applicable for automated deduction in its pure version [Bus98].
Today’s most-widely used approach to deduction is resolution, resulting in a
refutation-based deduction procedure. Resolution has been introduced by Robin-
son [Rob65] and Davis and Putnam [DP60], for propositional and first-order logic,
respectively. This approach is essentially based on a proof through contradiction,
that is, the negation of the formula to be proven is used in the process instead of the
proof goal itself. In each step, the resolution rule is applied—the only derivation rule
in the resolution calculus. Finding a contradiction proves the to-be-proven formula
true. Resolution results in efficient proof search procedures as well as proofs the
lengths of which are reasonable, thereby making it a practical scheme [Bus98].
A logic with equality requires, for not being a Herbrand logic, specific techniques
for its deduction apparatus. Basically, equality can either be handled axiomatically
through adding the equality axioms to the axioms of the calculus, which results
in a substantial increase of the proof search space by not considering the inherent
structure of equality in the reasoning [Pfe04], or through handling equality through
the inference mechanism [Bus98] directly. Paramodulation [RW69, WR73] is an
example for the latter approach in the context of resolution-based deduction systems
and is employed in a variant in leading resolution-based theorem provers, such as
the example provers mentioned further below.
Any deduction system needs to implement a proof strategy, that is, a selection on
which rules to apply in a given step of the deduction—for practical problem instances
many possibilities exist in each step, thus giving rise to a huge overall search space
for a given instance of deduction. The proof strategy is a key determining factor for
the efficiency of the resulting proof system and its machine implementability.
A large literature body exists on proof theory and efficient machine implemen-
tations of deductive systems. Our overview has only presented the basics of those
systems, the reader is referred to Pfenning [Pfe04] or Buss [Bus98] for further details
and references.
4.9.3 Axioms and Theories
The logical axioms X are the axioms that form, together with the deduction rules,
the deductive system L for a logic. X comprises the logical axioms for the calculus
to be implemented through a reasoning engine. For a logic with equality like ours, it
also comprises the equality axioms in case equality is to be realized through axioms,
which is not recommended. The logical axioms are implicit in the notation Γ`ψ of
ψ being a consequence of the premises Γ. A theorem prover implements the calculus
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based on logical axioms and deduction rules and is used on sequents of the form
Γ`ψ.
According to Mendelson [Men87], so-called proper axioms, or non-logical axioms,
are specific to the theory being considered and outside of a generic deduction appa-
ratus for first-order logic. A theory over a language is the closure of the theorems
that can be derived under both logical and proper axioms and the rules of deduc-
tion [Men87]. The theorems of the resulting theory induced by the proper axioms,
the logical axioms, and the deduction rules are true only under interpretations that
are compliant with the structure induced by the axioms, while the theorems that
can be derived through the deduction rules from only the logical axioms are true
under any interpretation. We denote a theory based on the proper axioms Z as TZ.
The deduction system L is implicit in this notation and assumed to be fixed. Such
theory is also referred to as deductive theory, as being defined through a deduction
apparatus.
In applications of logic, proper axioms are used to model the structure of a
specific problem domain, e.g., an arithmetic [Men87]. In this thesis, we use proper
axioms for modeling certain structural aspects of our identity management system,
e.g., the typing system for identity subtyping (Sec. 4.4.11), or for modeling concrete
relations valid in a given system, e.g., expressing the certifier ontology a party relies
on in its deductions (Sec. 4.10).
Using knowledge representation terminology, an axiom can be either a fact, that
is, a predicate that holds, or a rule specifying how to derive predicates that hold
based on premises assumed to be true. Also note that inference over a given theory
in a formal language is a purely syntactical process and fully determined through
the underlying formulae.
The theory of interest for making derivations in our system considers also the
proper axioms Z for modeling our domain. As noted, it is henceforth referred to as
TZ and we use the notation Γ `Z ψ to indicate that a derivation be made in this
theory, using our standard calculus L.
Technically, deduction for Γ `Z ψ can be realized through a deduction for Γ,Z`ψ
using a theorem prover, that is, the proper axioms are expressed as premises of the
derivation to be made.
Note that deductions on a sequent require specific handling of free variables. An
environment E , that is, a function from free variables can be given as additional
argument to a sequent, resulting in the notation of (4.21). The sequent is evaluated
with the free variables in the preimage of the function E being substituted with
the terms according to E . A free variable which is not instantiated through an
environment has the meaning that it can be instantiated with any of the values of
its type.
Γ `EZ ψ (4.21)
With the proper axioms expressed as part of the premises, this gives
Γ,Z `E ψ .
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4.9.4 Machine Implementation
Automated reasoning in a calculus is a powerful tool for considering formally mod-
eled knowledge of certain aspects of a system in the formal data model. Automated
reasoning concretely allows for deriving, based on inputs that are assumed to hold,
e.g., data statements proven by another party, facts that hold in the logic. The
reasoning is specified through deduction rules.
An algorithmic implementation of a deductive system to be executed by a com-
puting apparatus is referred to as theorem prover. It allows for computing in an
automated fashion whether a sequent Γ`ψ holds. For computing fulfillment of se-
quents in the context of our data representation language, multiple approaches can
be followed: A prototypical implementation can utilize an existing theorem prover,
or a special-purpose theorem prover can be constructed.
Multiple efficient theorem provers for full first-order logic with equality have been
implemented and made available under flexible open source licenses, where promi-
nent provers include, e.g., the E Theorem Prover [Sch, Sch02] and SPASS [SPA10,
WDF+09]. Both of those support full first-order logic with equality, based on res-
olution and a variant of paramodulation. Another example for a theorem prover
capable of first-order logic is Prover 9 [McC10]. Those tools apply numerous spe-
cialized techniques for increasing the efficiency of their deduction procedures. It is
left to future work to investigate the applicability of specific provers to our logic
with equality and integer extensions, as well as their extensibility, for obtaining a
prototype implementation of a concrete deductive system for our logic. Also, the
application of the advanced concepts utilized for realizing efficient deduction proce-
dures in the best theorem provers for a specialized implementation of a deduction
engine for our logic and its specifics, e.g., the arithmetic extensions for integers and
types, might be worthwhile.
For building a production system, the approach of constructing a special-purpose
deduction system is preferable to using an extension of a generic theorem prover.
Identity statements in our language have substantial structure, thus comprise only
a tiny fragment of full first-order logic with the discussed extensions. A special-
purpose implementation can exploit the known structure of our language in the
form of heuristics and the proof search strategy, compared to provers for general
first-order languages. This is expected to reduce the proof search space, and thus
runtime, considerably. Regarding the deduction mechanism, both the approaches
of building either on the ideas of the sequent calculus or resolution can lead to an
efficient practical implementation when exploiting the language structure.
Finding satisfying formulae for fulfilling a data request—see Sec. 5.4.6—requires
additional functionality than only proving whether a sequent holds. A fulfilling
formula, derivable in the theory T used for reasoning, as well as an environment
specifying the variable assignment for the free variables of the conclusion need to
be computed in addition to executing the theorem proving procedure. Thereby, the
conclusion ψ (conjecture to be proven) is interpreted as a question and the theorem
prover computes, based on the portfolio formulae φ1, . . . , φk, a formula φ from which
the conjecture is derivable under an also-computed environment E . The process of
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finding an answer for a conjecture is, in the context of automated theorem proving,
denoted as answer extraction, see, e.g., Sutcliffe et al. [SYT09]. The variables of the
conjecture to be instantiated are outermost existentially quantified in their formal-
ism, while they are free variables in ours, for which reason we need an additional
environment for instantiating the variables.
Investigating how answer extraction integrates with a deduction procedure of
our logic, that is, how it can be integrated into the proof search, is a further inter-
esting piece of future work. Available theorem provers support answer extraction
as part of the search process—similar ideas can be employed for realizing a custom
automated deduction engine for our language. The structure of our language ben-
efits a substantially reduced search space of possible assignments to be attempted
in a proof search compared to general first-order languages. Integrating finding a
potentially fulfilling formula with the proof search and not performing the steps of
finding a potential answer and checking whether it is a correct answer sequentially
is crucial for a practical system in order to leverage ontologies as part of the used
theory for finding an answer and for reasons of efficiency.
The language extension of supporting operators, see Sec. 4.4.17 further compli-
cates practical implementations by further deviating from standard integer exten-
sions to first-order logic. Similarly, the language feature of date types of different
granularities and the relations over them complicate the reasoning. Thus, a produc-
tion system may forego those features for a substantially simpler and more efficient
reasoning engine.
4.9.5 Contradictions
The approach of resolution is based on the principle of proof through contradiction.
Thus, when employing a deduction apparatus using resolution, care must be taken
that the axioms of the theory together with the formulae in the antecedent do
not lead to a contradiction on their own, which is an issue introduced through
the openness of our system. A contradiction would let one infer any statement
as true under the assumption of the hypotheses, which can allow an attacker to
illegitimately gain access to a resource by introducing specifically crafted statements
or ontologies (axioms) leading to a contradictory theory under which resolution
would be performed.
Using deduction techniques not based on refutation may suffer from the same
problem of contradictions. For such approaches, it is left open to investigate the
possibility of adapting the deduction system to detect contradictions occurring in a
deduction process or removing the deduction rules based on contradictions. This is
possible in calculi where contradictions are not inherent to the approach of reasoning.
Such changes of a calculus may lead to a calculus which is not complete in terms of
allowing for the syntactic derivation of all logically entailed formulae. Lacking the
completeness property may be tolerable, though, for our application. In the worst
case, this may lead to (rare) situations of a policy not being satisfied through data
statements in their evaluation, although logic entailment holds. Always retaining
the soundness property, though, is clearly crucial for the security of the system.
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It is worth considering how we can prevent an attacker from introducing formu-
lae into the hypotheses used for an instance of deduction by providing a sequence
of maliciously crafted formulae to the party executing a deduction procedure. The
relevance of this lies in the application of deduction for the computation of autho-
rization decisions by a party based on formulae received from a requester. This
requires consideration in the axioms used as part of the theory, as well as the for-
mulae provided by the requester, acting as premises for an instance of deduction.
Axioms. A possibility of contradictions being introduced is through formulae
forming a part of an axiom system used as a subset of the constituting axioms
of a theory. This can be countered irrespective of the deduction system being used.
We distinguish the cases of (1) the system-specific non-logical axioms, (2) ontolo-
gies from trusted ontology providers, and (3) ontologies from untrusted ontology
providers. Note that the logical axioms are fixed and determined by the choice of
deduction system.
Case (1): The system-specific axioms need to designed carefully to not induce a
contradiction in any theory based on legitimate formulae as axioms and reasoning
thereover based on legitimate premises. An example is the set of rules related
to the type system for identities of Sec. 4.4.11.2. Case (2): Similarly, ontologies
from trusted ontology providers need to be carefully designed to avoid inducing a
contradiction in conjunction with legitimate formulae. Additionally, the language
governing the permissible ontology rules is further constrained than for Case (1) to
not cause conflicts in conjunction with the system-specific axioms. An example for
such ontologies are the certifier ontologies of Sec. 4.10.1. Case (3): Ontologies from
untrusted ontology providers are heavily constrained in their expressivity such that
they can be verified by the recipient to not be crafted in ways to be able to induce
contradictions together with the axiom parts of the theories they are to be used
in. An example for this are the rules related to each identity type and required for
considering such identity type in the automated reasoning framework.
Premises. Regarding formulae to be released, we have taken care in our language
design to avoid that an attacker may be able to induce a contradiction in the theory
used for an instance of deduction. Multiple provisions in the language design for
taking care of this are presented next, while we leave, as for the above, an exhaustive
treatment of this subject to future work. (1) Through the association of attributes
and their values with identities instead of parties directly, a party can have multiple
different values for a single attribute in different identities. This makes sense in
many circumstances, such as nicknames. (2) The naming of terms based on under-
lying cryptographic protocols, e.g., zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for proving
knowledge of the corresponding cryptographic object, ensures that an attacker can-
not use the same term for two different identities. Combining (1) and (2) prevents
an attacker from creating a contradiction through the attribute values of illegitimate
identities. Even by obtaining maliciously issued attributes in an identity certified
by a certifier controlled by the attacker, the attacker cannot induce a contradic-
tion through a particularly chosen attribute value by expressing predicates over this
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value.34 (3) An identity referred to in a data statement needs to be referred to
by its base type in the type hierarchy to avoid contradictions introduced through
different references of the same identity, which can be accomplished through the
cryptographic proof in our credential protocols.
We also leave it open for future work how one can verify a formula or set of
formulae of the premises for contradiction freeness in the theory of the set of axioms
that need to be considered, also considering the approaches from above, to guarantee
that no contradiction is induced by an attacker.
4.10 Ontologies
Gruber [Gru93] has defined an ontology as an “explicit specification of a conceptu-
alization,” which is the most widely used ontology definition in use today [GOS04].
Borst [Bor97] defines an ontology to be a “formal specification” and particularly a
“shared conceptualization.” This aspect of ontologies being a shared conceptualiza-
tion is crucial for our work.
Technically speaking, in terms of our data representation language, an ontology
is a set of formulae used for modeling a part of the domain of identity management
of interest, on the one hand in terms of its structural properties, and on the other
hand in terms of concrete instances of parties and other entities. The formulae of
an ontology are used by parties as axioms in the course of automated deduction,
thereby resulting in a specific theory derivations are made in.
Ontologies can be provided by third parties or defined by a party itself, where
ontologies of the further form are denoted as third-party ontologies. The strength
of using ontologies in our system comes largely from using third-party ontologies,
because this allows parties to outsource certain decisions and assessments to those
third parties instead of every party making those decisions and performing the
assessments on its own. We find the support for such outsourcing to be a crucial
functionality of an open identity management system, because assuming every party
to be required to acquire or have the extensive knowledge expressed in the ontologies
they use on their own is unreasonable.
Ontologies are put to multiple uses in our system, with a main use case being
the specification of expressive data requests through referring to abstractions de-
fined through ontologies. Another important use case is realizing certain system
features, e.g., the binding of identities to a registration identity, where the certifier-
permitted registration identities are specified through an ontology issued by the
certifier. Through those and further uses of ontologies, they are crucial for enabling
interoperability in an open system.
Based on the discussions in Sec. 4.9 on derivations over theories using proper
axioms, we can compute derivations based on the ontologies O1, . . . ,Ok as follows,
34Note that this relies on a random challenge being provided by the verifier in the cryptographic
credential protocol, ensuring that cryptographic values from which object identifiers are derived
cannot be under the control of the attacker.
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with the formulae of the ontologies being considered as further premises besides Γ:
Γ,O1, . . . ,Ok `ψ .
4.10.1 Types of Ontologies
We define the following types of ontologies for our architecture: system-defined
axioms, concept specification ontologies, party assessment ontologies, subtype on-
tologies, registration binding ontologies, and dummy identity ontologies. This par-
titioning is motivated by a system perspective related to which parts of an overall
ontology will be provided by each ontology provider as separate entities and by a
functional partitioning.
From a technical perspective, that is, the formal language and the applicable
deduction procedures, our system is open in terms of what can be specified through
ontology formulae. Constraining the languages for the specific types of ontologies
helps in avoiding unintended consequences when composing ontologies or obtaining
ontologies from non-trusted parties.
System-defined axioms. The system-defined axioms Oax are the axioms defined
as an integral part of the system in the context of this thesis or future extensions
thereof. The permitted syntax for expressing the rules is not further constrained
as those axioms are under full control of the system developers and thus can be
considered as being trusted. The set of axioms is small and the axioms induce a
structure on our domain of discourse. There is one single fixed set of those axioms
applicable to all parties in a system and the axioms are not subject to the usual
scheme for obtaining ontologies.
The type derivation rules for the type system for typing identities of Sec. 4.4.11.2
are an example for system-defined axioms. Those rules are an example of structural
rules describing the domain of interest—subtype hierarchies in the example. They
are shipped together with an implementation of the system and thus, by definition,
are received from a trusted provider. There is no need for system-defined axioms to
be obtained by a party from a third-party provider.
Concept specification ontologies. Concept specification ontologies define con-
cepts and relate them to other concepts and attributes of identities, and thereby
determine the vocabulary that data requests can be expressed over and impose a
structure on the vocabulary. A concept is an (abstract) entity of interest in our
identity management domain that is made explicit as an element of the vocabulary
formulae can be expressed over through its definition in an ontology.
Examples for such concepts are the concept of the trust level of a party, the
assurance level of attributes certified by a party, or a party being an OECD gov-
ernment certifier, or EFTA or EU government certifier. An abstract concept like
in these examples is defined through a formula representing a rule specifying which
premises need to hold on a given entity, e.g., party or identity, in order that a pred-
icate expressing the concept to be specified on the entity holds. In case a concept
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is not expressed as part of an inference rule, it can be specified outside of the set of
formulae to establish it as part of the vocabulary.
Technically, the definition of ontology rules is based on standard ideas of first-
order logic of expressing predicates assumed to hold as premises and specifying,
through implication, predicates that can be derived as conclusion, where entities
such as parties or identities are referred to through ∀-quantified variables.
Using concept specification ontologies is crucial for the definition of vocabularies
and semantics thereof in an open identity management system and for realizing
abstractions in the definition of data requests.
Example 4.25 (Assurance level) The below example specifies a simple rule that
lets one infer an assurance level of 7 of a party (certifier), referred to by variable C,
based on it being an OECD government certifier, having a trust level of at least 7,
and undergoing a periodic security audit. The concepts in the premises are assumed
to be well-understood concepts defined in this or other ontologies. The variable types
of C and s are defined as C :: pty, s :: int.
∀C, s :Property(C, “oecdGovCertifier”) ∧ Property(C, “securityLevel”, s)∧
Geq(s, 7) ∧ Property(C, “periodicSecurityAudit”)
→ Property(C, “assuranceLevel”, 7)
The idea behind the concept of an assurance level is that it represents an indication
of assurance of attributes vouched for by the assessed party (certifier). It can be
used for abstractly specifying eligible certifiers in a data request, thereby capturing a
(potentially) large set of eligible certifiers for which such property can be inferred with
a single simple statement expressed in the request. Assurance levels are an example
for a practical concept for abstractly specifying the certification requirements of an
attribute.
As can be seen from the example, the rule uses the ∀-quantifier over the enti-
ties to make the statements about and expresses the inference through implication.
Multiple rules can be expressed, also as parts of different ontologies, inferring the
same predicate based on different assumed facts.
Example 4.26 (Concepts) Examples for high-level concepts useful for the speci-
fication of data requests in the context of authorization policies are “securitylevel”,
“physicalSecurityLevel”, “orgSecurityLevel”, or “trustLevel”. Examples for concrete
abstractions over parties in the system are “swissGovtEntity”, “oecdGovtEntity”,
“eftaGovtEntity” or “euGovtEntity”, which can be equally useful for the concise spec-
ification of data requests. A further property interesting in the context of attribute
assurance is the strength of identity verification a certifier performs on the attributes
it vouches for. The meaning of the above examples should be clear from their nam-
ing.
In a practical system, the concepts defined through a concept specification on-
tology can evolve from international or industry standards or recommendations in
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a domain. A widely agreed standard or recommendation can lead to a generally
accepted ontology specifying the concepts contained therein, thus avoiding fragmen-
tation of the vocabulary and semantics thereof in the case of a large number of on-
tologies. Ideally, a single or a few such ontologies being internationally agreed (and
standardized) would benefit interoperability of parties greatly through an agreed
vocabulary and semantics as a basis for interoperability and common understand-
ing. In this thesis, we remain with the examples above and do not give a complete
concept specification ontology.
When making inferences, a party uses ncs concept specification ontologies
Ocs1 , . . . ,Ocsncs as part of the overall ontology employed for its reasoning, resulting
in Ocs defined as follows:
Ocs :=
ncs⋃
i=1
Ocsi .
Party assessment ontologies. Ontologies formally specifying assessments of
parties are crucial for realizing the outsourcing of trust decisions through the assess-
ment of parties by so-called trust providers. Such outsourcing of trust facilitates the
openness and scalability of the identity exchange system. An assessment of a party
comprises a third party assessing the party with respect to certain metrics, e.g.,
metrics corresponding to concepts defined in concept specification ontologies, and
formalizing the assessment results of the party through a party assessment ontology
made available to other parties. Trivial examples of metrics of an assessment are
attributes of the legal identity of the party, e.g., as available from PKI certificates
related to the party or other sources.
We currently define the certifier ontology as a main kind of ontology in this
category. Such an ontology makes statements about certifiers in the system and
particularly associates properties with the certifiers. Another type of ontology in
the category of assessment ontologies is the conditional recipient ontology which
comprises assessments of conditional release trustees. Both those ontologies, and
possible future further similar kinds of ontologies for other classes of parties, are
generically referred to as party assessment ontologies and can help simplify authoring
of data requests and thus authorization policies and substantially increase their
expressivity through exploiting the knowledge modeled in the ontologies.
The assessment result of a party is formalized through a set of predicates or
formulae expressed about the party. The following shows how a single property
value u for property p is associated with a party s through a property predicate:
Property(s, p, u) .
Using a trinary predicate Propertypty×str×β allows for associating a property value u ::
β of property p with subject s. The subject is represented through a constant term
s under which the party is known to others, usually its public pseudonym.35 The
35Although it is possible from a data model and system perspective to refer to pseudonymous
parties in party assessment ontologies, this is at the current time only a niche use case.
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subject term is one which is used for certifier identifier objects and identities, that
is, the one uniquely derivable from PKI certificates related to the party. Following
this approach integrates the formulae referring to the terms with our approach of
data modeling and particularly making automated deductions.
Following the earlier discussions of Sec. 4.4.14 on modeling property predicates,
a k-ary predicate can be used for expressing (k − 2)-tuples or (k − 1)-tuples of
values as properties of a party, one of the arguments being used for representing
the subject and, depending on the approach, another argument for the property.
Property predicates can be expressed both in the assumption and conclusion part
of implication-based ontology formulae.
Attributes of a party, e.g., as contained in a PKI certificate, are expressed
through a formula of attribute predicates as for any kind of identity, expressed over
an identity corresponding to the PKI certificate. They use the same (public) subject
identifier of the party as in the property predicates associated with the party. Addi-
tionally, a formula expressed over an identifier object based on the public key can be
expressed to specify the corresponding subject and subjectId terms. This relates to
how our data model is used for modeling conventional PKI technology as discussed
earlier in Sec. 4.8. Even without an assessment, having those formulae available
for reasoning about the certifiers as part of the ontology facilitates openness of a
system.
The following example predicate associates the property “trustLevel” with value
8 with the party referred to by the constant s:
Property(s, “trustLevel”, 8) .
Properties that can be expressed in an assessment ontology can be anything
ranging from low-level properties associated with the party to aggregate properties
such as a trustworthiness level assigned to the party following a well-defined as-
sessment and evaluation procedure based on information obtained through an audit
of the party. Examples for assessed properties of parties may include, but are not
limited to, the ones presented in the context of the concept specification ontologies.
Example 4.27 (Party specification formula) The following property predicate
expresses that the party referred to through subject term s is an OECD government
certifier:
Property(s, “oecdGovCertifier”) .
For such approach of party assessment and related trust outsourcing to work,
we need to assume existence of parties in the system who act as ontology providers
issuing assessment ontologies to other parties and who are trusted by the other
parties for issuing the ontologies, that is, to make statements they have verified
diligently, e.g., through the assessment of parties through audits or other suitable
means.
Considering the information that assessment ontologies can provide, those on-
tologies are a means for outsourcing trust decisions that are otherwise hard or prac-
tically infeasible to make in an open, world-wide system, particularly for small
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organizations or users. Reasons for this are that a view of the system with sufficient
coverage and possibly access to parties for their assessment is required, which may
be a very strong assumption or require a substantial investment by a party.
Defining and agreeing on ontologies that assign properties to parties, e.g., cer-
tifiers, through attribute statements, is a huge effort on its own. Thus, reusing the
knowledge captured in such assessment ontologies and thus amortizing the effort
over a large set of parties is a facilitator for an open identity exchange system as
the one we define.
A main idea behind the use of party assessment ontologies is that in an open
data exchange system the idea of specifying parties through attributes instead of
(unique) identities as done for users in privacy-preserving user-centric identity man-
agement is carried further to the specification of certifiers. The reason is that for
the assurance of attribute statements, in the general case, not the identity of the
attributes’ certifier is relevant, but so are its properties, e.g., as assessed through
independent organizations.
A party uses the party assessment ontology OtPy constructed as follows from
ntPy such ontologies OtPy1 , . . . ,OtPyntPy through set union:
OtPy :=
ntPy⋃
i=1
OtPyi .
Subtype ontologies. A subtype ontology Otp defines a type hierarchy over a sub-
set of the identity types in the system. A formula of the following form comprising
a single predicate expresses that type t′ is a subtype of type t:
Subtypestr×str(t
′, t) .
Using the subtype rules of Sec. 4.4.11.2, which are part of the system-defined
axioms, and predicates expressed over type attributes in the object specification
formulae of identities and data statements based on those allows for inferring Type
predicates that hold with respect to a subtype ontology Otp for a given identity.
Any identity type that is not referred to in a subtype ontology a party uses in
its deductions forms its own trivial hierarchy of height zero comprising only itself.
The type id is always assigned to any identity through the logic’s type system.
A subtype hierarchy specifies the subtype relations from the view of the provider
of such ontology for a subset of the identity types in the system. In an open sys-
tem, multiple providers will issue subtype hierarchies. This raises the problem of
composition of the ontologies. Composing two subtype ontologies can, unless they
are disjoint in terms of the identity types they talk about, lead to multiple super-
types being assigned simultaneously to a given identity in the reasoning procedure.
This is related to multiple inheritance, though, based on different merged subtype
hierarchies. That is, an identity can be the subtype of different supertypes of dif-
ferent type hierarchies the party relies on. We leave it to future work to explore the
detailed implications and potential unintended consequences of this for applications
of reasoning such as policy matching or computing authorization decisions.
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Subtype hierarchies that are disjoint in terms of the identity types they refer to
do not lead to composition problems and can thus be composed without unintended
consequences. This situation can be achieved from having domain-specific ontolo-
gies, where for each domain one dominant ontology gets adopted in the system.
A subtype ontology comprises a set of subtype formulae for representing the
hierarchy. A party may use multiple subtype hierarchies Otp1 , . . . ,Otpntp for its logic
inferences, resulting in a compound subtype ontology Otp:
Otp :=
ntp⋃
i=1
Otpi .
Registration binding ontologies. As discussed in Sec. 3.9, an identity can be
established based on a registration identity, that is, the first identity obtained for
a registration domain. When using credential systems, this ensures that the same
private key of the party is used for issuing both the registration credential and the
one to be issued based on it. Liability and trust issues are non-technical drivers that
will, in practice, require that a certifier needs to be able to specify which registration
identities (private certificates) it accepts for establishing its own identities (private
certificates) based on those. This can be achieved through registration binding on-
tologies as explained next.
For credential systems, a registration binding ontology specifies, which registra-
tion certificates are permissible for binding to-be-issued certificates of a certifier to,
using the same secret key. One such ontology specifies the permissible registration
certificates for identities of one type one specific certifier issues. A party obtains
such ontology from each issuer for each certificate type for all certificates it holds.
Because in an open system any party can act as a certifier, certifiers are in general
not trusted for providing ontologies. Thus, it must be ensured that the ontology be
verified to not introduce unintended logical consequences into a deduction process
using the ontology, or be generated through the party using it from a constrained
formal representation of the ontology. Either of those approaches is equivalent in
terms of security in that the ontology provider (certifier) cannot inject a rogue on-
tology into the reasoning process of the party.
For each permitted type tR of registration identity and certifier cR for an identity
of type t with certifier c, a predicate is added to the ontology as follows, where tR
and t are constant terms of type str and c and cR constant terms of type pty:
PermittedRegIdType(t, c, tR, cR) .
The set of all such formulae for one pair (t, c) comprises the registration binding
ontology for the identity type t, certified by the party referred to through subject
term c.
Rule (4.22) is specified as part of the system-defined axioms Oax and models the
structural relationships between identities in the system as induced by the relation
PermittedRegIdType. The rule expresses the derivation of a predicate RegBindid×id
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in case two identities are in an according relation as specified in the rule in (4.22).
∀C,CR, t, c, tR, cR : Eq(CR.type, tR) ∧ CR.certifier = cR∧
Eq(C.type, t) ∧ C.certifier = c∧
C.holder = CR.holder ∧ PermittedRegIdType(t, c, tR, cR)
→ RegBind(C,CR)
(4.22)
A data request can express the predicate RegBind(C,CR) on an identity variable
C and thereby require that holdership of the single registration identity CR with
respect to which C has been established be required to be proven as well. A data
request can express further predicates over CR as needed for the policy at hand.
Due to the constrained nature of the identity binding ontologies and the formal
verification or generation thereof through the party utilizing the ontology, composing
such ontologies with each other or any of the other ontologies does not pose a
problem.
A party should use registration binding ontologies, if available, for all identity
types for which it has dummy identity ontologies to not unnecessarily constrain the
automated deduction system when computing fulfilling statements for data requests.
As discussed for dummy identities below, providers of certifier ontologies are, from
a system perspective, in an excellent position to also vouch for registration binding
ontologies for the referred-to identity types.
A party may use up to one registration binding ontology per active identity
relationship in its repository and per dummy identity. Composing those ontologies
Oreg1 , . . . ,Oregnreg gives
Oreg :=
nreg⋃
i=1
Oregi . (4.23)
Dummy identity ontologies. Furthermore, we assume that ontologies we refer
to as dummy identity ontologies be available. A dummy identity ontology specifies
one or more dummy ontologies through their specification formulae Φdy comprising
formulae {γdyi }, where a formula γdyi makes statements about the type and certifier
of a dummy identity of the identity type issued by the certifier. The values of those
attributes are the same for all identities of a given type from the same certifier. For
the remaining attributes of a dummy identity, no predicates are specified through the
specification formula for the dummy identity. A dummy identity ontology is required
for policy matching in the general setting of data requests comprising disjunctions.
Through proper computation of the term that is used to refer to the identity
in the formula of the ontology, a dummy identity is always referred to using the
same term in the representation in ontologies and renamed in data statements to be
released like other identities, which is exploited for interoperability between parties
and the definition of the semantics. For each dummy identity being specified, spec-
ification formulae for a corresponding identifier object and identity of its certifier
are comprised in the sets Φidf/ont and Φidy/ont, respectively, of the party specification
ontology.
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A dummy identity ontology can be created by an ontology provider by collecting
public keys and certificate structures for identity types and certifiers of its interest,
deriving the specification formulae, and formalizing multiple of them as a dummy
identity ontology. For facilitating system openness, we do not rely on a situation
that for all referred-to identity types in a formal deduction procedure it is mandated
that an identity be specified in one of the party’s identity relationships or be specified
as a dummy identity in the ontology of the party. Rather, the party can obtain,
for identity types referred to in ontologies being used and not being defined in
the ontology it composes using dummy identity ontologies from third parties, the
information required for constructing a dummy identity ontology on its own to
accommodate reasoning over identities of these types. The latter is made explicit
through the set Φ̂dy in the discussions in Sec. 5.4 on the data release protocol based
on credentials.36 The formulae specifying dummy identities are required for finding
fulfilling formulae for data requests while supporting disjunctions and the use of
identity types of which the party does not have any identities in identity relationships
of its portfolio.
For allowing for unconstrained reasoning over identities issued by the certifiers
referred to in the party specification ontologies a party uses, specification formulae
for dummy identities should be available that at least cover the union of all identi-
ties referred to in those ontologies. Due to their assessment of certifiers, providers
of party assessment ontologies are likely to have the data required for defining those
corresponding dummy identity ontologies. From a system perspective, having those
parties issue both those kinds of ontologies is our approach of choice and is assumed
to hold for practical systems. Taking this approach of mutually aligned party spec-
ification and dummy identity ontologies thus resolves the problem of a party being
required to obtain corresponding dummy identities through other channels. Let
Ody1 , . . . ,Odyndy be the dummy identity ontologies a party uses. Then, its composed
dummy identity ontology is defined through set union as
Ody :=
ndy⋃
i=1
Odyi .
4.10.2 Composition of Ontologies
In a practical open system, a party will be required to compose multiple ontologies
to use for its reasoning in order to benefit from the advantages that the use of
ontologies bring about in terms of expressivity and trust outsourcing. Composing
nO ontologies O1, . . . ,OnO of either kind as discussed earlier through set union
results in a single ontology O:
O :=
nO⋃
i=1
Oi .
36From an implementation architecture perspective, Φ̂dy can also be realized as a dummy identity
ontology the party creates itself instead of obtaining it from an ontology provider as then this
knowledge can be processed like third-party-obtained dummy identity ontologies.
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The compound ontology O comprises a key part of the theory T underlying the
reasoning for deciding Γ `O ψ, that is, deciding whether given premises Γ fulfill a
formula ψ. This notation is equivalent to using the following sequent in the same
derivative system: Γ,O1, . . . ,OnO `ψ. The formulae of the individual ontologies
are assumed to hold as part of the premises for the deduction to be made.
As outlined already, composing ontologies may lead to unpredictable or unde-
sired properties of the resulting compound ontology, particularly if ontologies being
composed refer to or define the same concepts.
It is important to note that combining multiple ontologies where each of those
may refer to the same concepts and make (slightly) different statements, may lead to
an ontology that makes different statements about the same element, e.g., party. For
example, the trust level of a certifier may be represented differently in two ontologies
that are being combined and both assessments can be derived in the reasoning. This
can make sense semantically, reflecting the different assessment procedures used.
The party using ontologies is responsible for a selection of proper ontologies and
thus the theory resulting from those ontologies once composed. Clearly, it would
counter the intention of using ontologies if parties using them need to scrutinize
and fully understand them, which is particularly true for users and small service
providers who do not have the required resources and knowledge. We next outline
approaches for mitigating problems resulting from composing ontologies, without
requiring that the party using the ontologies scrutinize or assess them.
Meta ontologies. The theory TO resulting from using an ontology O in a de-
duction, composed from multiple ontologies, must fulfill what the party intends to
use as foundation for the theory for computing its derivations. As most parties
will presumably lack the resources and technical capabilities of making such as-
sessments, one solution thereto is to have independent organizations perform such
assessments and publish machine-processable information on mutually compatible
ontologies. The result is a meta ontology making statements on which ontologies
may be used safely together for deductions. A meta ontology itself is, like other
metadata, outside of the data representation formalism of our data model.
This approach permits multiple such meta ontologies by different organizations
be made available. Each party in the system can select to trust one of those to rely
on for the ontologies to use in its automated deductions. For this to work, it needs
to be assumed that assessments of ontologies reflected in those meta ontologies be
sufficiently close to each other such that parties relying on different meta ontolo-
gies obtain sufficiently similar and thus mutually compatible compound ontologies.
Parties may also select to choose their own or no third-party ontologies, with the
inherent loss of expressive power with respect to their policy specification, in case
their application case permits so.
Market-driven selection. In an open system with multiple (competing) in-
stances of ontologies being available for each kind of ontology, it can be expected
that some of those ontologies will be adopted by a large fraction of the parties, based
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on a selection through market forces. For example, quality of assessment, coverage,
and reputation of the ontology providers can play a role in this. Assuming that
ontologies in general model a well-delimited part of the system, where this part is
delimited through conceptually meaningful parameters, different prominent ontolo-
gies of a certain type could be merged without the compositional problems discussed
above arising.
4.10.3 Trust in Ontologies
Generalizing the approach of the assessment of parties taken for party specification
ontologies leads to the trust assessment of ontology providers. As proposed in a
report by Hogben and the author [HS06], we propose that related to the perceived
value of the interaction being performed by a party, different ontologies, depending
on the trust in their issuers, may be applied for reasoning related to this interaction.
This facilitates security on the one hand and openness on the other hand, and allows
for balancing those properties. This is an advanced topic and may allow for the use
of low-trust ontologies for low-value transactions and high-trust ontologies for high-
value transactions.
As hinted already earlier, when applying ontologie for making automated deduc-
tions in our logic, we may differentiate between trusted and untrusted ontologies.
Trusted ontologies are obtained by a party from ontology providers it trusts for the
purpose of providing ontologies of the type it obtains from it. All the kinds of on-
tologies we define, except for the identity binding ontologies, belong to this category.
Untrusted ontologies are obtained from parties that are not trusted for the purpose
of providing any kind of ontologies. This comprises certifiers—in an open system,
every party can act as certifier—of identities in general, and thus makes the identity
binding ontologies they issue untrusted.
Note, though, that trust is, in general, not a binary property and different
degrees of trust apply to different providers. When only differentiating between
trusted and untrusted ontologies instead of considering a spectrum of trust over
ontologies [HS06], trusted ontologies can be composed with the ontology forming
the theory for reasoning, while untrusted ontologies need to be verified or derived
from a representation that ensures it not influencing the reasoning in an adversarial
manner, before composing it with the trusted ontologies.
4.10.4 Interoperability Challenges
An open ontology approach for an identity management system poses multiple in-
teroperability challenges. Assuming an open system, it is likely that two interacting
parties will use different sets of ontologies to compose their respective ontology to
make derivations under, that is, different theories. For concept specification or party
assessment ontologies this may mean that the parties use similar, though not nec-
essarily the same, vocabulary, as well as similar, though not necessarily identical,
assessments of parties.
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Regarding the vocabulary, it is crucial that the concepts both parties need to
refer to, e.g., in a data request and a corresponding response data statement, are the
same, that is, that the ontologies have an intersection with respect to this. Though,
the assessment of parties by different assessors may deviate to some degree, e.g.,
through different assessment procedures used by the ontology providers or judgment
employed in some steps of the assessment procedure. Expressed differently, the
composed ontologies used by the interacting parties need to be sufficiently “close”
to each other.
The parties in an interaction using different, but close, ontologies can result
in the same properties or (slightly) different properties derived through automated
reasoning in an instance of deduction. Both parties obtaining sufficiently close
results is a prerequisite for the interaction to work, e.g., a user being able to properly
fulfill a data request issued by a service provider. Particularly, policies should be
flexible enough such that they can still be fulfilled by other parties using slightly
different ontologies than the policy authoring party as this is key for interoperability
of an open system based on our ontology framework.
Example 4.28 (Closeness of ontologies) Take the following as an example for
the closeness of the ontologies of interaction partners and flexible specification of the
policy. Ontology provider P1 assesses certifier C and assigns a trust level of 3 to it,
while provider P2 assesses the trust level of C to be 4. Data recipient (relying party)
R requires a trust level of at least 3 for access to one of its services and states this
in an access control policy. A user U can use an identity issued by C to authorize
at R when using P1’s ontology, while R checks fulfillment of the policy using the
ontology of P2.
As assessment procedures are not perfect, this approach may sometimes also lead
to a failure of interactions due to ontologies diverging too much or policies being
specified in a “too tight” manner with respect to the party authoring the policy,
that is, too close to the assessment specified in the ontology. Different ontologies
represent different views on the system and its parties of different trust providers
and thus having different ontologies reflects the real-world situation of assessment
differences, and particularly also judgment and opinions may play a role in the
assessment procedures. For example, a service provider’s policy reflects this party’s
world or system view and a user’s identity statement constructed in response to
such policy reflects the user’s world or system view, both based on the ontologies
those parties use in their processing. In the case when the ontologies of the parties
in an authentication interaction are not sufficiently close, this may result in denial
of access, even though in the view of the authenticating party the authentication
should have succeeded. That is, it can lead to an excessive release of data without
the expected gain, but it cannot lead to obtaining access the authenticating party
is not eligible for because the server always uses its trusted ontologies, that is, its
world view, for the access decision. The imperfections outlined above are, in our
opinion, the natural consequence of an open ontology-based identity system without
central authorities.
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Using appropriate namespaces for defining the vocabulary referred to in an ontol-
ogy is crucial for avoiding unintended interrelations between two ontologies. That
is, when a provider defines a new vocabulary, it must use terms from a names-
pace that ensures collision freeness with terms chosen by other providers. The URI
scheme [BLFM05] by W3C is an appropriate scheme for this, as discussed for a
related interoperability problem in the scope of the overall data model in Sec. 4.5.2.
4.10.5 Distribution of Ontologies
One main requirement for identity management of the kind we propose is that
an architecture and infrastructure for the handling of ontologies, including their
secure, that is, integrity potecting, distribution, be in place. This architecture
is the same for the different kinds of ontologies we use. Protocols for obtaining
ontologies need to ensure the integrity of the ontology. This can be technically
achieved through applying standard (cryptographic) mechanisms, such as standard
PKI-based signatures by the ontology provider over the canonicalized representation
of the ontology, analogous to certifying public keys through public key certificates.
4.10.6 Discussion
The use of ontologies is optional to a certain extent in the sense that a basic de-
ployment of our system can operate without ontologies provided by third parties,
of course implying a substantial loss in the expressive power and openness of our
identity system. For bootstrapping a system, a first deployment phase can be done
with fewer or no third-party ontologies being available while still providing the basic
identity services for transferring authentications between the system participants.
At a later stage, ontology-providing parties can emerge and offer additional value
to the system participants through the ontologies they issue. For example, such
ontology providers can assess third parties such as certifiers or trustees. Providers
that issue subtype hierarchies for identity types could be related to the issuers, e.g.,
being an organization involved in defining a type hierarchy over European electronic
identity credentials.
One of the more substantial non-technical issues related to third-party-issued
ontologies is liability, e.g., liability for the assessments made by an ontology provider,
or the rules provided by it. The liability issues get considerably more elaborate when
using a composed ontology for reasoning, particularly for the case of unintended
consequences introduced through the composition. A discussion of those aspects is
left to future work, closely related to the technical aspects of ontology composition.
Those discussions need to be generalized in the case of using meta ontologies.
The use of ontologies in an identity management system increases the overall
system complexity, in both technical and non-technical dimensions, substantially,
though is required for obtaining an open system. Multiple aspects related to ontolo-
gies have been touched only in our discussions, while a more detailed elaboration is
left to future work. Our main contributions with respect to ontologies are the tight
integration of ontologies into our system-wide data model, thus also integration with
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the deduction system, policy matching process, and thus all processes for realizing
the release of certified data, and the discussion of various challenges and proposal
of solutions.
4.11 Semantics
A formal language on its own does not have meaning because of only being expressed
at the syntactic level, that is, formulae expressed in it merely are compositions of
strings. The meaning of formulae is given by the semantics and the deductive sys-
tem of the logic. The model-theoretic, also known as Tarski-style, or denotational,
semantics of a formal language as considered in this thesis is concerned with the de-
notations, true or false, of the sentences over the language [Gir90]. This is achieved
through interpretations, that is, assigning objects from a universe of discourse to
the terms of the language, which gives meaning to the formulae. A discussion on
the deduction system is given in Sec. 4.9.2 on the logic.
Only statement-type formulae, that is, such without free variables, can be in-
terpreted as they do not comprise free variables and thus get a denotation assigned
through the semantics. The different dialects of the data statement language for
different technologies as well as object specification formulae are statement-type
formulae.
An interpretation I is a mapping from constant terms to elements of the do-
main of discourse and from function and relation symbols to concrete functions and
relations.
The domain of discourse is the set that the symbols of the language are mapped
to and means, intuitively speaking, what the language being interpreted is about,
that is, the set of elements that the terms of the language refer to. The domain of
discourse is also referred to as domain, or universe of discourse, or universe. Because
we operate on a sorted logic, the domain of discourse comprises a set of elements
for each of the sorts defined in the language.
Recall that the type definitions for the data types can be seen as part of an
ontology or type system T which defines those types with the operators and relations
specified on them and the interpretations thereof. That is, those definitions are fixed
for all interpretations and need not be redefined in each interpretation. Notation-
wise, though, we handle all terms equally in the following discussions, regardless of
T . Handling the above aspects in the type system may be relevant for the logic
retaining its first-order properties.
The semantics defines, for a complete system, the meaning of the statement-type
formulae expressed in this system in a specific state Gδ, where a state is defined
through the protocols of Chapter 5 executed so far. Thus, it provides the formal
logic foundation for the cryptographic protocols. Also, it allows a party who has
observed or participated in a subset of the protocols up to this state to verify the
denotation of data statements it has received being equal to true through verification
of the protocols.
The matching of a party’s portfolio against a formula specifying a data request
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as explained in Sec. 5.4.6 is done solely on the syntactic level, without account to
an interpretation. The utility of the semantics in this context is to provide the
underlying interpretation reflecting the current system, thereby giving meaning to
the operation of matching.
4.11.1 Types and Interpretation Domains
For the definition of an interpretation I for our language, we build upon the concept
of a system state or state. A state is defined through the sequence of all instances of
cryptographic protocols that have been executed. Thus, it determines the existing
identities, conditionally released identities, opaque identities, and identifier objects.
Particularly, it also determines the terms used to refer to those, also considering the
use of different terms to refer to a single such object.
We assume a discrete state transition system with states being in a total order.
Furthermore, we assume that each transition corresponds to a discrete time value.
We denote the system state at a given time δ as Gδ. Executing a cryptographic
protocol induces a transition of the system to a new system state Gδ+1.
We make a distinction between the syntactically valid terms for a type τ˜ as
specified through its grammar and its state-dependent specification τ˜G
δ
in order
to have the basic language specification through the grammar independent of the
system state, while ensuring that only terms for which a mapping is defined in the
interpretation function are considered for a given interpretation. Thus, such type
is given by the system state Gδ based on which the interpretation is to be done.
Formulae that comprise terms not defined in a given system state do not have an
interpretation, although if they are well-formed according to the syntax.
Types τ˜ ∈ {idfo, id, crid, oid, idf, pty} have a state-dependent type extension τ˜Gδ
and thus depend on the state Gδ the interpretation is to be done in. Their state-
dependent specifications are referred to as τ˜G
δ
. For simplifying the notation, we
may omit the system state from the type when it is clear which state we mean.
For our typed logic, an interpretation requires that each type τ˜ be mapped to
a domain D
τ˜Gδ , the interpretation domain of the type. We may again simplify
notation with respect to state-dependent type specifications and use Dτ˜ when it is
clear what is referred to. Any set can have its corresponding interpretation domain
in a given state of the system, expressed using similar notation.
The interpretation domain for a type can be independent of Gδ and identical
to the type’s extension with each element being mapped to itself. For the latter
we say that the terms of the type are self referential in an interpretation. This is
the case for the data types in T dat, that is, {int, str, bool, date} and {dateξ : ξ ∈
{Y,M,D,h,m, s}} defined for our system and the type att for attribute names.
For the types idfo, id, crid, oid, idf, and pty, the respective interpretation domain
is different to the set induced by the type. The first four of the mentioned types
have functions as elements of their interpretation domains as induced through the
executed protocols modeling the creation of the identifier object, identity, condition-
ally released identity, and opaque identity, respectively. The type idf maps to the
interpretation domain of identifiers existing for established identifier objects. The
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type pty maps to the interpretation domain comprising all parties in the system.
The types id and pty have in common that multiple elements of the type can map
to a single element of the interpretation domain through an interpretation function.
Due to the property of our logic of not being based on the unique names assump-
tion, the following holds for those types and interpretation domains for τ˜ ∈ {id, pty}:
|τ˜Gδ | ≥ |D
τ˜Gδ | .
4.11.2 Interpretation
We model an identity c :: id of identity type τ in the system as a function which maps
an attribute name for an attribute of type β to the corresponding attribute value of
this type for all attributes defined by the identity type τ , where Aτ = {a1, . . . , akβτ }
with ai ∈ [[att]] is the set of attributes of the identity type and T idyτ the set of
data types corresponding to the attributes. Such function is represented through a
function symbol c defined as
c : A →
⋃
βi∈T idyτ
[[βi]] ,
with the property that c(ai) :: βi.
Note that identities and other objects, such as identifier objects, opaque identi-
ties, and conditionally released identities, are technically records, similar to records
in programming languages. However, we treat identities and such other objects as
functions for the convenience of the resulting notation and terminology. Those func-
tions have finite domains and thus can be modeled as elements of the universe of
discourse. It is easy to see that the typing of such records can be done axiomatically
and that it can be expressed easily in classical first-order logic. Henceforth, we will
use the function notation and terminology to refer to identities and other objects.
Using the symbol c, the prominently used notation c.a for referring to attribute
a of identity c is thus only an alternative notation in our language for the function
notation c(a). We use this alternative notation for it being, thanks to its record syn-
tax, more intuitive, though, we need to revert to the formal definition in the current
discussion of the semantics and for being aligned with first-order logic concepts.
Analogous to identities as explained, all conditionally released identities, opaque
identities, and identifier objects correspond to functions.
Did comprises the functions representing identities existing in the system at
state Gδ. The function X idyc is such function for identity c of type τ , where A =
{a1, . . . , akβτ } is the set comprising attribute names, kβτ the number of attributes
of τ , T idy the corresponding set of data types, and βi one of the data types:
X idyc : DA →
⋃
β∈T idyτ
Dβi .
As the type att is self-referential, DA is equal to A ⊆ [[att]]. The interpretation
domains for the types idfo, crid, and oid for identifier objects, conditionally released
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identities, and opaque identities, respectively, comprise the respective functions re-
sembling the objects of the respective object types. The function corresponding to
an identifier object p is X idfp , that of a conditionally released identity e is X cride , and
that of an opaque identity q is X oidq .
For a constant or basic variable t of type β, that is, t :: β, its interpretation,
denoted as tI , is an element of Dβ , that is, tI ∈ Dβ . For an identity c ∈ [[id]], we
have cI being a concrete function X idyc ∈ Did. For an identity c of a type τ , that
is, c ∈ [[τ ]], cI is a function X idyc ∈ Dτ ⊆ Did. The interpretation of an attribute
reference c.a of an identity is defined as
(c.a)I = (cI)(aI) ,
which is formally equivalent to the function notation cI(aI). The interpretations for
other objects and their attributes are analogous to the interpretation for identities.
The interpretation of an attribute reference can be extended recursively to ex-
pressions built using operators (functions) ◦ of DefOps, which defines the operators
over the basic data types, as defined through T on arguments of type β = int:
(s :: β ◦ t :: β)I = sI ◦β tI .
The type β is the type of the subexpressions s and t, where the type of both subex-
pressions must be the same and the operator ◦β must be defined according to our
type system T .
For date types, the situation is slightly different, as for operations on dates one
argument is a date while the other one is a date duration. No recursive definition
is required due to the simplified syntax of date expressions. Let s :: β, t :: int, where
β ∈ {date, dateY, . . . , dates}, and let date expressions be defined as follows:
(s :: β ◦ t :: int)I = sI ◦β tI .
Other types than int and the date types do not have operators defined.
A predicate symbol R with arguments t1, . . . , tk is interpreted as follows through
interpretation of its arguments and the predicate symbol with a relation:
R(t1, . . . , tk)
I = RI(tI1 , . . . , t
I
k ) .
A function symbol f with arguments t1, . . . , tk is interpreted as follows, again by
interpreting its arguments and the function symbol with a function:37
f (t1, . . . , tk)
I = f I(tI1 , . . . , t
I
k ) .
Free variables, that is, such not captured in the scope of quantifiers, are handled
by requiring that they be mapped to constant terms. For this, we use an environment
E , also called variable assignment or assignment, which is a function from the free
variables of a formula to terms of the language. A formula comprising free variables
can only be interpreted with respect to an environment E that maps all free variables
to terms which we can interpret.
The object identity t1 = t2 is built into the logic and has the semantics that both
terms connected with the =-symbol refer to the same object in any interpretation.
37Note again our use of the function terminology in this work.
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Example: Expressions. The interpretation of an expression exp is defined re-
cursively via the interpretations of the components it comprises as discussed above.
Both the type and the value of an expression are defined through its components.
Next, we present the interpretations for expressions of types int and date as exam-
ples.
Expression terms of type int are defined as a sum of l products of constant factors
uji and attribute references oji .aki as well as a constant value:
exp = uj1 · oj1 .ak1 + · · ·+ uji · oji .aki + . . .+ ujl · ojl .akl + ujl+1 .
For the interpretation expI of exp, an integer constant uji is interpreted with itself
and the attribute reference is interpreted in the standard way through a function.
The operator symbols + and · which are function symbols in the language are
replaced with the corresponding group operations +int and ·int over the integers. We
may omit the int-decoration for those operators for notational simplicity.
expI = uIj1 · (oj1 .ak1)I + . . .+ uIji · (oji .aki)I + . . .+ uIjl · (ojl .akl)I + (ujl+1)I
A date expression is much more constrained than an integer expression and its
interpretation is defined analogously. Next, we present the kind of date expressions
with the first argument being an attribute reference o.a :: dateξ and the second
argument an integer u :: int, while other forms of such expressions exist, e.g., one that
has a date constant as its first argument, with accordingly simpler interpretation:
exp = o.a + u
Such an expression is interpreted analogous to an integer expression by interpreting
both arguments and the operator symbol following the rules established further
above.
expI = (o.a)I + uI
We define the semantics of a statement φ using a standard inductive definition
of a models-relation:
I |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff I |= φ1 and I |= φ2
I |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff I |= φ1 or I |= φ2
I |= ¬φ iff I 6|= φ
I |= ∃x : φ iff x :: β and there is c ∈ [[β]] such that I[x 7→ c] |= φ
I |= t = s iff tI = sI
I |= ∀φ iff I |= φ for all φ
I |= P(t1, . . . , tk) iff PI(tI1 , . . . , tIk )
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Interpretability of formulae comprising disjunctions. Formulae with dis-
junctions deserve specific mention as for their interpretation we need to ensure that
a function X idyc exist for every identity function symbol c referred to therein. For
other objects, a function exists by definition of the protocols, even though it may
be created only in the process of proving the formula. The following two cases at
least require consideration of this: (1) A party who intends to reveal and prove cor-
rectness of such formula comprising a disjunction to another party, and (2) a party
who establishes an identity relationship which comprises a disjunction.
In either of the above cases, we cannot yet ensure, for a referred-to identity
c :: τ for which the predicates stated in the formula do not necessarily hold, that
a function X idyc ∈ Dτ ⊆ Did exists. This is due to the use of a disjunction in the
formula, that is, only one of the branches of the disjunction needs to be fulfilled by
corresponding identities of the party. From this it follows that it is not ensured that
an interpretation of such formula exists, although they are syntactically perfectly
valid. The problem with the interpretation can be solved by introducing the concept
of dummy identities.
Definition 4.3 (Dummy identity) A dummy identity c for an identity type τ
comprises the type and certifier attribute reflecting the type τ and a certifier for this
type, formalized through the corresponding function X idyc . For all further attributes
of τ , the dummy identity comprises a special, reserved, value.38
A dummy identity cτ :: τ is defined for each pair of static identity type τ and
certifier and can be referred to in formulae like any other identity. Note that X idyc ∈
Dτ and availability of such function for each dummy identity ensures that formulae
with disjunctions can be interpreted in general. Also note that the special values
for other attributes than the type and certifier are required for type correctness of
formulae. Further details on dummy identities in a system are given in Sec. 5.1.2.
Note that Case (2) cannot be realized with our credential protocols, though, can
be realized with protocols based on online certifiers who vouch for the statement in
an identity relationship.
Well-typed formulae. The semantics of well-typed statement-type formulae has
been defined above. The semantics of non-well-typed, or ill-typed, formulae is unde-
fined as it is unclear what the meaning of such statements is in reality in this case.
One example for an ill-typed statement is a formula comprising a predicate with
arguments of types not compliant with the predicate signature, e.g., the predicate
Eqstr×str(c.lastName, t) with lastName :: str, t :: int.
Recall that, due to our approach of handling the typing of identities as presented
in Sec. 4.4.11.2, all identities are of the same type id without subtyping through the
built-in typing of the logic. In contrast to related work [CMN+10], we can therefore
not ensure only through considering the built-in types of terms for the typing of
identities, conditionally released identities, opaque identities, and identifier objects
38Note that we do not further define the treatment of this special value per data type in the
respective sections on formal languages and semantics.
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that the interpretation of attribute references of such objects is defined in case a
formula violates our static typing scheme for objects. In such type violation case, the
function image corresponding to the identity for a referenced attribute is undefined.
In the case that a function cannot be evaluated, there exists no interpretation for a
given formula and the formula is considered to not be a well-formed formula of our
logic.
The reason for this less stringent typing system of the logic itself is that we do
not define identity types in the standard type system of the logic, but on top of it.
This holds analogously for opaque and conditionally released identities. This is a
minor drawback of our modeling approach for the typing of those objects.
4.11.3 Predicates
We next define the semantics of the predicate symbols of the language through the
interpretation of their arguments and concrete predicates.
Note that the technical implementation of the predicates, e.g., encoding of date
values as integers, does not need to be considered in the semantics of the language
and needs to be handled in the implementation based on private certificate protocols.
Predicates on integers. Let the predicate symbol Pint×int be any of the symbols
referring to relation predicates on arguments of type int:
Pint×int ∈ {Eqint×int,Neqint×int, Ltint×int, Leqint×int,Geqint×int,Gtint×int} .
The semantics of a predicate Pint×int over the integers can be defined through
interpreting its arguments and interpreting the predicate symbol with the corre-
sponding relation over the integers:
I |= Pint×int(exp1 :: int, exp2 :: int) iff PIint×int(expI1 , expI2 )
PIint×int, the interpretation of Pint×int, is defined as the corresponding relation over
the integers as
PIint×int =

=int if Pint×int = Eqint×int
6=int if Pint×int = Neqint×int
<int if Pint×int = Ltint×int
≤int if Pint×int = Leqint×int
≥int if Pint×int = Geqint×int
>int if Pint×int = Gtint×int
,
where the relations =int, 6=int, <int,≤int,≥int, and >int are the standard equality, non-
equality, and inequality relations over the integers.39
39For notational convenience we abbreviate the typing decoration β × β of the binary relations
with a single β.
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Note that the infix notation tI1 P
I
int×int t
I
2 for a binary relation on terms t
I
1 , t
I
2
for its interpretation is equivalent to its relation notation PIint×int(t
I
1 , t
I
2 ) and we may
use those notations interchangeably. Note also that the arguments of the predicate
Pint×int are expressions over the integers and thus integers in the trivial case.
Predicates on dates. The various date types are particularly interesting because
of the generic type date and the different granularized types dateξ that may be
arguments of predicates.
As a prerequisite, we define a function Expand(d, ξ2) to increase the granularity
of a given date constant d :: ξ1 to granularity ξ2 by concatenating delimiting tokens
and zeroes to the right side of the representation of the constant d until it is expressed
with granularity ξ2. Let Ĝdate := {(Y,M), (M,D), (D,h), (h,m), (m, s)} ⊂ Gdate be
the ordering expressed over all “adjacent” symbols indicating date granularities. Let
GdateTO := {(1,Y), (2,M), (3,D), (4,h), (5,m), (6, s)} define a total order over the date
granularities, ranging from coarse to fine granular. In 4.24, we define the Expand
function through a recursive definition based on Ĝdate and GdateTO .
Expand(d, ξ2) :=

d||“-00” if d :: dateY, ξ2 = M
d||“-00” if d :: dateM, ξ2 = D
. . .
d||“-00” if d :: datem, ξ2 = s
Expand(Expand(d, ξ′), ξ2) if d :: dateξ1 , (i, ξ1) ∈ GdateTO ,
(j, ξ′) ∈ GdateTO , i < j,
(ξ′, ξ2) ∈ Ĝdate
(4.24)
As an example, the function with arguments Expand(2011-07-01, s) evaluates to
2011-07-01-00-00-00 in granularity s indicating seconds.
Next, we present the predicates on date arguments of the same granularized date
type dateξ with ξ ∈ {Y,M,D,h,m, s} as
exp1, exp2 :: date
ξ
I |= Pdateξ×dateξ(exp1, exp2) iff PIdateξ×dateξ(expI1 , expI2 )
with
PI =

=dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Eqdateξ×dateξ
6=dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Neqdateξ×dateξ
<dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Ltdateξ×dateξ
≤dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Leqdateξ×dateξ
≥dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Geqdateξ×dateξ
>dateξ if Pdateξ×dateξ = Gtdateξ×dateξ
,
where the relations =dateξ , 6=dateξ , <dateξ ,≤dateξ ,≥dateξ , and >dateξ are the standard
relations over the given date type.
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Eqdate×date is the semantically most relaxed equality predicate with both argu-
ments being typed with the generic date type date and therefore comprising a value
of any of the granularized date types. It interprets the less-granular argument as
a range and evaluates the range boundaries with respect to the other argument
using predicates for arguments of the same granularity. Equality holds if the more
fine-granular argument is within the range that the less-granular one is interpreted
as. There are two cases to consider, namely the first or the second argument of the
predicate being the more fine granular argument.
I |= Eqdate×date(d1, d2) iff

I |= Geqdateξ2×dateξ2 (d2,Expand(d1, ξ2)) and
I |= Ltdateξ2×dateξ2 (d2,Expand(d1 + 1, ξ2))
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ1, ξ2), ξ1 6= ξ2
I |= Geqdateξ2×dateξ2 (d1,Expand(d2, ξ1)) and
I |= Ltdateξ2×dateξ2 (d1,Expand(d2 + 1, ξ1))
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ2, ξ1), ξ1 6= ξ2
The above specifies the semantics of the predicate symbol Eqdate×date over the generic
date type completely through using predicate symbols on the granularized types the
semantics of which is defined as explained before and expressing the models-relation
on those.
Non-equality NeqIdate,date is the negation of the above and realized analogously.
Example 4.29 (Equality of arguments of different types of date) A con-
crete example of arguments being of day and hour granularity and the definition of
the predicate for such arguments follow:
d1 :: date
D, d2 :: date
h
I |= Eq(d1, d2) iff I |= Geq(d2,Expand(d1,h)) and I |= Lt(d2,Expand(d1 + 1,h)) .
Inequalities with arguments d1, d2 of type date with different granularities are
defined through inequality predicates on the same granularized types. First, we
present the definition of the predicate Leqdate×date:
I |= Leqdate×date(d1, d2) iff

I |= Leqξ2×ξ2(Expand(d1, ξ2), d2)
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ1, ξ2), ξ1 6= ξ2
I |= Ltξ1×ξ1(d1,Expand(d2, ξ1))
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ2, ξ1), ξ1 6= ξ2 .
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The inequality Ltdate×date is realized similar to the above:
I |= Ltdate×date(d1, d2) iff

I |= Leqξ2×ξ2(Expand(d1 + 1, ξ2), d2)
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ1, ξ2), ξ1 6= ξ2
I |= Ltξ1×ξ1(d1,Expand(d2, ξ1))
if d1 :: date
ξ1 , d2 :: date
ξ2 ,
Gdate(ξ2, ξ1), ξ1 6= ξ2 .
The further inequality relations Geqdate×date and Gtdate×date between arguments of
different granularized types are handled analogously considering the range semantics
of the less-granular argument.
Note that using our cryptographic credential protocols, only a subset of the
defined predicates can be proven in zero knowledge depending on which of the
arguments are constants or expressions.
Considering the above discussions, the support of different granularized types
in the relation predicates substantially increases complexity of the semantics and
implementation, and it particularly can lead to increased runtime for equality rela-
tions.
Predicates on strings. The predicates our language supports for strings are
equality Eqstr×str and the negation Neqstr×str thereof, while predicates for expressing
lexicographic ordering over strings are not supported due to the performance issues
of the related cryptographic protocols. The semantics for the predicate Eqstr×str on
arguments of type str is defined as follows, where t1, t2 :: str and =str is the relation
for string equality for elements of the interpretation domain Dstr:
I |= Eqstr×str(t1, t2) iff tI1 =str tI2 .
The semantics of negation Neqstr×str of the Eqstr×str predicate can be defined
directly through the non-equality 6=str of the interpretations of the string arguments
through the 6=str-operator for arguments of the interpretation domain:
I |= Neqstr×str(t1, t2) iff tI1 6=str tI2 .
Predicates on booleans. The semantics for the type bool is easy to define fol-
lowing the ideas given already above for str-typed arguments:
I |= Eqbool×bool(t1, t2) iff tI1 =bool tI2 ,
I |= Neqbool×bool(t1, t2) iff tI1 6=bool tI2 .
Equality on party identifiers. A data type deserving specific mention is the
type pty as different terms can be interpreted with the same identifier for a party.
This is a key property of our approach to data representation and impacts the se-
mantics: Only equality of parties can be expressed in our logic using object equality
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(=). The predicate is true if both its arguments are interpreted with the same party
in an interpretation I.
Equality over parties is defined through equality over the interpretations of the
arguments and refers to equality of the referred-to parties, not the terms:
I |= (t1 = t2) iff (tI1 =pty tI2 ) .
The relation =pty is well defined and evaluatable for the interpretation domain Dpty
of the type. The interpretation of a term of type pty is a system-wide unique
identifier for the party that need not be further specified. The interesting aspect
for this equality relation is its dependence on the system state specified through the
interpretation I.
The =-relation on subject , holder , certifier , and recipient attributes refers to
the equality of parties, and not equality of the terms used for referring to them.
That is, even for different terms that refer to the same party, equality can hold,
that is, for different pseudonyms referring to the same party. It is important to
mention that this predicate cannot be evaluated by every party which exactly re-
flects the power of pseudonymous interactions: The holder of pseudonyms can link
different pseudonyms to belong to the same party through the terms it uses, the
recipient cannot do so by default, unless given additional information by the holder,
thus, those equality relationships remain hidden at the syntactic level. This shows
the appropriateness of our choice of using a logic with equality for our modeling
purposes.
Attribute names. We do not need to express predicates over att-typed arguments
as such arguments are only used as arguments of functions corresponding to identifier
objects, identities, opaque identities, and conditionally released identies.
4.11.4 Interpretation for a System State
We next define an interpretation I which determines the meaning of formulae in a
concrete system in a given system state Gδ. This formally connects the language
fragments of Lp, e.g., Lp/c, corresponding to specific technologies, to the crypto-
graphic protocols that have been executed until Gδ has been reached. We note that
we are interested in a single relevant interpretation for a system at state Gδ only,
which is a function of Gδ, or, equivalently, the protocols executed until then.
Considering the discussions above, the interpretation function I is a surjective
function from the (state-dependent) types to their (state-dependent) interpretation
domains. The function corresponds to a partition shown in (4.25) comprising the
functions of the different types.
I =I idfo ∪ I id ∪ Ioid ∪ Icrid ∪ Iatt ∪ I idf ∪ Ipty∪
I int ∪ Idate ∪
 ⋃
ξ∈{Y,M,D,h,m,s}
Idateξ
 ∪ Istr ∪ Ibool (4.25)
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When we want to refer to the interpretation I τ˜ for a type τ˜ in a specific system
state Gδ, we may make this explicit with the notation I τ˜ ,δ.
Every execution of a cryptographic protocol, the functionality of which in terms
of the data representation is discussed in Chapter 5, induces a state transition from
Gδ to Gδ+1. This state transition induces a change of the state-dependent types
and corresponding interpretation domains as well as the interpretation function.
The execution of one instance of a protocol is assumed to be atomic. We consider a
system state Gδ to be equivalent to the corresponding sequence of protocol instances
executed for reaching it.
We anticipate in the following discussion partly how the execution of each of the
cryptographic protocols discussed in detail in terms of data modeling in Chapter 5
influences the system state. Particularly, we also use some terminology and symbols
introduced in Chapter 5 without being introduced now. For a full understanding of
the following discussion, Chapter 5 is a prerequisite.
4.11.4.1 Establishing a Registration Subject Identifier
An instance of the protocol EstIdtfRelReg between parties A and B, with an optional
delegater D, creates a new registration identifier object referred to through the term
t′p, modeled through its corresponding function X idft′p . Execution of the protocol
creates a new term for referring to A or new terms for A and D in case of delegation,
reflected in an updated interpretation function
Ipty,δ := Ipty,δ−1 ∪ Ipty,∆t′p ,
where Ipty,∆t′p = {(t′h,A,A)} in the case of no delegation and I
pty,∆t′p = {(t′h,B,A),
(t′s,A,D)} in the case of delegation. Recall that the term renaming function for t′p
is defined as %idft′p = {} in the non-delegation case and %idft′p = {(th,A, t′h,B)} in the
delegation case. Execution of the protocol updates the interpretation function
I idfo,δ := I idfo,δ−1 ∪ I idfo,∆t′p ,
with I idfo,∆t′p = (t′p,X idft′p ), where X idft′p = {(holder ,A), (subject ,A), (subjectId ,
t′sid,A)} in the non-delegation case and X idft′p = {(holder ,A), (subject ,D), (subjectId ,
t′sid,A)} in the delegation case, and optionally comprising the tuple (domain, tdm) in
case of a domain identifier object.
4.11.4.2 Establishing a Subject Identifier
A protocol instance EstIdtfRel between parties A and B, with an optional delegater
D, creates a new identifier object t′p, modeled through its corresponding function
X idft′p . Execution of the protocol creates a new term for B referring to A and addi-
tionally a new term for referring to D in case of delegation:
Ipty,δ := Ipty,δ−1 ∪ Ipty,∆t′p
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where Ipty,∆t′p = {(t′h,B,A)} for the non-delegation case and I
pty,∆t′p = {(t′h,B,A),
(t′s,B,D)} in the delegation case. Additionally, execution of the protocol updates
the interpretation function
I idfo,δ := I idfo,δ−1 ∪ I idfo,∆t′p .
where I idfo,∆t′p = (t′p,X idft′p ) and X idft′p = {(holder ,A), (subject ,A), (subjectId , t′sid,A)}
in case of no delegation and X idft′p = {(holder ,A), (subject ,D), (subjectId , t′sid,A)} in
the delegation case, always with an optional domain (domain, tdm).
4.11.4.3 Establishing an Identity Relationship
A protocol instance of EstIdtyRel between parties A and B, with an optional dele-
gater D, creates a new identity relationship between A and B, either with A or D
as subject, in case of it being without or with delegation, respectively. The term t′c
used by both A and B for referring to the created identity corresponds to a function
X idyt′c which is the interpretation for the identity, resulting in
I id,δ := I id,δ−1 ∪ {(t′c,X idyt′c )} .
Thereby, X idyt′c is the function representing the identity as discussed in detail in other
parts of this work. No new terms for referring to the parties are created during this
protocol, thus
Ipty,δ := Ipty,δ−1 .
Regardless of executing an instance of EstIdtyRel, each pair of identity type and
certifier for which identities are to be issued by the certifier gives rise to a dummy
identity referred to through c and modeled through X idyc , thus, giving rise to the
tuple (c,X idyc ) being added to I id,δ−1, where Gδ is the system state corresponding
to the creation of the identity type by the certifier.
4.11.4.4 Releasing Data
An instance of the protocol RelData between parties A and B, with an optional
delegater D being referred to, releases a data statement to B. Thereby, only existing
terms for referring to the parties are used, that is, the interpretation function for
parties remains the same:40
Ipty,δ := Ipty,δ−1 .
New terms are created for referring to identities, as well as for to-be-established
conditionally released identities and opaque identities, and lead to updates of the
corresponding interpretation functions for those types of objects.
40Note, though, that in a practical implementation, this protocol can lead to the implicit estab-
lishment of new identifier relationships as part of the protocol for reasons of efficiency and more
concise protocol specification.
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Let tidy1 , . . . , t
idy
`idy
be the identities corresponding to credential-based identity rela-
tionships of the party and dummy identities referred to in the formula to be released.
Execution of the protocol extends I through introducing new terms t′idy1 , . . . , t
′idy
`idy
for identities:
I id,δ := I id,δ−1 ∪
`idy⋃
i=1
(t
′idy
i ,X idytidyi ) .
Let tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid be the terms for referring to the conditionally released iden-
tities generated in the protocol and toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid the terms for referring to the
generated opaque identities. The interpretation function is extended as presented
next, using new terms for the newly created conditionally released identities and
opaque identities and adding them to the corresponding functions:
Icrid,δ := Icrid,δ−1 ∪
`crid⋃
ˆ`crid+1
(tcridi ,X cridtcridi ) and
Ioid,δ := Ioid,δ−1 ∪
`oid⋃
ˆ`oid+1
(toidi ,X oidtoidi ) .
For a formula to be released, the context of whom the formula is to be released
to influences the applicable terms for the holder and subject of the parties the
formula makes statements about. The constraints on terms th and ts referring to a
holder and a subject are that a term th may only be a term that A has previously
established with B about party A and, analogously, for the delegater D, a term
referring to it as subject may only be a term established by A with B about D
previously, through an instance of a protocol for establishing an identifier object. In
case those constraints are not met, the formula may still be true according to the
denotational semantics, though a cryptographic proof of it that might be accepted
by B cannot be verified any more by the data recipient B.
Following the above, the system state Gδ gives rise to the following state-
dependent type definitions and interpretation domains for the non-self-referential
types as defined in (4.26), thereby defining the permissible terms in formulae and
their interpretations, respectively, in a given system state.
idfoG
δ
= preimg(I idfo,Gδ) Didfo = img(I idfo,Gδ)
idG
δ
= preimg(I id,Gδ) Did = img(I id,Gδ)
cridG
δ
= preimg(Icrid,Gδ) Dcrid = img(Icrid,Gδ)
oidG
δ
= preimg(Ioid,Gδ) Doid = img(Ioid,Gδ)
ptyG
δ
= preimg(Ipty,Gδ) Dpty = img(Ipty,Gδ)
idfG
δ
= preimg(I idf,Gδ) Didf = img(I idf,Gδ)
(4.26)
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4.11.5 Extension: Operators on Attributes
Our extension of Sec. 4.4.17 of introducing operators for attributes requires further
consideration and makes the definitions of the predicates and the underlying logic
more non-standard. Recall that an operator allows for an inequality to be expressed
on an attribute in the definition of the object, e.g., identity, without using a formula.
Next, we sketch the basic ideas for such extension without giving full details.
For this extension, a function X idyc modeling an identity and the functions corre-
sponding to the other kinds of objects are redefined such that they map an attribute
name not only to the typed attribute value, rather they map an attribute name to
a tuple (d :: β, op :: Op) comprising the value d of type β of the attribute and an
operator op. That is, the functions do not map any more to an element of a basic
data type alone, which changes the definition of predicates when an argument is an
attribute reference.
Interpretations are done analogously by mapping identities and other crypto-
graphic objects, represented as function symbols, to the actual functions of the
interpretation domain of the types. Considering the definitions given earlier, an at-
tribute reference is interpreted with a pair (d :: β, op :: Op). Constants and variables
denoting elements of basic data types are typed with such. This leads to the situa-
tion that predicates on the basic data types need to take the definition of attribute
references through operator-attribute tuples and terms typed with basic types into
consideration.
Concretely, this leads to a substantial complication of the definition of the pred-
icates on the basic types and the recursive definition of terms recursively composed
through operators, comprising also expressions. The semantics of those predicates
is defined through reducing them to the predicates expressed without operators
and accounting for the operator-value tuples through distinguishing cases for the
operators. Recursively composed terms are handled similarly by considering cases
depending on the operators of the components.
Using operators complicates the semantics and the deductive system of the logic
substantially by deviating from the standard definitions of the data types and mak-
ing the relation predicates substantially more involved, as well as the interpretations.
This is the main reason why operators are maintained only as an optional extension
to our system.
Predicates. Next, we define the semantics for the predicate Eq(int×Opint)×int on an
integer-operator argument and an integer-only argument to give an example for the
semantics specification when having operator support.
I |= Eq(int×Opint)×int((d1, op1), d2) iff dI1 =int dI2 and op1 = eq
The other required predicates can be specified using similar ideas, though are
not presented here.
Expressions on integers. Recursive definition of terms also needs to take the
operators into account. Expressions on the int-type are a good example for this and
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we sketch the approach for such expressions as one particular example of recursive
definition of terms.
Let an expression exp be defined as is standard as a sum of products and a
constant term. Then, the interpretation eˆI of the value eˆ, without operator, of the
expression exp is defined as the expression on the interpreted values with operators
of the type int, where pii(t) is the i-th projection of tuple t:
eˆI :=uIj1 · pi1((oj1 .ak1)I) + . . .+ uIji · pi1((oji .aki)I) + . . .+
uIjl · pi1((ojl .akl)I) + uIjl+1 .
The operator of the expression is derived as shown in (4.27), where the expression
is undefined in case the last of the cases applies. Let for the operator derivation
below opji be defined as pi
2((oji .aki)
I), where variable i ranges from 1 to l and let
⊥ represent a value that is undefined.
expI :=

(eˆ, eq) if ∀i : opji = eq
(eˆ, lt) if ∃i : opji = lt ∧ ∀i′ 6= i : opji′ = eq ∨ opji′ = leq ∨ opji′ = lt
(eˆ, leq) if ∃i : opji = leq ∧ ∀i′ 6= i : opji′ = eq ∨ opji′ = leq
(eˆ, geq) if ∃i : opji = geq ∧ ∀i′ 6= i : opji′ = eq ∨ opji′ = geq
(eˆ, gt) if ∃i : opji = gt ∧ ∀i′ 6= i : opji′ = eq ∨ opji′ = geq ∨ opji′ = gt
⊥ = otherwise
(4.27)
An observation is that not all combinations of operators in the arguments lead to
valid expressions which substantially constrains how expressions can be expressed.
Practically, this is not a notable limitation when considering the use cases for oper-
ators.
The by far most relevant case is the one of all operators being eq which is the
case of standard expressions on integers. The other cases capture requirements
of rather specific use cases which compute expressions over integers with operators
and have multiple restrictions on the integers to be considered. This functionality of
computing expressions on attributes with operators other than the equality operator
can be considered optional due to its specificity.
4.11.6 Discussion
The data model and its semantics are constructed such that the semantics applies
throughout all formulae in a system at a given state, not only a single formula or
set of formulae in isolation. Concretely, this means that terms have global validity
in the system, not only in a limited context, such as an authentication transaction.
This partially leads to the complications in our data model, e.g., the (re)naming of
terms to refer to entities.
A substantial advantage of a semantics with those properties is that a recipient
party of data statements can derive new formulae from multiple received formulae
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and the semantics equally applies to such formulae as well. For example, this is
relevant for supporting incremental authentication. For different approaches where
a semantics is defined for a single formula viewed in isolation, the semantics does not
apply for formulae derived through the logical calculus from multiple such formulae.
Capturing aspects such as revocation of identities or consumption of identities
through their usage, that is, temporal aspects or aspects of non-monotonicity would
require consideration of non-standard logic, e.g., linear logic, for expressing this.
We have modeled such aspects as operational semantics of the underlying protocols.
Keeping those aspects outside of our data model and semantics and constraining it
to capturing basic identity data aspects makes it compatible with the monotonicity
property of first-order logic and allows for interpreting a formula in the latest system
state Gδmax where the formula has been derived from formulae released in earlier
system states.
Our semantics models the actual relations that hold in terms of identity manage-
ment in a system at a given state, e.g., the attribute values of identities, or holders,
subjects, and certifiers of the identities in the system, rather than being constrained
to modeling what can be (cryptographically) proven by parties to other parties
based on their portfolio and a concrete suite of mechanisms. That is, a formula true
under an interpretation corresponding to a system state may be not provable us-
ing certain cryptographic protocols, because mechanisms constrain which formulae
can be proven. This is intended rather than being a limitation, because the primary
purpose of a semantics is defining the denotation of each formula in a system. Cryp-
tographic or other techniques for establishing the correctness of a released formula,
e.g., a proof of equality of the subject of two identities, govern which statements
can be established by a party using cryptographic material it holds.
Related to this, there is a difference between the statements that can be proven by
a party through cryptographic mechanisms and the statements that can be syntacti-
cally deduced from those statements in our calculus, while both are statement-type
formulae and captured by our semantics.
Also, there exists a gap between formulae that are fulfilled according to the
semantics of the language Lp/g and what can be derived by a party having received
the formulae. Less can be derived, e.g., linking different pseudonyms to the same
holder or subject is possible only if the equality of those has been established by the
sender. This precisely captures the idea of privacy-enhancing protocols and has led
to the complications with the term for referring to objects and semantics.
For a clean modeling of formulae comprising disjunctions through the semantics,
we have used the approach of introducing what we refer to as dummy identities. For
those parts of a formula which are not fulfilled through identities or other objects
related to a party, those globally defined dummy identities are used for being able
to interpret such a formula. This is crucial for the semantics of a data-minimizing
formula a party wants to release, which refers both to credentials and pseudonyms
the party holds as well as credentials that it does not hold. This has solved only
one of the multiple challenges related to disjunctions in formulae.

Chapter5
Cryptographic Protocol
Integration
In the current chapter we discuss the application of the data representation concepts
of Sec. 4.4 for expressing data in our system. This comprises the representation of
formulae corresponding to identifier objects and identities and formulae for the spec-
ification of the interfaces of the cryptographic protocols to be executed to establish
those, as well as for the data release protocol to utilize those objects for releas-
ing data. We present the different languages required for expressing those system
aspects and discuss how they relate to each other. Also, we discuss how the proto-
cols relate to the data stored by a party and how output of a protocol is handled
by a party. Because the presented protocols are a means for realizing the channel
transformation rules presented in our channel model of Chapter 3, we explain how
the protocols relate to and thereby realize the authentication functionality of this
model. Our holistic view over all protocols a party can execute, instead of only the
data release protocol as in many related works, is, by formally relating the different
protocols, an important contribution.
For our presentation, we go into a deep level of detail on the data representation
beyond the conceptual level for avoiding ambiguities and facilitating an implemen-
tation of the overall system. Thereby, the presentation touches on crucial aspects
related to an implementation of the system, such as interfaces for the protocols.
213
214 5 Cryptographic Protocol Integration
The protocol interface discussions can be seen as a substantial extension and gen-
eralization of earlier work by the author [CSZ06b, CSZ06a] which had interfaces of
the protocols for a privacy-enhancing PKI system as one of its contributions. The
current work is based on a generalization of the protocols as well as formally linking
them to the data representation. An implementation architecture of further aspects
of the protocol implementation is presented in work by the author [Som11].
As part of our presentation of the protocol interfaces, we particularly show how
cryptographic objects are created in protocols, stored in the party’s portfolio and
repository, and re-used between instances of (different) protocols by being referred
to through terms of the logic-based data representation across those protocol in-
stances. Preventing undesired linkabilities being established between protocol in-
stances through the data representation and obtaining a data representation which is
capable of utilizing the reasoning capabilities of our logic, e.g., for matching a party’s
identifier and identity relationships against a data request, require the approach be-
ing explained for creating and renaming constant terms in our logic-based language
used to refer to objects or parties. This handling of terms introduces additional
complexity in contrast to comparable languages which may seem unproportionate
at a first glance. Though, this term handling provides substantial benefits, such
as the full support of automated deductions in different contexts, particularly for
matching a party’s repository formulae against data requests, authorization deci-
sions, and making deductions in our logic over multiple received data statements
of a party, a semantics valid over all data statements in a system and not only
defined for individual formulae, and full integration of delegation support into the
logic-based modeling and reasoning.
In this chapter we focus on protocols based on credential systems as underlying
cryptographic technology. See Chapter 6 for a summary of our approach for the run-
time generation of cryptographic protocols for releasing data. A generic, protocol-
independent, view of our system for the support of further certification technologies
besides credential systems is presented in earlier work [Som11]. Particularly, we
show how cryptographic approaches are used for realizing registration domains and
delegation registration domains.
We note that the notation we use for addressing entities such as parties or
identifier objects in the following discussions diverges from the notation used for
the channel model in Chapter 3. The reason is that in the discussions below, a
single protocol may realize different aspects of a rule in the model and thereby
we cannot reuse the same notation, e.g., different certifiers Ci and Ck+1 in rule
AuthDele-Cred are represented with B in the protocol for establishing an identity
relationship. Related to the protocols for establishing identifier relationships and
identity relationships, we interchangeably use the terminology of establishing the
corresponding identifier object or identity.
5.1 Prerequisites
We next present some prerequisites needed for a discussion of the protocols.
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5.1.1 Cryptographic Object Structures
For each object type, that is, each identity type, conditionally released identity type,
and opaque identity type, a corresponding structure, or cryptographic object struc-
ture, determining the technical encoding for the cryptographic object is required in
order to be able to compute cryptographic protocols based on those. A structure is
defined for each certificate type issued by a given certifier, opaque identity type, or
conditionally released identity type either explicitly or implicitly.
Recall that the type of an object defines its attributes and their data types.
While identity types are specified explicitly, the type of an opaque or conditionally
released identity is given implicitly through the relation of the attributes of the
object with attributes of other objects through relation predicates in the formula
through a data release protocol of which the cryptographic object gets created, made
explicit during the protocol, and stored with the created cryptographic object. The
reason for not specifying the types of opaque or conditionally released identities
explicitly upfront is to not complicate policy authoring.
The structure for an object type determines the technical encoding for the repre-
sentation of the data expressed in the object specification formula, or, equivalently,
expressed in the corresponding formula in the semantics. This encoding does not
have any meaning at the level of the data model, but rather is necessary for the
technical implementation of the semantics expressed through the formula in the
data model using cryptographic techniques.
The main part of the encoding specification of a structure is a function M
specifying the mapping from attributes specified in the object specification formula
to integer attributes of the corresponding cryptographic object. The preimage of
the function comprises the attributes of the object and the image contains triples
each comprising the data type of the attribute, a mapping algorithm, and a tuple of
indices. The data type and mapping algorithm determine how the attribute value is
mapped to its cryptographic representation, the index tuple comprises the indices
of attributes of the cryptographic object that the attribute is mapped to.
For identities, the structure is denoted certificate structure as it specifies the tech-
nical encoding for the private certificate used for realizing the identity. A certificate
structure for a given certificate type by a given certifier is specified by the certifier
or another desigated party. Integrity of a certificate structure is ensured through
certification using traditional PKI approaches or a Fiat-Shamir signature-based PKI
in the case of pseudonymous certifiers. Thus, for an identity, the structure needs to
be obtained by a party that intends to execute a cryptographic protocol referring
to an identity of this type and certifier from the certifier of the identity.
For a certificate structure, the encoding is specified through the functionM and
the supported features and details regarding their cryptographic realization through
integer attributes of the certificate through the function F .
For conditionally released and opaque identities, the structure is determined by
the party in the instance of the RelData protocol in which it is created and stored
as metadata expressed over the cryptographic objects. As the latter structures are
determined through the formula being released and proven, using the same approach
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of PKI-based integrity protection is not a flexible approach.
5.1.2 Dummy Identities and Certificates
For realizing cryptographic proofs comprising disjunctions over predicates expressed
over identities that the prover cannot fulfill with the identities of its identity rela-
tionships, we make use of the concept of dummy identities introduced with the
semantics in Def. 4.3 in Sec. 4.11.
For each dummy identity c, an object specification formula φc describes its at-
tributes analogous to the identity specification formula or formulae specifying an
identity in an identity relationship. The difference is, though, that only statements
about the type and certifier are made—all other attributes are left unspecified in-
stead of being populated with arbitrary values in order to avoid problems with policy
matching.
The constant term for referring to a dummy identity is computed by applying
a collision-resistant one-way function to a canonicalized representation of the at-
tribute values of the identity concatenated with the corresponding certifier public
key. This avoids, with overwhelming probability, that different dummy identities for
the same type and certifier can have the same term for referring to them. The term
construction is analogous to the derivation of terms for identities from cryptographic
material realizing identities, and so is the purpose.
A dummy identity has corresponding certifier specification formulae specifying
an identifier object and identity that have the certifier as subject. The integrity of
those formulae can be verified cryptographically by the party through PKI using
standard mechanisms or a Fiat-Shamir based signature in case of a pseudonymous
certifier.
Dummy identities are utilized for finding satisfying formulae for data requests
comprising disjunctions by using automated deduction in our logic calculus. For
such requests, a dummy identity can match with predicates in an OR-branch of a
request for which the party does not have identity relationships, that is, credentials,
consistent with those predicates. Through its definition, a dummy identity always
matches correctly the type and certifier predicates anywhere in the formula, while
predicates in OR-branches referring to the dummy identity need not hold when
other OR-branches are fulfilled.
A dummy identity with its object specification formula can be created by the
certifier of identities of such types and its integrity protected through a signature
with the issuing key of the certifier. Architecturally, specification formulae of dummy
identities are conveyed to parties as part of ontologies as explained in Sec. 4.10.
Using such ontology, a party can find a dummy identity as a matching identity for
predicates in an unfulfilled OR-branch of a data request.
A dummy identity referred to as tidyi is associated with a dummy certificate
χcrti comprising only a certificate structure and the attribute tuples, though no
cryptographic certificate, that is, signature. The certificate structure is required for
constructing cryptographic proofs in which proofs for assertions about the dummy
identity are to be simulated using zero-knowledge proof of knowledge simulation
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techniques as part of a disjunctive statement. The certificate structure is the exact
same certificate structure the certifier provides for any certificate of the same type.
A dummy identity is also related to the public key of the certifier—this key is used
by all parties executing protocols based on private certificates of this type issued by
the certifier. A dummy certificate for a dummy identity can be constructed by a
party based on the certificate structure and the specification formula for the identity.
5.2 Establishing Identifier Relationships
The concept of identifier relationships has been introduced in Sec. 4.7.1. The below-
presented protocols for establishing identifier relationships are suitable for the case of
party B being known under a (public) pseudonym to A. The two-way pseudonymous
case where the other party does not reveal a pseudonym upfront can be handled in
a similar way, where the difference is that initially B is not known by a pseudonym
which needs to be reflected in the protocols and their interfaces.
5.2.1 Protocol for Establishing a Registration Identifier Re-
lationship
The protocol EstIdtfRelReg is used by a party A to create a new identifier object
for itself or another party D as subject with a party B, in the context of a registra-
tion of A in the sense of our model of Chapter 3 or registration with a delegation
certifier. In the further case, a registration identifier object is created, in the lat-
ter case, a delegation registration identifier object. The identifier object realizes a
pseudonym and is technically represented at both involved parties A and B through
a new identifier relationship. In our channel model, this protocol is executed when-
ever a party intends to establish a pseudonymous relationship with a registration
certifier or with a certifier for the purpose of establishing a delegation relationship.
In the idealized model of a pseudonym and credential system of Lysyanskaya et
al. [LRSW00] and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01], a registration is done once
for each user only, thereby imposing constraining assumptions. We next present the
inputs and outputs of the parties A and B for an instance of the protocol.
EstIdtfRelReg protocol interface:
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Input
A φA, {3(“estWith”, tsidB),3(“subj”, ts)}
B −
Output
A φ′A, {3(“role”, “holder”),3(“estWith”, tsidB),
3(“pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂gc),3(“privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜gc),
3(“renFct”, %idf)}, successA
B φ′B, {3(“role”, “recipient”),3(“estWith”, tsidB),
3(“pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂gc)}, successB
Notational concepts. For the interface for the protocol EstIdtfRelReg, we intro-
duce the general approach we employ for specifying interfaces of protocols of using,
for the input and output of each of the involved parties, formulae for making state-
ments about objects and using metadata predicates, e.g., for expressing pseudonym
identifiers and cryptographic material.
Formulae. The formulae are based on the concepts of the data model of
Sec. 4.4. Different constrained languages are used for representing those formulae.
Free variables in a formula are used for indicating that those be instantiated with
concrete terms in a corresponding output formula.
Metadata. The metadata predicates are implicitly associated with the for-
mula through the interface notation and expressed through 3-predicates. A meta-
data predicate can be of one of the following kinds: First, the predicate comprises
a label χ3 specifying the kind of metadata and a metadata item ξ3 as in (5.1).
Second, it—in addition—comprises a term o3 for referring to the object that the
metadata applies to as in (5.2). The object needs to be one that is referred to in
the formula that the metadata predicate is associated with. Through this approach
we can associate metadata with formulae in general and also with specific objects
referred to therein. Note that, by referring to objects in metadata predicates using
terms of our data representation approach, we introduce parts of the formalized
data representation based on the data model into the representation of metadata.
Metadata predicates being part of the protocol output can be stored transparently
with an established identifier relationship or identity relationship or other entry.
3(χ3, ξ3) (5.1)
3(o3, χ3, ξ3) (5.2)
Explicit and implicit input. The interface of a protocol as we specify it
comprises the input and output elements of the protocol, though, there are different
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ways of how elements can be provided as input. On the one hand, an item can be
explicitly passed as part of the protocol input at the API level of the implementa-
tion of the protocol, on the other hand an item can be retrieved by the protocol’s
implementation from the party’s data repositories or online services based on fur-
ther information available in the input, particularly the terms referred to in input
formulae. The latter approach to protocol input is denoted by putting the respec-
tive input element in between 〈〈 〉〉 symbols. We chose this notational approach in
order to make all required inputs and outputs for the protocol explicit in the inter-
face, while constraining the input elements required to be explicitly passed in an
implementation to the minimum possible and therefore following the architecture
paradigm of encapsulating the complexity of a subsystem within it. This discus-
sion is already very close to an implementation and corresponding architecture—see
Sommer [Som11] on related aspects of an implementation architecture—one goal of
it being to keep the protocol interface of the credential protocols reasonably simple.
Optional interface arguments. An optional interface argument is indi-
cated as being optional by including it between [ ] symbols.
Omitted interface elements. Further cryptographic material such as
what we refer to as system parameters, see, e.g., a related protocol specifica-
tion [Sec10], is required for each of the protocols for realizing a pseudonym and
credential system, though, is not mentioned in the specification of the protocol
interfaces.
Also, further not mentioned metadata for internal bookkeeping and, e.g., data
tracking functionality, such as a timestamp of protocol execution, may be required
for a practical system implementation at both parties for all protocols. We do not
make any of those further elements explicit in order to not clutter the notation more
than necessary.
5.2.1.1 Input
Formulae. We use the approach of data modeling of Chapter 4.4 for representing
the formulae, φA for the input of party A, φ
′
A for A’s output, and φ
′
B for B’s output
as shown in (5.3). The output formulae are derived from the input formula through
the protocol. The free variables in the input φA are replaced with constant terms in
the output after a successful protocol execution. In an implementation, A’s input
φA can be derived from a template at party A, similar to how a certifier can use
templates for the formulae for determining identity relationships to be established.
φA =Tp.holder = th,A ∧ Tp.subject = ts,A ∧ Eq(Tp.subjectId , tsid,A)
φ′A =t
′
p.holder = t
′
h,A ∧ t′p.subject = t′s,A ∧ Eq(t′p.subjectId , t′sid,A)
φ′B =t
′
p.holder = t
′
h,B ∧ t′p.subject = t′s,B ∧ Eq(t′p.subjectId , t′sid,B)
(5.3)
For the input formula φA in (5.3), the identifier object to be created is repre-
sented through a free variable Tp, with the variable expressing the meaning that an
220 5 Cryptographic Protocol Integration
identifier object will be created in the protocol. The holder of the object is indicated
through a constant or variable term th,A referring to the party itself. The subject of
the identifier object is specified by the attribute subject through term ts,A, being a
constant or variable for A itself or a third party D. The protocol being used for es-
tablishing the identifier relationship is indicated through the protocolSuite attribute
like for an identity. We may omit this attribute in the specified formulae in the text
for the reason of brevity.
Whether the holder and subject are constants or variables depends on whether
the pseudonym is to be established for A itself or a third party, resulting in the
following cases: Case (1) of establishing a registration identifier object: The identi-
fier object is to be created for A itself, thus both attribute values are represented
through the same variable, that is, th,A = ts,A, because holder and subject are the
same party and there is no constant available yet to refer to it. The meaning is that
a new term referring to A is created in the protocol associated to both holder and
subject of the identifier object. Case (2) of establishing a delegation registration
identifier object: For the case of the identifier object to be established about a third
party D, that is, the subject term referring to D, the holder is a constant term th,A
referring to A and the subject a variable ts,A referring to D that gets instantiated
through the protocol. The term for party A is the term used by the party to refer
to itself locally throughout the registration domain this delegation registration iden-
tifier object is to be created in and has been created for one registration identifier
object—of possibly multiple ones—with A being the subject.
Metadata. The metadata predicate 3(“estWith”, tsidB) specifies the pseudonym
identifier of the party with which the identifier is to be established, where tsidB :: idf.
This identifier is available in all practical settings where B acts under a public
pseudonym. In case its pseudonym with A has not been established yet, the protocol
interface needs to be able to reflect this as mentioned further above—we do not
elaborate this case here. The metadata predicate 3(“subj”, ts) specifies whether the
identifier is to be established for the party itself or a third party, where ts is the
term referring to the subject in A’s local representation.
5.2.1.2 Output
For the discussion of the output, let κ̂gc be the public, or shared, part of the cryp-
tographic material representing the established pseudonym. Technically, κ̂gc is a
discrete logarithm-based group commitment of a private key of A generated as part
of this registration protocol instance. Let κ˜gc be the commitment opening informa-
tion, which is, technically, exactly the private key.
Formulae. The output of party A is a new formula φ′A derived from φA with
the free variables instantiated with terms created during the protocol as follows:
The term t′p is derived from cryptographic material κ̂
gc resulting from the protocol
execution as η(ζo(κ̂
gc), idfo) and replaces Tp of the input formula. The generated
subject identifier is a constant term t′sid,A = t
′
sid,B, also derived from cryptographic
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material generated during the protocol as outlined next. In Case (1) of a registration
identifier object, the same terms t′h,A = t
′
s,A for holder and subject for A’s output
are derived from cryptographic material from the protocol execution by computation
of η(ζs(κ̂
gc), pty), in Case (2) of a delegation registration identifier object, the holder
term t′h,A used by A is the same as the corresponding input term th,A, that is, t
′
h,A =
th,A, and the subject term t
′
s,A for A’s output is the same as the corresponding term
t′s,B for B’s output as explained below.
Because those technical details could not be provided in the summary of the
cryptographic protocol generation in Chapter 6, we briefly introduce the abovemen-
tioned functions now. The function ζo computes a term for an object identifier based
on applying a collision-resistant one-way function on its argument and the function
η encodes its first argument as a value in the set corresponding to the type specified
through its second argument. Analogously, the function ζs computes a term for
referring to the holder of the cryptographic object argument, and ζd computes a
term for the subject and is used only in case the subject is different to the holder.
The output of party B is a new formula φ′B derived from φA with free variables
instantiated with terms created during the protocol, similar to φ′A. The subjectId
receives the same term in either case. In Case (1), the equal holder and subject
terms t′h,B = t
′
s,B are computed like for A. The difference to A’s output is that in
Case (2) the constant subject term t′s,B for B’s output is created from cryptographic
material from the protocol execution as η(ζd(κ̂
gc), pty) and the holder is computed
as t′h,B := η(ζs(κ̂
gc), pty).
That is, most free variables are instantiated in an analogous manner, except for
the stated differences, for both formulae, because of the protocol being a registration
protocol and this not establishing any undesired linkabilities.
The differences in terms between φ′A and φ
′
B for referring to the same party
defines a term renaming function, or term replacement function, %idf as given in (5.4).
Only party A is privy of this term renaming function.
%idf :=
{
{} for Case (1)
{(th,A, t′h,B)} for Case (2)
(5.4)
Metadata. Party A receives the following metadata as output in the form of
metadata predicates: the role of being holder of the identifier relationship, the
public and private parts κ̂gc and κ˜gc of the cryptographic material of the identifier
object of the identifier relationship that has been established, being the public and
private part of the established cryptographic pseudonym, the renaming function %idf
for the identifier object, and the subject identifier for B with whom the identifier
relationship has been established. κ˜gc comprises the private key of the party created
in the registration interaction.41 As one example for the predicate notation, the
term renaming function %idf is returned as metadata predicate 3(“renFct”, %idf) in
A’s output.
41The private key can, in an implementation, be handled as separate entity that is accordingly
secured, e.g., through containment in a tamper-resistant security token.
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Party B receives the role of being recipient of the identifier relationship, the
public part κ̂gc of the pseudonym, and the identifier under which it has been known
towards A in the protocol.
B learns nothing more than its output data presented above, particularly not any
further information about A, which is a main property of a protocol for establishing
an identifier object. Particularly, party B does not learn the formulae φA and φ
′
A
during protocol execution.
5.2.1.3 Post Processing
Once the protocol has been successfully executed, entries in the parties’ data repos-
itories are created by the parties as follows: A creates a new entry in its identifier
relationships comprising the formula φ′A as object specification formula of the new
identifier object and the metadata predicates it has received as output. Through
the role predicate, this identifier relationship is flagged as one of the party’s identi-
fier relationships it has established with another party. To reflect the data exchange
with B, A creates an entry in its data track with itself being the subject, that is, the
term t′sid,A being used, and data recipient being tsidB and the revealed data being
formula φ′A. B creates a corresponding identifier relationship entry with formula
φ′B and subject t
′
sid,B, flagged as the recipient side of the relationship through the
output metadata. B also creates an entry in its profile data for subject term t′sid,B
based on formula φ′B.
5.2.2 Protocol for Establishing an Identifier Relationship
For the case when a subject identifier is to be established not in the context of a reg-
istration interaction, an instance of the protocol for establishing a non-registration
subject identifier is executed. This protocol is denoted as EstIdtfRel and is similar
to the above protocol in terms of interface and cryptographic realization.
The protocol models A establishing a pseudonym with a party B, based on an
already-established registration domain or delegation registration domain—crypto-
graphically, the private keys thereof—for binding the new identifier object to the
user in a cryptographic manner.
The formulae φA, φ
′
A, and φ
′
B are similar to the formulae for the registration
protocol, with the differences outlined next. The discussion on metadata applies
analogously and is not repeated.
5.2.2.1 Input
As for the registration protocol, the non-registration protocol has two cases for
the handling of terms depending on whether the pseudonym is to be established
about the party A or a third party D, indicated through a metadata predicate in
party A’s input. Case (1) of a regular identifier object with A being the subject is
realized through a constant term referring to A being used as value for the attributes
holder and subject in φA. Both are again the term that A uses in its local data
representation for referring to itself in the registration domain in which to establish
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the identifier object. The registration domain is implied by the subject term. Case
(2) of a delegation identifier object with a third party D being the subject is handled
by using a constant term for the holder equally to Case (1) and a constant term
for the value of the subject attribute that refers to D as subject. This term is,
analogous to Case (1), the term A uses locally to refer to the pseudonym subject
and has been introduced into A’s data repository through a delegation registration
identifier object.
For Case (1), the term used to refer to the holder and subject is the term created
with the establishment of a registration identifier object the private key of which the
to-be-established identifier object is to be bound to. For Case (2), this is true for the
holder of the to-be-established object, while the subject term is the one created with
the establishment of a registration identifier object for D, the delegation private key
of which the to-be-established identifier object is to be cryptographically associated
with.
Output. The output formula φ′A is created with some notable differences to the
registration protocol. The constant terms t′p and t
′
sid,A = t
′
sid,B are created equally
to the registration protocol. The holder and subject are handled differently, as
explained next. For Case (1), both holder and subject are the same constant th,A =
ts,A used in the input to indicate the sameness of the party with those functions. The
constant is the one created as holder term in the establishment of the registration
identifier object of the party in whose registration domain the current object is to be
established. For Case (2), the holder is the constant referring to A as in A’s input
and the subject the constant referring to D in the input. Note that φ′A specifies the
representation of the identifier relationship using A’s local terms.
The output formula φ′B again requires further consideration and exposes differ-
ences to the registration case. t′p and t
′
sid,B = t
′
sid,A are the same terms used in
φ′A computed from the cryptographic material. For Case (1), the subject term t
′
s,B
is computed as t′s,B := η(ζs(κ̂
gc), pty) from the cryptographic material generated in
the cryptographic protocol, and so is the holder term t′h,B := η(ζs(κ̂
gc), pty) because
both terms refer to the same party. For Case (2), the holder term t′h,B is computed
as for Case (1), while the subject term is computed from the cryptographic material
in a different way as t′s,B := η(ζd(κ̂
gc), pty). This results in the term t′h,B for refer-
ring to the holder and the term t′s,B referring to the subject of the identifier object
being different terms to the ones in A’s output formula, while t′sid,B is the same as
tsid,A.
The renaming of terms between φ′A and φ
′
B defines, as in the registration pro-
tocol, a renaming function %idf as presented in (5.5).
%idf =
{
{(th,A, t′h,B)} for Case (1)
{(th,A, t′h,B), (ts,A, t′s,B)} for Case (2)
(5.5)
The function is returned as metadata predicate 3(“renFct”, %idf) in A’s output,
determining the term renaming in later protocols related to this object.
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5.2.3 Multi-party and Public Pseudonyms
The interface for the protocols EstIdtfRel allow for establishing a single subject
identifier with one other party—the standard case of cryptographic pseudonyms
based on credential protocols. When considering the valid case of establishing the
same pseudonym with multiple other parties as, e.g., required for delegation (multi-
party identifier) or the public (public identifier), that is, all parties in the system,
either an extension of the above or new protocols are required.
For the credential-based delegation protocols, we require that the delegater es-
tablish the same cryptographic pseudonym with two parties. This requires an exten-
sion of both the protocol interface and the cryptographic protocol. At the interface
level, the extension reflects the possibility of an already-established pseudonym be-
ing also established with another party. Cryptographically, this can be realized
by communicating the public part κ̂gc of the cryptographic pseudonym to the new
recipient and proving holdership of the corresponding private part κ˜gc without es-
tablishing a new cryptographic pseudonym.
When a party A creates a public identifier, or, public pseudonym, that is, a
public name used by all parties for referring to A, it practically executes a single
protocol, very similar to the EstIdtfRelReg or EstIdtfRel protocol, in which it creates
the private and public formulae and cryptographic objects for the pseudonym and
makes the public part available to all parties in the system. The latter can be
achieved by standard means of uploading the public part to a public pseudonym
repository. With the uploading, no pseudonym has yet been established by A with
any other party—this happens only later once another party obtains the public part
of the pseudonym from the repository.
A special case of this are public keys of parties used on the Internet as of today,
this special case being one of the motivations for introducing public pseudonyms
as they allow us to model identifier objects with service providers and certifiers
as subjects in exactly the same way as the identifier objects of users. Those of
service providers and certifiers are based on conventional PKI technology, though,
not credential systems, today.
The same terms for the subject and holder as defined through the renaming
function for the identifier object are exposed towards all parties the identifier object
is estblished with for a multi-party or public pseudonym.
5.2.4 Traditional Technology
For realizing PKI functionality, both registration and non-registration protocols
need to be specified also for traditional certificate protocols. Using the ideas we
employed for credential systems, this is an analogous task. A signature key pair
of a party can be seen as a cryptographic pseudonym, much like in the case of
credential systems. The terms used for referring to parties can be derived from
the cryptographic material similarly to the credential protocols. See Sec. 4.8 for a
discussion on expressing PKI functionality.
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5.2.5 Relation to the Channel Model
Relating to the model of Chapter 3, a new identifier relationship is established when-
ever a party needs to interact with another party. This does not explicitly correspond
to a channel transformation rule in the model. Multi-party pseudonyms are required
for realizing the transformation rule for delegation, while public pseudonyms are
used for realizing PKI functionality—certifiers and service providers act under pub-
lic pseudonyms. Pseudonymous certifiers act under multi-party pseudonyms shared
with all or a subset of all parties.
5.3 Establishing Identity Relationships
Establishing identity relationships based on credential protocols is realized through
the protocol EstIdtyRel for a party A obtaining a credential with subject A or a
delegater D from a certifier B.
5.3.1 Protocol for Establishing an Identity Relationship
The protocol EstIdtyRel creates a new identity relationship between a party, e.g.,
a user, and another party, a certifier. This comprises both registration and non-
registration as well as delegation identity relationships. As explained in detail in
Section 4.7.2, an identity relationship specifies an identity vouching relationship
between two parties and can, once established, be used by its holder to reveal cer-
tified attribute data about the subject of the identity relationship to other parties.
Establishing an identity relationship means that the certifier agrees to certify the
data related to the subject in the identity relationship and enabling the holder of
the identity relationship to utilize the identity relationship in future interactions
with arbitrary parties for releasing (parts of) the certified attribute data contained
therein. When employing private certificate protocols, an identity relationship can
be used for releasing data based on the identity relationship without further in-
volving the certifier in the data release interactions.42 We have found the strong
integration of identity relationships and related protocols with our data model to be
crucial for obtaining a practical system, thus those aspects are discussed in detail.
5.3.1.1 Languages
The protocol inputs and outputs for establishing an identity relationship based
on a private certificate and the corresponding identity are described, among other
parameters, through formulae expressed using our data modeling approach. This
gives rise to multiple languages Lidy,Lidy/p, and Lidy/r required specifically in the
context of identity relationships and their establishment. The language Lidy, with
Lidy ⊂ Lg, can be seen as the common ground for both Lidy/p and Lidy/r and is itself
42Certificate revocation might in this case involve the certifier or a third party, though in a
different way than an online certifier vouching for identity statements in a protocol based on online
certifiers.
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not applied for data representation. The language Lidy/p is used for representing
the formula-based input to and output of the protocol EstIdtyRel for establishing an
identity relationship, while Lidy/r is used for representing the identity of the resulting
identity relationship. Lidy/r has been introduced already with the concept of identity
relationships in Sec. 4.7.2.
Lidy ⊂ Lg can be informally specified as comprising Eq predicates43 with appro-
priate type signature with one argument being an attribute of the to-be-established
identity, the identity being referred to through a variable or constant term, and
the other argument representing an attribute value, either through a constant term,
or an attribute reference of a conditionally released identity or opaque identity
referred to through a constant. The predicates are connected only through the
∧-connective throughout the formula. Predicates on the holder , subject , certifier ,
type, and protocol attributes of the identity must be stated, and the holder , subject ,
and certifier attributes must be related through the logical equality operator = to a
constant term. Further predicates specifying the certifier through a certifier identity
can be present.
5.3.1.2 Prerequisites
Multiple aspects need to be discussed as prerequisites to the interface for the protocol
EstIdtyRel protocol.
Identifier objects. As prerequisites for executing the protocol for establishing
an identity relationship, A needs to have an identifier object tp established with the
certifier for specifying the holder of the new identity, as well as an identifier object
tp′ for the subject, where the latter can be the same one as the further.
Prerequisite protocol steps. For the case of establishing a non-delegation iden-
tity, it is assumed that A authenticates a formula φ to B using RelData.
For the case of establishing a delegation identity, protocol steps for initiating
the delegation as discussed in Chapter 3 are assumed to be executed as follows. D
initiates the delegation with the certifier B and establishes the identifier object tp′
B|A
with it. The corresponding pseudonym in the channel model is Dck+1|a. We also
assume that A establishes the identifier object tp with D. The delegater establishes
and authenticates the pseudonym tp′
B|A
also towards A and signs the delegation
authorization token Y it sends to A with the corresponding authenticated statement.
The token contains the pseudonym tp′
B|A
of A with D, that is, Ack+1|d in the channel
model.
A provides the delegation authorization token Y to B to prove eligibility for being
the holder of the to-be-established delegation identity relationship. A authenticates
towards B under tp through the prove of φ. Over the authenticated channel A
43For the extension discussed in Sec. 4.4.17, also the inequality predicates Geq,Gt, Leq, and Lt
can be applicable for specifying the values of user attributes of the identity. The Neq predicate
is not particularly useful in this context and therefore not further discussed, though, could be
employed for specifying values of user attributes.
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sends Y and B observes the same pseudonym tp contained therein as the one to
the holder of which B has been instructed by D to issue the delegation certificate.
Through this it is ensured that the certificate is issued to right party A and is,
cryptographically, bound to the right private key of A on which also tp is based.
Building on those assumptions on required protocol steps for a non-delegation or
delegated identity relationship having been executed, the further discussions elabo-
rate on the establishment of the identity (relationship) between A and B with the
subject being A or the delegater D.
Prerequisite formula. The abovementioned formula φ making pseudonym asser-
tions has been proven by A to B. We give details on the formula and particularly
the pseudonym assertions made, using the terms in the view of B. For the non-
delegation case, holdership of the identifier object tp and tp′ is proven, both of which
must have the same term th,p,A as their holder and subject and tsid,p as a subject
identifier (see (5.6)).44 In this case, the identifier objects are either registration or
derived identifier objects. For the delegation case, holdership of two distinct iden-
tifier objects tp and tp′ needs to be proven. The holder and subject of tp are th,p,A
and th,p,A, respectively, and of tp′ the terms th,p′,A and ts,p′ . Both th,p,A and th,p′,A
refer to the same party indicated through equality in the logic, while ts,p′ refers to a
delegater D (see (5.7)). In this case, tp is a registration or derived identifier object
with A as subject, and tp′ a delegation registration identifier object with delegater
D as subject. The terms tsid,p and tsid,p′ are the pseudonym identifiers of the iden-
tifier objects and are used in the protocol interface of the protocol EstIdtyRel for
unambiguously specifying the holder and subject of the to-be-established identity,
also in case of assertions over more than two identifier objects being made in φ.
φn =tp.holder = th,p,A ∧ tp.subject = th,p,A∧
Eq(tp.subjectId , tsid,p) ∧ tp′ .holder = th,p,A∧
tp′ .subject = th,p,A ∧ Eq(tp′ .subjectId , tsid,p) ∧ φ˜n
(5.6)
φd =tp.holder = th,p,A ∧ tp.subject = th,p,A∧
Eq(tp.subjectId , tsid,p) ∧ tp′ .holder = th,p′,A ∧
tp′ .subject = ts,p′ ∧ Eq(tp′ .subjectId , tsid,p′)∧
th,p,A = th,p′,A ∧ φ˜d
(5.7)
The assertions over identifier objects are part of the identifier object introduction
sub-formula of an identity statement φn or φd of language Lp/c of Sec. 4.5. Let such
statement be denoted by φ, with φ ∈ Lp/c. Let the sub-formula φ˜ be the remaining
part of such comprehensive identity statement comprising the sub-formulae beyond
the identifier object statements. A formula φ can be any formula allowed in the
protocol for releasing data that is provable with our cryptographic protocols and
44Technically, this can be realized by a single identifier object being proven, the complications
here are of purely syntactic nature and arise from two identifier objects being exposed at the
protocol interface for it capturing also the delegation case.
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can particularly also contain ∨-connectives for the attribute assertions as far as this
is useful from the perspective of the use case.
Additional identifier objects may be referred to in φ, e.g., when objects from
multiple bridged registration domains are referred to, though, are not further rele-
vant in the context of establishing an identity relationship. Terms tp and tp′ refer
to two distinct identifier objects chosen from all identifier objects in φ to represent
the holder and subject of the new identity.45
Multiple identity statements can be made through means of multiple identity
statement formulae as long as the above-presented pseudonym assertions are avail-
able and the different statements bound accordingly to the same party through
identifier objects. We assume in the remainder, without loss of generality, that a
single formula φ has been revealed and proven by A to B. This can be easily gener-
alized to multiple formulae proven in the current session or different sessions, with
statements about A,D, and possibly other parties, and stored in the profile data of
B.
As explained in Sec. 5.4, for the protocol RelData for proving—or releasing—data
statements, a formula φ ∈ Lp/c related to such protocol instance refers to objects
holdership of which is proven and which may be created during the data release pro-
tocol. Let the objects holdership of which is proven, regardless of whether they have
been generated in the data release protocol, be the following: the primary identifier
objects tidf1 , . . . , t
idf
`idf , primary identities t
idy
1 , . . . , t
idy
`idy
, opaque identities toid1 , . . . , t
oid
`oid ,
and conditionally released identities tcrid1 , . . . , t
crid
`crid . Note that none of the identities
is referred to in the current instance of the protocol for establishing an identity
relationship, only the other mentioned objects are.
It is important to observe that A uses different terms than those exposed to
B as part of its view on formula φ for referring to holders and subjects as well
as the primary identities in the formula—see Sec. 4.8 and Sec. 5.4 for details on
the renaming of terms in the context of the RelData protocol. The same term
renaming as for φ applies to the terms reoccurring in the interface of the protocol
for establishing an identity relationship, and applies to both the formulae and terms
outside of formulae referring to objects. Let the local term used by A for th,p,A be
t¯h,p,A and for ts,p′ be t¯s,p′ .
Constructing the issuing specification. For obtaining the formula φB ∈ Lidy/p
specifying the certificate issuing protocol, B constructs a new formula φ̂prf by com-
bining the prerequisite formula φ proven by A and an additional specification for-
mula φ˜prf .
Thereby, the certifier B makes, through φ˜prf , further attribute assertions, e.g.,
related to access rights to a service, about the subject A or D of the to-be-generated
identity. Technically, φ˜prf is expressed in a simplified fragment of the language
Lp/c sketched next, which is similar to the language Lidy/r for expressing identity
45In a practical system, establishing the identifier objects tp and tp′ or further identifier objects
can be integrated with the prerequisite statement φ to be proven by A to B. For obtaining a
cleaner formalism, we assume in this thesis that those protocols are standalone protocols.
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specification formulae of identity relationships. A formula in this language expresses
the certifier through a third-party specification sub-formula and attribute predicates
over one or more identities or identifiers or combinations thereof. The attribute
predicates in the formula comprise as a main part the statements that B makes
about the subject of the to-be-issued identity in addition. The identity is referred
to through a constant term derived in a well-defined manner from the predicates
specified over it. The certifier of the identity is specified to be B, using a term B
uses for referring to itself in its local data representation. This formalizes that the
statements are declarations by party B. The holder and subject of the identity are
specified to be the terms used in tp and tp′ in φ.
In the case of establishing a delegation identity, the formula φ˜prf comprises the
attributes of the identity to be delegated and the new identity is associated with
the subject being the delegater.
An extension to delegating also attributes that have originally been issued based
on opaque or conditionally released identities can be achieved by the delegater pro-
viding the private cryptographic material and object specification formulae of those
objects to the delegatee and the delegatee using them as input to the protocol. This
needs to be considered in the prerequisite steps for establishing a delegation. We
do not provide the details for this, though, the cryptographic protocol for issuing
is technically analogous to that for issuing certificates on attributes of opaque or
conditionally released identities the party has established itself with the certifier
with the additional prerequisite steps having been carried out.
The formula φ and φ˜prf are combined through conjunction φ̂prf = φ ∧ φ˜prf .
Thereby, φ˜prf adds additional attribute statements to the attribute assertions sub-
formula of φ. When conjuncting the third-party specification formula of φ˜prf with
that of φ and doing the same for the attribute assertion sub-formulae, the resulting
formula φ̂prf meets the syntax requirements of Lp/c and thus φ̂prf ∈ Lp/c.
The formula φ̂prf expresses potentially excessive information in addition to what
is to be represented through the new identity. A transformation F is applied by the
certifier B to φ̂prf for obtaining the formula φB. This transformation is parameter-
ized and depends on the policy of the certifier specifying which information that has
flown from φ to φ̂prf to retain in φB. Based on the parameters, the transformation
realizes the following: An equality predicate in the attribute assertion sub-formula
of φ̂prf may yield an equality predicate over the same or a parameter-determined
attribute of the to-be-established identity Tc and the same constant value or at-
tribute of a conditionally released or opaque identity. That is, predicates expressed
over different identities in φ̂prf that may be referred to in the predicates of φ̂prf are
now expressed over a single variable Tc for the new identity to be established. The
holder and subject of Tc are specified to be equal to the holder of tp and subject of
tp′ , respectively. The certifier of Tc is specified to be equal to B through the term
used also in a certifier identity with subject B that can be obtained by parties who
will later verify proofs over the new identity to be created. Further certification
metadata is added to the identity using equality predicates. An equality predicate
on the attribute type of Tc is added with the value being the constant representing
the type of the new identity.
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Only ∧-connected predicates are allowed in the formula as it specifies a new
identity relationship.46 Only a subset of the predicates of φ̂prf is retained in φB, the
remaining predicates may have been required for fulfilling the authorization policy
of B for allowing A to establish a new identity relationship with B.
The function F is tightly dependent on the intentions of B for the identity rela-
tionship to be established and cannot be fully formalized in general. For example, B
may accept an attribute with a certain name in φ, though, re-certify it in Tc under
another attribute name, which can be the case when different certifiers use different
attributes to refer to the same conceptual entity, e.g., a last name.
A technical realization of the function F in a practical system can be obtained
through the concept of a template that specifies the mapping from a formula φ and
additional attributes representing φ˜prf obtained from data sources at the party to a
formula φB as discussed in [Som11].
Inequality predicates as explained in the extension to the data model in
Sec. 4.4.17 can be used in φ, φ˜prf , and φ̂prf as an extension to the process for estab-
lishing identity relationships for identities with attributes having an inequality as
operator.
Inverse renaming. As certain terms have been renamed by A through the
RelData protocol and those renamed terms are used by B for representing the issuing
specification formula φB in the EstIdtyRel protocol, A needs to perform a reverse
renaming of terms in φB in order to obtain an intermediate formula φ
′′
A based on
its locally used terms. We denote the renaming transformation as κ−1. Recall that
the holder and subject are defined through the identifier objects tp and tp′ of φ,
respectively.
A receives from B the specification formula φB and the pseudonym identifiers
tsid,h denoting the holder of the to-be-established identity and tsid,s denoting its
subject as part of the protocol. The party retrieves the renaming functions %idftp and
%idftp′ from the metadata of the corresponding identifier relationships of Ridf using
the subjectId values tsid,h and tsid,s for the lookup. It applies the inverse functions
(%idftp )
−1 and (%idftp′ )
−1 to the holder and subject terms in the received formula φB
that are elements of the preimages of the inverse renaming functions. The inverse of
the discrete function is obtained in a straightforward way by replacing every tuple x
in the function’s set-based specification through (pi2(x), pi1(x)). The renaming leads
to the mapping of terms between φB and φ
′′
A as defined through the mentioned
renaming functions.
This renaming establishes the terms the party uses locally to refer to itself and, if
applicable, the delegater in the formula. The protocol specification formula φ′′A ob-
tained through applying κ−1 on φB is the input of A for the cryptographic protocol
for issuing a credential, while B’s input for the cryptographic protocol is φB.
The inverse renaming κ−1 essentially reverses the renaming of terms performed
46For the credential protocols based on any of the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature protocols,
only the conjunction operator is allowed for specifying the attribute statements of a to-be-issued
credential.
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in the instance of the RelData protocol for releasing φ. The required mappings are
comprised in the renaming functions %idftp and %
idf
tp′ for the primary identifier objects
specifying the holder and subject for Tc referred to in φ. We refer the reader to
the general specification of the renaming in Sec. 4.8 and the discussion on the data
release protocol in Sec. 5.4 later in this chapter.
Object equality predicates between terms as expressed through the =-relation of
the language can be left in the formula as an equality statement may now—through
the term renaming—relate the same terms with object equality and thereby be a
tautology. Opaque and conditionally released identities referred to in φB do not
require a renaming as they are shared only between A and B. Opaque identities
allow for establishing an identity relationship comprising attributes the certifier does
not learn.
The formula obtained through this renaming is the one based on which party
A executes its part of the cryptographic protocol. It is, particularly, also used for
retrieving objects required as protocol inputs referred to in the formula from its
local data repository.
5.3.2 Protocol Interface
The following is the protocol interface for the protocol EstIdtyRel, executed between
a party A and a party B, the latter being the certifier, where the main input φB
has been discussed in great detail further above.
EstIdtyRel protocol interface:
Input
A –
B φB, tsid,h, tsid,s, [tsid,p′
B|A
, ]{(oi, {νlB,i}1≤lB,i≤nB,i)}1≤i≤rB
Output
A φ′A, {(o′j , {ν′l′A,j}1≤l′A,j≤n′A,j )}1≤j≤r′A , successA
B φ′B, {(o′k, {ν′l′B,k}1≤l′B,k≤n′B,k)}1≤k≤r′B , successB
The input is explained first. The protocol input is determined by the certifier
B because it is the party that decides on the data to be included in the identity
relationship that it will vouch for. Clearly, this can be a function on the statements
received in this or previous interactions with A or data obtained through other
means by B. A does not provide input to the protocol at the level of the protocol
interface.
The input of B comprises a data statement φB, constant terms tsid,h and tsid,s,
and metadata predicates expressed on the formula and objects referred to from the
formula. The term tsid,h :: idf is the identifier the prospective holder A of the
identity relationship is known to B under. This identifier must always be known by
B for the following reasons: An identity relationship is always established based on
one or two identifier objects its recipient holds. Also, B needs to know A by some
identifier, e.g., for purposes of allowing for revocation of A’s anonymity as well as for
non-credential-based protocols where B needs to be involved online when A makes
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use of the identity relationship to release data. The optional argument tsid,p′
B|A
defines the subject identifier that the delegater has used for initiating the delegation
and that is comprised in the delegation authorization token Y. The metadata being
required depend on the protocol used for establishing the identity relationship. Most
metadata, such as public keys, required by the protocol need, in an implementation
of the system, not be passed at the API level, but can be obtained from the protocol
implementation from other components of the architecture or remote services, which
leads to a simplification of the interface.
The output of A comprises a formula φ′A as well as a set of metadata predicates
returned at the side of A. B’s output comprises, analogously, a formula φ′B and
metadata predicates.
We next give details on the parameters of the interface and particularly show the
differences between the output and the input as there are some important aspects to
note when using private certificate systems as underlying protocols. The elements
that hide most of the interface complexity are the formulae at both of the parties.
5.3.2.1 Input formula
A formula φB specifying the identity relationship to be created is expressed in Lidy/p.
The language is based on Lidy with the following constraints: the identity is always
referred to through a variable for expressing that the underlying object be created in
the protocol. Conceptually, the input formula stands—as it contains free variables—
for the set of valid output formulae of the protocol, while the output formulae are
statement-type formulae without free variables.
φB =Tc.certifier = tsB ∧ tcid.subject = tsB ∧ φ˜cid∧
Tc.holder = th,p,A ∧ Tc.subject = ts,p′∧
Eq(Tc.a1, t
a
1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ Eq(Tc.au, tau)∧
Eq(Tc.a
3
1 , t
a31 ) ∧ . . . ∧ Eq(Tc.a3q , ta
3
q )
(5.8)
The formula structure for φB as presented in (5.8) is explained next. The certifier
specification (line 1 of (5.8)) comprises the association of the new identity Tc with
an existing certifier identity, or identifier relationship, or combination of identifiers
and identifier relationships, as discussed for the language Lp/c in Sec. 4.5, through a
constant term tsB and a subformula φ˜cid detailing the certifier specification. Based
on whether a non-delegation or delegation identity relationship is to be established,
the value of the holder and subject of the to-be-established identity are specified
as follows (line 2 of (5.8)): in the non-delegation case, the holder and subject are
specified to equal th,p,A, in the delegation case, the holder equals th,p,A, while the
subject equals ts,p′ . This properly links the holder and subject to the holders and
subjects of the pseudonyms holdership of which has been proven beforehand through
φ.
The core of the formula modeling the attribute data for the to-be-generated
identity comprises a sequence of ∧-connected predicates Eq(Tc.ai, tai ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ u,
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each stating an equality assertion between a user attribute reference of the identity
(Tc.ai) and the value t
a
i it is to hold which can be either of the following: a constant
term or an attribute reference of an opaque identity or of a conditionally released
identity (line 3 of (5.8)). The opaque and conditionally released identities permitted
to be referred to are, w.l.o.g. with simplified indexing, toid1 , . . . , t
oid
`oid and t
crid
1 , . . . , t
crid
`crid ,
respectively, of φ, which are a subset of those referred to in φ. Another sequence of
∧-connected predicates specifies the in-formula metadata, comprising the temporal
validity of the identity, protocol suite to be used, and possibly further attributes,
expressed through predicates Eq(Tc.a
3
i , t
a3i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q (line 3 of (5.8)).
The input formula φB needs to be established before protocol execution can
begin. In our architecture, the certifier can use a template that acts as a blueprint
for each new identity relationship for a class of identity relationships, e.g., for each
relationship for an identity of a certain identity type.
5.3.2.2 Output formulae
The formula φ′A is expressed in Lidy/r and represents A’s view on the established
identity relationship. The language is based on Lidy and similar to Lidy/p, though,
only constant terms are allowed. All values of attributes are constants representing
those values, without the option of attribute references of cryptographic objects.47
The certification metadata does not comprise the predicates related to the certifier
specification—only the predicate associating a term for the certifier with the new
identity.
For obtaining the output formula φ′A of A, the intermediate formula φ
′′
A as
used by A as the specification for the cryptographic protocol needs to undergo
multiple changes. Once the cryptographic protocol has been successfully executed,
A computes the constant term t′c as η(ζo(κ˜
crt), id) based on the credential κ˜crt it
has obtained in the protocol. Note that this computation can be based on the
almost-final credential, which both issuer and recipient have access to to allow both
to compute it—we abstract from this in the formal notation, though. This term
is henceforth used by A to refer to the identity locally, e.g., in input formulae to
the protocol RelData for releasing data and particularly to refer to the identity
in φ′A in place of Tc in φ
′′
A. The term is computed analogously by B and used
by it for referring to the identity in its local identity relationship. Note that B’s
representation of the identity relationship is not required for A for using the identity
relationship, though, it is needed for requesting revocation of the identity t′c.
The terms referring to the holder and subject of t′c have been renamed already
when obtaining φ′′A from φB to reflect A’s terms. This is, for example, crucial in
retaining A’s capabilities of using deduction in our logic calculus for computing a
formula for fulfilling a data request.
Another crucial change for transforming φ′′A to φ
′
A is the replacement based
on function $ of attributes specified through reference to attributes of opaque or
47The only exception to only terms being allowed are values of user attributes which may be
variables in the case of restriction formulae. This is not applicable to a formula φ′A, though, only
to formulae defined in addition to φ′A for the identity relationship.
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conditionally released identities with the corresponding attribute values, that is,
constant terms, only available to A. The subformula specifying the attributes of
t′c is transformed to properly realize attribute references to attributes of opaque or
conditionally released identities as constant terms. Each predicate Eq(t′c.ai, to.ai′)
where to refers to an opaque or conditionally released identity the attribute ai′ of
which the attribute ai of the new identity is to be equal to is replaced with a new
predicate. The latter states an equality predicate between t′c.ai and the attribute
value of to.ai′ known to A as part of the private cryptographic item, κ˜
dfc or κ˜enc for
to being a cryptographic commitment or ciphertext of a verifiable encryption pro-
tocol, respectively, that is, corresponding to an opaque or a conditionally released
identity, corresponding to to, but not known to B. Only those plaintext attributes
of the opaque or conditionally released identities are relevant when using the estab-
lished identity relationship later. Information on how the attributes were obtained,
e.g., through which specific opaque identity, is not relevant for the holder of the
relationship in order to release data based on it. The attribute values are required
to be known in the identity relationship of A in order to match it against data re-
quests for its use. Note that, optionally, A can obtain the formula φ′′A as metadata
output for tracking the details on how the identity relationship has been established.
Predicates related to attributes of opaque or conditionally released identities can of
course not be changed in φ′B as the corresponding attributes are hidden towards
party B.
The predicates related to the specification of the certifier identity are used for
obtaining a specification formula specifying the certifier identity. The certifier iden-
tity is returned as a metadata predicate based on which a new profile data entry of
A is generated in the post-processing stage of the protocol. The certifier predicates
are removed from the output formula as they are held separately by both parties.
The certifier identity corresponds to a public key certificate for the certifier in case
PKI mechanisms are used for ensuring authenticity of the certifier.
The above-discussed changes to φ′′A for obtaining the formula φ
′
A are expressed
through the function FR party A executes in the relevant channel transformation
rules in the model of Chapter 3.
The formula φ′B is expressed in a fragment of Lidy/p with all terms being con-
stants. The most noteworthy difference to φ′A is that it can comprise attribute
references to attributes of conditionally released and opaque identities instead of
only constants as in φ′A for representing the values of user attributes. The dis-
cussed changes in the formulae are protocol-dependent and applicable for credential
protocols.
5.3.2.3 Metadata
The following on-formula metadata can be expressed on any of the formulae φ
through metadata predicates, that is, outside of our data model. Thus, such on-
formula metadata do not have meaning in the data model and authorization policies
cannot build on such data, and they are not considered in syntactical derivations
in our logic. Such metadata is input by B and output to both A and B and are
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discussed next.
A technical specification of the identity relationship specifies aspects that are
required by the underlying cryptographic protocols in addition to what is formally
expressed within the formula φ . For our credential protocols, an important part of
this technical specification is the certificate structure, first discussed by the author in
earlier work [CSZ06b, CSZ06a] and in Sec. 5.1.1. The certificate structure is input
as metadata on the variable term referring to the to-be-created identity of φB and
output as metadata on the constant t′c referring to the created identity in both φ
′
A
and φ′B.
Another crucial kind of metadata input are the cryptographic objects underly-
ing the conditionally released and opaque identities toid1 , . . . , t
oid
`oid and t
crid
1 , . . . , t
crid
`crid
referred-to in φB. For each opaque identity t
oid
i , a metadata predicate
3(toidi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂
dfc)
and for each conditionally released identity tcridj , a metadata predicate
3(tcridj , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂
enc)
is required as input to the cryptographic protocol for both parties A and B. For
A, the opaque identities and conditionally released identities
3(toidi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜
dfc) for 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid and
3(tcridj , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜
enc) for 1 ≤ j ≤ `crid
are required as additional private cryptographic input objects. Note that those
public cryptographic materials can be part of the metadata of φ or of formulae
proven previously by A to B. Using their term names toidi and t
crid
j , they can be easily
retrieved by both parties from the metadata of those previously executed protocols.
We note that those input elements are obtained by the component executing the
protocol instead of being explicitly passed for the reason that A is not able to pass
them as input as it does not know the issuing specification at the time it needs to
invoke the protocol and pass the input elements. The private certificate created
through the protocol is a metadata predicate output on the side of A as private
cryptographic material. Further on-formula metadata can be expressed as required
for an implementation of a system, without giving all the details here.
Further inputs are the cryptographic materials related to the identifier objects
tp and tp′ determining the registration domain and delegation registration domain
of the new identity and thus the underlying private keys: A inputs both private and
public parts thereof, while B only inputs the public parts. Those cryptographic ele-
ments are required for establishing the cryptographic binding of the issued credential
to the private keys and registration domains related to tp and tp′ .
The specification formula related to the certifier identity and the public key
related to it are comprised in further metadata predicates. This is used for creating
profile data entries on the side of A for specifying the certifier of the new identity
through an identity specification formula for the certifier identity corresponding
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to its public key certificate and an identifier object corresponding to the public
key, both using the same term to refer to the certifier. See Sec. 4.8.1 for details
on how a certifier is represented by other parties through identities or identifier
relationships. This is required for making automated derivations referring to the
established identity, e.g., for matching the party’s portfolio with data requests in
the context of instances of the RelData protocol.
5.3.3 Post Processing
Once the protocol for establishing an identity relationship has been successfully
executed, A stores φ′A and the metadata predicates returned by the protocol in a
newly created identity relationship flagged with a metadata predicate as an identity
relationship it is holder of. Possible further object specification formulae specifying
less information on the new identity can be added by A, e.g., through using a policy
editor, for associating different authorization policies governing the release of certain
attribute information in a negotiation protocol. B stores its formula φ′B and the
obtained metadata in an identity relationship flagged as one it vouches for. It needs
to use the identity relationship when being involved in providing certified identity
data based on the identity relationship to a data recipient in protocols with on-line
issuer and for a potential revocation of the relationship in the case of credential
protocols. For both parties, the new identity relationship is associated with the
identifier relationships it has been issued on through metadata predicates. The
input data to the protocol are not required any more after the protocol execution, yet
can be retained for reasons of accountability. To summarize, the obtained identity
relationships have a completely different meaning to the certifier and to the certifiee.
A creates a new profile data entry flagged as being that related to a certifier of
one of its identity relationships. The formulae of the entry are the ones specifying the
identity and identifier object of the certifier. The associated cryptographic metadata
are a public key certificate and corresponding public key required for executing
RelData protocol instances for proving holdership of the credential underlying t′c.
5.3.4 Relation to the Channel Model
We first discuss the case of establishing a non-delegation identity. The formula
φB corresponds to F(φ̂prf ,Ci,ℵi), where φ̂prf = φ ∧ φ˜prf in the model, which forms
the basis for establishing one identity relationship with certifier Ci as formalized
in Rule Auth-Cred of Chapter 3 for k identity relationships. The formula φi in the
model corresponds to the formula φ̂prf with amendments by the certifier already con-
tained. Thus, φ̂prf corresponds to a combination of possibly multiple authenticated
statements on the channel from A to B. The formula φ˜prf thereby is authenticated
in a trivial way in that it is a claim by B towards itself. The function F models
the transformation of φ̂prf to φB through B. The context ℵi of the certifier thereby
captures the parameterization of the function F to determine how the new formula
is computed based on the statement authenticated to the certifier.
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To obtain φ′′A first from φB and φ
′
A in a second step corresponds to A applying
the function FR in the channel model to express A’s term renaming and replacement
of attributes referring to opaque and conditionally released identities with their
respective values. The parameter PA of the function is party A’s data repository in
its state at the time of having the authenticated channel with Ci, that is, the time
of establishing the identity.
Delegation. The case of establishing a delegation identity relationship requires
further considerations in addition. The relations between the identifier objects re-
quired for establishing an identity relationship with the pseudonyms has been dis-
cussed further above as part of the prerequisites. The subject term of the new
identity as specified through the identifier object tp′ of φ refers to the same party,
the delegater D, to which the subject term D uses for referring to itself in the state-
ment it proves to the delegation certifier Ck+1 for initiating the delegation refers.
Those subject terms used for referring to D are different, though.
The semantics of those parties being the same gets established only through
A providing the delegation token Y it has received from D, comprising also the
pseudonym D has used towards Ck+1, and requesting the delegation certificate to
be issued for the subject of identifier object tp′ , also referring to D. Until that, the
latter identifier object could have referred to any party as its subject in case it is a
newly generated delegation registration identifier object.
Through issuing of the delegation certificate, the registration identifier object
A has established for subject D and the corresponding registration domain get
cryptographically related to party D and A receives the capability of authenticating
a statement about D decorated with a security symbol towards other parties using
the private certificate obtained in the instance of the EstIdtyRel protocol.
General. As a minimum requirement, the authentication property gets trans-
ferred from a channel between A and a certifier to a channel between A and a
relying party in a data release protocol. In the delegation case, the authentication
property gets transferred from a channel between the delegater D and the delega-
tion certifier to a channel between A and B. This means, the new statement is
ensured to be about the same party. This transfer of authentications is realized
cryptographically by issuing the new credential on the same private key the identi-
fier object tp is based on, and, for the delegation case, also on the delegation private
key the delegation registration identifier object tp′ is based on.
The formula φ˜ of the formula φ proven as a prerequisite to the protocol EstIdtyRel
may optionally comprise assertions about a registration identity of A in order to
ensure B that A has used a proper registration identifier, i.e., is a registered party
in the system. Only if this is ensured, the authentication of the party with the cer-
tifier may be assumed to hold and thus can be transferred to another party through
using a credential as explained in the model in Chapter 3, which is equivalent to
transferring the security symbol annotating the channel endpoint between the chan-
nels. Requirements regarding the assertion to be proven are determined by the
238 5 Cryptographic Protocol Integration
authorization policy of B.
Note that the original extension [BCS12b, BCS12a] of the Maurer–Schmid chan-
nel model abstracts, for obtaining a simpler model, the complexity of the functions
F ,FR,FD, and FDR and thus abstracts the corresponding aspects of the languages
for expressing the formulae and how they relate.
In our secure channel model of Chapter 3, all formulae used for expressing rules
refer to terms as observed by the recipient channel endpoint of the formula, that
is, the party on the opposite side on the channel of the statement annotation. The
corresponding formulae using terms of the source party are not represented and
are a detail not relevant to the model, though, relevant for the logic-based data
representation discussed in the current chapter and Chapter 4. This observation
applies to all protocols discussed in the current chapter.
5.4 Release of Data
The release of certified data by a party A to a party B is done through the protocol
RelData. An instance of this protocol comprises the release of a data statement and
a cryptographic proof of correctness of the statement.
5.4.1 Protocol for Releasing Data
The protocol for releasing data is a 2-party protocol between a party A, the prover
or data provider, and a party B, the verifier or data recipient. At the time of
starting the protocol, A knows B at least under a pseudonymous identifier tsidB .
This can be B’s public identifier (pseudonym) in case of B being a service provider
acting under its public pseudonym, which is the common case. For the case of B not
acting under a public pseudonym, it needs to establish a pseudonymous identifier
tsidB with A for realizing a two-way pseudonymous interaction between the parties.
Furthermore, we assume that A has established one or multiple pseudonyms with
party B for the parties the statement it releases towards B is about, that is, itself
and optionally one or multiple delegaters.48
5.4.1.1 Protocol Interface
Next we present the interface of the protocol RelData in detail, starting with a
high-level view thereof.
RelData protocol interface:
48This assumption can be relaxed when extending the release protocol to support the establish-
ment of identifier objects as mentioned previously.
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Input
A φA, tsidB , {(oi, {νlA,i}1≤lA,i≤nA,i)}1≤i≤n3A
B –
Output
A φ′A, {(o′j , {νl′A,j}1≤l′A,j≤n′A,j )}1≤j≤nˆ3A , successA
B φ′B, {(o′k, {νl′B,k}1≤l′B,k≤n′B,k)}1≤k≤nˆ3B , successB
The input comprises a data statement φA, a subject identifier tsidB B is known
to A under, and a set of metadata predicates ν associated with the existing or to-be-
generated objects oi referred to from within φA, that is, identifier objects, identities,
conditionally released identities, and opaque identities, as an input of party A. Party
B does not provide input explicitly passed at the API level for this protocol because
A fully determines the statement to be released to B. Cryptographic key material
need not be passed as input to the protocol because it can be obtained during the
execution of the protocol [Som11].
The output of A comprises a new data statement φ′A based on φA as well as
a set of metadata predicates on the objects that are referred to in φ′A returned as
output on the side of A. B’s output comprises, analogous to A’s, a data statement
φ′B based on φA and metadata predicates on the objects referred to in φ
′
B returned
as output on the side of party B. The output of both parties comprises a boolean
flag success indicating successful execution of the protocol.
The objects and associated metadata entities being input and output of the
protocol are detailed next. The terms used for referring to the objects in A’s and
B’s output in the interface specification are the ones used in A’s input formula after
a renaming for obtaining the output—details hereto are provided further below.
Cryptographic entities are input and output through metadata predicates associ-
ated with terms representing the objects the entities correspond to. Such metadata
predicate has the form as explained in (5.2), e.g., 3(oi, “pubCryptoMaterial”, ξ
3),
with ξ3 being cryptographic material as indicated through the “pubCryptoMaterial”
constant, expressing that the metadata is the corresponding public, that is, shared,
cryptographic material for object oi. For the objects to be generated in the protocol,
that is, objects, the corresponding cryptographic entities of which are generated, the
input may still comprise key material or other metadata.
The generated objects that are output of the protocol can be referred to in
future protocols for relating their attributes to other attributes without revealing
them. This requires that the cryptographic metadata being output as representative
entities of the objects be input to the future protocols.
Metadata input. The identifier objects tidf1 , . . . , t
idf
ˆ`idf represent established pseudo-
nyms A is the holder of about A or third parties. An object tidfi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idf is
associated with metadata predicates comprising its underlying cryptographic objects
used in the cryptographic protocol: the private part κ˜gci and the public part κ̂
gc
i .
The extension of to-be-generated identifier objects tidfˆ`idf+1, . . . , t
idf
`idf of the RelData
protocol represents those identifier objects through a term each without the need of
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associating metadata with them in the input.
Note that the private key or keys of party A are not made explicit in the protocol
interface as they are modeled to be part of cryptographic objects κ˜gci .
The identities tidy1 , . . . , t
idy
`idy
correspond to private certificates the party holds as
part of identity relationships or to dummy certificates for simulated parts of the
cryptographic proof to be computed. Let tidy1 , . . . , t
idy
ˆ`idy correspond to identities for
which the party has identity relationships and thus private certificates, that is, their
specification formulae being elements of the set Φ̂idy that is part of the output of
the result of an instance of the matching algorithm of Sec. 5.4.6. Let furthermore
the remaining identities referred to through tidyˆ`idy+1, . . . , t
idy
`idy
be dummy identities. An
identity tidyi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idy is associated with its underlying certificate κ˜crti through
a metadata predicate. A dummy identity tidyi ,
ˆ`idy + 1 ≤ i ≤ tidy
`idy
is associated
with a dummy certificate χcrti . A public key PK
crt
i is further metadata required
as input for an identity tidyi , 1 ≤ i ≤ `idy and is obtained within the protocol.49
The predicates for the cryptographic keys are decorated with 〈〈 〉〉 symbols in the
interface specification for indicating that they may be retrieved from within the
protocol. For the non-dummy identities, a private key SKcrti is required in the
protocol and obtained through the identifier relationship. The dummy certificates
χcrti can be created during the cryptographic protocol by obtaining the certificate
structure using the certifier metadata associated with the corresponding identities.
The opaque identities toid1 , . . . , t
oid
ˆ`oid represent hidden attributes generated in previ-
ous executions of instances of the RelData protocol that can be related to attributes
of other objects in the current protocol. An opaque identity toidi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`oid is
associated with a cryptographic commitment κ̂dfci shared between the parties and
the opening information κ˜dfci , comprising the constituting attribute tuples, private to
A. The to-be-generated opaque identities toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid do not require to be associ-
ated with cryptographic metadata as an element κ̂dfci contains the cryptographic key
material required for the protocol, which is derived during the computation of the
protocol instance in which it has been generated. For each toidi with
ˆ`oid+1 ≤ i ≤ `oid,
private input χdfci needs to be input by A. An entity χ
dfc
i is generated when finding
or otherwise defining the formula φA to be released, e.g., through policy matching.
It comprises the attribute tuples of the function X oid
toidi
corresponding to χdfci according
to the semantics.
Technically, κ̂dfci is a Damg˚ard–Fujisaki–Okamoto commitment [DF02] and κ˜
dfc
i
is the corresponding opening information. Thereby, κ˜dfci is the technical encoding, as
defined through the structure of toidi , of the tuples of the function X oidtoidi corresponding
to the opaque identity according to the semantics of Sec. 4.11 and an additional
49Note that public and private keys are indexed as their corresponding certificates, although
multiple certificates may be issued using the same public key and on the same private key. In the
basic case of the cryptographic protocols, a single private key per user is employed, unless the user
has multiple registrations in the system. In an implementation, safeguards must ensure that the
private key be not exposed, e.g., by passing it as a reference to a key on a tamper-resistant security
token.
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randomizing value for achieving the statistical hiding property of the cryptographic
commitment.
The conditionally released identities tcrid1 , . . . , t
crid
ˆ`crid represent conditionally rele-
ased identities that have been generated in previous instances of the RelData proto-
col. A tcridi , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`crid is associated with the entity κ˜enci private to A representing
the technical encoding of the attributes of tcridi and κ̂
enc
i being the shared cipher-
text. The to-be-generated conditionally released identities tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid represent
ciphertexts and corresponding plaintext entities to be generated within the protocol
execution and being protocol output. Every tcridj , 1 ≤ j ≤ `crid is associated with a
public key PKencj for encryption, the corresponding predicate being annotated with
〈〈 〉〉. For each tcridi with ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid, private input χenci needs to be input
by A, analogous to χdfci above. Each χ
enc
i is generated when determining φB and
comprises the attribute tuples of the function X crid
tcridi
corresponding to tcridi following
the formal semantics.
Technically, κ̂enci is a ciphertext computed through the Camenisch–Shoup ver-
ifiable encryption scheme [CS03] of the attribute tuples of κ˜enci , where κ˜
enc
i is the
technical encoding, as governed through the structure for κ̂enci , of the attribute tu-
ples, except for the condition and recipient attributes, of the set-based specification
of the function X crid
tcridi
corresponding to the conditionally released identity in the se-
mantics defined in Sec. 4.11.
Note that both χdfci ,
ˆ`oid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid and χenci , ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid above could
be easily computed as part of the RelData protocol from φA and its 〈 〉 annotations,
though, they are already computed as part of the policy matching process and thus
available to the protocol. Also note that those elements are not 〈〈 〉〉-annotated as
they are not available in A’s repository and thus cannot be retrieved by the protocol
implementation.
We summarize the discussed input metadata predicates next, with objects re-
ferred to through the terms A uses in its local representation. The tabular notation
indicates for each metadata predicate through the party names in the rightmost
columns which parties receive them as input.
RelData Metadata input:
〈〈3(tidfi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂gci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idf A B
〈〈3(tidfi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜gci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idf A
〈〈3(tidyi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜crti )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idy A
〈〈3(tidyi , “privCryptoMaterial”, χcrti )〉〉 for ˆ`idy + 1 ≤ i ≤ `idy A
〈〈3(tidyi , “pubKey”,PKcrti )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ `idy A B
〈〈3(toidi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂dfci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`oid A B
〈〈3(toidi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜dfci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`oid A
3(toidi , “privCryptoMaterial”, χ
dfc
i ) for
ˆ`oid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid A
〈〈3(tcridi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂enci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`crid A B
〈〈3(tcridi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜enci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`crid A
3(tcridi , “privCryptoMaterial”, χ
enc
i ) for
ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid A
〈〈3(tcridi , “pubKey”,PKenci )〉〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid A B
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Note that the 〈〈 〉〉-annotated entities can be obtained by the implementation
of the protocol and do not need to be passed as input explicitly at the API level.
Retrieval of those entities is done based on the object term used in pi1(3j) of the
metadata predicate3j that refers to the object the predicate applies to in the party’s
local representation of data. We thereby assume that the protocol implementation
has access to the data repository P of the party. We next discuss this for protocol
participants A and B, using formula φA or φ
′
B, respectively. B only requires a
subset of the inputs of A, namely the non-private materials.
κ̂gci and κ˜
gc
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idf and κ˜crti for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idy are retrieved from the
corresponding identifier and identity relationships which A is holder of by A, and
κ̂gci for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idf from identifier relationships another party has established with
B by B. Public keys PKcrti related to identities are retrieved from the profile data
entries in P representing the public key certificates of the keys, using the certifier
specification sub-formulae of φA or φ
′
B.
κ̂dfci and κ˜
dfc
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`oid are retrieved by A from the metadata predicates
related to the data tracking entries for the previously released formulae by A, where
those cryptographic entities have been created in the protocols for proving those for-
mulae. κ˜dfci , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`oid are retrieved by B from profile data entries created for those
formulae after previous protocol executions through which it received data through
the RelData protocol. Analogously, κ̂enc and κ˜enci for 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`crid are retrieved by A
from the data track entries for the formulae for the release of which those entities
have been generated and κ̂enci , 1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`crid and from corresponding profile data
entries by B. The encryption keys PKenci , 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid are obtained by both A and
B through executing appropriate protocols, e.g., PKI-based protocols, from parties
as determined through the third-party specification formulae corresponding to the
conditional data recipients under whose keys to perform the encryption.
Metadata output. For the to-be-generated identifier objects tidfˆ`idf+1, . . . , t
idf
`idf , the
metadata output for an object tidfi ,
ˆ`idf + 1 ≤ i ≤ `idf comprises the private part of
the established cryptographic pseudonym κ˜gci and the public part κ̂
gc
i for A and the
public part κ̂gci for B.
50
There is no output corresponding to private certificates—the cryptographic ma-
terial resulting in the protocol for a certificate κ˜crti is a proof of knowledge κ¯
crt
i of a
randomized certificate ˜˜κcrti based on κ˜crti showing the correctness of (parts of) the
formula φ′B, though, not being reused in a future protocol. Note that a creden-
tial system supporting privacy-preserving revocation of credentials, e.g., using the
approach of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02a] based on dynamic accumulators
requires that a cryptographic credential κ˜crti corresponding to an identity t
idy
i with
1 ≤ i ≤ ˆ`idy be updated with respect to the revocation feature before being used in
a RelData protocol. Otherwise, the generated cryptographic proof may not verify
at B’s side. Such credential update is assumed to have been executed before the
RelData protocol is invoked. In terms of architecture, this can be done periodically
50The functionality of creating identifier objects within the RelData protocol is an extension.
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by a component related to the cryptographic protocols of the architecture, an invo-
cation of a pre-protocol to RelData performing the update, or a combination thereof.
It is crucial that the complexity of this be encapsulated into a component related
to the cryptographic protocols and abstracted from the programming interface.
The to-be-generated opaque identities toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid have cryptographic meta-
data output: An opaque identity toidi has commitment opening information κ˜
dfc
i and
commitment κ̂dfci for A as metadata output and only the commitment κ̂
dfc
i for B.
The protocol computes an integer attribute tuple from χdfci through a represen-
tation of the attributes of the latter following the object specification structure for
κ̂dfci . The structure is canonically determined through the attribute types in χ
dfc
i and
formula φA. The commitment κ̂
dfc
i is computed as a Damg˚ard–Fujisaki–Okamoto
commitment over the integer attribute tuple, thereby creating an additional ran-
domization integer. The attribute tuple and the additional integer form the integer
tuple κ˜dfci .
Similarly, the to-be-generated conditionally released identities tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid
have output as follows: A tcridi has its protocol-generated private attribute tuples
κ˜enci and the shared ciphertext κ̂
enc
i as output for A and κ̂
enc
i for B.
In the protocol, κ˜enci is derived from χ
enc
i analogous as above through a repre-
sentation of the attributes of the latter following the object specification structure
for κ̂enci . The structure is derived analogous as for a κ̂
dfc
i . The ciphertext κ̂
enc
i is
obtained through Camenisch–Shoup verifiable encryption of the tuple κ˜enci under
the condition and the public key specified for tcridi through φA.
Note that the cryptographic entities κ˜crt· , κ̂
enc
· , and κ̂
dfc
· corresponding to identi-
ties, conditionally released identities, and opaque identities, respectively, comprise
structural information in the form of cryptographic object structures—a certificate
structure for a certificate—specifying aspects such as available attributes and their
encoding.
The metadata output predicates for both parties are summarized next, using the
same notation as for the metadata input.
RelData Metadata output:
3(tidfi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂
gc
i ) for
ˆ`idf + 1 ≤ i ≤ `idf A B
3(tidfi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜
gc
i ) for
ˆ`idf + 1 ≤ i ≤ `idf A
3(toidi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂
dfc
i ) for
ˆ`oid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid A B
3(toidi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜
dfc
i ) for
ˆ`oid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid A
3(tcridi , “pubCryptoMaterial”, κ̂
enc
i ) for
ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid A B
3(tcridi , “privCryptoMaterial”, κ˜
enc
i ) for
ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid A
5.4.1.2 Formulae
The input and output formulae of the RelData protocol are based on our formal
data representation of Chapter 4. The formulae are expressed in the language Lp/c,
that is, φA, φ
′
A, φ
′
B ∈ Lp/c.
The syntax of Lp/c applies to our credential-based cryptographic protocols, other
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protocols, e.g., such based on conventional certificates or an online certifier, may
have a less or more expressive syntax, respectively. In any case, the specification
language for any practical technology is a fragment of Lp/g.
The meaning of the formulae in the RelData protocol is different to the meaning
of formulae in the protocols explained earlier: The formulae are statement-type
formulae and specify the data statement to be released by A to B, proven correct
with respect to cryptographic material corresponding to the referred objects.
The input formula φA is constructed based on formulae used in A’s local rep-
resentation of identifier and identity relationships and the constant terms used in
those, while the ouput formulae φ′A and φ
′
B express exactly the same semantics
as A, though using different terms for referring to certain objects and parties as
explained later. φA refers to objects that party A holds using the terms party A
uses in its local data representation in P—see Sec. 4.8.
We recall that a formula of Lp/c comprises multiple sub-formulae in the preamble
and one sub-formula for specifying the attribute assertion. For the details we refer
the reader to the discussions in Sec. 4.5. The cryptographic reason behind only al-
lowing the ∧-connective in sub-formulae for identity introduction and conditionally
released identity introduction is that—because of how the cryptographic protocols
operate—only a single public key can be associated with an object throughout a for-
mula and thus the certifier or conditional data recipient needs to be specified in the
top-level ∧-node of the formula. For Camenisch–Shoup verifiable encryption [CS03],
only one release condition can be specified for a conditionally released identity per
formula, thus it needs to be associated with this conditionally released identity in
the top-level ∧-node.51
The identifier objects tidf1 , . . . , t
idf
ˆ`idf referred to may be any of the identifier objects
from identifier relationships A has with B about itself or third parties, which means,
those which have the term tsidB as identifier in a metadata predicate indicating the
party they have been established with.
5.4.2 Term Derivation and Renaming
The terms used in the output formulae φ′A and φ
′
B and in the metadata are com-
puted from the terms of the input φA through term renaming. This renaming assigns
constant terms to protocol-generated objects and ensures that no undesired linka-
bilities are established through inappropriate re-use of terms throughout multiple
protocol instances. The renaming explained in the current section is performed to
obtain formulae φ′A and φ
′
B from φA. Note that the renaming of objects the names
of which are protocol dependent can only be done once the cryptographic protocol
steps of A have been computed.
51For the Camenisch-Damg˚ard verifiable encryption scheme [CD00], this could be relaxed and
different release conditions could be specified in different disjunctive branches of the formula.
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5.4.2.1 Term Derivation
Terms referring to objects in the input formulae and metadata that are yet to be cre-
ated within the protocol execution need to be replaced with concrete constant terms
in the output based on the executed cryptographic protocol. This holds for protocol-
generated conditionally released identities referred to through tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid and
protocol-generated opaque identities toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid—both of which can be created
as part of the RelData protocol. One can—for reducing the number of message ex-
changes over the network—as an extension also have identifier objects created as
part of the protocol instead of in a separate protocol.
For a conditionally released identity tcridi ,
ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ tcrid`crid , let κ̂enci be the un-
derlying shared cryptographic object, that is, a ciphertext based on the Camenisch–
Shoup verifiable encryption scheme [CS03] for our protocols. The term for referring
to tcridi in the output is computed as t
′crid
i := η(ζo(κ̂
enc
i ), crid) as part of the protocol.
For an opaque identity toidi ,
ˆ`oid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `oid, let κ̂dfci be the underlying shared
object available to both parties. The term for referring to this opaque identity in
the output is computed as t
′oid
i := η(ζo(κ̂
dfc
i ), oid) as part of the protocol.
For an identity tidyi , 1 ≤ i ≤ `idy, let ˜˜κcrti either be the randomized private certifi-
cate (signature) holdership of which is proven or a tuple sampled from a probability
distribution indistinguishable from that of the signature tuples for the correspond-
ing public key a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol simulation transcript
over which is generated. This results in a cryptographic zero-knowledge proof tran-
script or a protocol simulation transcript, respectively, denoted as κ¯crti . The output
term for tidyi is computed as t
′idy
i := η(ζo(κ¯
crt
i ), id) as part of the protocol. Note that
unlike for identifier objects which are never renamed, an identity based on a private
certificate or an identity a proof of which is to be simulated needs to be renamed
to not establish unintended linkability with previous protocol instances or reveal
information on which identities are backed by private certificates and for which a
proof simulation is computed in the cryptographic proof.
The above-discussed derivation and renaming of terms is captured in a function
%prf for the prove protocol instance and added as a metadata predicate in A’s output,
to be used for precisely tracking the released data, including terms used, in the data
track. This can facilitate a presentation of released data to the user, while comprising
information on linkability of protocols.
5.4.2.2 Term Renaming
The terms used for referring to values of the holder and subject attributes of objects
are renamed as part of the protocol. The idea hereto is that the terms used for
referring to the holder and subject of objects are those terms used for the holder and
subject of identifier objects. Complications are incurred through multiple identifier
objects with different holder and subject terms that may refer to the same party,
due to the approach following which those terms are computed for each identifier
object. See Sec. 4.8 for details on those aspects.
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We next explain the term renaming for a formula for the prominent special case
of the general renaming regime introduced in Sec. 4.8 of the formula referring to
one identifier object with A as subject and one with a delegater D as subject as
the identifier objects referred to in the identifier introduction sub-formula. Let p1
represent an identifier object for an identifier of and about A with B and p2 an
identifier object of A about a delegater D with B. Let the terms t¯h,A,1 = t¯s,A,1
be used in A’s input formula to refer to the holder and subject of the identifier
object p1. Let furthermore the term t¯h,A,2 be the holder term and t¯s,A,2 be the
subject term of the identifier object p2 as used in A’s formula. Note that the terms
t¯h,A,1, t¯s,A,1, and t¯h,A,2 are all equal following the local representation of identity
data which φA builds upon through construction. Let the term th,A,1 := %
idf
p1 (¯th,A,1)
be the holder and ts,A,1 := %
idf
p1 (¯ts,A,1) the subject of p1 as determined through its
term renaming function %idfp1 . Analogously, let th,A,2 := %
idf
p2 (¯th,A,2) be the holder
and ts,A,2 := %
idf
p2 (¯ts,A,2) be the subject of the identifier object p2 according to its
term renaming function %idfp2 . Recall that the renaming function of an identifier
object captures the mapping of locally used terms in A’s data representation to the
terms used in interactions with the party or parties the identifier object has been
established with.52 The functions %idfp1 and %
idf
p2 are retrieved by A as metadata from
its portfolio. Let the terms th,A,1, ts,A,1 and th,A,2 refer to the same party A and
ts,A,2 to a delegater D.
The renaming proceeds as follows for the case presented above: Choose the
identifier object p1 as the one for determining the term th,A,1 which is the same term
as ts,A,1 used for referring to A in the output formula φ
′
B. Choose furthermore the
term ts,A,2 for referring to D as the other subject in the output φ
′
B. Replace each
occurrence of term t¯h,A,1 throughout φA with th,A,1, except for in logical equality
predicates relating attributes of identifier objects other than p1 with constant terms.
Replace the term t¯s,A,2 with ts,A,2 throughout φA, except for in predicates relating
attributes of identifier objects other than p2 with constant terms. Replace the term
t¯h,A,2 with th,A,2, except for in predicates relating attributes of identifier objects
other than p2 with constant terms. Introduce a new predicate th,A,1 = th,A,2 using
the logic’s object equality, connected with ∧ to the predicates in the identifier object
introduction sub-formula, for specifying the sameness of the renamed terms with the
original terms because this semantics of the formula would otherwise be lost through
the renaming.53
This approach generalizes to an arbitrary number of identifier objects about
parties being referred to in φA, particularly also multiple identifier objects about
the same party. The basic idea in the generalized setting is to choose one identifier
object for each party referred to through the same term in the input φA and use
this for determining the term renaming for referring to this party. The renaming is
done throughout the formula, but not for predicates referring to attributes of the
52Note that the terms are always the same for a given identifier object, thereby following the
concepts underlying a pseudonym.
53Note that this goes beyond a pure term replacement, though is required for retaining the
equality semantics between terms referring to parties after term renaming and for obtaining an
output formula φ′B that is logically equivalent to φA.
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other identifier objects than the chosen one. Equalities are established between the
terms that were the same in the input and have been renamed to different terms
in the output. A special—and very common—case is when only a single identifier
object is used for making statements about A.
The explained approach also captures the case of identifier objects and identities
based on different registration identifier objects. This is the case when a user ob-
tains different registration pseudonyms and therefore different private keys, implying
multiple private key domains (see Sec. 4.8). Such different domains are reflected by
using different terms in the input to refer to the party A that may be related by
the logic’s equality symbol = and cryptographic proof thereof through a domain
binding credential. Due to conducting a separate renaming for each different input
term referring to the same party, this results in different output terms and therefore
handles this case correctly.
The processing renames the terms used by A in its local data representation to
the terms to be used for the instance of the release protocol and introduces equalities
where required to retain the semantics of φA in φ
′
B. This seemingly complicated
approach is necessary for our logic-based data representation to achieve that a holder
of identifier and identity relationships can match data contained in such against data
requests using derivations in the underlying logic, and particularly also considering
data about third parties, while supporting delegation and party registration.
When using credential protocols for proving the integrity of the formula with
respect to the referred-to identifier and identity relationships, the new terms for
referring to objects are determined by the cryptographic protocol and cannot be
arbitrarily chosen by the party. A term tidyi gets replaced with a term t
′idy :=
η(ζo(κ¯
crt
i ), id). A term referring to a conditionally released identity gets replaced
with the term t
′crid
i := η(ζo(κ̂
enc
i ), crid) and one referring to an opaque identity with
term t
′oid
i := η(ζo(κ̂
dfc
i ), oid)—details about the computation have been explained
further above. This renaming is done once the cryptographic protocol has been
executed.
This leads to terms that are unique with overwhelming probability and lead to
a collision with already-existing terms only with negligible probability with appro-
priate choice of character lenghts of terms and assuming a polynomial number, in a
security paramter, of terms being created in the system. From a logic-based mod-
eling perspective this is an ideal situation because the terms are provably correctly
chosen which may not be the case when different or no deterministic schemes for
deriving the terms from cryptographic elements of the proof are used.
Once the term renaming has been done, the resulting formula is used as input to
the cryptographic protocol for generating a cryptographic proof for the correctness
of the formula. The data recipient does not need to perform the term renaming as
it already receives the formula with the renamed terms. The respective party uses
input to the cryptographic protocol as discussed further above and retrieves the
cryptographic materials by lookup based on object names of objects in the formula
from its repository.
The cryptographic proof can, when being generated as a non-interactive proof
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based on a Fiat-Shamir signature, be sent to the data recipient together with the
formula φ′A. Note that, once the cryptographic proof has been computed, a final
renaming step on certain elements of the formula is carried out as explained above
to properly name the proof-dependent elements.
More details on the cryptographic protocols are presented in the form of a sum-
mary of the cryptographic protocol subsystem in Chapter 6.
5.4.3 Post Processing
Once a protocol instance for releasing data has been successfully executed, the
releasing party A stores its protocol output, that is, the released formula φ′A as well
as any associated metadata in its data track with itself as subject, while the recipient
stores the received formula φ′B and metadata in a profile data entry with the subject
being the value of the attribute subjectId for the party the data statement is about,
that is, A or a referred-to delegater D, or both.
The recipient B’s metadata comprise cryptographic material proving the correct-
ness of the released formula as well as cryptographic objects related to the opaque
and conditionally released identities. The latter allow a third party, the respective
conditional data recipient, to obtain the attribute values of a conditionally released
identity if the attached condition is fulfilled.
Uncovering the attribute values of a conditionally released identity tcridi , that is,
obtaining the function X crid
tcridi
, through the corresponding conditional data recipient
is performed through a separate protocol involving B and the conditional recipient.
Thereby, B requests a decryption of κ̂enci and passes the condition that it claims to
hold. The conditional recipient checks whether the condition holds and decrypts
the ciphertext κ̂enci with the condition and its private decryption key as input.
The prover A’s metadata comprise the same as the recipient’s fulfilling the dis-
cussed conditions on term names, and additionally the term renaming function
applied to its input formula for obtaining the output. Both parties store the crypto-
graphic objects related to the protocol-generated conditionally released and opaque
identities, where A stores both the shared and private objects related to those. Both
parties store the object specification formulae related to the generated conditionally
released and opaque identities. Those objects are required in future instances of the
RelData protocol between A and B, the specification formulae of which refer to the
corresponding conditionally released and opaque identities.
5.4.4 Architecture Aspects
An instance of a RelData protocol is triggered by the party A who intends to release
data, e.g., a user A interacting with a service provider B. Within our architecture,
the RelData protocol is typically invoked from within the policy-driven negotiation
protocol discussed in earlier work [Som11] for mutual release of (certified) data
between two interacting parties. Note that establishing a confidential and one-way
authenticated channel using standard PKI technology can already establish attribute
knowledge about the authenticated party exploitable in a negotiation protocol and
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can be viewed as a data release protocol based on traditional X.509 server-side
certificates.
Multiple technologies for releasing data. A data statement can make use of
multiple identity relationships and thus require, in the general case, multiple un-
derlying protocols based on different technologies for the technical exchange of the
data, e.g., a credential system for the release of certified data and a protocol for
the plaintext release of attribute data. The proposed logic-based representation
of data allows for this as it is largely protocol independent. The release of such
combined formula needs to be handled through an appropriate component in an
implementation architecture. This can be done by splitting a formula to be released
into multiple formulae and execute protocols for the release accordingly, e.g., a cre-
dential protocol and a plaintext release protocol to release a compound statement
comprising both identity information certified by third parties and claimed by the
party. A data statement can also build on multiple formulae of different identity
relationships with mutually “compatible” protocols. In this case, identities of dif-
ferent identity relationships can be related to each other, e.g., their subjects can
be expressed to be the same party without revealing a unique identifier. Currently,
private certificate systems are the only technology supporting such proofs that in-
volve multiple identity relationships, even with different certifiers, and even allow
for relating unrevealed attributes of such to each other. For uncertified claims this
can be trivially achieved, though based on honesty of the claiming party and thus
not interesting from a protocol perspective. See Sommer [Som11] for architecture
discussions related to supporting multiple technologies.
Theft and sharing prevention. When relating multiple identifier objects or
identities through their holder and subject attributes and using credential-based
protocols for proving the given formula correct, using the same holder or subject for
two different objects means that the holder or subject party of those is the same.
The proof thereby shows that the objects have the same underlying secret key, and
optionally additionally delegation secret key. Such key equality is strong evidence
of sameness of the party because a party can be disincentivized or prevented from
sharing its master secret key, or protected from theft thereof, through different
technical or organizational means or a combination thereof, e.g., containment of the
private key on a hardware token or encryption of a valuable external secret of the
user under the private key [CL01]. See Bichsel [Bic07] for a discussion of theft and
sharing prevention and references to relevant literature. For identity relationships
for delegated identities some concepts apply analogously to the delegation private
key the party holds.
5.4.5 Relation to the Channel Model
Referring to the channel transformation rule Auth-Cred for transferring authenti-
cations of our model in Chapter 3, the protocol RelData realizes the part of the
channel transformation rule where A authenticates a statement φ′ to B which is
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based on statements A has authenticated to certifiers Cifor1 ≤ i ≤ k and for
which A has established identity relationships based on those authentications. The
symbol θ with appropriate decorations as referred to in the sequent for relating
φ′ to the party’s repository in rule Auth-Cred refers to the set of identifier object
specification formulae of A for the identifier objects it has established with B. The
symbol η refers to the object specification formulae for the already-established or
to-be established conditionally released identities. Analogously, χ refers to the ob-
ject specification formulae for the existing or to-be-created opaque identities. The
object specification formulae contained in η and χ are required for the modeling of
the channel transformation in order to be able to establish the `O-relation in the
logic calculus.
For rule AuthDele-Cred for transferring authentications of channels while also
modeling delegation, the above applies analogously, while additionally the authen-
ticated statement can be used to construct the statement φ′ authenticated to B.
The functions FD and FDR show some differences to the corresponding functions for
non-delegation issuing in terms of handling the authenticated formula with Ck+1
for considering the delegation. The details of the identity relationships for both the
non-delegation and delegation case and their correspondance to the channel model
have been discussed in Sec. 5.3.
Note that the protocol RelData can consider an arbitrary number of delegation
credentials for one delegater and make statements about an arbitrary number of
delegaters in one formula, while the channel transformation rule is constrained to
a single credential for a single delegater D. A formula comprising assertions about
multiple delegaters is not crucial for practical systems.
5.4.6 Construction of φA
A formula φA used as the main input specification for an instance of the RelData
protocol needs to be available to A before triggering the data release protocol. The
most prominent way of defining the formula is that A has received a data request
ψ within a negotiation protocol, with ψ being a formula in a fragment of Lr/g
corresponding to a specific protocol, which it needs to fulfill. Then it generates
φA from the request ψ through a formal process, possibly with additional external
input, e.g., by the user.
For our credential protocols, the fragment of Lr/c of Lr/g is used as request
language, while for any other mechanism, an appropriate fragment of Lr/g can be
employed. For each mechanism, a pair of request and statement languages is defined,
for our credential protocols this is (Lr/c,Lp/c).
The language Lr/c has been defined in Sec. 4.6 based on the overall data model.
Let us recall here that main differences to the statement language are that free
variables are used for expressing request semantics—a free variable stands for any of
the possible concrete instantiations of this variable in a statement formula provided
as a response to a request. Furthermore, ontology-based generalizations can be used
in the specification, e.g., of third parties.
The process of finding fulfilling formulae for a data request (policy) using the
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party’s repository P is denoted as matching or policy matching. The matching
process builds on the identifier specification formulae of the identifier relationships
of the party, the identity specification formulae of the identity relationships, the
profile data entries for third parties, and the data track entries for formulae during
the proof protocol for which opaque and conditionally released identities have been
computed.
5.4.6.1 Input
Let ψi be the formula specifying t
idf
i of identifier relationship 
idf
i of the party and
Φidf = {ψi : 1 ≤ i ≤ `Ridf} the set of the formulae of all its identifier relationships.
Let ψ′j,j′ be the formulae specifying the identity t
oid
j of identity relationship 
idy
j and
Φidy = {ψ′j,j′ : 1 ≤ j ≤ `R
idy} and j′ be the formula index for an identity relationship.
Thus, the latter set comprises all specification formulae of all identity relationships
that party A has established. The sets of formulae Φidf and Φidy specify all identifier
and identity relationships of the party from a data model perspective.
A selects the set Φ¯idf ⊆ Φidf comprising the formulae tidfi for all identifier objects
of identifier relationships comprising a metadata predicate 3(tidfi , “estWith”, tsidB),
that is, an identifier object established with the interaction partner using the pseudo-
nym identifier tsidB in the current interaction. Furthermore, for a formula to be
part of ψ′, the corresponding identifier relationship should not comprise a metadata
predicate that flags it as disabled.
Similarly, A constrains the set Φidy to Φ¯idy ⊆ Φidy by only considering formulae
of identity relationships which are active, that is, do not have metadata associated
that flag them as revoked, expired, superseded, or otherwise disabled.
Let φcrid1 , . . . , φ
crid
ˆ`crid be the object specification formulae corresponding to the con-
ditionally released identities tcrid1 , . . . , t
crid
ˆ`crid of the formula that are available in meta-
data predicates associated with formulae of data track entries at A and the set Φ̂crid
the set of those formulae. Let, analogously, be Φ̂oid be the set {φoid1 , . . . , φoidˆ`oid} of ob-
ject specification formulae correponding to available opaque identities toid1 , . . . , t
oid
ˆ`oid .
Those formulae can be easily obtained from the data track entries for previously
released formulae for the cryptographic protocols through which the cryptographic
objects have been computed through looking them up using the term names in the
request formula.
For to-be-generated conditionally released identities tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid and opaque
identities toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid it can be assumed that such identities with arbitrary at-
tributes and being of arbitrary type as induced through their constituting attribute
tuples can be created as it is required for fulfilling a request ψ, unless the formula
makes a contradictory statement about their attributes, and thus they can be con-
sidered available in the computation of finding solutions to the request ψ. The terms
used to refer to those objects are random terms and are replaced with terms based
on the cryptographic material in φ′B once the required cryptographic protocol steps
have been executed by party A.
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Let O be a theory modeling the composed ontology over which reasoning by the
party is done in our logic. This comprises the complete ontology the party intends
to consider for the policy matching. The ontology is composed from ontologies of
the different ontology types as discussed in Sec. 4.10. How those ontologies are
provided by ontology providers and obtained by the party is also discussed in the
referred-to section. Using the ontology O allows the party to leverage ontology-
defined knowledge for its automated deductions.
We henceforth denote the set of formulae of the part OtPy of the composed
ontology O for specifying the identifier objects of certifiers and conditional recipients
as Φidf/ont and the set of identities of certifiers and conditional recipients as Φidy/ont.
This includes the certifiers for the dummy identities being specified. Furthermore,
we denote the set of specification formulae for dummy identities from the part Ody
of the ontology as Φdy.
Further sets of specification formulae, in addition to those in O resulting from
the composition with OtPy, make assertions about the certifier identifier objects and
identities that the party holds locally in its profile data—related to the certifiers of
its identity relationships and possibly further certificates. As well, corresponding
formulae make statements about conditional data recipients. We denote the sets
for the formulae specifying identifier objects and identities of those third parties as
Φidf/cert and Φidy/cert, respectively. Those formulae may be additionally resembled
through formulae in the ontology, without any effect. New formulae are added
to those sets whenever a new certifier is encountered for establishing an identity
relationship, or new data recipient is encountered in a data release protocol. Holding
those formulae outside of third-party-issued ontologies is required in order to support
that certifiers not captured in a third-party-issued ontology be considered in the
automated deduction process. This is a prerequisite for openness and scalability
of the identity system as it removes strong assumptions on the reliance on third
parties for the logic-based reasoning to work. Additionally, it can be seen as crucial
for the bootstrapping of such open system until the overall required ecosystem has
emerged.
Also, the party can use specification formulae Φ̂dy for dummy identities in addi-
tion to what the ontology O specifies, again facilitating openness. Those should be
aligned with the specification formulae of the party specifying certifiers.
5.4.6.2 Output
The output of the matching algorithm is a set Ω of solutions ω′i. Each solution
comprises a formula ψ′′, the identifier relationship specification formulae Φ̂idf ⊆ Φidf
and identity relationship specification formulae Φ̂idy ⊆ Φidy required for fulfilling the
request formula ψ, specification formulae Φ˜dy ⊆ Φdy ∪ Φ̂dy for the dummy identi-
ties, zero-knowledge proofs related to which are to be simulated, and the generated
private entities χdfcˆ`oid+1, . . . , χ
dfc
`oid and χ
enc
ˆ`crid+1
, . . . , χenc`crid for the to-be-generated opaque
and conditionally released identities toidˆ`oid+1, . . . , t
oid
`oid and t
crid
ˆ`crid+1
, . . . , tcrid`crid , respectively.
The matching algorithm computes for each such toidi the set of tuples specifying
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its attributes based on the request formula ψ as well as the term toidi for referring to it.
The tuples are stored as part of χdfc, while the cryptographic data is not contained
there and added in the cryptographic protocol. Analogously, the algorithm computes
the set of attribute tuples and term tcridi for each of the to-be-generated conditionally
released identities tcridˆ`crid+1, . . . , t
crid
`crid . The tuples are stored as part of χ
enc
i for each t
crid
i
and the cryptographic data is generated during the cryptographic protocol only.
Each χdfci comprises the attribute tuples and structure for t
oid
i and corresponds to
an object specification formula φoidi that specifies the attribute values of t
oid
i through
a sequence of predicates connected through the ∧-connective. Let the set of formulae
Φoid be defined as Φoid := {φoidi : ˆ`oid+1 ≤ i ≤ `oid}. Analogously, each χenci comprises
the attribute tuples and structure for tcridi and corresponds to a formula φ
crid
i that
specifies the attribute values of tcridi through a sequence of predicates. The formula
set Φcrid is defined as Φcrid := {φcridi : ˆ`crid + 1 ≤ i ≤ `crid}. The formulae in Φoid
and Φcrid are object specification formulae, analogous to the formulae of an identity
relationship specifying the corresponding identity.
A solution formula ψ′′ is the target formula of the computation and refers to
identifier objects and identities, specification formulae of which are part of the out-
put, and similarly for dummy identities. The constant terms used in the formula are
those referred to in the specification formulae. Also, it refers to all newly generated
opaque and conditionally released identities using the terms indicated in the above
discussions. A result formula does not comprise (free) variables and thus makes a
concrete identity statement and can be proven with our cryptographic credential
protocols.
The formula ψ′′ comprises 〈 〉 annotations around predicates of the formula spec-
ifying for which predicates the party needs to hold cryptographic material to create
a cryptographic proof for the truth of the predicate. For the other predicates, a
zero-knowledge proof simulation of the cryptographic proof will be generated, this
being indistinguishable from a proof to the verifier of the protocol.
The relation between a result formula ψ′′ and the inputs to and parts of the
output of the matching process is formally defined, in terms of the underlying logic
calculus, through the sequent (5.9), where O∗ = Oax ∪ Φidf/ont ∪ Φidy/ont.
Φ̂idf , Φ̂idy, Φ˜dy, Φ̂crid, Φ̂oid,Φcrid,Φoid,Φidf/cert,Φidy/cert `O∗ ψ′′ (5.9)
That is, the sequent comprises all prerequisite formulae from which to syntactically
derive ψ′′. Of the ontology O, only the system-defined axioms Oax are required
because of the rule for deducing the type predicate from a type attribute, as well as
the sets Φidf/ont and Φidy/ont, that is, the specification formulae for identifier objects
and identities of third parties, which are not comprised in Φidf/cert and Φidy/cert,
e.g., because of the party not having an identity relationship with a party specified
therein and thus having no profile data entry for the third party, which is a common
case for dummy identities to be used in branches of a disjunction. Other parts of the
ontology are not required for the deduction of the data statement ψ′′ from the input
formulae. The intuition behind this is that the formulae on the left side, except
for Φ˜dy, specify the portfolio and non-portfolio parts of the repository needed for
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computing a cryptographic proof and items generated during the matching process of
a data request to find a result—the set Φ˜dy specifies the dummy identities. Not using
any further parts of O as outlined implies that the relation between the formulae
on the left side of the sequent and ψ′′ does not require any of the ontology-based
abstractions, except for the typing. Expressed differently, ψ′′ is expressed without
any abstractions, which is required for a formula to be provable with credential
protocols.
The formula ψ′′ comprises 〈 〉 annotations around predicates54 that are to be
proven using cryptographic material of the party. Those predicates are the pred-
icates which refer to identifier objects, identities, conditionally released identities,
and opaque identities described through formulae in the corresponding sets in the
sequent as well as the predicates expressing the type and certifier of referred-to
dummy identities in the top-level ∧-node of the formula, and required certifier iden-
tifier objects and identities.
For ensuring that A can generate a cryptographic proof for ψ′′, the 〈 〉-fulfillment
condition of Def. 5.1 needs to hold for ψ′′.
Definition 5.1 (〈 〉-fulfillment) A formula ψ′′ is 〈 〉-fulfilled in L if and only if,
when constructing a formula ψ̂′′ from ψ′′ by replacing every 〈 〉-annotated predicate
of ψ′′ with the constant true and every other predicate with the constant false, the
relation ψ̂′′ ` true holds in L.
Note that this definition allows that more than the minimum necessary predicates
for fulfilling the definition be 〈 〉-annotated in ψ′′, that is, that the formula is “over-
fulfilled” with respect to cryptographic material underlying the referenced objects.
Let Θ be a sequent of the form of (5.9) with the assumptions as discussed for
the sequent and a formula ψ′′ of a fragment of Lp/g as its conclusion. Then, the
〈 〉-fulfillment property of Def. 5.1 holds for the formula ψ′′. This follows from
the semantics of our logic, the definition of the sequent being based, among other
things, on the portfolio of the party and parts from the ontology, and the constraints
imposed on Lp/g and thus any fragment thereof.
We are interested only in the interpretation Iδ corresponding to a system in a
given system state induced by the so-far executed protocols as explained in Sec. 4.11
on the language semantics because it relates to the cryptographic material a party
holds to prove a formula correct using protocols. Expressed differently, this means
that all 〈 〉-annotated predicates need to be provable with underlying cryptographic
material the party holds, that is, its identifier and identity relationships, as well as
publicly available material. That is, a 〈 〉-fulfilled sequent in this setting can always
be proven to be true using cryptographic protocols by the party.
Definition 5.2 (〈 〉-minimal) A 〈 〉-fulfilled formula ψ′′ is 〈 〉-minimal, if and only
if no 〈 〉 annotation of a predicate can be removed with the formula remaining 〈 〉-
fulfilled.
54Allowing also for sub-formulae to be 〈 〉-annotated may be required in a protocol setting where
an identity relationship can comprise statements with disjunctions. We see this currently only
being efficiently possible with protocols with online certifiers realizing such identity relationships.
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Intuitively, this definition means that no predicates not required for constructing
a cryptographic proof for ψ′′ are 〈 〉-annotated. Formulae not fulfilling this property
can result, for example, when the party’s portfolio can fulfill a branch of a disjunction
and thereby already making the formula fulfilled, while, in addition, (parts of) other
branches being fulfilled by the portfolio.
Definition 5.3 (Portfolio minimal) A sequent of the form (5.9) with a 〈 〉-anno-
tated formula ψ′′ is portfolio minimal if and only if the sequent holds and no formula
in the sets of formulae Φ̂idf and Φ̂idy can be removed with the sequent (5.9) still being
fulfilled.
Definition 5.3 means exactly what it defines, namely that no superfluous object
specification formulae are contained in the set Φ̂idf comprising the identifier spec-
ification formulae and the set Φ̂idy comprising the identity specification formulae.
When providing the metadata input to the RelData protocol, the cryptographic ob-
jects related to identifier objects and identities are chosen to correspond to a solution
with a portfolio-minimal sequent.
When generating a cryptographic protocol through our run-time protocol gen-
eration approach of Chapter 6, a 〈 〉-minimal formula ψ′′ is used as statement to
create the protocol for, and the formulae Φ̂idf and Φ̂idy of the corresponding portfolio-
minimal sequent express precisely which identifier objects and identities, and thus
the corresponding relationships, of the party the proof will be based on.
Let an environment E be an instantiation of free variables, that is, a mapping
from free variables to constant terms of the corresponding type. We relate the result
formula ψ′′ to the request ψ through the theory TO induced by the ontology O over
the deductive system L and environment E as shown in (5.10).
ψ′′ `EO ψ (5.10)
Note that there does not necessarily exist a bijection between the free variables
referring to identities and identifier objects in ψ and constant terms in ψ′′. Due to
the expansion of ontology concepts in ψ, e.g., into disjunctions of sub-statements,
a single free variable in ψ may be expanded to multiple constant terms referring
to concrete objects in ψ′′. An ontology-defined concept that expands to a single
identity in the result leads to the special case of a one-to-one mapping to a constant
in ψ′′ for such free variable of the request.
The sequents (5.9) and (5.10) for a formula ψ′′ formalize how the input to the
matching algorithm and the ontology O are used for fulfilling a request ψ.
Considering the expected number of identity and identifier relationships in Φ¯idf
and Φ¯idy for typical users in a practical system and the complexity of practical
data requests ψ of service providers, the number |Ω| of solutions for a request can
be expected to be reasonably small. One can represent the solutions by avoiding
redundancies of re-representing the equal parts of different solutions and thereby
preserving the structure among the elements of the solution set which can also be
advantageous for representing the solutions to a human user for soliciting required
input.
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5.4.6.3 Towards an Algorithm
The preceding discussions on matching a party’s portfolio and other repository for-
mulae with a request have tackled the problem from a perspective purely based on
the logic formalism underlying our languages. In Sec. 4.9 we have discussed options
of implementing the deductive system for our logic, particularly with an account
to the differences of our logic to standard first-order logic. Below, we complement
those discussions with thoughts related particularly to finding satisfying formulae
for data requests, thereby extending the above discussions towards an operational-
ization through an algorithm.
A matching algorithm M needs to find the result set Ω, or a subset thereof,
given a request ψ and further inputs as discussed above. Each result of Ω has as its
main components a formula ψ′′i and environment E ′i as explained in detail. We next
elaborate on crucial aspects relevant for finding such formulae and corresponding
environments for our logic-based approach.
Ontology-based expansions. A complication for the algorithm M is the ex-
pansion of ontology concepts to disjunctions. Take as an example an identity the
issuer of which is specified to be an OECD government issuer through an ontology
concept in the third-party specification sub-formula and over which predicates are
expressed in the assertion sub-formula of ψ. For better data minimization, this
ontology concept may be “expanded” such that it results in a disjunction of the
assertion statements, each branch referring to one of the possible identities, without
comprising an ontology abstraction. Such new request is intended to improve the
privacy of the party by revealing even less data in a response to it by hiding the
concrete identity type it uses to fulfill a transformed attribute request predicate.
The case of not performing an expansion of an ontology concept results in a result
comprising a fulfilling statement to one of the disjunctive branches induced by the
abstraction, thereby being a valid response to the request.
Let ι(ψ,O, par , Φ¯idf , Φ¯idy) be a function taking a request ψ, ontology O, param-
eters par , and formulae Φ¯idf , Φ¯idy representing the applicable parts of the party’s
portfolio as inputs and, governed by par , expanding ontology-based abstractions
in ψ. Concretely, it expands an ontology-based specification sub-formula for an
identity to multiple identities satisfying such sub-formula and transforming ψ to a
logically equivalent, under the theory TO induced by O, formula which expresses the
relation predicates over the abstractly specified identity with disjunction semantics
over the different identities fulfilling the abstraction. This defines a new formula
that states the same predicates, in a disjunction branch for each of the identities
fulfilling the abstraction. The function also outputs information for computing the
environment Ei.
Note that our formal logic does not mandate whether such ontology-based ab-
straction in a request be responded to through predicates over a single fulfilling
identity or a disjunction over all or a subset of all fulfilling identities of the ab-
straction. Thus, the need for the above-discussed function ι and its parameter par
arises.
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The statement language supports different ways of realizing such expansions,
of which we explain two next. (1) Each relation predicate or sequence of relation
predicates expressed on the abstractly specified identity as part of the assertion sub-
formula may be expanded to a disjunction of such predicates or predicate sequences,
each expressed on one of the fulfilling identities. This approach is applicable to cases
where the identity is referred to in an assertion sub-formula comprising disjunctions
itself by creating a disjunction over sub-formulae, each referring to one concrete
identity. The transformed formulae blow up substantially when multiple ontology-
based generalizations are used. (2) For each ontology-based expansion, an opaque
identity is introduced as a proxy for the different fulfilling identities for the abstractly
specified identity. A disjunction is specified over the opaque identity, in each branch
the referred-to attributes of one of the fulfilling identities being specified to be equal
to the ones of the opaque identity. Each reference to an attribute of the identity in
a relation predicate in the assertion sub-formula is replaced with a reference to the
corresponding attribute of the opaque identity.
Particularly when attribute values are requested, non-trivial sub-formulae are
expressed over the to-be-expanded identities, or multiple expansions are computed,
approach (2) is preferable for resulting in simpler result formulae. Both approaches
lead to formulae logically equivalent to the original request under the used ontology,
though, being potentially very different structurally.
Registration binding predicates on the abstractly specified identity further com-
plicate the processing as the registration binding identity has to be considered in
addition. We do not present the syntactic details of the explained transformations in
this work. Those expansions are a highly advanced approach to further strengthen
data minimization and are supported by the logic.
Technically, finding fulfilling identities for an ontology-based abstraction can be
realized by using the automated deduction capabilities of our logic for enumerating
the concrete identities of the party that match a given specification sub-formula
of a request, as part of the overall matching computation. The parameters par
thereby govern how many disjunctive branches be used in the expanded formula
and over which eligible identities. The formulae related to the portfolio of the party
are required in order to also include the identity the party needs for fulfilling the
disjunction to be created.
The result after applying such expansions to ψ following par is an intermediate
formula referred to as ψ′. Note that a, possibly empty, subset of all the expan-
sions are computed based on par and as allowed by metadata governing permissible
expansions associated with the request. Note furthermore that par models also
potential user input to the process or user preferences.
The output related to an environment Ei for a ψ′i can, for example, be based
on a random choice of any suitable object in ψ′ to be mapped to an object in ψ in
order to not reveal the 〈 〉 annotation of the formula.
Generally, it is possible that different parameter sets par i be used for obtaining
different expanded requests ψ′i on which the further processing is performed. Also,
this computation can, for obtaining the widest coverage of potential responses to
the request and considering available identity relationships at the same time, be
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interleaved with the remaining matching computations. Though, we assume for
our explanations—for sufficing with a simpler formalism in our logic—that a single
parameter set be used and a single formula ψ′ be computed before the remaining
matching steps. This covers also the setting of no such expansions being done by
the party and thus ψ′ = ψ. In a system, also the approach of not allowing for such
expansions at all and requiring them to be made explicit already in the original
request is practical.
A computed request ψ′ can refer to a larger number of identities for primary
identities as well as for corresponding certifier identities and certifier identifier ob-
jects through the expansion of abstract ontology concepts to disjunctive statements
as outlined above. The formula ψ′ can serve as the basis for establishing the formal
relation in the underlying calculus L between a result formula ψ′′ and environment
E ′ obtained through matching and the request ψ. We relate the result formula ψ′′
to the request ψ′ using the environment E ′ as presented in (5.11):
ψ′′ `E′O ψ′ . (5.11)
Such sequent can be expressed with a one-to-one correspondence between variables
used on the right side and constant terms on the left side of the `-symbol which
would, as outlined further above, not necessarily be the case for ψ on the right side.
Thus, a result gives rise to a formula ψ′ only comprising terms that can be
derived from the formulae corresponding to the cryptographic pseudonyms, cre-
dentials, other objects and relevant specification formulae A holds, and dummy
identities.
Deduction-based computation of ψ′′. The processing for computing a result
can be formalized through an extension of the sequent notation. The left side of
the sequent comprises most of the elements of the left side of the sequent (5.9),
and the right side of the sequent is equal to the right side of (5.11). In addition to
the discussions related to reasoning in Sec. 4.9, we require that the formula ψ′′ be
output as well by the automated deduction procedure as presented in (5.12).
Φ̂idf , Φ̂idy, Φ˜dy, Φ̂crid, Φ̂oid,Φidf/cert,Φidy/cert `[ψ′′,E′]O ψ′ (5.12)
The extended sequent notation `[ψ′′,E′]O specifies that the formula ψ′′ and the envi-
ronment E ′ be computed as part of the deduction procedure. For such ψ′′ and E ′,
both (5.9) and (5.11) hold. Note that the notation does not make the computation
of the formula sets Φcrid and Φoid explicit. Also note that the full ontology O needs
to be used, e.g., for resolving abstractions.
The requirement that formula ψ′′ and environment E ′ be provided as output,
including its 〈 〉 annotations, necessitates an extension of standard deduction mech-
anisms. So does the output of the subset of the input formulae based on which ψ′′
can be derived under the used theory. The deduction mechanism furthermore needs
to ensure that the formula ψ′′ be generated following the syntactical constraints of
the relevant fragment of Lp. Backtracking techniques can be employed for sampling
the whole solution space for a given set of input parameters.
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Using E ′ and the information output by the algorithm ι for expanding ontology-
based abstractions, the environment E can be computed. The sequent (5.10) holds
with respect to this environment E . As already noted earlier, this environment may
require, depending on expansions performed in the computation of ψ′, that it be
computed using an approach that creates a randomized mapping.
Technically, ontology-based expansions could be part of the above deduction
process. Through standard disjunction introduction rules, the desired formulae
could eventually be derived through reasoning, though, the search space is huge and
required extensions to a reasoning engine substantial. Our opinion is that having
the expansion separated keeps the reasoning more closely aligned to standard logic
and the overall system substantially simpler.
The beauty of the proposed solution of using an extension of the deductive
system L for our logic for finding fulfilling formulae for a given data request shows
in the complexities of the matching process being handled through the deductive
system. As an example, this comprises the proof of logic equivalence of disjunctions
obtained by applying ι to the corresponding ontology-based concepts. This shows
the tight integration of the overall data modeling and system with the underlying
logic.
5.4.6.4 Discussion
Intuitively, a formula ψ′′ from a fragment of Lp can comprise statements about
multiple pseudonyms and statements referring to attributes of multiple credentials
the party holds, thereby revealing partial attribute information of attributes of mul-
tiple credentials, as well as dummy identities for which the party does not hold
credentials. Predicates expressed over those can reveal partial information on the
attributes, relate opaque attributes to credential attributes, and release attributes
under conditions to designated parties using conditionally released identities. Cer-
tifiers and conditional data recipients are specified through assertions about further
identifier objects and identities.
For a real-world system, restricted fragments of both the data request and repre-
sentation languages Lr/g and Lp/g and thus the required matching functionality can
be implemented, thereby resulting in a less expressive but simpler system. For first
practical deployments of user-centric identity management system based on private
certificate technology as the data release protocols, for example, no support of dis-
junctions in a data statement is a reasonable approach, while this functionality can
be added at a later stage as an incremental deployment.
The data recipient also uses automated deduction in a theory induced by a
composed ontology OB in the calculus L. Its computations can be accelerated if the
environments E ′ specifying the free variable assignment with respect to the request,
the chosen expansion ψ′, and E are provided together with the response formula ψ′′.
Sequent (5.13) is evaluated first to check whether the reponse ψ′′ fulfills ψ′.
Next, B can efficiently check whether ψ′ is a valid expansion of the request ψ.
This together establishes validity of the sequent (5.14) and thus that the request is
fulfilled.
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ψ′′ `E′OB ψ′ (5.13)
ψ′′ `EOB ψ (5.14)
When not using this accelerated approach to verification, additional functionality
must be reflected in an extension of the automated deduction procedure of the
recipient such that the recipient can derive a valid environment as part of a deduction
as shown in sequent (5.15) and prove the sequent correct, without using any auxiliary
input for accelerated computation.
ψ′′ `[EB]OB ψ (5.15)
5.4.6.5 Open challenges
Ontologies and disjunction requests. Regarding the use of ontologies, a chal-
lenge in terms of system openness arises from the way a response relates to a request
through an environment. Assuming that a party does not have dummy identity on-
tologies available at its disposition for identity types referred to in a request it does
not have identity relationships for, problems arise for a request comprising a dis-
junction where the party intends to fulfill one branch of the disjunction with its
portfolio and does not have formally represented or other information on identity
types referred to in the other branches.
The problem consists when a disjunctive request is fulfilled with a response com-
prising only conjunction as connective because, through inherent properties of the
data representation, the type and certifier of all referred-to identities are specified
as part of the top-level conjunction in a request or response preamble. Without on-
tology knowledge over the identities the party does not have an identity relationship
for, the sequent for relating the response and request does not hold in the deductive
theory and portfolio used by the party.
The problem can be addressed in a practical system by representing a request
that comprises a disjunction over k different options as k different requests com-
municated in a request message of which the party chooses one. Another option is
to change the request syntax such that a request can have a disjunction at the top
level and each disjunctive branch comprising only the conjunction connective. This
would eliminate the need for having type and certifier information about identities
not backed by the party’s identity relationships in the top-level conjunction of the
response formula.
This problem highlights some of the issues that can arise when using a fully
logic-based language for representing data and the challenges resulting from using
an open system and the expressivity we support with our approach.
Deduction system. When computing a fulfilling data statement for a request
with the properties as explained further above, one aspect to be considered is that
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the resulting formula needs to fulfill the language constraints of the language for
the respective technology being used. This brings technology dependence into the
computation and can lead, depending on the supported technologies, to differently
constrained data statements in line with what the underlying technology can prove.
Our discussions have so-far assumed a single request-response language pair (Lr/c,
Lp/c), and thus technology, being used.
Two design approaches for realizing technology-dependent matching computa-
tions are the following: (1) A single matching engine that can handle multiple tech-
nologies and their constraints, or (2) one matching engine per technology to account
for the technology-specific constraints. The matching engine thereby needs to con-
sider technology capabilities as well as aspects of collateral release of the respective
technologies for finding data-minimizing results.
5.4.7 Conventions for Requests
We next discuss conventions for data requests for a given request pattern which
should be followed for avoiding subtle logic-related issues. A request ψ that is to
request an attribute value of a specific attribute of either of a set of eligible identities
can be expressed using different approaches.
The optimal approach is to express the type and certifier of a single identity
variable through a generic way using disjunctions or ontology-based generalizations
in the request preamble and express the attribute request over the attribute of this
identity. This captures only a subset of possible requests for requesting attribute
values of different identities.
When different identities have different attribute names for the same concept,
which is possible in an open system without a centrally governed management of
attributes, the optimal approach is not applicable. For example, this is the case
when different identity types and certifiers use different attribute names for the
same conceptual attribute, e.g., lastName and familyName.
The not-recommended approach in this case is to request a disjunction where in
each branch of the disjunction an attribute value of the attribute of one of the eligi-
ble identities is requested. When having multiple free variables in different branches
of the disjunction directly associated with multiple identities, this will result in the
following problem when matching with a party’s repository: For the one occurrence
of a free variable that corresponds to the identity the party has an identity rela-
tionship for, the attribute value will be revealed in a response. Though, for all
identities with dummy certificates as underlying cryptographic material, the values
need to be chosen appropriately, thereby introducing complications: Either, those
values are chosen randomly, thus making clear immediately through which identity
the value is provided and not comprising clean response semantics, or requiring that
this request pattern be recognized by the system and the values be chosen to be the
same as the one of the identity for which the party has a corresponding certificate,
thereby concealing through which identity the attribute value has been released.
The recommended convention to follow in this case is to express the attribute
request on a to-be-generated opaque identity represented through a free variable in
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the top-level ∧-node of the formula and relate the attributes of this opaque identity
to the eligible identities in disjunction branches. Then, a single free variable which
will be assigned the requested attribute value in a response is exposed in the request.
This resolves the above issue, though leads to another subtle issue: The party
needs to choose one appropriate attribute name for the requested attribute, out of
potentially multiple such. This is outside of the scope of our logic and needs to be
handled through the application layer or extensions.
The above-discussed issue is not a problem related to the request language or
its formalization, rather the correct use of such generic logic-based language. As a
general convention derived from those discussions, no attributes should be requested
to be revealed in disjunction branches in the attribute assertion sub-formula. Rather,
the above approach of using an opaque identity over which the request is expressed
and which is related to the actual identities in the different disjunction branches
should be used. This is a convention and not enforced in the language, though,
automated tools could check requests for this to hold.
A more generic problem related to the use of ontology-based generalizations in
an open system is the above issue that different attributes of different identities ful-
filling the ontology concept may have a different attribute name, although referring
to the same conceptual attribute, e.g., lastName. This implies that relation predi-
cates cannot be expressed over a single attribute of this identity. Such situation is
unavoidable in open systems without a central party dictating attribute semantics.
One partial solution to this problem is to standardize widely used attribute
names and their meaning, considering the needs of a largest-possible set of stake-
holders. This should mitigate the issue to some extent, though, not completely.
A technical solution is to extend our languages to allow for a formal mapping to
specify that different attributes refer to the same “conceptual attribute” and relate
predicates to one of the attribute names or a new name for the conceptual attribute.
Variables for attributes are possible with respect to first-order logic, thus the ex-
tension is expected to fit into our logic framework without major changes of the
language.
5.4.8 Collateral Release
Let ψ be a request for data expressed in a fragment of the language Lr/g. This
request can be fulfilled through any of a plurality of valid responses Ω by parties in
a system, where ω′i is one response. For one result formula ψ
′′
i , the sequents (5.9)
and (5.11) need to hold with respect to an environment E ′i instantiating free variables
and an expanded request ψ′. The possible responses can differ greatly in terms of
data minimization, that is, whether and how much additional information is released
on top of what is required to fulfill ψ.
For example, a greatly sub-optimal approach in terms of minimizing data release
is an attribute value being stated in a response for which only an inequality predicate
over the attribute is requested. Providing the value may reveal substantially more
information than requested through an inequality predicate. Traditional certificate
technology is an example for a mechanism with which certified attribute values need
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to be released, instead of also allowing for predicates to be expressed over them. The
best response φ′ to a request ψ w.r.t. data minimization and thus privacy is one
that reveals as little as possible—ideally no—information in addition to what is
required to fulfill ψ. In a system which does not support generalizations through
ontologies or the logic-based approach to subtyping in a request as discussed in
this work, a request essentially specifies precisely which identities of which types
certified by which certifying parties need to be used in a response. In such setting,
the best response φ′ in terms of data minimization is such that resembles exactly
the predicates requested in ψ, that is, φ′ is obtained through term replacement of
free variables in the request through constants induced through an environment E
without the need of considering ontology concepts.
Ontology-based generalizations as supported in our data representation compli-
cate matters because an identity, certifier, conditional recipient, or property predi-
cate in a request can be fulfilled with various concrete instances in a valid response
as governed through the ontology. Also, an ontology-based expansion ι adds addi-
tional degrees of freedom for reducing the release of information, e.g., regarding the
concrete type and certifier of the identity held by the party and used in the proof
through expanding predicates expressed on an ontology concept to a disjunction over
multiple such over different identities. Additional complexity in deciding which of
the possible responses is most data minimizing lies in the anonymity sets the party
resides in in the view of the data recipient for the different identities it can use for
one abstractly specified identity in a request. All this makes it substantially harder
to determine in a programmatic manner which of the possible responses is the best
in terms of data minimization. The best data-minimizing response statement φ′ for
ψ in such general setting we operate in is one which utilizes the possible ontology-
based expansions for minimizing data release, uses credentials and attributes such
that the party resides in the largest-possible anonymity set in the view of the re-
cipient, and employs credential technology to the widest extent possible to prove
a response formula comprising the predicates of the request, while not replacing
request predicates with more-revealing ones, e.g., an inequality with an equality.
Note that being able to derive an optimally data-minimizing response φ′, the
data-minimal response, to a request ψ requires that the request be phrased accord-
ingly with the cryptographic mechanisms in mind that can be used for proving
correct a valid response to the request. That is, the request must not express asser-
tions not provable with the available cryptographic techniques, e.g., non-supported
predicates over attributes.
We use the concept of collateral release for expressing additional information
being released to the data recipient or third parties through releasing a response φ
on top of what is minimally required for satisfying a data request ψ.
Definition 5.4 (Collateral release) Collateral release is the release of informa-
tion to the data recipient of a transaction or third parties through the response φ
or the proof protocol in addition to what is released through release and prove of a
minimal response φ′ to a request ψ.
That is, collateral release captures the excessive information not required for ful-
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filling ψ, though contained in φ or being otherwise released through the inherent
properties of the employed mechanism and not captured in φ.
When creating a data statement fulfilling a request, collateral release can arise
from decisions in the matching process or selection of the result that release ex-
cessive information, or the use of inappropriate technology for releasing data. For
example, when using a protocol based on an online certifier for releasing a data
statement φ, the certifier learns certain information which is not captured in φ and
neither relevant for the data recipient to make an authorization decision. As another
example, consider a response φ revealing more attribute information than required
for fulfilling ψ, which is collateral release captured in φ. The latter is, for example,
the case when using traditional certificate protocols for the data release instead of
private certificate protocols.
For computing a fulfilling response φ for a request ψ based on a party’s identifier
and identity relationships, φ needs to be generated such that it takes the technology
of the identifier and identity relationships into account and reflects precisely the
identity statement being learnt by the other party. As an extreme example, fulfilling
a simple inequality predicate over the party’s date of birth attribute may require one
to release all attributes of a certificate when using traditional attribute certificates,
which needs to be reflected in the formula φ. For supporting identity relationships
based on multiple different technologies thus requires that this be considered in the
matching process and a result φ be generated accordingly. Collateral release to
third parties, such as an online certifier, is never captured in the statement φ and is
therefore additional collateral release through the employed mechanism. Reducing
collateral release requires an interplay of properly authored policies, support by the
matching engine, and preferences and input by the party to be considered.
The term collateral release has been originally introduced by the author in
the talk for presenting the work on privacy-enhancing yet accountable access con-
trol [BCS05] as specifying the additional information leaked through the specifi-
cation formula for a credential protocol, where any information beyond the pure
attribute information was considered such additional information. For credential
systems this has been found comprising the certifier and type information of cre-
dentials as well as what third parties learn in case of using conventional protocols
for ensuring attribute integrity. For the definition of conditional release in this the-
sis, we include the information relevant for the trust decision in the information
required to be revealed which leads to our revised definition of the term collateral
release that seamlessly fits our generalized model.
5.4.9 Result Selection
The final step of computing a response to a request comprises a selection of one result
ω′i from the set of valid results Ω for fulfilling the request ψ. This can comprise a
choice made by the human user, an algorithm, e.g., one operating on the user’s
preferences and interaction history, or a combination thereof. A combination of
user and machine selection is envisioned for practical systems. The formula ψ′′i ,
being part of ω′i, is released to the other party together with cryptographic elements
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and a proof of its correctness. Consent given by the human user, as required,
e.g., in European legislation [Eur95], is the final step before an instance of the
RelData protocol can be executed on the chosen formula ψ′′i to be released, or could
be part of the selection process. See work by the author [CSSZ06, BCPS09] for
two possible realizations for such interface for human-computer interaction in a
simplified setting and this thesis for a summary of the discussions. While the further
of those works focuses only on the selection of a valid response with a minimum
consumption of browser real estate, the latter supports a more expressive language
for data statements and considers user consent more explicitly. Both approaches,
though, are based on a less expressive language then the one used in this thesis.
The outcome of the selection is a single solution ω′i, comprising a formula ψ
′′
and the additional result elements as discussed earlier. The formula is exactly, using
different notation, the input formula φA of A in a RelData protocol instance and
specifies the data to be released. This formula thereby particularly determines the
run-time generation of the cryptographic protocols to prove the formula correct.
Other result elements of ω′i are input to the protocol, together with additional
elements such as public keys and further cryptographic material, as explained in
detail earlier. The result elements of ω′i are sufficient to obtain all further required
inputs for the protocol RelData.
5.5 Discussion
A substantial fraction of the discussions in this chapter has been related to terms
and their renaming throughout multiple protocol instances. The presented approach
follows the idea of a party A using certain terms for referring to parties, including
itself, and other objects, e.g., identities, locally, and renaming certain of those terms
before revealing a formula referring to the terms to another party. That is, corre-
spondences between objects are established through relating them to the same or
different parties through their subject and holder attributes in a party’s local data
representation. For terms referring to the subject and holder of objects, the renam-
ing is governed through the identifier objects the party has with the recipient of a
formula. Identities receive a fresh name whenever holdership of them is proven to a
data recipient. This renaming ensures that no undesired linkabilities are established
between the issuing and prove transaction for a private certificate and multiple proof
transactions of the same certificate. The renaming reflects that, instead of the orig-
nal signature of the certificate, a proof of knowledge over a randomized certificate
based on it is sent to the other party. The original choice of terms for a party or
object is always done by deriving the term from the cryptographic object it relates
to. Technically, a logic with equality allows for such renaming and referring to the
same entity with different names.
Our approach to term renaming allows a party A to perform automated deriva-
tions in the underlying logic calculus in a generic way using the formulae as rep-
resented locally by having objects properly related with each other. Parties are
referred to with the same term throughout different formulae in the view of the
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party and thereby the intended relationships between the referred-to objects are ex-
pressed. Other parties can do reasoning over multiple formulae they have received
from (the same) other party as well.
Regarding the renaming of terms in order to avoid unintended linkabilities be-
tween actions of the party, the rule is that whenever a mapping is defined in the
metadata of a formula of an identifier relationship, the mapping must be used to
rename locally used terms in a formula before sending the formula to the other
party. The application of such a mapping is required to maintain unlinkability of
the transaction to previous transactions.
5.6 Realizing the Channel Calculus
The mapping of channel transformation rules to cryptographic protocols has been
discussed abstractly together with selected rules in Sec. 3.5. Further above in the
current chapter, we have presented the protocols and their relation to our data
model and channel model. In the current section, we present further details on how
rules are implemented through the cryptographic protocols and thereby present
a connection between the secure channel model and cryptographic protocols for
realizing the rules. The discussion builds upon the cryptographic protocols, the
interfaces of which have been presented earlier in this chapter.
A particular aspect we consider is how registrations of parties in the system and
for delegations relate to the generation of new private keys of parties and corre-
sponding private key domains. We present how the aspects of applying the data
model discussed in Sec. 4.8 are realized with protocols.
The channel transformation rules express what is possible in terms of transfer-
ring security symbols and endpoint annotations from prerequisite channels to target
channels using standard and advanced privacy-enhanced cryptographic protocols.
Thereby, there is no one-to-one correspondance between rules and protocols: Ap-
plying a single rule may require multiple cryptographic protocols to be executed be-
tween parties, with specified constraints in terms of timing, annotation statements
and security symbols. For example, rule Auth-Cred requires, in the general case,
multiple protocol instances of protocols EstIdtfRelReg and EstIdtfRel for establishing
pseudonyms and EstIdtyRel for issuing credentials and one instance of RelData for
releasing data based on the pseudonyms and credentials and other objects. A single
instance of an executed protocol can be part of multiple instances of the application
of a rule. For example, a single instance of EstIdtyRel for issuing a credential can
be used for multiple applications of rule Auth-Cred for transferring authentications
between channels. When a rule requires multiple cryptographic protocols to be
executed, the timing annotations ti[tj ] of channels define when the cryptographic
protocols are required to be executed, and thus also their dependencies.
Note that, when using cryptographic protocols that only support the unlinka-
bility property of issuing and proving holdership of a credential for a single show,
that is, single-show unlinkability, a different mapping of the rules Auth-Cred and
AuthDele-Cred is required, namely requiring a credential re-issuing for every use of a
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credential, also for delegation credentials. A prominent example for such protocols
is the UProve scheme building on the credential system of Brands [Bra00] based
on blinding signatures in the issuing transaction. Such systems do not support
the multi-show unlinkability property of the cryptographic protocols we build on in
this thesis, which break the linkability to the issuing during the show protocol of a
credential.
Regarding the notation in this section, we use generic notation that makes the
parties involved in created objects explicit in the notation, e.g., in order to more
easily see correspondance of objects to the same registration domains. For this
reason, notation differs to the notation used in the chapter on the secure channel
model.
5.6.1 Cryptographic Objects
We first present the cryptographic realizations of the identity management con-
cepts of Sec. 4.8 using a pseudonym and credential system. The different kinds of
pseudonyms and credentials realize the concepts introduced in Sec. 4.8.
5.6.1.1 Pseudonyms
A cryptographic pseudonym is computed as a cryptographic commitment of a tuple
ν of cryptographic values. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first
element pi1(ν) is always a private key of the party holding the pseudonym. Further
elements depend on the kind of pseudonym being considered.
A registration pseudonym pA,Ci,`r of a party A with a registration certifier Ci
for the party itself as the subject of the pseudonym is computed on the tuple
νA,Ci,`r = (xA,Ci,`r ) using the Pedersen scheme [Ped91], with the value xA,Ci,`r
being a private key of the party generated as part of this protocol. This results
in an information-theoretically binding and computationally hiding commitment of
ν. The pseudonym corresponds to a regular registration pseudonym as defined by
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01].
A delegation registration pseudonym pA,D,C∗k ,`d of party A with delegation cer-
tifier C∗k is computed over the tuple νA,D,C∗k ,`d = (xA,Ci,`r , zA,C∗k ,`d), where the first
value is a private key of a registration pseudonym and zA,C∗k ,`d is a private key of
A generated for the delegation. pA,D,C∗k ,`d is a pseudonym under which party A is
known to the delegation certifier which can issue one or more delegation credentials
on pA,D,C∗k ,`d to A on behalf of a delegater D. The key zA,C∗k ,`d is denoted dele-
gation private key, held by A, and used by A for all pseudonyms and credentials
to be established and obtained talking about the delegater D in the context of this
delegation registration pseudonym.
A delegation pseudonym pA,D,Bl,`b of a party A with a party B, with A as holder
and a delegater D as subject is computed over the tuple νA,D,Bl,`b = (xA,Ci,`r ,
zA,C∗k ,`d , yA,B,`b), where the first element is A’s private key to use, zA,C∗k ,`d the dele-
gation private of A to use, and yA,B,`b a random value for obtaining the information-
theoretic hiding property of the private keys.
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A non-registration pseudonym, or derived pseudonym, pA,C′j ,`o of party A with
party C′ for the party as subject is computed as commitment over the tuple
νA,C′j ,`o = (xA,Ci,`r , yA,C′j ,`o), where xA,Ci,`r is the private key corresponding to
a registration pseudonym pA,Ci,`r and yA,C′j ,`o is a randomizing value for obtaining
the information-theoretic hiding property.
Recall, that a registration or delegation registration pseudonym is established
with an instance of the protocol EstIdtfRelReg, while a non-registration pseudonym
or delegation pseudonym is established with an instance of the protocol EstIdtfRel.
The indices `r, `d, `b, and `o range from 1 to the number of pseudonyms of the
respective kind of the party A with the respective other party. All pseudonyms are
based on the Pederson commitment scheme for single group elements or the variants
thereof generalized to commitments of tuples of group elements.
5.6.1.2 Credentials
A credential is a message tuple µ and a signature over it using one of the schemes
of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02b, CL04] or another scheme with comparable
properties. We assume, without loss of generality, that the private key of a party is
always encoded through the first attribute of a credential pi1(µ).
A credential cA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r issued by a registration certifier Ci to party A on a reg-
istration pseudonym pA,Ci,`r , with A as both holder and subject, is a signature
over a message tuple µA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r = (xA,Ci,`r )||χA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r , where (xA,Ci,`r ) is the 1-
element tuple comprising the private key for creating the registration pseudonym
pA,Ci,`r , and χA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r is a tuple comprising the remaining attributes of the cer-
tificate resulting from credential features and user attributes as derived from the
high-level issuing specification. Such credential is referred to as registration creden-
tial, or credential if the registration property is not relevant in the context being
considered.
A credential cA,C′j ,`o,ˆ`o
issued by a certifier C′j to party A on a non-registration,
or derived, pseudonym pA,C′j ,`o , with A as both holder and subject, is a signature
over a message tuple
µA,C′j ,`o,ˆ`o
= (xA,Ci,`r , yA,C′j ,`o)||χA,C′j ,`o,ˆ`o , (5.16)
where (xA,Ci,`r , yA,C′j ,`o) is the tuple comprising the private key and randomizing
value used for creating the pseudonym pA,C′j ,`o , and χA,C′j ,`o,ˆ`o
stands for the re-
maining attributes of the certificate, analogous to above. Such credential is referred
to as non-registration credential, or credential if the non-registration property is
clear from the context.
A credential cA,D,C∗k ,`d,ˆ`d
issued by delegation certifier C∗k to A on a delegation
registration pseudonym, with party A as holder and D, the delegater, as subject, is
a signature over the message tuple
µA,D,C∗k ,`d,ˆ`d
= (xA,Ci,`r , zA,C∗k ,`d)||χA,D,C∗k ,`d,ˆ`d , (5.17)
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where (xA,Ci,`r , zA,C∗k ,`d) is the message tuple of the delegation pseudonym and
χA,D,C∗k ,`d,ˆ`d
are the remaining attributes analogous to the above. Such credential
is referred to as delegation credential, or credential if the delegation property is not
of interest in a particular context.
The indices ˆ`r, ˆ`o, and ˆ`d range from 1 to the number of credentials of the
respective type per pseudonym of party A. Recall that credentials are also referred
to as private certificates in this work.
5.6.1.3 Private key domains
The private key domain KxA,Ci,`r of a private key xA,Ci,`r comprises all crypto-
graphic pseudonyms and credentials established or issued based on this key, with the
key being their first attribute, including the corresponding registration pseudonym.
A private key domain KxA,Ci,`r corresponds to the registration domain induced by
the identifier relationship corresponding to the registration pseudonym within the
establishment of which the private key has been generated. The registration domain
comprises the identifier and identity relationships corresponding to the pseudonyms
and credentials of KxA,Ci,`r .
The concept exists analogously for a delegation private key zA,C∗k ,`d held by
a party A and comprises all delegation registration pseudonyms and delegation
credentials established with and issued by delegation certifier C∗k and delegation
pseudonyms established with other parties based on this delegation private key.
The concept is referred to as delegation private key domain. A delegation private
key domain for a key zA,C∗k ,`d is always a proper subset of a private key domain
KxA,Ci,`r and denoted as KDzA,C∗
k
,`d
.
For all cryptographic objects within a private key domain KxA,Ci,`r , equality of
the private key can be proven cryptographically for multiple of those objects without
revealing the key, with the result of establishing the binding of the objects to the
same private key xA,Ci,`r and thus party. Analogously, this is true for equality of
the delegation private key of the pseudonyms and credentials in a delegation private
key domain KDzA,C∗
k
,`d
, where equality of the delegation private key refers to equality
of the delegater.
5.6.1.4 Domain Bridging
A party may have pseudonyms and credentials in different private key domains
KxA,Ci,`r and KxA,Ci′ ,`r′ . Making statements about objects from those different
private key domains in a single formula and establishing that those objects are held
by the same party requires an additional binding credential that establishes that
the two private key domains belong to the same party. The cryptographic proof
also requires that holdership of this binding credential be proven. We refer to this
approach as bridging of private key domains.
Such bridging of private key domains and thus registration domains is supported
throughout the framework and system, from the model and data representation
language to the cryptographic protocols. For our model of authentication, the
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corresponding concept is registration domain bridging. Bridging is not explicitly
supported for delegation registration domains due to the limited use in practical
scenarios and the inherent complexity.
A practical use case for such bridging of domains in a future identity system is
the simultaneous use of an electronic driver’s license or identity card and identity
credential contained in the Secure Element of a mobile phone in a single data state-
ment, while cryptographically establishing that both credentials belong to the same
party through an additional binding credential. We think that such functionality is
crucial for a future open identity system where people might have multiple regis-
tration domains and thus private key domains as in this example. Suitable issuers
of private key domain credentials are either the registration issuers who provide
this as additional services to the parties they issue certificates to or independent
third-party issuers.
5.6.2 Protocols
We next present the relation between the cryptographic protocols of Sec. 5 and our
secure channel model of Chapter 3. The notation we use most of the time is the
notation from above with detailed indices for objects describing the parties involved,
as well as key domains. Only for delegation issuing we revert to simpler notation
used in the model in order for allowing more easily to establish a correspondence to
the channel model.
5.6.2.1 Establishing Pseudonyms
Multiple channel transformation rules require the protocols EstIdtfRelReg and
EstIdtfRel for establishing pseudonyms. A party A uses one of those protocols when-
ever it needs to establish a new cryptographic pseudonym with another party B.
Those protocol instances are captured implicitly in the model as part of multiple
channel composition rules and result in a party having established and authenticated
the pseudonym and the party’s capability of authenticating a pseudonym statement
based on the established pseudonym at any later time towards the other party.
Pseudonyms are expressed as part of the party annotation formulae of channels.
In the following, we are interested in cryptographic pseudonyms as discussed in
Sec. 2.3 and Sec. 5.6.1.1 and their relations to private key domains as discussed. Cer-
tifiers act under public pseudonyms which can be realized, e.g., based on standard
cryptography and PKI protocols and Fiat-Shamir-based PKI extensions thereof as
discussed earlier in this thesis. Public pseudonyms are prominently required for par-
ties acting under their public pseudonyms, such as most certifiers, service providers,
and conditional data recipients, and captured equally in the model, though of less
technical interest in terms of the protocol discussions.
In addition to being identifiers of parties, cryptographic pseudonyms based on
our credential protocols serve another purpose as discussed further above in this
section: They are based on a private key of their holder and are used for binding
credentials and other pseudonyms to this private key and thus the party. When
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releasing (parts of) the information of a private certificate to another party, this
is done with the party acting under a different pseudonym with this other party,
where it can be ensured that this be established based on the same private key of
the party. Alternatively, when the new pseudonym is based on a different private
key domain, bridging of private key domains can establish party equality for objects
being part of different private key domains. For the secure channel model, using
either the same key domain or bridging different domains is crucial for obtaining a
security symbol at the channel endpoint decorating the annotation statement of the
party on a channel derived through one of the rules for transferring authentications,
that is, obtaining the authenticity property, when the annotation formula specifies
holder or subject equality between objects from different domains.
The protocol EstIdtfRelReg realizes the part of the channels with security symbol
at party A towards a certifier Ci in rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred which relates
to a pseudonym pA,Ci,`r being established as part of a party registration. Concretely,
the protocol realizes the establishment and implicit initial authentication of such
pseudonym. Attributes are associated to such pseudonym through a credential on
tuple µA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r issued such that pi
1(µA,Ci,`r,ˆ`r ) = xA,Ci,`r , that is, the credential is
bound to the private key of A created for the pseudonym pA,Ci,`r .
The part of the rule AuthDele-Cred realized through issuing of (delegation) cre-
dentials to A requires a delegation registration pseudonym to be established as
explained in more detail further below.
The target channels of rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred comprise the estab-
lishment of a pseudonym using EstIdtfRel with B about A, and for AuthDele-Cred
additionally a pseudonym about the delegater D, also established with EstIdtfRel,
all of which have pi1(ν·) = xA,Ci,`r for a private key of A for the corresponding tuple
ν· of the pseudonym. The pseudonym about D has pi2(ν) = zA,C∗k ,`d as a delegation
private key. The proof of knowledge of the pseudonyms towards B is done as part
of an instance of the protocol RelData, as part of the proof of the overall formula φ′.
The protocols for establishing a pseudonym ensure that the new pseudonym is
bound to a private key xA,Ci,`r of A established in a registration. This requires that
A prove holdership of a registration credential before establishing the pseudonym
to establish validity of the private key, that is, to show that the party is registered
in the system.
Assume party A has established a registration or non-registration pseudonym
with a party B. Then, A can authenticate under this pseudonym towards party B
using the channel transformation rule Auth-Sig for transferring the authentication to
a later point in time. Using pseudonym protocols of [CL01] or [Sec10] for creating
a Fiat-Shamir signature based on a proof of knowledge of the secrets behind a
pseudonym corresponds to using a signature based on a traditional public/private
key pair for authentication.
5.6.2.2 Credential Issuing: General Discussion
The issuing of credentials comes into play for the rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred
for the transfer of multiple authentications and for delegation. Issuing by a certi-
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fier Ci to a recipient party A is a combination of re-certifying authenticated at-
tributes, statements authenticated through out-of-band means or through channel
transformations, and new statements made by the certifier. Issuing of a credential
can be modeled through a single authentic channel between the credential recipi-
ent and certifier, with the recipient being annotated with authenticated formula φi,
comprising also a pseudonym. As explained in Chapter 3 and in greater detail in
Sec. 5.3, the function F(φi,Ci,ℵi) in rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred expresses
the changes formula φi is subjected to for obtaining the formula which represents
the credential to be issued. The channel Aφi •ti2 [ti1 ]←−−−−φCi,ACi in the rules Auth-Cred
and AuthDele-Cred represents the issuing of a credential from the certifier Ci to A.
For the credential system of this work, there are two kinds of certificate issuing:
registration issuing and non-registration issuing of a credential. The channel model
captures this through whether a channel with a security decoration is assumed to
exist or derived from channels with a security symbol as decoration. Next, we
explain the registration of a party in a system and the associated protocols related
to pseudonyms and issuing of a credential, as well as the protocols in the non-
registration case.
5.6.2.3 Registration Issuing
The cryptographic registration protocols for establishing a registration pseudonym
and issuing a registration credential for a party apply, in terms of the model, in two
cases. (1) Party A performs a registration in the sense of the channel model, or (2)
it performs a new cryptographic registration based on an authentication with the
certifier obtained through channel transformation rules of the model. Case (1) is the
one following the definition of registration as being based on an out-of-band process
of proving identity attributes and entering the system and is the standard case for
registration of a party. Case (2) extends this to obtain a more generic system, where
the out-of-band authentication can be replaced with an in-system authentication.
Case (2) does not fit the modeling of registration smoothly, and is considered as
optional extension with additional incurred complexity.
During a registration in either Case (1) or Case (2), a registration pseudonym
and credential are always generated, bound to the same private key. Without the
registration credential, the pseudonym and private key would be of no use towards
other parties than C.
Case (1): Party Registration. As discussed in Sec 3.9, a registration comprises
a party (user) A becoming a registered party in the system. In a registration of
party A with certifier Ci, A first obtains a registration pseudonym pA,Ci,`r with
Ci through executing an instance of the protocol EstIdtfRelReg which comprises the
generation of a private key xA,Ci,`r for A such that it is sufficiently ensured that only
A has access to this key.55 The subject and holder functions of the to-be-established
pseudonym are both held by A.
55Constraining access to the key to only A can, for example, be achieved by generating and
containing it in a tamper-resistant hardware token such as a smart card or Secure Element of
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The key xA,Ci,`r induces a private key domain KxA,Ci,`r . With each registration
a party performs with a certifier, a new registration pseudonym together with its
associated private key is obtained. Each certifier may restrict each party to register
once, e.g., in order to control exclusion of parties, as in the standard model of creden-
tial systems [LRSW00, CL01]. Our approach of allowing for multiple registrations
with the same or different certifiers generalizes this standard approach.
Party A is authenticated to Ci under the pseudonym pA,Ci,`r and additional
attribute statements can be associated with this pseudonym through out-of-band
means, e.g., through verification through Ci of a physical passport of A. Those
statements can be modeled in our data representation language as being certified
as per the out-of-band authentication. Both the pseudonym and attribute state-
ment are modeled with a channel where A authenticates a statement towards Ci,
comprising the pseudonym statement and the out-of-band authenticated attribute
statements. Optionally, Ci can assign further attribute statements to A, resulting in
further authentic channels from A to Ci, where A acts under the same pseudonym.
Those statements can be modeled in the data representation language such that
their certifier is party Ci. The resulting channels can be combined with the one ob-
tained earlier to obtain a single channel resembling the authentication of A towards
Ci under statement φ.
Ci issues a credential on the formula F(φi,Ci,ℵi) which gets cryptographically
bound to the established registration pseudonym pA,Ci,`r of A with Ci by the cre-
dential being issued on, and thus bound to, A’s private key xA,Ci,`r . The credential
issuing is achieved through executing an instance of the protocol EstIdtyRel param-
eterized as explained in Sec. 5.3. The credential issuing is modeled with a channel
existing at a later time where A is authenticated again with φi and the channel
direction being reversed. This channel is one of the prerequisite channels for rules
Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred for transferring multiple authentications to other par-
ties and delegation. The credential is member of the private key domain KxA,Ci,`r .
A registration credential is required to allow for proving to other parties that
the party has registered in the system and can, and typically will, comprise also
attribute statements about the party. From an architecture perspective, it is ad-
visable that registration pseudonyms, particularly the private key associated with
them, and registration credentials be issued to a protected storage area under con-
trol of the recipient party only such as a tamper-resistant hardware token of the
party. Depending on security requirements, the obtained cryptographic material
can alternatively be stored without additional protection. A verifier in a RelData
protocol can decide through its authorization policies and used ontologies which
credentials of which (registration) certifiers it trusts for a given purpose.
Note that in the above modeling of registration issuing, we do not separate the
establishment of the registration pseudonym and the statement A is authenticated
under into different channels, although the pseudonym represents a transaction with
a cryptographic protocol in our system, while the statement is authenticated through
a mobile handset. Technically, it may make sense to view the generation of the private key as
separate protocol, though, we see it as part of the protocol for establishing a registration identifier
for simplicity.
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any suitable out-of-band means. Our interest is only the resulting authentic chan-
nel where A is authenticated with a pseudonym and attribute statement towards
Ci based on which a credential issuing protocol takes place. Again, authorization
policies in the system will be used to determine whether a certifier accepts a certain
issuing authority, thereby not imposing limiting restrictions and facilitating an open
identity system.
Case (2): Derived Authentication. Another case that may be important in
practical identity systems based on credentials is that a party can perform a regis-
tration with a certifier while authenticating a statement to the certifier based on a
channel transformation rule and not through out-of-band means. In other words, the
authentication through rule application is considered as out-of-band authentication
for this case to fit the model. This case is handled in terms of protocols analogous
to the case above, with the difference that the initial channel is not assumed to
exist, rather that it is established through out-of-band means. The initial authentic
channel needs to be created through application of rule Auth-Cred or AuthDele-Cred,
that is, within the authentication system. The above discussions also apply to this
case of registration issuing.
The use case for this Case (2) is to allow a certifier to act as registration certifier
while obtaining the identity information of the registree through channel trans-
formation rules based on other credentials, instead of running a (more expensive)
out-of-band authentication procedure.
5.6.2.4 Non-registration Issuing
Any non-registration issuing of a credential is discussed next with respect to the
involved cryptographic protocols. First, we consider issuing of credentials which are
not delegated ones. In such issuing, an existing private key xA,Ci,`r of the party
created during a registration with certifier Ci is used for issuing the credential on.
Let C′j be the certifier from whom A intends to obtain a credential. A creates
a pseudonym pA,C′j ,`o with C
′
j based on its private key xA,Ci,`r .
56 A establishes
a channel where it authenticates a pseudonym with itself and attribute assertions
towards C′j . The resulting channel is an authentic channel from A with annota-
tion formula φ′j to C
′
j . Optionally, C
′
j may assign further attribute statements to
A resulting in additional authentic channels assumed to be available. As in the
registration issuing, those channels can be combined to a single authentic channel
between C′j and A, that is, it carries a security symbol decorating φ
′
j of A. The lat-
ter is crucial in order that the new credential be issued to a properly authenticated
user. Note that, as explained earlier, a security symbol cannot be obtained through
only establishing a new pseudonym with C′j . Rather, it requires in addition either a
56The choice of which private key (domain) A uses is based on a decision at the identity man-
agement level and out of scope in this work. It determines the private key the new pseudonym
and credential are based on and thus with which other pseudonyms and credentials of the party it
can be used in formulae without assuming additional domain bridging certificates for establishing
equality of pseudonyms based on different private keys.
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credential from a registration certifier or a credential from a non-registration certifier
who has properly authenticated, in the view of C′j , the party, that is, has obtained a
security bullet on the party’s side of the channel, to obtain the authenticity property
for the statement on this channel. A channel with the same annotation φ′j of A and
reversed channel direction is the channel used for the issuing of a credential. The
issued credential is cryptographically bound to the party’s private key xA,Ci,`r , thus
part of the private key domain KxA,Ci,`r , and thus cryptographically bound to the
party.
Rule AuthDele-Cred requires multiple uses of pseudonym protocols, data release,
and issuing: D establishes, using EstIdtfRel or EstIdtfRelReg a non-registration or
registration pseudonym DCk+1 with Ck+1 on which it obtains a credential, bound
to the same private key xD, representing channel D
φD •t6[t5]←−− φCk+1,DCk+1 of the
rule. D furthermore establishes a pseudonym DCk+1|a with Ck+1 which is addi-
tionally established with A, again based on private key xD. Establishing the same
pseudonym with two parties can be achieved through an extension of EstIdtfRel.
Through the same underlying private key of D, both pseudonyms can be revealed
in a single formula towards Ck+1 and shown to relate to the same party through
RelData for establishing channel Dφ
∗
D•t
∗
6 [t
∗
5 ]−−−→φ
∗
Ck+1,DCk+1 for delegation initiation. A
establishes a pseudonym Ack+1|d with D, that it later establishes also with Ck+1,
using EstIdtfRel. D acts under pseudonym Dck+1|a towards A, and signs the dele-
gation authorization token Y with a statement revealing this pseudonym. Thus, A
obtains an authorization token it can provide to Ck+1 under pseudonym Ack+1|d.
A establishes with Ck+1 pseudonyms Ack+1|d with A as subject and D[a]ck+1 with
D as subject. The further is a non-registration pseudonym, the latter a delega-
tion registration pseudonym. Both are based on xA, while the latter additionally
comprises the newly generated delegation private key zA,D of A. As A can prove
holdership of Ack+1|d towards Ck+1 and the same pseudonym is signed by D under
Dck+1|a as part of the authorization token Y, it can be ensured sufficiently that the
delegation credential is issued to the right party as authorized by D. The delegation
credential is cryptographically bound to xA, which Ack+1|d is based on, and zA,D of
D[a]ck+1 . Pseudonyms of a party being part of the same private key domain helps
ensuring that the party behind the pseudonyms is the same, and this be provable,
and thus the proper credential of D can be delegated to the proper party A. A can
now create new pseudonyms with D as subject with other parties. Such pseudonym
D[a],· is computed on private key values (xA, zA,D), with a third random component
for the hiding property.
Through the support of such delegation over the authority of making at-
tribute statements, we extend the basic approach of credential systems of binding
pseudonyms and credentials to a master private key, see Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [CL01], to the setting of delegation and possibly multiple private key domains
and delegation private key domains. See Rule AuthDele-Cred of Chapter 3 for addi-
tional information on the rule for delegation and how it is realized.
A practical aspect of delegation is that a delegation certificate, the original cor-
responding certificate of which is issued on a hardware token, will, in many practical
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scenarios, be issued as software-based certificate, bound to a sufficiently protected
private key of the delegatee for obtaining a flexible delegation system. The require-
ments on the private key to bind it to can be expressed through the authorization
policy of the delegation certifier that determines the permissible prerequisite formu-
lae and proofs by the delegatee (certificate recipient) for protocol EstIdtyRel—see
Sec. 5.3. All language mechanisms, e.g., ontology-based abstractions, can be em-
ployed for the policy determining permissible prerequisite formulae. This shows
again the integration for the specification of our system. A concrete example for
this is the delegation of (parts of) an electronic identity card private certificate
bound to a hardware token, where the delegation certificate is issued as a “software
certificate” bound to a hardware-protected private key of the delegatee. For this
example, a suitable private key is the one created by the delegatee when getting its
registration pseudonym for obtaining its own electronic identity card.
5.6.2.5 Discussion
Registration and derived issuing. The main difference of registration and de-
rived issuing of credentials is that registration issuing builds on an original authen-
tication relationship between recipient and certifier established through out-of-band
means, while non-registration issuing is based on an authentication derived through
channel transformation rules. In the further case, an original binding of the reg-
istration pseudonym and credential to its recipient is achieved, while in the latter
case, the binding of the pseudonym with the certifier and the issued credential to
the recipient is based on an established original binding. Either case leads to the
issuing of the credential to a properly authenticated recipient—the registration issu-
ing is used for bootstrapping a system, while the non-registration issuing is used for
system operation based on at least one bootstrapped user authentication per user
in the system. Technically, this difference shows in either a new private key for the
recipient being created, or a key created in a previous registration issuing transac-
tion being reused for creating the new pseudonym and issuing the new credential,
both of which reside in the private key domain induced by the used key.
Note that for both kinds of issuing we abstract in the channel model of Chapter 3
that credential issuing is an interactive multi-round 2-party protocol, see, e.g., prior
works [CL01, Sec10]. A secure channel for executing such multi-round protocol
can be easily obtained in practical settings from the available channels stated in
the rules, including those resulting from the standard PKI model, using channel
transformations.
Multiple registrations. By allowing for multiple registrations of a party and
governing authentications through the approach of handling trust as explained in
Section 3.8, we can obtain a flexible system in terms of choice of certifiers a user can
register with and that verifiers can accept, which is, in our view, a crucial prerequisite
for an open identity system with a plurality of players. The approach prevents the
strong assumption of single registration authorities or specific properties imposed
for such. All trust decisions are left to parties relying on attributes, while allowing
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for trust outsourcing.
Security symbols. Multiple private key domains of a party are not explicitly
captured with the syntax of the secure channel model, though they are formally
expressed through using the data representation language of Chapter 4 for its an-
notations. The model thus allows for easily combining different authentications of
a party with registration certifiers to a single authenticated formula. Thereby, the
holder and subject of identifier objects and identities are represented through terms
of type pty, with concepts abstracting from parties’ private keys. Terms related to
different private key domains are different in a statement and need to be related
through additional logical equality predicates, proven through proof of knowledge
of a corresponding bridging credential. That is, an additional refinement comes into
play in the data representation language, which has been accounted for also in its
semantics, the authorization policies, and cryptographic protocols.
Regarding the security of private keys of parties, we make the assumption that
the party has control over them and only the party can use them for executing
protocols. Using security tokens for containing private keys and user authentica-
tion mechanisms towards those tokens allows for strongly binding a private key to a
party. What will always be possible is that the party gives away its authentication
secret for the token or performs, in case this is not possible, e.g., for biometric au-
thentication, an authentication for a transaction executed by someone else. Another
possibility is that an attacker obtains the token and authentication capability. This
is not a perfect situation, though, properly reflects the situation of what a party is
able to do with its certified identity information in remote transactions. A stronger
or more restrictive binding of tokens, and thus private keys, to their holders, and
thus stronger authentication properties, seems unrealistic in practice. The account-
ability mechanisms we support disincentivize parties to give away their tokens or
illegitimately execute transactions for other parties.
Recall that a security bullet on a channel endpoint means that the endpoint
annotation statement is authenticated. For statements based on cryptographic ob-
jects from a single private key domain, the assumptions we make on private key
security imply that the statement has been authenticated by the party being able
to use the private key for creating cryptographic proofs or has been authenticated
illegitimately by another party, possibly facilitated by the party.
Though, when statements over objects from different private key domains are
combined in one formula, the situation gets more involved: Two users may illegiti-
mately combine their capabilities of using their respective private keys and creden-
tials and compute a proof of a formula over multiple of their credentials of their
respective private key domains. This would amount to be a generalized variant of
credential pooling [CL01]. As long as the statements over objects of the different
domains are not related to each other by equating their holders or subjects and
thus establishing that they are held by or are about the same party, such party
equality semantics is not implied by such formula proven jointly by dishonest users.
Thus, it is perceived by its recipient as a statement authenticated by a single party
and with a bullet annotation, where the annotation means the formula is properly
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authenticated, in this case, potentially jointly by two parties in case of dishonest
users. Establishing party equality semantics requires that knowledge of a private
key domain bridging credential for the private keys of the private key domains of
both parties be proven. Though, this is impossible for dishonest users under the
assumption that the issuer of bridging credentials must sufficiently ensure that pri-
vate key domains it bridges are held by a single party. Thus, for a formula based on
bridging private key domains, a bullet annotation implies that the formula has been
authenticated by a single party, having access to the used private key domains, or
another party having gained illegitimate access as discussed for a single key domain.
Considering those discussions, the semantics of our channel model of a bullet
decoration of an endpoint annotation formula expresses exactly what is intuitively
intended, particularly also for formulae based on multiple private key domains.
5.6.2.6 Releasing Data
Data release through credential protocols by a party A to a party B is part of the
rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred of the channel calculus. Relevant aspects, such as
the dependence of a data statement φ′ to be released on the formulae authenticated
to certifiers or the protocol interface and its relation to the data representation, have
been discussed in detail earlier in this work.
In an instance of the RelData protocol, party A authenticates a formula φ′ to-
wards B, where the formula refers to identifier and identity relationships of at least
one of the party’s registration domains, backed by the corresponding pseudonyms
and credentials as related cryptographic material. For rule Auth-Cred, only registra-
tion and non-registration pseudonyms and registration and regular credentials with
the party as holder and subject are the corresponding cryptographic materials of
referred-to objects in the formula. For AuthDele-Cred, also a delegation pseudonym
and delegation credential for making identity statements about the delegater may be
cryptographic material corresponding to referred-to objects. We have noted before
that only a single identity relationship about a delegater can be considered in the
rule, while the protocols allow for more generic operation.
The formula φ′ may furthermore refer to conditionally released and opaque iden-
tities, corresponding to ciphertexts and commitments of tuples of attributes. A
conditionally released or opaque identity being referred to may be an instantiated
or uninstantiated one. In the further case, it corresponds to an existing ciphertext
or commitment, in the latter case, the corresponding cryptographic object must be
generated as part of the protocol instance.
Establishing the target channel of the rules Auth-Cred and AuthDele-Cred re-
quires only a single protocol instance of RelData to be executed, in addition to the
pseudonym and credential protocols explained further above.
Chapter6
Run-time Protocol
Generation
In this chapter we summarize our approach to generating cryptographic protocols
for releasing data through the protocol RelData as specified in formulae expressed in
the fragment Lp/c of Lp/g. Each instance of the RelData protocol between A and B
with A authenticating a data statement φA, or, after term renaming, φ
′
A, requires
that a cryptographic protocol implementing the semantics of such data statement,
that is, allowing for an authentication of the formula, be generated and executed.
Proving a data statement φA ∈ Lp/c based on data-minimizing cryptographic
primitives requires a cryptographic protocol that is a function of the statement. Due
to the large number of possible data statements, the corresponding cryptographic
protocols cannot be exhaustively defined statically. For example, if a data statement
comprises an inequality predicate on a non-revealed attribute of a private certificate,
the inequality is proven with an inequality proof protocol over the attribute of a
private certificate without releasing the attribute. Other constellations of predicates
in the formula give rise to specific cryptographic constructions for realizing them.
We use the approach of run-time generation of cryptographic protocol instances
based on the protocol specification to be authenticated. Each formula φA to be
authenticated serves as input to the generation of a protocol implementing the
semantics of this formula and execution thereof.
Our approach of run-time protocol generation is based on compiling the input
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data statement into a cryptographic protocol implementing the semantics of the
statement. The protocol is an interactive two-party protocol between the prover A
releasing the statement and verifier B receiving it. When the verifier can successfully
verify the protocol, it can be assured that that statement made and proven by A is
true in the interpretation Iδ of a system in a given system state which is induced by
the executed protocols. This establishes cryptographic assurance about the identity
assertions comprised in the statement.
Such interactive two-party protocol being generated for a statement formula
builds on cryptographic protocols for data minimization, so-called zero-knowledge
proof protocols [GMR85, GMR89], or, more precisely, zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge (ZK-PoK) protocols [BG92], over the cryptographic elements explained
in Sec. 5.4. The protocol proves knowledge of Pedersen commitments [Ped91,
Sch91], that is, elements of prime-order groups, or discrete logarithm representa-
tions [CS97a], that is, tuples of elements of prime-order groups, realizing the primary
identifier objects as specified in the formula. The protocol also proves knowledge of
SRSA-CL or BL-CL signatures [CL02b, CL04] of the statement over attribute tuples
realizing the primary identities that the party holds in its identity relationships and
generates zero-knowlege proof simulation transcripts of those that the party does
not hold. Opaque identities are realized through Damg˚ard–Fujisaki–Okamoto (DFO
or DF) commitments [DF02], and conditionally released identities through cipher-
texts of the Camenisch-Shoup verifiable encryption scheme [CS03]. The protocol
also proves knowledge of the secret preimages related to the attributes committed
through the Damg˚ard-Fujisaki scheme and encrypted through the Camenisch-Shoup
verifiable encryption scheme. Additional group commitments may need to be gen-
erated for realizing the to-be-instantiated primary identifier objects, and additional
DFO commitments may need to be generated to realize the logical connective struc-
ture of the assertion sub-formula in a cryptographic protocol. The technique for
implementing formulae comprising disjunctions is that of partial proofs of knowl-
edge of Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoenmakers [CDS94] and later improvements
thereof by Cramer [Cra96] and Cramer et al. [CDM00]. Attributes of signatures,
ciphertexts, and commitments are related with each other through preimage re-
lation proofs [CS97b]. Exact inequality proofs over committed integers are done
through Boudot’s protocol reducing an inequality to the proof that an integer is
non-negative [Bou00].
This approach of run-time generating protocols is in stark contrast to the ap-
proach taken in today’s deployed protocols based on conventional cryptographic
schemes, e.g., protocols with online certifiers or conventional certificates. In those
protocols, the cryptographic “proof” for a data statement is always computed in
exactly the same way—by the online certifier issuing a signature on the statement
as a response to an on-line query, or the holder of the conventional certificate prov-
ing knowledge of it using the associated private key based on standard techniques.
That is, for those schemes, the proof (or verification) protocol is not a function of
the statement, but is the same for all statements, and the statement is an input to
this protocol. This is possible due to the less powerful identity semantics of those
conventional protocols in not allowing for proving data-minimized statements.
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6.1 Overview
Our approach for run-time generation builds on a multi-layer processing architec-
ture, or stack, for both prover and verifier comprising the sequentially executed
transformations MLLL , MAPL, MCPL, and MCPL∗ to obtain an executable cryp-
tographic program for the prover and verifier side of the protocol, of which the
prover and verifier execute their respective parts. Work on this has started al-
ready in 2008 in the scope of an implementation of a cryptographic library for the
Identity Mixer credential system. The prover’s and verifier’s parts are structurally
similar, the protocol generation being determined by the formula to be proven, and
differ in certain operations that are executed, e.g., the prover operates on private
cryptographic elements such as keys and certificates and needs to process the 〈 〉
annotations of the formula, while the verifier obtains only shared elements and does
not see the annotations on whether a party of the protocol is proven or simulated.
The processing stack has five layers for handling the complexity of the transforma-
tion and allowing for optimizations at the different layers to be done. Much of the
complexity is incurred through support of monotonous formulae, that is, formulae
allowing for disjunctions.
The specification of an instance of the run-time protocol generation is given
through a formula, henceforth referred to as φ. Using the notation of Sec. 5.4, this
corresponds to the formula φ′A obtained by A through renaming of the holder and
subject terms on its protocol input φA. The first transformation MLLL maps φ to
a formula φLL of the language LLL, which is a formula still expressed in a declar-
ative way over cryptographic objects, thereby expressing the identity semantics of
φ through cryptographic objects instead of abstract identity management concepts.
The layer related to the language APL breaks with the declarative paradigm and
expresses specifications of cryptographic protocols, instead of declaration of state-
ments that hold, over the cryptographic objects. The identity-management-based
specification of LLL is mapped, throughMAPL, to an abstract protocol specification
φAPL ∈ APL that specifies a cryptographic protocol through predicates represent-
ing abstract building blocks. The APL-based protocol specification is compiled
through MCPL to a detailed protocol specification φCPL expressed in the cryp-
tographic protocol language CPL. Through MCPL∗ , the CPL specification φCPL
is transformed to a specification expressed in the executable cryptographic proto-
col language CPL∗ that can be executed by a cryptographic protocol interpreter.
The interpreter can realize a substantial speedup of the protocol execution by ex-
ploiting the instruction-level parallelism (ILP) inherent to the generated protocol.
The cryptographic protocol layers corresponding to the languages LLL,APL, CPL,
and CPL∗ represent protocols over cryptographic objects at different levels of ab-
stractions. Only CPL∗ is a sufficiently concrete specification to be executed by a
procedural protocol interpreter.
Performance is considered at multiple of the layers of the run-time protocol gen-
eration stack, e.g., through optimizing protocol representations in APL or execution
of protocols expressed in CPL∗ to exploit the advantages of computing architectures
with multiple execution units.
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6.2 Low-level Identity Specification Language
The language LLL, referred to also as Low-level Identity Specification Language,
is a language that realizes the semantics of Lp/c, through making statements over
cryptographic objects as opposed to identity-management-level objects as Lp/c does.
Cryptographic objects and keys. A cryptographic object is an entity realizing
the cryptographic concepts of commitments, signatures, and ciphertexts. A crypto-
graphic object thereby is represented as an array of integers holding private keys or
(fragments of) user and other attributes of the corresponding object referred to in
Lp/c. The cryptographic object also comprises cryptographic elements representing
the commitment, signature, or ciphertext, and metadata such as the structure, e.g.,
certificate structure, for an object. The actual cryptographic elements correspond-
ing to the cryptographic object are not of interest in LLL, only the corresponding
integer attributes are.
For example, a private certificate c1 is an array, where a reference to its ith integer
element is denoted as c1[i]. The integer type int in LLL,APL, CPL, and CPL∗ is
a (large) finite interval of integers. Predicates can be expressed over attributes of
cryptographic objects and certain kinds of the objects themselves. For example,
equality of an attribute c1[10] with the constant “Zurich” is expressed as
Eq(c1[10],Str2Int(“Zurich”)) , (6.1)
where Str2Int is a function used to make the predicate more easily representable
in the current presentation and encodes the length-restricted string argument to a
single int constant.57
Each identity-management-level object in the language Lp/c has a corresponding
cryptographic object in LLL. An identifier object corresponds to the opening infor-
mation of a Pedersen or group commitment and the commitment [Ped91, CS97a]
in LLL, an identity to a private certificate, that is, the attribute tuple of a private
certificate—or credential—based on the SRSA-CL [CL02b] or BL-CL [CL04] signa-
ture protocols together with the signature,58 an opaque identity to the opening infor-
mation of a Damg˚ard–Fujisaki–Okamoto commitment and the commitment [DF02],
and a conditionally released identity to the plaintext tuple of a Camenisch-Shoup
ciphertext and the ciphertext [CS03]. In LLL, only declarative statements over the
attribute tuple of a cryptographic object are of interest, while the cryptographic ele-
ments are used only in the specifications of cryptographic protocols in the following
layers generated from a formula in this language.
Note that the prover knows both the attribute tuple and the cryptographic
elements of a cryptographic object, whereas the verifier only receives cryptographic
57In the general case, a string can be mapped to multiple integers, where the mapping is specified
through the function M of the certificate structure corresponding to the certificate type of the
identity the attribute is part of.
58Also Brands’ credentials [Bra00] can be supported as an additional primitive by the run-time
generation system, though, with the important difference that they do not have the multi-show
unlinkability property, for which reason they are less interesting to us.
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elements related to it, metadata, and gets to know attribute information as expressed
through the LLL formula. A cryptographic object is always referred to through
the same term as used in the Lp/c formula for referring to the high-level object it
corresponds to. Cryptographic keys are expressed in a formula in LLL as constant
terms, for instance, PK1.
6.2.1 Predicates
Relation predicates can be expressed on int-typed attributes and comprise the pred-
icates Eq,Neq, Leq, Lt,Gt, and Geq, standing for equality, non-equality and the in-
equalities, respectively, analogous as done for Lp/c. Because the only attribute type
in LLL is int, the predicate signature need not be made explicit. Whenever a relation
predicate over an attribute of an object is expressed, it implies also holdership of
the respective object, without this being made explicit.
A predicate IdfRelProof can be expressed over a Pedersen or group commitment
object pj representing holdership of it without making any statements over the
attributes as shown in (6.2).
IdfRelProof(pj , hj , sj , sidj) (6.2)
The above predicate represents a proof of holdership of a Pedersen or group commit-
ment of the commitment object pj without revealing information on the committed
values. Additionally, it associates the terms referred to in the Lp/c formula specified
in the predicate with the identifier object. Technically, this relates the terms to the
private key or private keys pj is based on, that is, a private key of the party or a
private key and delegation private key, from the (delegation) private key domains
corresponding to the (delegation) registration domains the corresponding identifier
object is member of.
A public key specification predicate PubKey(o,PK) expresses that public key
PK is to be used for the cryptographic protocol related to cryptographic object o.
Through this, we specify the public keys for making cryptographic proofs of knowl-
edge of signatures of private certificates or computing and proving correctness of
Camenisch–Shoup verifiable encryptions. The key material required for computing
Damg˚ard–Fujisaki commitments is derived from other key material in a subsequent
transformation and need thus not be specified.
Conditions related to conditionally released identities are related to the corre-
sponding cryptographic objects through simple predicates, analogous to public keys.
A formula in LLL has a structure of sub-formulae corresponding to that of for-
mulae in Lp/c.
6.2.2 Transformation MLLL
The transformation MLLL from a data statement φ ∈ Lp/c to a formula φLL ∈ LLL
translates certain identity semantics of Lp/c to semantics that can be expressed
in a language talking about cryptographic objects. For each private certificate,
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the corresponding certificate structure must be obtained for expressing relevant
technical specifications, such as the mapping M of attributes. Also instantiated
DFO-commitment objects and ciphertext objects have a corresponding structure
that needs to be available.
Our discussion of MLLL starts with the mapping of the preamble of φ. The
third-party specification sub-formula, identity introduction sub-formula, and con-
ditionally released identity introduction sub-formula of φ are used for obtaining a
sequence of public key specification predicates PubKey(oi,PKi), thereby realizing
the certifier or conditional recipient semantics of primary identities and condition-
ally released identities of φ, as specified through the association of objects with third
parties through the certifier and recipient attributes, respectively. The public key
for a private certificate is determined through the certifier and type attributes of the
corresponding identity. Furthermore, the conditionally released identity introduc-
tion subformula is mapped to predicates associating Camenisch-Shoup ciphertexts
with release conditions.
The identifier object introduction subformula is mapped to a corresponding sub-
formula making statements about the Pedersen or group commitment objects cor-
responding to the identifier objects. The predicates, which are defined for each
primary identifier object pj which φ introduces, that associate the subject , holder ,
and subjectId attributes with constants through logical equality, are mapped to a
predicate IdfRelProof, exposing the terms hj , sj , and sidj . This formally associates
the terms of Lp/c with the commitment.
Note that the terms used for the holder and subject of identifier objects are those
resulting from the renaming specified through the nested equivalence relations E and
E′γ discussed in Sec. 4.8.2. Logical equality relations expressed between holder or
subject constant terms of different identifier objects in φ are mapped to ∧-connected
equality relations Eq(pi[ki], pj [kj ]) between the corresponding private key attributes
with index ki and kj of the corresponding commitment objects with the meaning
that equality of those private keys be proven in the cryptographic protocol.
A logical equality relation between two terms in the identifier object introduction
sub-formula in φ for bridging registration domains is mapped to equality relations of
the private key attributes of the corresponding domain bridging private certificate
and the integers corresponding to the private keys of the commitment objects corre-
sponding to the identifier objects of the bridged registration domains. This implies
also that a proof of knowledge of the domain bridging certificate be specified, that
is, predicates being added relating the corresponding private key attributes.
The mapping of the assertion sub-formula is the remaining functionality of
MLLL . It transforms the assertion sub-formula of φ to an assertion sub-formula
expressed over the cryptographic objects over only int attributes.
In this sub-formula, predicates with and without a 〈 〉 annotation may be con-
tained. When mapping these predicates to predicates of φLL, those annotations are
retained structurally, that is, all target predicates obtained from mapping a predi-
cate of φLL comprise a 〈 〉 annotation if and only if the source predicate does. The
annotation has implications on how the certificate structure of a private certificate
is obtained, as well as on the cryptographic material, and governs whether crypto-
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graphic protocols are to be proven based on secrets known by the prover or whether
simulated transcripts are to be generated.
The mapping comprises the encoding of attributes of objects into int-typed at-
tributes of the cryptographic objects, as governed through the function M of the
corresponding structure. An int-typed attribute of Lp/c is encoded as the corre-
sponding int attribute of φLL while enforcing the restriction that the to-be-mapped
integer be representable through its limited-length int-typed encoding. A date at-
tribute is mapped to a single attribute of type int, also with a check of the encoding
result being within the value domain of int. The complication hereby is that a date
requires a 0-point as governed through the structure corresponding to the crypto-
graphic object it is contained in, which can vary for each private certificate type,
opaque identity type, or conditionally released identity type. The 0-point deter-
mines the date/time value which is encoded as the integer 0. A str-typed attribute
is mapped to one or multiple attributes of type int, as governed through the structure
of the cryptographic object the attribute is to be encoded in. An unlimited-length
integer is encoded as a hash resulting from application of a collision resistant hash
function to the attribute. This is the only attribute mapping option which does not
encode the attribute value, that is, is not preserving the attribute value. A bool or
idf attribute is mapped in a straightforward way to an int attribute. Further encod-
ings which may be more efficient, though, require additional building blocks [CG08],
are not included in our discussion now. It is not hard to integrate those into our
generic framework and architecture. The indices of the target attribute for encoding
an identity type are specified in the object structure.
Relation predicates are mapped one-by-one, such that the connective structure
of φ is preserved. Additional parantheses may be added, if required for specifying
the precedence, around a sub-formula obtained from mapping a single predicate.
A relation predicate with a given signature in φ expressed on two arguments is
mapped to the corresponding predicate on int-typed arguments in LLL. An argu-
ment is mapped considering the above type mapping for the different data types
and, in case of the argument being a generic int or date expression, also consid-
ering the complications incurred from the expression, that is, relating to multiple
attribute references. For date expressions, additional complexity results from the
0-point encoding of the referred-to date attributes and also date granularities.
A predicate relating the holder or subject attribute of an identity with a constant
pty-typed term requires special handling. Such a predicate is mapped to an Eq
predicate between the corresponding private key attribute of the private certificate as
determined through its structure and the private key attributes of the commitment
object that exposes the respective pty-typed constant term in its corresponding
IdfRelProof predicate. This cryptographically realizes the proof that those objects
are based on the same private key or delegation private key. Private key attributes
of commitment objects or private certificates are never related to constant terms
through predicates, only to other such attributes, because an equality relation with
a constant would reveal the private key.59
59The system implementation, the private key being contained in a tamper-resistant hardware
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A feature predicate is mapped to a predicate representing the feature in LLL—we
do not give further details here as this is not particularly involved or interesting.
The structure of the generated assertion sub-formula of φLL is equivalent to
that of the source sub-formula of φ. With structural equivalence of the formulae we
mean that, while a predicate of φ can result in a sequence of predicates in φLL, when
considering such sequence as a single element of the formula, the formulae have the
same logical connective structure. This is ensured through the construction and by
not leaving the paradigm of φLL still being declarative.
6.3 Abstract Protocol Language
The Abstract Protocol Language APL abstractly specifies cryptographic protocols
through basic cryptographic building blocks, or primitives. Contrary to formulae
of Lp/c and LLL, a formula expressed in APL specifies a cryptographic protocol
over the cryptographic objects instead of declaratively specifying relations among
attributes.
6.3.1 Language APL
The language is a formula-style language expressing predicates over elements, where
a predicate corresponds to a cryptographic building block. A formula specifies the
composition of building blocks to a composed cryptographic protocol for proving a
data statement φ. The building blocks are abstract in APL and specified in detail
only in the next-lower layer in the stack using the language CPL.
A cryptographic protocol is realized through composing instances of basic crypto-
graphic protocols. APL represents those instances of basic cryptographic protocols
abstractly, without giving their detailed specification. Each basic cryptographic
protocol that we use for composing a protocol is represented through at least one
APL predicate. Thereby, we distinguish between compute predicates and prove
predicates. A compute predicate only comprises computation steps a party needs to
perform locally, while a prove predicate represents a ZK-PoK to be executed with
the other party in the protocol.
A basic cryptographic protocol is represented through predicates in a way that
its non-prove-related protocol steps of the parties are represented as compute pred-
icates for the prover or verifier, while the ZK-PoK part is represented through a
single prove predicate used by both prover and verifier in their processing. For ex-
ample, the proof of knowledge protocol of an SRSA-CL signature over a tuple of
attributes [CL02b] is represented as compute protocols SRSACLrand or SRSACLsim
for the prover, depending on whether the party needs to compute a proof or cre-
ate a simulation transcript, SRSACLrec for the verifier, and a ZK-PoK specification
SRSACLprove for both. Thereby, SRSACLrand randomizes the SRSA-CL signature,
while SRSACLsim, in the simulation case, creates a tuple indistinguishable from
token, or combinations thereof, should prevent the private key from being revealed.
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a signature, over which a simulated proof of knowledge transcript is to be com-
puted. SRSACLrec captures the receiving of values computed by the prover through
SRSACLrand or SRSACLsim and assigning them to variables of the cryptographic
program expressed in CPL. SRSACLprove corresponds to the ZK-PoK of the ran-
domized signature, thereby capturing both the protocol endpoints of the prover and
the verifier.
Predicates are associated with terms corresponding to the cryptographic objects,
terms corresponding to public keys, or terms resembling constants. Through the re-
use of the same terms in different predicates, the building blocks of one instance of a
basic protocol are related to each other, and so are different instances of (different)
protocols. For example, a prover uses the predicate in (6.3) with the term c refer-
ring to the corresponding private certificate and PK referring to the corresponding
verification public key and k to the number of attributes of the certificate. Later
in the APL formula, the prover uses (6.4) with the same parameters and an addi-
tional set D of the released attributes of the certificate for relating those predicates
to belong to the same protocol instance of the protocol for proving knowledge of
an SRSA-CL signature. The same approach is used to relate different instances of
(different) basic protocols with each other.
SRSACLrand(c,PK, k) (6.3)
SRSACLprove(c, D,PK, k) (6.4)
An appropriate representation through protocol fragments expressed in CPL
and their corresponding APL abstractions is devised, as outlined for the SRSA-
CL signature prove protocol, for each basic cryptographic protocol required for our
system. This comprises the optional BL-CL signature proof protocol [CL04], a gen-
eralization, for supporting all inquality relations, of Boudot’s inequality proof over
committed integers [Bou00], a computation of a Camenisch-Shoup ciphertext and
verifiable encryption proof thereof [CS03], computation and proof of knowledge of
DF commitments [DF02], computation and proof of knowledge of Pedersen and
generalized group commitments, and proving linear relations between committed
attributes [CS97b]. While equality of attributes is expressed through a linear rela-
tion, non-equality requires a separate protocol. The k-show protocol [CHK+06] for
cloning protection and prove protocol that an element is contained in a dynamic
accumulator [CL02a] realize the k-show per epoch feature and revocation feature
for a private certificate, respectively.
A formula in APL expresses the composition of building blocks corresponding
to instances of basic cryptographic protocols to the overall cryptographic protocol
for proving the input formula.
6.3.2 Transformation MAPL
The mappingMAPL implements the declarative semantics of a formula in LLL in a
cryptographic protocol in APL using the building blocks for the basic cryptographic
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protocols. Due to the paradigm change from LLL to APL, the mapping MAPL is
substantially more involved than MLLL and we can only present the basic idea of
this mapping in the current summary chapter. MAPL changes the representation
paradigm from the formula being a declarative identity statement to it being a cryp-
tographic protocol specification with execution semantics. In the transformation of
φLL to APL, the constraints of the basic cryptographic protocols, particularly the
constraints relating to ZK-PoKs of linear relations between preimages of homomor-
phic functions, need to be enforced. The main effects this has is the introduction
of new cryptographic objects, so called representative objects or proxy objects and
the expression of protocols over those instead of the objects they proxy, and a re-
lated structural change of the part of the formula that corresponds to the assertion
sub-formula of φLL.
Some cryptographic objects referred to by terms already in φLL need to be
generated, or instantiated. This holds for to-be-generated DFO commitments and
Camenisch-Shoup ciphertexts and for the optional generation of group commit-
ments, corresponding to to-be-generated opaque and conditionally released identi-
ties and pseudonyms, respectively. Their attributes have been computed already
with an earlier mapping and passed as additional input to MAPL. The compu-
tation is expressed through the appropriately parameterized compute predicates
corresponding to the cryptographic protocol required.
Without giving the details, a DF commitment as proxy object is generated for
attributes of cryptographic objects and a relation predicate in φLL over attributes of
cryptographic objects is expressed over the proxy instead of the attribute itself. This
simplifies processing and is required in the general case of formulae with disjunctions
to be able to implement the relation semantics of LLL with cryptographic protocols.
This concerns linear relations among preimages of the proofs of knowledge over
homomorphic functions for realizing the relation predicates in the formula φLL in
the general monotonous formulae.
For each uninstantiated Camenisch-Shoup ciphertext object referenced in φLL, a
computation predicate for computing the ciphertext according to the 〈 〉 annotations
in φLL and the semantics is issued. For every ciphertext, a predicate for computing
a DFO commitment of the attribute tuple of the ciphertext is generated as well as a
predicate for proving knowledge of it. Equality predicates between the attributes of
the ciphertexts and the DFO commitments are generated as well to relate them to
each other. Analogous processing is applied for each DFO commitment referenced
in φLL. This processing is performed only once for a formula and creates ciphertexts
and commitments as well as proxy objects for those. That is, a proof of knowledge
predicate for a ciphertext or commitment is done once per formula. Objects referred
to only in non-〈 〉-annotated predicates in φLL are created with random or otherwise
suitably determined attributes. Note that the generation of the objects as outlined
is specific to the prover in the interaction.
For processing the predicates in an ∧-node of φLL, the following is done for a
relation predicate: For simplicity of the processing, a predicate for a proof of knowl-
edge of an SRSA-CL signature, or for creation of a proof simulation by annotating
it with the 〈 〉sim annotation, is added for each reference of an attribute of the cer-
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tificate, though, only once per ∧-node. This can be optimized in a post-processing
step by removing not-required proxy objects. For each referenced attribute, a pred-
icate for generating a proxy DFO commitment is placed, and also a predicate for
proving holdership of it and relating the proxied attribute to that of the certificate
proof. This creates proxy objects for certificate attributes in the current scope of
the formula. The relation predicate on expressions over attribute references of any
of the cryptographic objects is translated to an expression predicate expressed over
the attributes of the proxy objects. Feature predicates are mapped to such of APL
in a straightforward manner. Non-availability of a 〈 〉 annotation for a predicate in
the source formula is translated to a 〈 〉sim annotation of the generated predicates
in φAPL and availability of a 〈 〉 annotation leads to creation of no annotation for
the target predicates. That is, the 〈 〉sim annotation in CPL is the annotation with
inverse semantics to the 〈 〉 annotation in APL.
Note that this approach may create multiple proof-of-knowledge predicates for a
single certificate reference in different disjunctive branches of the formula. Different
proof-of-knowledge protocol instances or simulations thereof for one certificate re-
quire that the same randomized certificate be used as homomorphic preimage of the
homomorphic preimage proof of knowledge in order to implement the strict equality
semantics that all references of an identity in φ refer to the same cryptographic
object. This is subtle, though, crucial for generating a correct protocol.
6.3.3 Protocol Optimization
APL is designed to support optimizations of the protocol in terms of obtaining
more efficient crypographic protocols with the same identity semantics. Such op-
timizations operate on the formula and change its structure, e.g., introduce addi-
tional proxy objects and change the corresponding predicates and whole subformu-
lae. They are defined through patterns specifying optimizable subformulae and how
they are transformed. Through the simplified processing for the transformation to
APL, performing basic optimization steps is mandatory for obtaining a reasonable
protocol and avoiding the overhead introduced with the use of proxy objects.
Once an APL formula φAPL has been obtained, a formula that implements
the same data release semantics can be constructed through executing an optimiz-
ing post-processing stage. Proxy objects can be removed, unless required, in such
a post-processing optimization transformation. Also, multiple attributes (of one
object) can be merged into a single proxy object in case this can reduce the com-
putational effort. Further optimization transformations may reduce the number
of SRSA-CL proof of knowledge predicates required in the formula. Such trans-
formations may move the proof predicate up the tree representing the connective
structure of the formula, introduce new proxy objects for its attributes, and express
the original relation predicates over the attributes of the new proxy objects. De-
pending on the considered scope of such transformation, it requires to operate on a
subtree and make substantial changes in it. Such optimization transformations for
efficiency improvements can be complex and are best applied by following patterns
and heuristics.
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The capability of optimizing protocols shows the power of the APL language
and is one motivation for our run-time generation approach and its multi-layered
architecture.
6.4 Cryptographic Protocol Language
CPL, the Cryptographic Protocol Language, is used for specifying cryptographic
building blocks realizing the basic cryptographic protocols. A protocol specification
of a composed protocol expressed in CPL results from transforming the representa-
tion of the protocol expressed in APL using the transformationMCPL. Each APL
predicate has a corresponding CPL-specified cryptographic building block compris-
ing the implementation details for the predicate required for the transformation
MCPL.
6.4.1 Languages CPL and CPL∗
For CPL, we follow a hybrid language design, that is, deviate from standard language
design of following a single language paradigm. CPL comprises language elements
with procedural and such with declarative semantics. A protocol expressed in CPL
is a sequence of statements having sequential execution semantics. A statement is
either a procedural, or imperative, statement or a declarative, or ZK-PoK, state-
ment. Due to the declarative statements, a protocol specification in CPL cannot be
executed by a procedural interpreter.
A procedural statement is one realizing imperative language structures such as
loops or conditionals, or an atomic statement for executing an (algebraic) operation
or declaring a type, that is, it is an instruction.
A declarative statement specifies a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge composed
from possibly multiple proof parts, where each part is an instance of a basic crypto-
graphic protocol. A declarative statement is expressed in an extension of the widely
used Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97a], where the latter is rather a specification
of a proof goal than of the proof itself. Our extension is sufficiently concrete and
explicit to serve as a proof specification for unambiguously specifying the proof pro-
tocol. Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols are expressed over homomorphic
functions defined in procedural operations.
The language referred to as Executable Cryptographic Protocol Language, or
CPL∗, is the fragment of CPL without its declarative component and expresses
executable cryptographic protocols. Thus, both a protocol specification in CPL and
a CPL∗ program for such specification can express the same cryptographic proto-
cols at different abstraction levels, while only a CPL∗ program is executable by a
reasonably simple protocol interpreter.60
A specification in CPL is expressed over group elements, e.g., such part of the
cryptographic elements part of the cryptographic objects referred to in formulae in
60A protocol interpreter with an integrated zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge compiler can
execute CPL specifications.
6.4 Cryptographic Protocol Language 291
LLL, referred to through constants and variables, much like constants and variables
in a high-level programming language. For example, the cryptographic elements
of an SRSA-CL signature or public key [CL02b] are referred to as group elements.
All group elements are typed with the mathematical group they belong to through
the ::T-operator and groups are defined through separate operations. Homomorphic
functions are defined with the function definition operator ::F. Procedural operations
in a CPL specification specify algebraic operations to be executed to assign values
to variables, e.g., addition, multiplication, or multi-base exponentiation in a given
group, much like the operations in a high-level programming language. Declar-
ative statements also refer to variables and constants representing cryptographic
values, homomorphic functions, or other entities, and specify zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge over homomorphic functions over those values.
6.4.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Each basic cryptographic protocol is represented through a set of cryptographic
building blocks. Each such cryptographic building block is specified in detail using
CPL and a non-CPL interface. A cryptographic building block comprises an in-
terface and a body. The interface specifies input elements to the building block,
elements exposed by the building block, dependencies in terms of other building
blocks, and secret preimages the building block specifies proof-of-knowledge proto-
cols over.
The interface comprises multiple sections, each of which are sketched next. The
inputs comprise identifiers of typed elements being expected as input to an instance
of the building block. Exposed elements are identifiers of typed elements that an
instance of the building block exposes to a composed protocol. A dependency ex-
presses that an instance of the current building block requires an instance of each
building block listed among the dependencies. This is required for realizing the
representation of a single protocol through multiple building blocks, that is, for
“connecting” the building block instances for a protocol instance. The preimage
relations specify the indices of preimages appearing as preimages in ZK-PoKs over
homomorphic functions in a prove operation of the building block. Those preim-
ages can be related through predicates to those of other building block instances of
the composed protocol during protocol composition for realizing linear relations on
attributes. All other preimages remain internal to the ZK-PoK operations of the
building block.
The body is a fragment of a cryptographic protocol specified in CPL. Statements
in the body can refer to input elements, elements of dependencies, and elements
declared within the body. A declared element can be exposed to other building
blocks, that is, be accessible in a composed protocol from other building blocks.
Those that are not exposed have the body of this building block as scope and are
thus not visible outside of the building block.
A building block specifies a template of a fragment of a cryptographic protocol.
The interface specifies aspects for the composition of an instance of the building
block with instances of other building blocks. During transformation of an APL
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formula φAPL to a CPL formula φCPL, building blocks corresponding to APL pred-
icates are instantiated and composed. In the protocol composition, building blocks
behave like macros when being instantiated and composed with other building blocks
in that they are contextualized and expanded into a wider context.
6.4.3 Transformation MCPL
Mapping an APL formula through the transformationMCPL to a CPL specification
uses, for each APL predicate, an instance of a CPL building block corresponding
to an APL predicate and composes it with the specifications Γ and ∆ for the
procedural and declarative part of the specification, respectively, generated so far.
An instance of a building block thereby is obtained by instantiating a building block,
which generates a copy of the building block template and transforms this copy. The
transformation steps comprise, among other steps, determining the input elements
to the building block, resolving building block dependencies, and renaming elements
in the body to refer to those of the inputs and building block dependencies, and
renaming internal elements based on a protocol-wide unique identifier of the building
block to separate the namespace of the instance of the building block from other
instances. This realizes an integration of the building block, represented as a macro-
like structure, through instantiation, into the context of the composed protocol. An
instantiated building block is composed with both Γ and ∆, the composed protocol
specifications comprising procedural and declarative operations, respectively.
The approach of building blocks acting as templates from which cryptographic
protocol fragments for integration into the protocol to be composed are derived
through instantiation allows for having sub-protocols specified in CPL independently
and composing them to a single CPL specification for a given APL input. Through
the macro approach, namespaces of building blocks are not perfectly isolated towards
each other once composed, though, when assuming that the authoring of all building
blocks used in a system is under control of one entity, this does not constitute a
problem. Using a procedure-like representation of building blocks would not result
in the explicit protocol representations we can obtain and potential drawbacks for
their optimized execution for exploiting the inherent ILP.
The details of MCPL for instantiation and composition of building blocks are
involved and not explained in this summary due to space constraints.
6.4.4 Transformation MCPL∗ to CPL∗
A composed protocol expressed in CPL still comprises declarative ZK-PoK opera-
tions which need to be compiled to procedural sub-programs for obtaining an exe-
cutable cryptographic protocol specification, or (cryptographic) program, expressed
in CPL∗. The mappingMCPL∗ from CPL to CPL∗ is the final transformation step
in our run-time protocol generation stack and outputs an executable cryptographic
program. The mapping compiles the declarative zero-knowledge proof specifications
to procedural sub-programs using the approach of zero-knowledge proof compilers.
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A declarative CPL operation specifies a Σ-protocol [Cra96], or a part thereof,
where a Σ-protocol is, informally, a 3-round interactive protocol between a prover
and a verifier, where the prover sends a commitment of randomness in the first
round, the verifier a random challenge in the second round, the prover a response
in the third round, and the verifier accepts if a verification equation on the protocol
transcript can be verified. Σ-protocols are zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Note
that such protocols can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics.
A zero-knowledge proof system informally is an interactive protocol through
which an assertion can be proven without revealing any further information. Zero-
knowledge proofs have been introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR85,
GMR89]. Zero-knowledge proofs are a powerful concept in that all of NP admits a
zero-knowledge proof system [GMW86, GMW91] and even everything provable, that
is, all of IP is provable in zero knowledge as shown by Ben-Or et al. [BOGG+88].
Though, practically efficient61 proof systems exist only for a much more constrained
class of languages, for which efficient protocols have been devised.
A proof of knowledge is, intuitively speaking, an interactive protocol through
which a party can prove knowledge of an element x for a pair (x, y) ∈ R being
member of a relation R. Formalizing that a party knows something is non-trivial and
has been done by Bellare and Goldreich [BG92] through the notion of a knowledge
extractor.
6.4.5 Proof Protocols
The class of protocols of interest to us are the Σ-protocols, which are character-
ized the properties of special soundness and special honest verifier zero knowledge.
Thereby, the protocols are zero-knowledge proof (or argument) systems with a
knowledge error that is exponentially small in the challenge length [CDM00].
The concrete Σ-protocols of interest to us are proof of knowledge protocols of
the preimages of homomorphic functions. The functions we consider are exponenti-
ations or multi-base exponentiations, also referred to as multi-exponentiations, over
different classes of groups, that is, homomorphic functions over those groups or
product groups thereover.
The simplest class of protocols are proof of knowledge protocols for discrete loga-
rithms over groups with finite domains [Ped91] or tuples of logarithms over product
groups of such [CS97a]. The first known protocol instance for the further class is
the Schnorr protocol [Sch91], for the latter the representation proof protocol by Ca-
menisch and Stadler [CS97a]. This class of protocols is referred to as Σφ-protocols
in the framework of Bangerter et al. [BKS+09]. Proof systems for those classes of
protocols are zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in the definition of Bellare and
Goldreich [BG92].
Another important class of protocols are proof of knowledge protocols for preim-
ages of exponentiation or multi-exponentiation homomorphisms in hidden-order
61The constructions used in [GMW86, GMW91, BOGG+88] are efficient in the sense of the term
as it is used in theoretical computer science, that is, as being of polynomial complexity with respect
to a parameter. Thus, efficient protocols in this notion may well be entirely impractical.
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groups or product groups of such. The basic ideas for this have been put forth
by Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO97], with Damg˚ard and Fujisaki correcting the re-
sults [DF02]. The results have been generalized by Bangerter et al. [BCM05] and
Bangerter [Ban05]. These protocols are arguments of knowledge in the definition of
Bellare and Goldreich [BG92].
For an argument of knowledge [BG92], or computational proof of knowledge,
soundness does not hold for a computationally unbounded prover—such prover may
be able to convince a verifier about the truth of an assertion although it does not
hold. In this thesis, we may use the term “proof” loosely, that is, for both proofs
and arguments of knowledge in the sense of Bellare and Goldreich, unless the dif-
ferentiation is of importance.
Camenisch et al. [CKY09] have devised a framework for zero-knowledge proofs
for (multi-)exponentiation homomorphisms in (product) groups of known or hidden
order. Bangerter et al. [BKS+09] have proposed an extension thereof achieving
lower round complexity. The proofs of the latter are set in the auxiliary string
model or common reference string model by Blum et al. [BFM88] requiring access
of all parties to a common reference string, while the further does not build on this
assumption. Overall, the main constructions of both frameworks are very similar.
Linear relations between homomorphic preimages of homomorphisms in a com-
posed proof protocol can be handled as proposed in the literature [CS97a, Bra97,
CS97b]. Essentially, a preimage relation can be seen as a proof over a product group
using the standard proof protocol in the composition frameworks [CKY09].
A ZK-PoK specification can relate predicates expressed therein through con-
junctions and disjunctions using a generic structure of connectives. Preimages may
be related through linear relations—most commonly equality—with the constraint
that only preimages directly comprised in the same conjunction node may be re-
lated. This relates to the constraints imposed on APL on what can be realized
with cryptographic protocols. When viewing preimage proofs of knowledge over ho-
momorphic functions with related preimages as preimage proofs over corresponding
product groups, this observation follows immediately.
For realizing the multi-exponentiation homomorphism protocols of the above-
discussed frameworks, proofs that an integer lies in a given interval [CM99] are
required as auxiliary cryptographic mechanisms.
Compiling a CPL formula to CPL∗ can build on the zero-knowledge proof frame-
works of Camenisch et al. [CKY09] or Bangerter et al. [BKS+09]. The latter is more
suitable due to their 3-move protocols in which a proof can, without restrictions, be
transformed to a signature of knowledge using the Fiat-Shamir approach [FS86].
The programmatic composition of cryptographic building blocks corresponds to a
composition of Σ-protocols of the respective class using either of the above-discussed
frameworks. The frameworks mandate some overhead in order to ensure soundness
of the protocols, essentially the introduction of further DFO-type commitments over
so-called safeguard groups in certain cases [CKY09, BKS+09].
A Σ-type composed protocol can either be executed as an interactive proto-
col, thereby obtaining the zero-knowledge property, or by creating a signature of
knowledge as introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [CS97a] and later formalized by
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Chase and Lysyanskaya [CL06] in a non-interactive way through the Fiat-Shamir
approach [FS86] of using a (practical instantiation of a) random oracle [BR93] in
place of the verifier and thereby obtaining a signature of knowledge. Only in the
case of a signature of knowledge, a third-party-verifiable data statement can be
obtained, which may be of interest for verification by a conditional recipient be-
fore decrypting Camenisch-Shoup ciphertexts and is crucial for the application to
Fiat-Shamir-based PKI discussed earlier for it being a signature scheme.
6.4.5.1 Monotonous Formulae
Monotonous formulae, that is, formulae comprising disjunctions, can be realized us-
ing the approach of proofs of partial knowledge by Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoen-
makers [CDS94]. Predicates with a 〈 〉sim annotation thereby are such for which the
prover does not know the secret preimages, while for non-〈 〉sim-annotated predicates
it does know them. The connective structure over the formula gives rise to an ac-
cess structure which can be realized through a secret sharing scheme. Intuitively
speaking, the approach by Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoenmakers uses a suitable
secret-sharing scheme for “splitting” a received challenge into sub-challenges for the
different preimages, while allowing the prover to run a protocol simulator for the
sub-protocols corresponding to the 〈 〉sim-annotated predicates and only being re-
quired to compute the protocol for the non-〈 〉sim-annotated predicates. Thereby,
the prover remains capable of correctly computing the third protocol round for a re-
ceived challenge. The properties of the secret sharing scheme and the construction
ensure soundness, that is, the property that the prover needs to know preimages
corresponding to a qualified access structure, that is, needs to be able to prove all
non-〈 〉sim-annotated predicates in our construction.
According to a theorem of Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoenmakers [CDS94], using
a smooth secret sharing scheme allows for obtaining a witness indistinguishable
protocol [FS90] for the input being honest-verifier-zero-knowledge (HVZK) protocols
with special soundness. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is an example for a smooth
scheme, though, is a threshold scheme and thus not applicable for realizing general
access structures, unless one reverts to disjunctive normal form of the formula to
be proven as done in relevant related work [BKS+09, BBH+09]. The general secret
sharing scheme of Benaloh and Leichter [BL88] that is of interest for realizing general
connective structures is only a semi-smooth scheme, for which reason this theorem of
Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoenmakers [CDS94] does not apply. They have proven
a further theorem for obtaining a witness indistinguishable protocol from special
HVZK protocols with special soundness property for semi-smooth secret sharing
schemes. This theorem relaxes the smoothness property to semi-smoothness at the
cost of additionally requiring that the protocols to be composed have the stronger
special soundness property.
Witness indistinguishability (WI) as a protocol property has been introduced by
Feige and Shamir [FS90] as the property that the verifier cannot distinguish which
witness has been used by the prover, in case multiple witnesses could have been used.
The witness indistinguishability property of the proof of partial knowledge ensures
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that the prover leaks no information about which preimages the prover knows and
thus which predicates are 〈 〉sim-annotated. No statements on the zero-knowledge
property of the composed protocol can be made for this construction.
An additional construction by Cramer et al. [CDS94] allows for obtaining witness
hiding protocols, which is still a weaker property than the zero-knowledge property,
though, may be sufficient for applications such as identification schemes [CDS94].
Cramer has proposed an approach for obtaining a perfect zero-knowledge proof
system, also based on a semi-smooth secret sharing scheme and special HVZK pro-
tocols with the special soundness property, in his PhD thesis [Cra96], which has
been revisited by Cramer, Damg˚ard and MacKenzie [CDM00]. This construction
builds on the above-discussed construction yielding witness indistinguishable proto-
cols as a primitive and transforms a witness indistinguishable protocol into a perfect
zero-knowledge protocol.
Though, Cramer et al.’s construction for obtaining perfect zero-knowledge pro-
tocols poses practical problems in our system as it requires that all relations over
which the composed proof is expressed be known to the verifier upfront and that the
verifier compute and prove holdership of a commitment for each of the relations as
a first protocol step. Realizing this for our authentication flows where a party first
obtains a policy and cryptographic challenge for executing a signature of knowl-
edge protocol and responds with a signature of knowledge would require a higher
round complexity than for a Fiat-Shamir-based signature of knowledge, where only
an initial challenge is required from the verifier to ensure freshness. Concretely, the
verifier would need to be notified by the prover of all relations the proof protocol
makes use of before computing the proof.
6.4.6 Technical Realization
A zero-knowledge proof compiler transforming formal proof specifications similar to
the declarative operations expressed in a CPL formula into proof protocols has
been designed and implemented in a related line of work [BBK+09, ABB+10,
BBH+09, BKS+09, BABB+12]. A high-level overview of the concept of zero-
knowledge proof generation and compiler-based implementation can be found in
Bangerter et al. [BBK+09]. More recent work by this team proposes a certifying
compiler [ABB+10, BABB+12], creating formal-methods-based proofs as assurance.
Using the above-discussed frameworks and approaches for composing Σ-
protocols, one can compile the abstract ZK-PoK specifications of φCPL ∈ CPL
into a concrete protocol φCPL∗ ∈ CPL∗. The available work on zero-knowledge
proof compilers is a solid starting point. Some extensions required to integrate such
compiler into our run-time protocol generation approach for realizing the mapping
MCPL∗ are discussed next.
The line of work on zero-knowledge proof compilers [BBK+09, ABB+10,
BBH+09, BKS+09, BABB+12] always transforms monotonous formulae to disjunc-
tive normal form for applying the construction of Cramer, Damg˚ard, and Schoen-
makers [CDS94] based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Sha79]. Depending on
the connective structure of the formula, transforming to disjunctive normal form
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may be sufficiently efficient for some applications. An important extension to the
existing compilers is to build on a secret sharing scheme for general access structures
and using Cramer et al.’s approach for realizing monotonous formulae as discussed
above without reverting to disjunctive normal form. Without such extension, the
compilers are still applicable when always transforming ZK-PoK statements of CPL
into disjunctive normal form.
A required extension concerns the output format of the proof compiler. Cur-
rently, Bangerter et al.’s work outputs protocol specifications in LATEX or the high-
level programming language JAVA. A program in JAVA code is not suitable for
our purposes, because a run-time-generated protocol would need to be compiled to
JAVA byte code that can be executed by a JAVA virtual machine. This introduces
computational and latency overhead and also does not allow for optimizations by
exploiting the ILP inherent to the generated protocols in an as effective way as with
protocols represented as programs in CPL∗.
What is required for our framework is an output in CPL∗ or a similar language
that can be translated to it. Then, a compiled protocol can be composed with the
remaining cryptographic protocol expressed in CPL∗.
6.4.7 Composability of Cryptographic Protocols
The approach for protocol composition of the cryptographic protocols we use, and
related work building on non-trivial composed zero-knowledge proof systems alike,
suffer, although using well-known approaches for protocol composition, from the
problem that no formal proof of correctness of the overall composed cryptographic
protocols exists—only for the individual building blocks. Doing such formal proof,
either in the ideal-world/real-world simulation or game-based paradigm, is open
work for our system. Particularly, the genericity of the protocols, resulting from
them being a function of the input data statement φ, poses substantial challenges
hereto.
Regarding zero-knowledge proofs, due to the properties of black-box simulation
of the cryptographic protocols, concurrent composition poses the problem that a
protocol simulator has runtime exponential in the number of concurrently executed
protocols.
Those composability problems can be resolved by employing what is referred to
as universally composable protocols. Universally composable primitives guarantee,
when being composed with each other to a compound protocol and when polynomi-
ally many concurrent protocol instances being executed, their security properties,
and thus avoid problems of composition of protocols from basic building blocks and
concurrent composition. The cryptographic research community is active on univer-
sally composable protocols and promising results have become available [CKS11].
Our overall run-time protocol generation approach can be equally applied to
universally composable protocols once efficient variants thereof will be available for
the kinds of protocols we need.
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6.5 Protocol Execution
A cryptographic program expressed in CPL∗ is executed by the respective party hav-
ing generated it against the program generated by its protocol participant. Execu-
tion is realized by an optimizing interpreter exploiting the ILP inherent to the cryp-
tographic programs through parallel execution of independent instructions. This
is analogous to the approach a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) central
processing unit (CPU) takes for exploiting the instruction-level parallelism (ILP)
of assembly programs for those architectures based on, e.g., out-of-order issuing of
instructions to multiple concurrent execution units [HP12].
The technical approach proposed by us is the construction of a dependency graph
of the full CPL∗ program and an execution of the program by issuing independent
instructions concurrently, governed by the dependency graph. Instructions in our
setting are—in contrast to RISC assembly instructions—complex instructions, e.g.,
group operations in finite groups, such as multi-base exponentiation, requiring a
huge number of (RISC) machine instructions to be executed on a modern processor.
The concept of ILP applies analogously, though, with the assumption of an asyn-
chronous execution machine for the instructions and different instruction execution
times. It is easy to see from the individual basic cryptographic protocols that the
ILP of composed protocols is substantial, thus resulting—when being exploited—in
a considerable speedup of protocol execution.
The performance improvements obtained through exploitation of ILP during
protocol execution and through optimization of APL formulae are orthogonal to
the performance optimizations that the zero-knowledge proof compiler of Bangerter
et al. [BKS+09] can achieve. Implementation architectures which do not construct
a cryptographic program and execute the cryptographic operations in-line with the
processing of an input formula cannot exploit ILP of the protocol to the same extent.
Complementary to the abovementioned performance improvements are improve-
ments on the arithmetic layer. A first simple improvement is using multi-base expo-
nentiation using known algorithms instead of computing multi-exponentiations as
product of powers.
Using well-known techniques for precomputing certain group elements to reduce
the number of group operations for a multi-base exponentiation composes with ef-
ficiency improvements mentioned earlier. The cryptographic protocols we discuss
require that (multi-)exponentiations with the same (tuples of) bases be done re-
peatedly, e.g., when using the same public key. Verifyers of zero-knowledge proofs
can use precomputations for tuples of fixed bases with one variable base.
Operations with such structure can be sped up by precomputing group
elements related to the fixed bases and reusing them throughout multiple
(multi-)exponentiations with the same base tuples to obtain a space-time tradeoff for
the arithmetic operations [Pip76, BGMW92, LL94, Som04a]. Those efficiency im-
provements for (multi-)exponentiations build on the computation of short addition
chains or vector addition chains.
Those issues have been investigated by the author already in his master the-
sis [Som04a] in terms of efficient multi-exponentiation algorithms and a system
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design and implementation for run-time profiling the (multi-)exponentiation opera-
tions being executed and performing precomputations to speed up the execution of
frequently used base tuples.
6.6 Future Work
A complete implementation of our framework is left to future work, only a consider-
ably simplified version thereof realizing a relatively small fragment of Lp/c has been
implemented by the author based on a novel 2-layer architecture [Som07]. Such
implementation would leverage the existing work on compilers for Σ-protocols and
extend them as discussed. Integration of such compiler into our framework requires
a mapping from CPL to the language used for the compilers.
A detailed specification of our run-time protocol generation framework, of which
this chapter is a summary, is planned to be published in the future.
For real-world deployments, an important part is the optimizing capability of
the protocol interpreter for reducing protocol latency. Exploiting the IPL through
out-of-order issuing and concurrently computing a large number of protocols as is
the case for a verifier benefits the modular exponentiation throughput when using
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) for performing arithmetic operations. There-
fore, it may be worthwhile to explore the application of GPUs in settings of servers
performing a large number of verifications of credential proofs concurrently. Also,
consideration of using special-purpose hardware for performing group operations
may be important for practical deployments for being able to handle the computa-
tional load for verifying protocols on the server side.

Chapter7
Implementation
A part of the research for this thesis comprises the implementation of selected as-
pects of our results for validating our approach. The implementation results are
related to creating a system for privacy-enhancing identity management based on
credential protocols. The implementation efforts have already been summarized in
Sec. 1.5.1.2 in the introduction—next we present further technical information for
selected efforts, though, without going into all the details.
7.1 Cryptographic Protocol Library
In this thesis we have summarized a generic and thus very powerful approach to the
run-time generation of cryptographic protocols from a logic-based input specification
in Chapter 6. The resulting protocol framework is based on a 5-layer processing stack
and capable of generating protocols for realizing the semantics of data statements
expressed in Lp.
The author has implemented an earlier—and simpler—framework for generat-
ing and executing a simpler variant of the cryptographic protocols in the form of
a cryptographic library [Som07]. The supported language is based on the language
presented by the author in earlier work [BCS05, CSZ06a]. The language supports
predicates over multiple credentials in a single proof protocol, verifiable encryption
for realizing conditional release, and commitments for realizing opaque identities.
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A major missing functionality of the library is the support for statements com-
prising disjunctions—it is a main contribution of this thesis to handle the relevant
aspects of supporting disjunctions in formulae to be released for building a sys-
tem. Considering the functionality, the library [Som07] realizes the data release
protocols for an already strong subset of our approach for supporting anonymous,
yet accountable, access control [BCS05] and our framework for privacy-enhanced
PKI [CSZ06b, CSZ06a].
The library is based on a substantially simpler 2-layer architecture than that
proposed in this thesis. The high-level layer translates an input formula for which
a cryptographic protocol is to be generated into a low-level specification language,
similar to the mappingMLLL in the framework of Chapter 6. The similarities consist
in the mapping being from a language expressed on identity management concepts
to a language expressed over cryptographic objects, and go far in terms of technical
similarities. That is, identity semantics is translated to semantics of cryptographic
protocols.
The low-level layer translates a formula expressed in the low-level specification
language into executable cryptographic protocols and executes those. The mapping
is realized by an interpreter which maps predicates of the formula in the specification
language to cryptographic building blocks, links different building blocks with each
other as required for realizing the formula, and computes the cryptographic sub-
protocols corresponding to the building blocks. Thus, this layer essentially comprises
two sub-layers, one for mapping to the cryptographic building blocks and linking
them with other building blocks, and one for executing the cryptographic operations
corresponding to the building blocks. For this reason, one can argue this library
being based on a 3-layer architecture.
The library realizes the arithmetic layer in a way that possibilities for optimiza-
tions for the group arithmetic, such as multi-base exponentiations, are accounted
for in the technical architecture. The author has addressed efficient arithmetic for
cryptographic systems in his master thesis [Som04a]. This work has encompassed a
study of multi-base exponentiation, specialized algorithms for considering the spe-
cific structure of credential protocols, an approach for trading off memory against
runtime by run-time profiling of cryptographic operations being executed, and an
implementation of all this in a system based on the JAVA language framework.
The library is, to the best of our knowledge, the first implementation of the cryp-
tographic protocols for privacy-enhanced authentication based on a multi-layered
approach for transforming a high-level input to cryptographic protocols. It is the
successor of an earlier implementation of a simpler library for the credential pro-
tocols by the author done in early 2002 which also remained internal to IBM. The
library is, to the best of our knowledge, the first implementation that builds upon
using the idea of certificate structures for specifying structural information of cryp-
tographic certificates required for executing the mapping from the high-level input
formulae to the cryptographic protocols.
The approach summarized in Chapter 6 is more generic than the above-discussed
library and supports a more expressive specification language. The additional
mapping layer MAPL allows for protocol optimizations, while the generation of
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an executable program expressed in the language CPL∗ allows for exploiting the
instruction-level parallelism of the generated cryptographic protocols through par-
allel execution.
7.2 WS-Trust Request-Response Flows
Execution of a cryptographic 2-party protocol like the privacy-enhanced authentica-
tion protocols based on credentials requires messages being exchanged between the
parties. For real-world systems, standards issued by industry groups exist on how to
represent such messages and what their semantics is. Examples for such standards
are the WS-Security [WSS04] and WS-Trust [KN03a] standards. WS-Security is
based on XML-DSIG [ERS02] for digital signatures and WS-Trust builds on WS-
Security.
The author has proposed a method that utilizes the verifiable pseudo-random
function of Dodis and Yampolskiy [DY05] for generating a temporary signature key
based on an identity statement and zero-knowledge proof of its correctness and a
proof in zero knowledge that the key pair has been generated properly through
the verifiable random function [CGS06]. Using this temporary key, the prover of a
2-party protocol can bind the identity statement using the standard semantics of
WS-Trust [KN03a], while not requiring an extension of the underlying XML digital
signature standard [ERS02], which was perceived as crucial at the time. This enables
a new WS-Federation Active Requestor profile [KN03b] based on private certificates
instead of conventional tokens.
We have shown the integration of the request-response message flow with the
WS-Trust industry standard. The flow comprises a user obtaining a policy and
random challenge from a service provider, determining a data statement fulfilling
the policy and computing a cryptographic proof for it [Som07], and sending the
statement and proof to the service provider for verification. The integration of the
messaging with the WS-Trust standard has been reported in detail in Camenisch et
al. [CGS06] implementing the private certificate protocols. The integration with the
standard requires cryptographic operations to be executed which have been realized
as a separate library for a clean modeling from a software engineering perspective.
7.3 User Interface
We have implemented a simple yet powerful user interface allowing a user to choose
how to fulfill a data request of another party, as reported in Camenisch, Shelat
et al. [CSSZ06]. The user interface has been realized as a Web browser extension
for Firefox which renders the interface directly within the browser window the user
interacts with. The interface is rendered co-located to the interface element on the
Web page, clicking of which triggers the identity management protocol flow. The
advantage of such approach is that there is a strong visual link between the resource
to access through the interface element representing it on the Web page and the user
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interface for identity selection. It particularly also allows a user to open multiple
identity selections at once in different browser windows, e.g., to compare policies of
different service offerings.
The browser extension is constrained to only rendering data requests (policies)
and allowing a user to select how to fulfill the policies and communicating with
the locally executed process implementing policy matching and the cryptographic
protocols for obtaining the policy files and letting this process know about the
selection. That is, the use interface component does not implement substantial pro-
cessing logic. This is left to the back-end process, which is implemented using JAVA
and realizes the functionality for policy matching and performing the cryptographic
proof based on the data statement the user selects.
As technologies we chose the open-source Firefox Web browser due to its flexible
support of extensions and the XML User Interface Language (XUL), an XML-based
language for implementing user interfaces, for the implementation of the browser-
based user interface.
7.4 End-to-end Privacy-preserving Access Control
For demonstrating the feasibility of our approach of privacy-preserving access con-
trol, we have designed and implemented a fully functional end-to-end prototype
thereof. The prototype realizes a scenario in the healthcare domain. The basic
idea is that an insurance company offering healthcare insurance services provides
its members access to a healthcare portal with health-related information as an
extra service. The system allows users to log into an access-protected healthcare
information portal on a subscription basis without revealing identifying attributes.
Thereby, it differentiates different types of credentials and authorizations that can
be obtained through releasing parts of the attribute information of the credentials:
A user can either present a health insurance credential giving access to a basic part
of the portal, or an additional IBM employee credential for proving being a corpo-
rate member, which gives access to a wider selection of resources. Those options
were formalized in the simple authorization policies deployed in the system.
This system shows the use of a single as well as multiple credentials to gain
access to resources. Thereby, predicates for revealing partial information contained
in the credentials as well as predicates for relating non-released attributes of the
credentials, e.g., equality predicates over the private keys the credentials are based
on, have been realized through cryptographic protocols.
Technically, the server-side system was based on an instance of the Tomcat
application server, the authentication system of which was used to accept data-
minimizing proofs instead of username/password pairs as authentication tokens and,
depending on the attributes give access to respective sets of Web resources. The
cryptographic library of the author [Som07] with its integration into the WS-Trust
standard [CGS06] was used as authentication and messaging mechanism.
The user-side system features a Firefox Web browser with a plug-in that is
triggered upon the user clicking on an access control policy and invokes a user-
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side back-end process. This process matches the obtained policy with the user’s
credentials, queries the user for selecting a fulfilling statement of her choice, and
computes a cryptographic proof based on private certificates of the user.
The prototype implements earlier variants of the results presented in this the-
sis [BCS05, CSZ06b, CSZ06a], our user interface work [CSSZ06], and the results
on integration of the message flow with WS-Trust [CGS06]. Using an extension of
the underlying technical architecture, the results of this thesis can be integrated
with standards and, based on this, with commercial products, in the same way.
The more general access control system and negotiation protocol proposed by the
author [Som11] will require a multi-round message flow and additional processing,
though based on the same architecture.
The full system was presented at the Internet Identity Workshop 2007 in the
Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California [BSBC+07]. The system
realizes the complete protocol flow for data-minimizing access to an online resource.
The user thereby accesses an access-protected resource through her Web browser.
The response of such request is a data request provided to the user’s software system.
The software system matches the request against the user’s portfolio of private
certificates. The results of the matching are displayed to the user for her selection
which determines with which possible combinbation of attributes of her suitable
certificates she intends to fulfill the request.
7.5 Ontology-based Reasoning
In the scope of our work on using ontologies for reasoning on authorization [HS06],
a prototypical implementation of the concepts was built. This implementation was
capable of computing whether a data statement fulfills a data request of a pol-
icy using reasoning over an ontology. The data representation language used was
RDF [ME04], the ontology language OWL [MvHE04]. Data statements were to be
proven by a predecessor of our credential library [Som07]. Automated reasoning
was realized with a JAVA-based open-source reasoner by Hogben.
Building on a fragment of description logic, the prototype was among the first to
use the approach of using named nested graphs for representing disjunctions. This
work was performed as part of the efforts related to a comprehensive system for
user-centric privacy-enhancing identity management created as one of the technical
contributions of the PRIME project [PRI08].

Chapter8
Conclusions
We have designed a system and framework for privacy-enhancing identity man-
agement in open settings such as that of the Internet. The system allows users
to authenticate to service providers while minimizing the revealed data to what is
required by the service provider. The system supports the outsourcing of trust deci-
sions, e.g., regarding certification properties of attributes, similar to the delegation
of trust as proposed in trust management systems. The system supports delegation
of attribute authority, which is a crucial requirement of practical identity manage-
ment systems. It allows for binding attributes to parties in a flexible way through
multiple related registrations of a user instead of assuming a single registration. As
a particularly important feature, it supports the possibility of having accountability
of requesters authenticated through a non-identifying attribute statement, that is,
achieving accountability and privacy at the same time. Results on user interfaces
for selecting data statements to be released for fulfilling a policy have been obtained.
The integration of the messaging related to obtaining a policy and sending a proof
message with the WS-Trust standard and also with products building on this stan-
dard has been shown. We have shown furthermore how the required cryptographic
protocols for establishing identifier objects, establishing identities, and releasing data
based on those integrate with each other and the complete system, particularly the
logic-based data model. We have developed an approach for the run-time generation
of cryptographic protocols and summarize it in the thesis. An abstract authenti-
cation model for expressing the capabilities of our authentication system has been
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presented. We have shown how the cryptographic protocols can realize relevant
transformation rules of this model. Overall, the system and framework have been
defined based on the Privacy-by-Design paradigm of considering privacy right from
the beginning.
Only jointly employing multiple disciplines and extending and combining ap-
proaches from logic, access control, cryptography, and other domains, while consid-
ering usability, available standards, and system constraints to obtain an integrated
system, made our comprehensive results possible. This interdisciplinary and inte-
grating technical approach was not only necessary—it has constituted one of the
most exciting challenges of the work.
Our results have substantially advanced the state of the art in the privacy-
enhancing authentication and identity management domain by taking an integrated
approach to the topic and addressing privacy-enhancing identity management from
theory to practice, meaning to start the work with cryptographic protocols which
were available and building a system around those protocols to bring them to prac-
tice. The subtitle “From Cryptography to Practice” of the thesis has been chosen
to reflect this approach.
A part of the results presented in this thesis has been presented in the form of
research publications, which have been consolidated and integrated to the presented
coherent system and framework. We have validated our results through implementa-
tion of selected aspects of earlier variants thereof. Thereby, we have obtained a fully
functional prototype of a privacy-enhanced identity management system based on a
healthcare scenario, showing the practical feasibility of the data-minimizing authen-
tication aspects using cryptographic credential protocols. For further emphasizing
practical viability of privacy-enhancing authentication protocols, we have integrated
the protocol flow for accessing an online resource using messaging following the WS-
Trust standard and have prototypically integrated this with a commercial product.
In addition to the privacy-enhanced identity management system and framework,
we have made further contributions in related and orthogonal spaces as discussed
in the introduction. Those cover a wider perspective of privacy related to electronic
communication networks and data processing.
Due to the complexity of the Internet and Web ecosystem and personal data
economy, our results related to the system and framework for privacy-enhanced
identity management only provide solutions for parts of the privacy problem space.
Orthogonal contributions we have made cover the important area of electronic social
networks, which are a main cause of user data dissemination and related privacy
problems. Thereby, such results are crucial for protecting users’ privacy. Also, we
show how to integrate our privacy-enhanced identity management system with vir-
tual reality platforms, thereby obtaining an architecture which reuses the real-world
authentication infrastructure and maps it into the virtual world. Those orthogonal
results increase coverage of the privacy-related problem space in today’s electronic
communication systems. However, both in our core area of work as well as in further
areas, a plethora of items are left for future work.
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8.1 Open Problems
We next discuss open problems towards practical deployments of data-minimizing
authentication technologies of the kind discussed in this thesis. We have already
presented open issues in greater detail in multiple chapters of the thesis and summa-
rize those aspects here, while extending our view to a more comprehensive coverage
of the area of user privacy for electronic communication networks.
In the trust management area, an interesting branch of future work is com-
bining the advantages of our ontology-based approach with the approach taken in
trust management systems, leading to a more context-dependent use of ontologies
depending on assurance requirements of a transaction. Discussions related to this
have already started in an early report on the topic [HS06]. A generic approach
towards trust management has many challenges on the non-technical side, includ-
ing such in the areas of business models, liability aspects, and bootstrapping such
system, which are also part of future work.
Regarding our approach of data modeling as presented in Chapter 4, an imple-
mentation of an efficient deduction engine with support for policy matching for the
full proposed language is an open issue. Optionally, such deduction engine can oper-
ate on sufficiently expressive fragments of the data statement and request languages.
A policy editor for authoring policies based on our data request language is also left
for future work. Due to the complexity of the language, incurred mainly due to the
privacy features, a simple presentation for the policy author seems required.
The cryptographic protocols we build upon require further research to be done
regarding their composability, on the one hand composability of multiple crypto-
graphic building blocks to a cryptographic protocol, and on the other hand con-
current composability of multiple such composed protocols. The so-called universal
composability (UC) framework provides a widely accepted framework for composing
cryptographic protocols in a strong model. Universally composable cryptographic
protocols are an active field of research and a promising result on universally com-
posable zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols has recently been presented
by Camenisch et al. [CKS11], which suggests that strong composability of the kinds
of Σ-protocols we are interested in does not incur a large overhead. This ongoing
work in the cryptographic community will provide us with the theoretical founda-
tion for future versions of the cryptographic protocols. Those results are expected
to fit into our approach of run-time generating the cryptographic protocols from
individual provably composable cryptographic building blocks for implementing a
high-level protocol specification and will affect only the lowest layers concerned with
the cryptographic building blocks of the processing stack we have defined.
Regarding efficiency and latency of the execution of cryptographic protocols,
tailored algorithms and implementations thereof, including precomputation-based
optimizations, can lead to lower CPU requirements and latency of protocols. For
large-scale server-side deployments, using full-custom application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs) or the massive parallelism of graphics processing units (GPUs) for
realizing the arithmetic for the protocols will be necessary for reducing the energy
footprint and space and cooling requirements in datacenters for those computation-
310 8 Conclusions
ally expensive protocols. The “green” aspect, that is, the carbon footprint as well
as datacenter-related costs of the cryptographic protocols we propose have not been
prominent in discussions so far.
In the usability arena, we have obtained results on user interfaces for identity
selection for data-minimizing cryptographic protocols [CSSZ06, BCPS09]. Consid-
ering those and the relevant work in the literature body, there is still a need for
further work in this area. Particularly, when considering the more expressive lan-
guage proposed in this thesis, compared to the languages the abovementioned results
build on, additional challenges arise, e.g., data statements comprising disjunctions
and the resulting data-minimizing semantics as well as the support for account-
ability features for data-minimizing transactions. A crucial success property of a
privacy-enhancing identity management system is likely to be the non-intrusiveness
of the system in terms of not interrupting the usual workflows of the users more
than today’s approaches and being intuitive to use.
A practical system does, as argued in the introduction, not only require a privacy-
enhancing authentication system as the one proposed in this thesis. It will require
the integration of multiple mechanisms for protecting user privacy, such as policy-
driven life-cycle data management, tracking control tools, and traffic-layer privacy
protection mechanisms, all controlled in a concerted manner by a client system
enforcing a user’s preferences.
We think that preferences-based decision support systems for enforcing a user’s
intentions of data release and handling will be required for practical and usable
identity management systems. Those can build on user-defined preferences and
privacy metrics to support users in their identity mangement decisions. For a prac-
tical system, those support systems will need to control multiple privacy-enhancing
technologies to balance a user’s privacy against data release for the purposes of
service provisioning and customization and directed advertising. This is an area of
active research, however, in our view, comprises a very hard-to-address problem do-
main. As is true for any user-side preferences-based system, the default preferences
shipped by the vendors of the client system will be crucial for the obtained degree
of protection and are out of scope of the technical discussions.
An interesting item of work related to the deployment of a system we propose
comprises the question of privacy-preserving directed advertising, that is, directed
advertising in the setting of using data-minimizing authentication consistently, while
also limiting third-party tracking and employing techniques for reducing the release
of information through the communication protocol. Particularly, it may be in-
teresting to investigate cryptographic technologies for realizing privacy-enhanced
directed advertising, that is, the involved third parties being able to provide tar-
geted advertisements while learning less data required for the targeting than today.
New mechanisms in this space may lead to a reshaping of the current data econ-
omy, through increasing privacy throughout the current ecosystem while retaining
utility of the data. This may be crucial for practical acceptance of consistent use
of data-minimizing solutions as it will reflect interests of the different players in the
personal data economy. It is completely open whether reasonable mechanisms in
this space will be available.
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It is expected that Big Data analytics may lead to new challenges regarding
user privacy due to the extended capabilities of knowledge inference from available
data and the imbalance resulting therefrom. Data-minimizing authentication is
an important building block in this context, however, it is not able to resolve the
resulting challenges of large-scale data analytics.
A production-grade implementation of the proposed system is an important piece
of open work. Our implementations are prototype implementations without fulfill-
ing necessary criteria related to the software development, review, and certification
process for a production-grade security software library. An open source imple-
mentation of a simpler private certificate system is currently being done as part of
the European ABC4Trust government-funded program [ABC13], which includes the
first real-world pilots of the technology.
An integration with applications of a data-minimizing identity management sys-
tem for different classes of applications may be crucial for use cases not based on
a Web browser. We have shown both the integration of protocol flows for creden-
tial protocols into a relevant standard [CGS06] as a basis for a browser integra-
tion [CSSZ06] and integration with an open source application server [BSBC+07].
At the time when virtual world systems were at, or close to, the peak of the hype
cycle, we have also realized a prototypical integration of our authentication infras-
tructure with a major virtual world platform [BCH+09, BHSS10]. Analogously, such
integration is required for any kind of application or class of applications to leverage
the identity management system therein. This amounts to a pure implementation
rather than a research task as the basic architectural principles have been worked
on already, however, it is necessary for supporting a wide range of applications.
Because we focus on the technical aspects of privacy-enhanced identity manage-
ment in this work, we are intentionally missing out on multiple relevant non-technical
aspects for practical deployments of our technology or related technologies by busi-
nesses on the Internet. First and foremost, an aspect we do not consider is the
required re-design of business processes, which is necessary to allow companies to
retain the service quality offered today while operating on a reduced data set. This
has many non-technical implications which need further work towards a real-world
system deployment.
Furthermore, a crucial aspect is the investigation of legal aspects of data-
minimizing interactions, particularly in the sense of compatibility of data-minimizing
transactions with law enforcement requirements and national security. At least Eu-
ropean data protection legislation and a recent initiative in the USA comprise data
minimization as a main principle. Accountability of users in a setting of data-
minimizing transactions is subject to be worked on in the legal research domain.
Automating a user’s identity management decisions and addressing legal ques-
tions on the extent to which this is possible, e.g., in the European user consent
regime [Eur95], are further future research questions of interest. This comprises not
only automated identity selection, but also the presentation of policies to the user
and obtaining user consent as well as the automated release of information based
on user preferences.
Besides the abovementioned items of future work, there are further related areas
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of interest we have not mentioned here, e.g., usage control or data handling, data
anonymization, or privacy-preserving data mining.
Orthogonal to data-minimizing authentication are mechanisms for protecting
user privacy at the application layer for certain classes of particularly privacy-
sensitive applications provided to end users. The most prominent example for such
applications are electronic social networks for which our work on access control to
profile data in electronic social networks [MS12a] can mitigate part of the privacy
issues. In the area of back-end data processing performed, for example, by service
providers or government agencies, our result for privacy-enhanced identity resolu-
tion [VPCS11a, VPCS11b] provides a certain degree of protection of user privacy by
allowing parties to share obfuscated data sets instead of plaintext data sets, while
retaining utility of the data to a large degree and being practically efficient. Our
results in those areas are a starting point, however, they do not provide an exhaus-
tive solution to the issues. Further research in those and a plethora of other areas
are required for addressing today’s privacy issues in a comprehensive manner.
8.2 Outlook
The current trend of mobile computing and execution environments providing iso-
lation properties between regular and trusted application environments, such as the
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [Glo11] or so-called secure elements (SEs)—
essentially smart cards—integrated with mobile devices, and particularly combina-
tions thereof, may give rise to a ubiquitous deployment of platforms applicable for
securely performing authentication transactions over communication networks in
the near future. Such security-enhanced platforms can act as secure storage loca-
tion for a user’s private key(s) and certificates, can realize the user interface for
secure input and output, and perform (parts of) the cryptographic protocols related
to authentication transactions. Orthogonally or complementary to this, current
ongoing developments in the domain of realizing privacy-enhancing protocols on
future government-issued tokens, particularly electronic driver’s licenses (eDLs) in
the investigation of which the author is involved, may lead to authentication tokens
applicable in a widespread spectrum of authentication use cases. Both upcoming
mobile platforms and developments in the space of government-issued (identity) to-
kens can be seen as an ideal practical deployment platform for an authentication
solution as the one discussed in this thesis. Deploying our system based on such
end-user devices and tokens can resolve main architecture-related issues on how to
ensure security of private keys and thus the strong binding of attributes to parties
as well as protection against vulnerabilities related to the software stack of end user
devices.
Current regulatory trends are clearly going towards strengthening pri-
vacy [Eur12, The12] in some of the world’s regions, including the data minimization
aspect. With the dynamic technology development in the area, it can be expected
that the proposed data-minimizing authentication technologies increasingly become
state of the art, thereby being increasingly mandated by regulations. This reflects
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the usual life-cycle of technologies and their transition from research technologies to
becoming state of the art and facing widespread deployment.
Complementary to the proposals for strengthening legislation in Europe and the
USA, government-funded research projects have been supporting technology devel-
opment. The European PRIME [PRI08, CLS11], PrimeLife [Pri10], and ABC4Trust
[ABC13] research programs and the USA-based NSTIC [The11, Nat10] initiative
are prime examples for this. While PRIME and PrimeLife had a strong focus on
data-minimizing protocols and practical realization thereof and a broader view on
privacy, such as social network privacy and data handling, respectively, the goal
of ABC4Trust is to create an open source implementation of credential protocols
and the related infrastructural components and to pilot them in a selected set of
real-world use cases. NSTIC can be seen as both a complementary and competing
initiative to the European programs that has been launched in the USA. The author
has, as part of and in addition to his technical contributions in the context of his
thesis, made major technical contributions to PRIME and managed the PrimeLife
research program.
Frequent data breaches have been leading to a change of attitude within
companies towards storing excessive amounts of personal data in certain indus-
try sectors due to the substantial damages companies can incur in case of data
breaches [Dow08a]. Technologies we propose can help companies push data mini-
mization further compared to today’s deployed technologies and mitigate the risks
by contributing to a reduction of expected data breach costs. Orthogonal security
measures can be employed to reduce breach risks and thus further lower the overall
expected costs related to data breaches.
Thanks to the frequent privacy breaches and other privacy issues in areas directly
affecting peoples’ lives, such as in electronic social networks, end user awareness
has risen in the recent years. This is clearly reflected by the frequent coverage in
mainstream press and media in general. Particularly, the financial disadvantage and
inconvenience resulting from indentity theft related to data breaches is increasingly
perceived by the citizens.
Data-minimizing authentication has gained traction also in the field of stan-
dards, e.g., proposals in the scope of the European Citizen Card [Eur13] related
to data-minimizing mechanisms have been made, however, those relate to weaker
mechanisms than the ones proposed in this thesis. A recently started initiative
with major involvement by the author investigates data-minimizing identity man-
agement, considering private certificate technology, in the field of ISO-compliant
electronic driver’s licenses [Int09] within a joint working group of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC). Benefits of a potential future privacy-enhanced electronic driver’s
license are not only a greater utility for use cases in the driving domain due to
additional protection features and the capability of it to be used in online interac-
tions. Mainly, such driver’s licenses could, due to the potential widespread roll out,
become identity tokens applicable for secondary use cases and thereby become an
integral part of a future identity ecosystem building on privacy-enhanced protocols.
Considering the standardization activities of the recent years, privacy has clearly
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gained substantial attention in international standardization [ISO13, ISO11]. Also
in the domain of industry standards, multiple initiatives related to privacy can be
observed. In the author’s opinion, certain international standards or industry stan-
dards will be crucial for a successful large-scale deployment of the technologies we
propose. Standards are one means of making mechanisms state of the art through
the widespread acceptance and trust in a technology and consensus regarding de-
tails thereof that a widely agreed standard brings about. Once mechanisms are
considered to be state-of-the-art mechanisms, businesses may be legally required to
use them.
Considering the above trends in the different areas of relevance clearly shows
that privacy and data minimization have gained substantial traction in the recent
years within the technical community, companies, standardization bodies, regula-
tors, governments, and society at large. This can be seen as an indication of an
increasing readiness of the technical, economic, government, and societal environ-
ment for data-minimizing authentication and therefore a possible deployment of
such technologies in the mid-term future.
In order to achieve the openness of our system, different kinds of players are
needed besides service providers relying on statements being authenticated and users
employing the system for authenticating statements. Certifiers need to register
users, optionally verify their legal identities out of band, and issue corresponding
attribute certificates or issue assigned attributes. This role is expected to be fulfilled,
at least partially, by government certifiers issuing identity tokens such as identity
cards or driver’s licenses supporting (a subset of) our cryptographic mechanisms.
A completely new type of player are ontology providers who endorse statements
about other parties and take liability for those statements. This is closely related to
auditing parties and vouching for the assessed properties towards other players in
the system. Players taking the role of conditional data recipients for the purpose of
obtaining transactions with revocable anonymity are another kind of trustee service
that needs to emerge. The full potential of the system we put forth in this thesis
can only be leveraged with all those kinds of players being available in an identity
ecosystem.
A major problem for a deployment of cryptographic credential technology is
that establishing an identity management ecosystem comprising a plurality of the
required kinds of parties is, due to interdependencies and the currently non-obvious
revenue generation models, an inherently complex undertaking. Initially, individual
parties in such ecosystem are not incentivized to make investments for deploying
technology because monetary value can, due to the interdependencies, be generated
only once a certain market penetration has been reached. We think that such
ecosystem can be best bootstrapped by a number of government certifiers or mobile
operators registering users and issuing private certificates with attributes of high
assurance. Based on this, service providers can start supporting the technology and
allow users to interact with them in a privacy-enhancing way. Once the created
value of such initial system is perceived in the marketplace, the identity ecosystem
can grow and the full potential of the technology can be leveraged. As common for
paradigm-changing technologies, a multitude of opportunities for both established
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and new businesses will arise in such an identity ecosystem.
Our results obtained in the context of this thesis are a major step forward in
the area of system aspects of privacy-preserving identity management systems and
thereby can contribute to better user privacy in the future. Taking those and the
complementary and orthogonal results in the literature body into account, the au-
thor claims that the core technical challenges have been sufficiently resolved by now
to not be considered the main obstacle to a first deployment of privacy-enhanced
identity management, while substantial remaining challenges for establishing a sus-
tainable identity ecosystem are mostly of non-technical nature and relate to the
above.
In our opinion, one always needs to consider privacy-enhanced technologies of
the kind we discuss in the wider context they are to be deployed in, otherwise crucial
aspects related to their potential deployment and system characteristics are missing
because of considering a subsystem without its connection to practice. At a first
glance, today’s multi-billion dollar personal data economy and the proposed privacy-
enhanced technologies might seem like incompatible with each other. However, there
are multiple possibilities of a coexistence of both, as discussed next.
An extreme scenario in terms of aggressive data minimization through perform-
ing all transactions with the maximum-possible degree of data minimization with
respect to authenticated attribute statements and preventing all profiling is not re-
alistic to happen in the near to mid term in the opinion of the author, because
it would counter the personal data economy and substantial economic interests of
multiple players in today’s Internet ecosystem and innovation.
A realistic scenario, in the view of the author, is a scenario where the privacy
interests of users are balanced with the interests of the commercial entities in the
personal data economy.62 Authentications are performed in a data-minimizing way
based on certified attributes, with the multilateral benefits of this as discussed ear-
lier, while sufficient profiling information is obtained by service providers and op-
tionally third parties to allow for customizing services and targeting advertisements
for financing and driving the innovation of the overall Web ecosystem.
An extreme scenario in terms of data exploitation through a personal data econ-
omy is a scenario with extensive profiling as today for a large fraction of the inter-
actions, however, with privacy-enhanced authentication and further privacy tech-
nologies being employed in a concerted manner as governed by the users for certain
sensitive transactions. Our argumentation is that also in a data economy as today,
there is a need for data-minimizing identity management technology, at least for a
specific fraction of user interactions, to safeguard users’ privacy interests.
A paradigm shift in terms of how a future personal data economy operates might
be induced through the emergence of a personal data market, in which users receive
monetary value in exchange for the right to use their personal data for purposes not
related to transactions they execute. It can be argued that such a paradigm allows
for much better user control over personal data disclosures and their use. Also in
such a new paradigm, the technologies proposed in this thesis are crucial for helping
62Balancing interests is in the tradition of the European value system, which is also reflected in
the European data protection laws.
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minimize expected data breach costs, for the availability of high-assurance attributes
for use cases such as age or creditworthiness verification, and for minimizing data
release in transactions, and thereby benefit users and service providers alike.
When looking back to the state of cryptographic protocols for user-centric
privacy-enhanced authentication a decade and more ago and comparing the situ-
ation with today, the topic has become prominent in research, industry, and among
policy makers, while hardware technology has progressed substantially to allow for
short execution times of the cryptographic protocols. Considering this and the
efforts currently going on, we can argue that the overall environment has become
more favorable for a real-world deployment of the proposed advanced authentication
technologies.
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